From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com (out03.mta.xmission.com [166.70.13.233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C25E4184 for ; Fri, 2 Jun 2023 00:14:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]:38966) by out03.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1q4sQp-00Ew6R-PT; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 18:14:15 -0600 Received: from ip68-110-29-46.om.om.cox.net ([68.110.29.46]:54766 helo=email.froward.int.ebiederm.org.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1q4sQo-003HU4-La; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 18:14:15 -0600 From: "Eric W. Biederman" To: Paul Moore Cc: "~akihirosuda" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org, akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp References: <168547265011.24337.4306067683997517082-0@git.sr.ht> Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 19:14:08 -0500 In-Reply-To: (Paul Moore's message of "Tue, 30 May 2023 17:58:48 -0400") Message-ID: <87fs7abu0f.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: containers@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-XM-SPF: eid=1q4sQo-003HU4-La;;;mid=<87fs7abu0f.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.110.29.46;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=pass X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19DIiVSRQ5BpipU+RbDjDyU5NgJlxnB9UQ= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.110.29.46 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG, T_TooManySym_01,T_TooManySym_02,XMSubLong,XM_B_Unicode shortcircuit=no autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4984] * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.0 XM_B_Unicode BODY: Testing for specific types of unicode * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * -0.0 T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE No description available. * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Paul Moore X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 541 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.05 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 11 (2.1%), b_tie_ro: 10 (1.8%), parse: 0.96 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 20 (3.7%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.60 (0.3%), tests_pri_-2000: 19 (3.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 2.5 (0.5%), tests_pri_-950: 1.29 (0.2%), tests_pri_-900: 1.08 (0.2%), tests_pri_-200: 0.90 (0.2%), tests_pri_-100: 6 (1.1%), tests_pri_-90: 68 (12.6%), check_bayes: 67 (12.3%), b_tokenize: 6 (1.2%), b_tok_get_all: 8 (1.5%), b_comp_prob: 2.4 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 47 (8.7%), b_finish: 0.93 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 227 (42.0%), check_dkim_signature: 0.58 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.5 (0.5%), poll_dns_idle: 164 (30.4%), tests_pri_10: 2.1 (0.4%), tests_pri_500: 178 (32.9%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH linux 0/3] [PATCH] userns: add sysctl "kernel.userns_group_range" X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sat, 08 Feb 2020 21:53:50 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Paul Moore writes: > On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 2:50=E2=80=AFPM ~akihirosuda wrote: >> >> This sysctl limits groups who can create a new userns without >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current userns, so as to mitigate potential kernel >> vulnerabilities around userns. >> >> The sysctl value format is same as "net.ipv4.ping_group_range". >> >> To disable creating new unprivileged userns, set the sysctl value to "1 >> 0" in the initial userns. >> >> To allow everyone to create new userns, set the sysctl value to "0 >> 4294967294". This is the default value. >> >> This sysctl replaces "kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone" that is found in >> Ubuntu [1] and Debian GNU/Linux. >> >> Link: https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu- >> kernel/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/jammy/commit?id=3D3422764 [1] > > Given the challenges around adding access controls to userns > operations, have you considered using the LSM support that was added > upstream last year? The relevant LSM hook can be found in commit > 7cd4c5c2101c ("security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()"), Paul how have you handled the real world regression I reported against chromium? Paul are you aware that the LSM hook can not be used to achieve the objective of this patchset? > and although only SELinux currently provides an access control > implementation, there is no reason you couldn't add support for your > favorite LSM, or even just a simple BPF LSM to enforce the group > controls as you've described them here. Is there a publicly available SELinux policy that uses that LSM hook? Eric