From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
Cc: containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS root exploit
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2013 13:29:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87hakdrai1.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51412C67.30908-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org> (Andy Lutomirski's message of "Wed, 13 Mar 2013 18:48:23 -0700")
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org> writes:
> On 03/13/2013 11:35 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw-XMD5yJDbdMReXY1tMh2IBg@public.gmane.org> writes:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> It seem like we should block (at least) this combination. On 3.9, this
>>> exploit works once uidmapping is added.
>>>
>>> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/03/13/10
>>
>> Yes. That is a bad combination. It let's chroot confuse privileged
>> processes.
>>
>> Now to figure out if this is easier to squash by adding a user_namespace
>> to fs_struct or by just forbidding this combination.
>
> It's worth making sure that setns(2) doesn't have similar issues.
setns(2) and unshare(2) are done and merged. See commit.
commit e66eded8309ebf679d3d3c1f5820d1f2ca332c71
Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Date: Wed Mar 13 11:51:49 2013 -0700
userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
> Looking through other shared-but-not-a-namespace things, there are:
>
> fs_struct: Buggy as noted.
>
> files_struct: Probably harmless -- SCM_RIGHTS can emulate it
>
> signal_struct: This interacts with the tty code. Is it okay?
It should be. The tty code is heavily pid based, and CLONE_NEWPID
requires !CLONE_VM (which implies !CLONE_SIGHAND and !CLONE_VM).
> sighand_struct: Looks safe. Famous last words.
>
> FWIW, I've been alarmed in the past that struct path (e.g. the root
> directory) implies an mnt_namespace (hidden in struct mount), and it's
> entirely possible for the root directory's mnt_namespace not to match
> nsproxy->mnt_namespace. I'm not sure what the implications are, but
> this doesn't seem healthy.
The calls to check_mnt prevent abuse of the files found with fs_struct
not matching the current mount namespace.
static inline int check_mnt(struct mount *mnt)
{
return mnt->mnt_ns == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
}
Thanks for looking I know I did the same double take and wondered if I
had missed anything else by accident when this bug showed up.
So far even just looking it all over again I can't see anything. But I
have clearly been blind before.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-14 20:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20130313175729.GH12501@outflux.net>
[not found] ` <20130313175729.GH12501-oSa+0FWJbaXR7s880joybQ@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-13 18:35 ` CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS root exploit Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87r4jjkv18.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-14 1:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <51412C67.30908-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-14 20:29 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
[not found] ` <87hakdrai1.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-14 21:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
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