From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com (out01.mta.xmission.com [166.70.13.231]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C9A110E3 for ; Fri, 2 Jun 2023 02:20:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]:52334) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1q4tna-004fqV-3x; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 19:41:50 -0600 Received: from ip68-110-29-46.om.om.cox.net ([68.110.29.46]:56980 helo=email.froward.int.ebiederm.org.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1q4tnY-0034gx-SS; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 19:41:49 -0600 From: "Eric W. Biederman" To: Paul Moore Cc: "~akihirosuda" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org, akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp References: <168547265011.24337.4306067683997517082-0@git.sr.ht> <87fs7abu0f.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 20:41:42 -0500 In-Reply-To: (Paul Moore's message of "Thu, 1 Jun 2023 21:01:55 -0400") Message-ID: <87ilc67i95.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.1 (gnu/linux) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: containers@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-XM-SPF: eid=1q4tnY-0034gx-SS;;;mid=<87ilc67i95.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.110.29.46;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=pass X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19VrZxVOemsucyaabfl73Cwk/oBg1+agj4= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.110.29.46 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa04.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG, T_TooManySym_01,T_TooManySym_02,XMSubLong,XM_B_Unicode shortcircuit=no autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4027] * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.0 XM_B_Unicode BODY: Testing for specific types of unicode * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * -0.0 T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE No description available. * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Paul Moore X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 661 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.06 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 13 (2.0%), b_tie_ro: 11 (1.7%), parse: 1.45 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 24 (3.6%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.70 (0.3%), tests_pri_-2000: 22 (3.3%), tests_pri_-1000: 3.2 (0.5%), tests_pri_-950: 1.66 (0.3%), tests_pri_-900: 1.31 (0.2%), tests_pri_-200: 1.03 (0.2%), tests_pri_-100: 4.4 (0.7%), tests_pri_-90: 155 (23.4%), check_bayes: 123 (18.6%), b_tokenize: 7 (1.0%), b_tok_get_all: 7 (1.0%), b_comp_prob: 2.5 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 103 (15.6%), b_finish: 1.18 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 413 (62.5%), check_dkim_signature: 0.98 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 4.7 (0.7%), poll_dns_idle: 0.57 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.3 (0.3%), tests_pri_500: 14 (2.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH linux 0/3] [PATCH] userns: add sysctl "kernel.userns_group_range" X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sat, 08 Feb 2020 21:53:50 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Paul Moore writes: > On Thu, Jun 1, 2023 at 8:14=E2=80=AFPM Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Paul Moore writes: >> > >> > Given the challenges around adding access controls to userns >> > operations, have you considered using the LSM support that was added >> > upstream last year? The relevant LSM hook can be found in commit >> > 7cd4c5c2101c ("security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()"), >> >> Paul how have you handled the real world regression I reported against >> chromium? > > I don't track chromium development. You have chosen to be the maintainer and I reported it to you. >> Paul are you aware that the LSM hook can not be used to achieve the >> objective of this patchset? > > /me shrugs > [snip parts about performing a group id check] The LSM hook you added does not have the technical capability to reduce the attack surface to mitigate bugs in the kernel. It is the ineffectiveness of the hook not the permission check that I was referring to. Eric