From: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
To: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: "Alexander Mihalicyn" <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
"Joseph Christopher Sible" <jcsible@cert.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Wat Lim" <watl@google.com>,
"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: LPC 2020 Hackroom Session: summary and next steps for isolated user namespaces
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 19:05:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87tuuzv0hl.fsf@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201011205306.GC17441@localhost> (Josh Triplett's message of "Sun, 11 Oct 2020 13:53:06 -0700")
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> writes:
> On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 11:26:06PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> > 3. Find a way to allow setgroups() in a user namespace while keeping
>> > in mind the case of groups used for negative access control.
>> > This was suggested by Josh Triplett and Geoffrey Thomas. Their idea was to
>> > investigate adding a prctl() to allow setgroups() to be called in a user
>> > namespace at the cost of restricting paths to the most restrictive
>> > permission. So if something is 0707 it needs to be treated as if it's 0000
>> > even though the caller is not in its owning group which is used for negative
>> > access control (how these new semantics will interact with ACLs will also
>> > need to be looked into).
>>
>> I should probably think this through more, but for this problem, would it
>> not suffice to add a new prevgroups grouplist to the struct cred, maybe
>> struct group_info *locked_groups, and every time an unprivileged task creates
>> a new user namespace, add all its current groups to this list?
>
> So, effectively, you would be allowed to drop permissions, but
> locked_groups would still be checked for restrictions?
>
> That seems like it'd introduce a new level of complexity (a new facet of
> permission) to manage. Not opposed, but it does seem more complex than
> just opting out of using groups for negative permissions.
I have played with something similar in the past. At that time I've
discussed it only privately with Eric and we agreed it wasn't worth the
extra complexity:
https://github.com/giuseppe/linux/commit/7e0701b389c497472d11fab8570c153a414050af
instead of a prctl, I've added a new mode to /proc/PID/setgroups that
allows setgroups in a userns locking the current gids.
What do you think about using /proc/PID/setgroups instead of a new
prctl()?
Giuseppe
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-12 17:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-30 14:39 LPC 2020 Hackroom Session: summary and next steps for isolated user namespaces Christian Brauner
2020-10-10 4:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-10-11 20:53 ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-12 0:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-12 5:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-12 15:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-10-14 19:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-15 14:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-10-17 15:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-12 17:05 ` Giuseppe Scrivano [this message]
2020-10-13 12:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-10-13 15:17 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2020-10-15 14:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-10-19 12:12 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2021-04-21 17:27 ` Snaipe via Containers
2021-04-22 9:18 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2021-04-23 14:36 ` Franklin “Snaipe” Mathieu via Containers
[not found] ` <20210507133703.GB22450@mail.hallyn.com>
2021-05-10 13:02 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2021-05-10 13:57 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2020-10-15 15:31 ` Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
2020-10-17 16:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-18 10:20 ` Christian Brauner
[not found] ` <87h7qradml.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2020-10-19 0:15 ` The problem of setgroups and containers Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-19 20:07 ` [RFC][PATCH] userns: Limit process in a user namespace to what the creator is allowed Eric W. Biederman
2020-10-20 14:11 ` Christian Brauner
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