Re: [PATCH v8 19/19] ima: Enable IMA namespaces

Stefan Berger
2022-01-18T18:09:45Z

On 1/14/22 09:45, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 12:04:16PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> Introduce the IMA_NS in Kconfig for IMA namespace enablement.
>>
>> Enable the lazy initialization of an IMA namespace when a user mounts
>> SecurityFS. Now a user_namespace will get a pointer to an ima_namespace
>> and therefore add an implementation of get_current_ns() that returns this
>> pointer.
>>
>> get_current_ns() may now return a NULL pointer for as long as the IMA
>> namespace hasn't been created, yet. Therefore, return early from those
>> functions that may now get a NULL pointer from this call. The NULL
>> pointer can typically be treated similar to not having an IMA policy set
>> and simply return early from a function.
>>
>> Implement ima_ns_from_file() for SecurityFS-related files where we can
>> now get the IMA namespace via the user namespace pointer associated
>> with the superblock of the SecurityFS filesystem instance. Since
>> the functions using ima_ns_from_file() will only be called after an
>> ima_namesapce has been allocated they will never get a NULL pointer
>> for the ima_namespace.
>>
>> Switch access to userns->ima_ns to use acquire/release semantics to ensure
>> that a newly created ima_namespace structure is fully visible upon access.
>>
>> Replace usage of current_user_ns() with ima_ns_from_user_ns() that
>> implements a method to derive the user_namespace from the given
>> ima_namespace. It leads to the same result.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
[...]
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index b7dbc687b6ff..5a9b511ebbae 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg)
>> static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns,
>> char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> {
>> + struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_ns_to_user_ns(ns);
> So I think ima_policy_write() and therefore ima_parse_rule() can
> legitimately be reached at least from an ancestor userns but also from a
> completely unrelated userns via securityfs. Sorry, I didn't see this
> earlier. Think of the following two scenarios:
>
> * userns1: unshare -U --map-root --mount
> -----------------------------------------
> mount -t securityfs securityfs /userns1_securityfs
> fd_in_userns1 = open("/userns1_securityfs/ima_file, O_RDWR);
>
> /* I _think_ that sending of fds here should work but I haven't
> * bothered to recheck the scm code as I need to do some driving in a
> * little bit so I'm running out of time...
> */
> send_fd_scm_rights(fd_in_userns1, task_in_userns2);
>
> * userns2: unshare -U --map-root --mount
> -----------------------------------------
> fd_from_userns1 = receive_fd_scm_rights();
> write_policy(fd_from_userns1, "my fancy policy");

Passing an fd around like this presumably indicates that you intend to
let the recipient read/write to it.

> It also means that if you inherit an fd from a more privileged imans
> instance you can write to it:

Now in this example we have to assume that root is making a mistake
passing the file descriptor around?

# ls -l /sys/kernel/security/ima/
total 0
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Jan 18 12:48 ascii_runtime_measurements
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Jan 18 12:48 binary_runtime_measurements
-rw-------. 1 root root 0 Jan 18 12:48 policy
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Jan 18 12:48 runtime_measurements_count
-r--r-----. 1 root root 0 Jan 18 12:48 violations

>
> * initial_userns:

So that's the host, right? And this is a 2nd independent example from
the first.

> ------------------

> mount -t securityfs securityfs /initial_securityfs
>
> fd_in_initial_securityfs = open("/initial_securityfs/ima_file, O_RDWR);
>
> pid = fork():
> if (pid == 0) {
> unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER);
> /* write idmapping for yourself */
>
> write_policy(fd_in_initial_securityfs, "my fancy policy");
> }
>
> would allow an unprivileged caller to alter the host's ima policy (as
> you can see the example requires cooperation).

Sorry, not currently following. Root is the only one being able to open
that IMA files on the host, right? Is this a mistake here where root
passed the fd onto the child and that child is not trusted to mess with
the fd including passing it on further?

>
> In both cases the write can legitimately reach ima_policy_write() and
> trigger ima_parse_rule() from another user namespace.
>
> There are multiple ways to go here, I think.
>
> It's important to figure out whether - coming back to an earlier review
> of mine - you're ok with everyone with access to an opened policy fd
> being able to write an ima policy for the namespace in questions as long
> as _the opener of the policy file_ was privileged enough.
>
> If that's the case then you can just remove the WARN_ON()/add a
> non-WARN_ON() helper in there.
>
> From my ima-naive perspective this seems fine and preferable as this
> means clean permission checking once at open time.
>
> A good question to answer in order to solve this is whether or not a
> given operation is allowed is dependent on what is written, i.e. on the
> content of the rule, I guess. I don't think there is.