[PATCH v9 2/5] proc: subset=pid: Show /proc/self/net only for CAP_NET_ADMIN

[Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>]

Cache the mounters credentials and allow access to the net directories
contingent of the permissions of the mounter of proc.

Do not show /proc/self/net when proc is mounted with subset=pid option
and the mounter does not have CAP_NET_ADMIN. To avoid inadvertently
allowing access to /proc/<pid>/net, updating mounter credentials is not
supported.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
---
 fs/proc/proc_net.c      | 8 ++++++++
 fs/proc/root.c          | 2 ++
 include/linux/proc_fs.h | 1 +
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
index 52f0b75cbce2..6e0ccef0169f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -270,6 +271,7 @@ static struct net *get_proc_task_net(struct inode *dir)
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct nsproxy *ns;
 	struct net *net = NULL;
+	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(dir->i_sb);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	task = pid_task(proc_pid(dir), PIDTYPE_PID);
@@ -282,6 +284,12 @@ static struct net *get_proc_task_net(struct inode *dir)
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
+	if (net && (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) &&
+	    security_capable(fs_info->mounter_cred, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NONE) < 0) {
+		put_net(net);
+		net = NULL;
+	}
+
 	return net;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 0f9100559471..6d18f9ee0375 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
+	fs_info->mounter_cred = get_cred(fc->cred);
 	proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
 
 	/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
@@ -350,6 +351,7 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 	kill_anon_super(sb);
 	if (fs_info) {
 		put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
+		put_cred(fs_info->mounter_cred);
 		kfree_rcu(fs_info, rcu);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
index 19d1c5e5f335..ec123c277d49 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum proc_pidonly {
 struct proc_fs_info {
 	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
 	kgid_t pid_gid;
+	const struct cred *mounter_cred;
 	enum proc_hidepid hide_pid;
 	enum proc_pidonly pidonly;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
-- 
2.53.0