From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
criu@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2025 00:00:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250724230052.GW2580412@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANaxB-xXgW1FEj6ydBT2=cudTbP=fX6x8S53zNkWcw1poL=L2A@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 01:02:48PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> Hi Al and Christian,
>
> The commit 12f147ddd6de ("do_change_type(): refuse to operate on
> unmounted/not ours mounts") introduced an ABI backward compatibility
> break. CRIU depends on the previous behavior, and users are now
> reporting criu restore failures following the kernel update. This change
> has been propagated to stable kernels. Is this check strictly required?
Yes.
> Would it be possible to check only if the current process has
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN within the mount user namespace?
Not enough, both in terms of permissions *and* in terms of "thou
shalt not bugger the kernel data structures - nobody's priveleged
enough for that".
What the hell is CRIU trying to do there?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-24 23:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-24 20:02 do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Andrei Vagin
2025-07-24 23:00 ` Al Viro [this message]
2025-07-24 23:38 ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:12 ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-26 17:53 ` Al Viro
2025-07-26 21:01 ` Andrei Vagin
2025-07-31 2:40 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-07-31 7:53 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-31 8:11 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-13 18:56 ` Al Viro
2025-08-13 19:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2025-08-13 19:41 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 4:08 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2025-08-14 4:42 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 5:51 ` [PATCH][RFC][CFT] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes Al Viro
2025-08-14 5:57 ` [RFC][CFT] selftest for permission checks in " Al Viro
2025-08-14 6:37 ` Al Viro
2025-08-14 7:07 ` do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts Pavel Tikhomirov
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