From: Heinz Diehl <htd@fancy-poultry.org>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] 1,5 TB partition: use cbc-essiv or xts-plain?
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2009 19:34:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090803173420.GC21647@fancy-poultry.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <of8my6gub2u.fsf@stahl.absint.com>
On 03.08.2009, Henrik Theiling wrote:
> Yes, I know he is on this list. And I know it was invented for that
> purpose. But still, Wikipedia claims:
[....]
So we'll never know unless someone with enough expertise can tell us the
truth.
> > the proof yields strong security guarantees as long as
> > the same key is not used to encrypt much more than 1 terabyte of
> > data. Up until this point, no attack can succeed with probability
> > better than approximately one in eight quadrillion. However this
> > security guarantee deteriorates as more data is encrypted with the
> > same key. With a petabyte the attack success probability rate
> > decreases to *at most* eight in a trillion, with an exabyte, the
> > success probability is reduced to *at most* eight in a million.
> I'd like to use an algorithm without such a weakness.
The weakness is not related to the algorithm itself, but to the IV generator.
I would maybe have used xts in this case and had the harddisk divided in three
partitions with 500GB, using a different key for all of them.
> There is no immediate threat or strict confidentiality involved, but
> I'd like to keep all my data private, e.g. in case it is stolen, and
> because it's easily done. Plus very secure erasure of encrypted hard
> disks is very quick by overwriting the keys (in case I don't want to
> use them anymore). Further, if a disk is broken, I can send it in
> without companies being able to read plain text.
Ok, if your data are not likely to get stolen by one of the organisations
with the three huge letters, I would say that it makes no difference what
algorithm or method you are using. I would have choosen the one which
provides the highest speed. I think that 99.9999999% of all people in the
world are not able to do a successful attack on one of the supported
algorithms and operation modes. So it does not matter if you are using it
for wiping a harddisk, storing your data securely or have to send in a
broken harddisk to the servicefolks.
The main weaknesses are often related to a bad passphrase or different
circumstances which makes it easy for an adversary to get it, e.g.
writing down the passphrase or choosing not enough entropy.
> But I'd like to avoid mistakes of using a weak encryption algorithm,
> so I would like to understand what are the pros and cons for cbc-essiv
> or xts-plain or any other alternative.
To know that for shure, this is up to the people who have written this
beautiful piece of software, who have designed the methods/algorithms
by themselves or ones who are able to fully understand the sourcecode.
> > You can take a look at dm-crypt.c to find out what methods of IV
> > generation are supported by LUKS/dmcrypt.
> Encryption algorithms are very complex beasts, and I do not think from
> reading source code I could see any subtle weaknesses myself.
That was not my intention, they are all listed in this file, and you can
see what you will have to choose from.
> So you decided by speed alone? Because you think any option is strong
> enough security for you?
Yes.
> Speed is not really an issue for me -- any
> simple option is very propably fast enough for me (except maybe
> multi-layered encryption, which would seem like overkill to me).
Multi-layered encryption is just stupid. See Kerckhoff's principle:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27_principle
With regards to my little knowledge, the algorithm which is most secure per today is serpent,
I probably would have choosen "-c serpent-xts-benbi:sha256 -s 512" and had
the harddisk gotten divided into three partitions of 500GB. This results in
Serpent-256 encryption (256 bits go to XTS).
> > A lot of distributions also use "-c aes-xts-benbi:sha256".
> And why do they do so?
That's the question :-)
I simply don't know. We can only guess. There's so much disinformation and
uncertainty out there. I don't know.
PGP WDE e.g. uses (hardcoded) AES-256 in EME mode, and the key is derived
via the STR2KEY function. But _why_ they use it (maybe they think or know
this is the securest possibility?!), I don't know either.
Sorry I can't help you out.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-08-03 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-08-03 12:53 [dm-crypt] 1,5 TB partition: use cbc-essiv or xts-plain? Henrik Theiling
2009-08-03 14:34 ` Heinz Diehl
2009-08-03 16:16 ` Henrik Theiling
2009-08-03 17:34 ` Heinz Diehl [this message]
2009-08-03 17:37 ` Heinz Diehl
2013-01-03 9:50 ` Peter Pfundstein
2009-08-03 14:43 ` [dm-crypt] E3E-2A1 - 1, 5 " Heinz Diehl
2009-08-03 20:48 ` [dm-crypt] 1,5 " Moji
2009-08-04 7:42 ` Milan Broz
2009-08-04 13:01 ` Henrik Theiling
2009-08-03 21:46 ` Moji
2009-08-04 13:27 ` Henrik Theiling
2009-08-04 13:55 ` Moji
2009-08-06 11:02 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-06 14:32 ` Henrik Theiling
2009-08-06 15:24 ` Heinz Diehl
2009-08-06 16:00 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-06 16:02 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-07 12:16 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-07 12:20 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-07 16:00 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-08 8:27 ` Heinz Diehl
2009-08-08 10:03 ` Salatiel Filho
2009-08-06 15:43 ` Sam
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