From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Corrupted luks partition, help needed
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2010 00:07:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100603220711.GA11984@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20100603204818.GC26862@maude.comedia.it>
On Thu, Jun 03, 2010 at 10:48:18PM +0200, Luca Berra wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 03, 2010 at 10:14:53PM +0200, Arno Wagner wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 03, 2010 at 09:05:59PM +0300, Panagiotis Malakoudis wrote:
>>> OK, I looked a bit more inside LUKS specification and I now know that the
>>> 128KB keyslot is actually the 32byte master key AF-split to 128KB and then
>>> encoded with my key. A single bit of change in these 128KB makes key
>>> invalid.
>>>
>>> Now that I know all this, I consider the LUKS format fundamentally flawed to
>>> data corruption.
>>
>> It is. However this area should not be written by anything except
>> cryoptsetup. If you look closely basically every filesystem
>> and partition scheme is about as vulnerable. The thing is,
>> modern disks do not suffer single bit corruption easily. More
>> likely are whole lost sectors.
>
> well, actually if you look closely at modern filesystems and
> partitioning schemes, you will find there are more than one copy of
> critical metadata.
> ext2 has a backup superblock GPT partition has a secondary header and
> table at the other end of the
> disk
>
> we really miss an on-disk backup of the LUKS header.
However the partition table does not have a backup at all.
It is a trade-off. Security-wise, an on-disk backup is a risk.
Makeing a backup manually is not that hard. Maybe a function
on cryptsetup or a contributed script could make it easier,
but that is about it. If you do, on the other hand, a
sector-wise backup of the encrypted partition, you not only
get the LUKS header, but also protect all the data against
a disk failure. Keeping in mind that disk failure roughly
has 5% annual probability per disk, that backup is
non-optional in the first place....
Arno
--
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-06-03 22:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-06-03 15:32 [dm-crypt] Corrupted luks partition, help needed Panagiotis Malakoudis
2010-06-03 15:51 ` Milan Broz
2010-06-03 16:16 ` Panagiotis Malakoudis
2010-06-03 18:12 ` Milan Broz
2010-06-03 18:05 ` Panagiotis Malakoudis
2010-06-03 20:14 ` Arno Wagner
2010-06-03 20:48 ` Luca Berra
2010-06-03 20:56 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2010-06-03 22:07 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2010-06-04 6:05 ` Panagiotis Malakoudis
2010-06-04 8:54 ` Roscoe
2010-06-06 19:57 ` [dm-crypt] cryptsetup administration tool Ali Reza Sajedi
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