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From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS and LVM
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2011 21:07:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110218200718.GA12395@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ijmbmj$jv5$1@dough.gmane.org>

On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 04:53:20AM +1100, Eric Bauman wrote:
> Thanks for the reply!
>
> With regards to the multiple containers, the configuration I'd run  
> across was one container per partition, with the key for each stored in  
> /. When the system was booted, the passphrase was entered, and each  
> partition's container opened and mounted automatically.

If they are not combined into something larger, that is fine.
If they are (RAID or other LVM action), then I would allways
forst construct the whole device and then encrypt, i.e.
encryption on top of block layer and below filesystem.

> On 19/02/2011, Arno Wagner wrote:
>>> I typically randomise my block device before creating a LUKS container
>>> on it.  Option 2 would seem to reduce the effectiveness of this because
>>> LVM will give clues to where real data might be.
>>
>> I don't follow. That encrypted data is present is obvious from
>> the LUKS header. What is in the container(s) is as opaque in
>> (1) as it is in (2), given that cryptographically strong
>> randomness is used for the overwrite (I use plain dm-crypt
>> with a random password and overwrite with conventional,
>> mt19997-generated randomness).
>
> I meant not that the data protection of one was better than the other,  
> but rather in (2) LVM will store in plain-text both the start and end  
> offset of the partition. So perhaps an attacker would have a better idea  
> of where data is. Comparing knowing the partition starts at X and ends  
> at Y, there is probably some encrypted data in there somewhere, versus a  
> giant container with no indication of structure (could be encrypted data  
> or could be random garbage).

LUKS has a header per container. Also, knowing were the encrypted 
data is does not help the attacker, unless he/she can repeatedly
access the computer. In that case, all is luikely lost anyways.

Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-02-18 20:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-18 16:39 [dm-crypt] LUKS and LVM Eric Bauman
2011-02-18 17:33 ` Arno Wagner
2011-02-18 17:53   ` Eric Bauman
2011-02-18 19:57     ` Milan Broz
2011-02-18 20:07     ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2011-02-19 14:01       ` Eric Bauman
2011-02-19 14:52         ` Arno Wagner
2011-02-19 16:46       ` Nicolas Bock
2011-02-19 17:10         ` Milan Broz
2011-02-19 18:17           ` Jonas Meurer
2011-02-19 19:11             ` Nicolas Bock
2011-02-19 19:10           ` Arno Wagner
2011-02-19 19:08         ` Arno Wagner
2011-02-19 19:12           ` Nicolas Bock

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