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From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Memory location of the encryption key
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2011 00:15:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110314231514.GA21457@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110314221654.GE7787@tigress.com>

On Mon, Mar 14, 2011 at 11:16:55PM +0100, Hanno Foest wrote:
> On Tue Feb 15 10:54:35 CET 2011, Milan Broz wrote:
> 
> [Cold Boot attacks]
> > Moreover, this attacks also include "platform reset" attack when you
> > simply reset device and store memory image, because the power was
> > still present, there is no memory loss (except few pages for image
> > tool).
> 
> Hi, sorry for the late reply... but I've been wondering if these attacks
> - rebooting the device into some kind of imaging tool for retrieving the
>   memory image with the encryption key - can't be prevented by storing
> the key in a place in memory where it would be inevitably overwritten by
> the contents of the boot media.

That would be extremely difficult and relatively easy to circumvent,
e.g. by a PCI-E card that reads the memory and stops the boot
proccess before any data is loaded. Incidentally, a simple
way to kill the generic reset attack is to use a BIOS password and 
force a memory check.  

> Obviously this wouldn't stop the kind of attacks where the cooled RAM is
> being read in some kind of external device, but it would surely make
> attacks more expensive.

Indeed. One problem is that it is hard to know where the boot code
actually gets loaded to. A second problem is that it is rather
small (~100 bytes) and could possibly made smaller. That may be enough
to overwrite a key, but not a key-setup, i.e. the cipher with the key 
configured. Then there is the question of what to do if you have
more than one key.  

The simple way is to just have the BIOS erase the memory, and a memory
check does that. Obviously that is not enough. The "memory freezing
attack is also not very expensive, say < $1000.

Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 

  reply	other threads:[~2011-03-14 23:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-03-14 22:16 [dm-crypt] Memory location of the encryption key Hanno Foest
2011-03-14 23:15 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2011-02-14 13:03 Peter
2011-02-15  9:54 ` Milan Broz
2011-02-15 15:42 ` Arno Wagner

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