From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with Python subprocess + pipes
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 18:58:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160624165816.GA27570@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <576D60E1.7090805@dyne.org>
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 18:33:37 CEST, Police Terror wrote:
> You obviously did not look at the example because the data is not hidden
> steganographically.
You obviously did not understand what I wrote, because
I never claimed that in this case it was. I only claimed that
at this time this is the only valid known way to do plausible
deniablility.
[...]
> About a well engineered solution: today I just found VeraCrypt which
> actually works well. I encourage people to try it. It can create hidden
> volumes.
... and that have all the problems hidden volumes come with.
They also managed to create additional problems TrueCrypt does
not have, for example a broken password "quality" assessment
that cannot be bypassed (alternatively you get a broken
password iteration, that can lead to minutes of unlock time).
My trust in the VeraCrypt developers is much, much lower than
in the original TrueCrypt developers.
Seriously. Bright-eyed "can do" attitudes have no place in
IT security. They do much more harm than good and they endanger
users.
Regards,
Arno
> Arno Wagner:
> > What I would like to see is a plausible deniability technique
> > that is not just a worthless tech-demo, but where the
> > "plausible" part was actually well engineered with regards
> > to how things work in the real world and that is not limited
> > to a very small amount of steganographically hidden data.
> > So far, none exists.
> >
> > The thing is, for an incompetent attacker it is already
> > enough to just remove a partition from the partition table
> > and re-create it at need in the same place. For a competent
> > attacker, the things that exist today just provide probable
> > cause that you are trying to hide something and hence make
> > things worse.
> >
> > As it is, these tools are of negative worth, as they give
> > users a false sense of security.
> >
> > Also refer to FAQ 5.18 for my analysis of the status-quo.
> > The paper by Schneier et. al. I reference provides an
> > excellent in-depth analysis of the problems with the idea
> > of plausible deniability in a real OS environment.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Arno
> >
> > On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 14:16:05 CEST, Police Terror wrote:
> >> Here's the tool:
> >>
> >> https://github.com/RojavaCrypto/hiddencrypt
> >>
> >> Mostly proof of concept for now.
> >>
> >> Would be cool in the future to work something better out by hacking
> >> cryptsetup itself. Maybe if there's headerless volumes (that just look
> >> like random data).
> >>
> >> Multiple deniable Linux installs would be a killer feature.
> >>
> >> Milan Broz:
> >>> On 06/24/2016 11:56 AM, Police Terror wrote:
> >>>> Ahhh yes! Thank you Diagon and Milan.
> >>>> I've added now the -q switch.
> >>>>
> >>>> I looked at the pycryptsetup but 2 things:
> >>>>
> >>>> 1. It's not Python 3
> >>>> 2. It's an extra dependency and not in the repos.
> >>>
> >>> Fedora has both Python3 and 2 builds but other
> >>> distros do not compile it probably.
> >>>
> >>> (It was designed for Anaconda installer mainly.)
> >>>
> >>> Milan
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> dm-crypt mailing list
> >>> dm-crypt@saout.de
> >>> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
> >>>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> dm-crypt mailing list
> >> dm-crypt@saout.de
> >> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
> >
> _______________________________________________
> dm-crypt mailing list
> dm-crypt@saout.de
> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
--
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-24 16:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-23 21:37 [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with Python subprocess + pipes Police Terror
2016-06-24 5:42 ` [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with Python subprocess + pipes (saout: to exclusive) Diagon
2016-06-24 9:58 ` Police Terror
2016-06-24 5:42 ` [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with Python subprocess + pipes Milan Broz
2016-06-24 9:56 ` Police Terror
2016-06-24 10:45 ` Milan Broz
2016-06-24 12:16 ` Police Terror
2016-06-24 15:28 ` Arno Wagner
2016-06-24 16:33 ` Police Terror
2016-06-24 16:58 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2016-06-29 0:02 ` Arno Wagner
2016-06-29 8:47 ` Police Terror
2016-06-29 9:58 ` Arno Wagner
2016-06-29 11:47 ` Police Terror
2016-06-29 17:28 ` Arno Wagner
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