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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	fuse-devel <fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2016 15:31:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160325203148.GA4055@ubuntu-xps13> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJfpegvTuR-LZAVxeJAmojs=gcrM-t5dd-QyZM-bOYMYLRL6Dg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 09:58:43PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 6:07 PM, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 04:51:42PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> >> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 03:48:22PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> >>
> >> >> Can't we use current_cred()->uid/gid? Or fsuid/fsgid maybe?
> >> >
> >> > That would be a departure from the current behavior in the !allow_other
> >> > case for unprivileged users. Since those mounts are done by an suid
> >> > helper all of those ids would be root in the userns, wouldn't they?
> >>
> >> Well, actually this is what the helper does:
> >>
> >>     sprintf(d, "fd=%i,rootmode=%o,user_id=%u,group_id=%u",
> >>         fd, rootmode, getuid(), getgid());
> >
> > Sorry, I was thinking of euid. So this may not be a problem.
> >
> >> So it just uses the current uid/gid.  Apparently no reason to do this
> >> in userland, we could just as well set these in the kernel.  Except
> >> for possible backward compatibility problems for things not using the
> >> helper.
> >>
> >> BUT if the mount is unprivileged or it's a userns mount, or anything
> >> previously not possible, then we are not constrained by the backward
> >> compatibility issues, and can go with the saner solution.
> >>
> >> Does that not make sense?
> >
> > But we generally do want backwards compatibility, and we want userspace
> > software to be able to expect the same behavior whether or not it's
> > running in a user namespaced container. Obviously we can't always have
> > things 100% identical, but we shouldn't break things unless we really
> > need to.
> >
> > However it may be that this isn't actually going to break assumptions of
> > existing software like I had feared. My preference is still to not
> > change any userspace-visible behaviors since we never know what software
> > might have made assumptions based on those behaviors. But if you're
> > confident that it won't break anything I'm willing to give it a try.
> 
> I'm quite confident it won't make a difference.

I was just about to go make these changes and discovered that the
user_id and group_id options are already mandatory, due to this check at
the bottom of parse_fuse_opt():

        if (!d->fd_present || !d->rootmode_present ||
            !d->user_id_present || !d->group_id_present)
                return 0;

So I'll simply drop those two lines which supply default values for
these options.

Thanks,
Seth

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-25 20:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-04 18:03 [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1451930639-94331-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2016-03-03 17:02     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-04 22:43       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-06 15:48         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-06 22:07           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-07 13:32             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-28 16:59         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30  1:36           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-30 14:58             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 20:18               ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 10:53     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:17       ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:29     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:18       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 14:48         ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]           ` <CAJfpegv5JmB15yHpjYxVeOYdWWkoLMftr9-e_iS93Y_7m=t4Zw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 15:25             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:51               ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]                 ` <CAJfpegv5KR_Hi-79a8oyb+R+tv9W3RYqy5pngUKSyauVNk2ScQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 17:07                   ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-14 20:58                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-25 20:31                       ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:40     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 13:08     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle " Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 19:47 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 20:01   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:36     ` Seth Forshee

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