From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hongling Zeng" <zenghongling@kylinos.cn>
Cc: linux-sunxi@lists.linux.dev, dmaengine@vger.kernel.org,
Frank.Li@kernel.org, vkoul@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] dmaengine: sun6i-dma: Fix use-after-free in error handling paths
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 06:49:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260611064933.67F2E1F00898@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260611063631.96566-1-zenghongling@kylinos.cn>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing `sg_len` validation in `sun6i_dma_prep_slave_sg` leads to NULL pointer dereference and hardware memory corruption.
- [High] Missing bounds validation in `sun6i_dma_prep_dma_cyclic` causes a kernel panic via division by zero or NULL pointer dereference.
- [High] Deadlock risk due to incompatible lock contexts for `sdev->lock`.
- [High] TOCTOU race condition in `sun6i_dma_interrupt` leads to NULL pointer dereference if raced against `sun6i_dma_terminate_all`.
--
commit ca6b94283f2abd1205fd392ecfced542cac0978a
Author: Hongling Zeng <zenghongling@kylinos.cn>
dmaengine: sun6i-dma: Fix use-after-free in error handling paths
This commit fixes a use-after-free issue in the error handling paths of the
DMA preparation functions. It saves the next physical and virtual pointers
before freeing the current linked list node.
> diff --git a/drivers/dma/sun6i-dma.c b/drivers/dma/sun6i-dma.c
> index a9a254dbf8cb9..eb9c4ae87ac8e 100644
> --- a/drivers/dma/sun6i-dma.c
> +++ b/drivers/dma/sun6i-dma.c
> @@ -788,9 +788,15 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *sun6i_dma_prep_slave_sg(
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but missing sg_len validation in
sun6i_dma_prep_slave_sg() can lead to a NULL pointer dereference and
hardware memory corruption.
If a 0-length scatterlist is provided, the loop is completely bypassed:
for_each_sg(sgl, sg, sg_len, i) {
v_lli = dma_pool_alloc(sdev->pool, GFP_DMA32 | GFP_NOWAIT, &p_lli);
This leaves txd->v_lli as NULL and txd->p_lli as 0. When this descriptor is
later submitted in sun6i_dma_start_desc():
writel(pchan->desc->p_lli, pchan->base + DMA_CHAN_LLI_ADDR);
writel(DMA_CHAN_ENABLE_START, pchan->base + DMA_CHAN_ENABLE);
The uninitialized physical address 0 is fed directly to the DMA hardware
registers. Does this code need an explicit sg_len > 0 check to prevent
invalid memory accesses?
> return vchan_tx_prep(&vchan->vc, &txd->vd, flags);
>
> err_lli_free:
> - for (p_lli = txd->p_lli, v_lli = txd->v_lli; v_lli;
> - p_lli = v_lli->p_lli_next, v_lli = v_lli->v_lli_next)
> + p_lli = txd->p_lli;
> + v_lli = txd->v_lli;
> + while (v_lli) {
> + struct sun6i_dma_lli *next_v_lli = v_lli->v_lli_next;
> + dma_addr_t next_p_lli = v_lli->p_lli_next;
> dma_pool_free(sdev->pool, v_lli, p_lli);
> + v_lli = next_v_lli;
> + p_lli = next_p_lli;
> + }
> kfree(txd);
> return NULL;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -869,9 +875,15 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *sun6i_dma_prep_dma_cyclic(
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but missing bounds validation in
sun6i_dma_prep_dma_cyclic() can cause a kernel panic via division by zero or
a NULL pointer dereference.
The function computes the number of periods without checking if period_len
is zero:
unsigned int i, periods = buf_len / period_len;
If buf_len is less than period_len, periods evaluates to 0, which skips the
allocation loop and leaves prev as NULL, resulting in an immediate NULL
pointer dereference here:
prev->p_lli_next = txd->p_lli; /* cyclic list */
Could this be triggered by a caller passing invalid lengths, and should we
return an error early if period_len is zero or greater than buf_len?
> return vchan_tx_prep(&vchan->vc, &txd->vd, flags);
>
> err_lli_free:
> - for (p_lli = txd->p_lli, v_lli = txd->v_lli; v_lli;
> - p_lli = v_lli->p_lli_next, v_lli = v_lli->v_lli_next)
> + p_lli = txd->p_lli;
> + v_lli = txd->v_lli;
> + while (v_lli) {
> + struct sun6i_dma_lli *next_v_lli = v_lli->v_lli_next;
> + dma_addr_t next_p_lli = v_lli->p_lli_next;
> dma_pool_free(sdev->pool, v_lli, p_lli);
> + v_lli = next_v_lli;
> + p_lli = next_p_lli;
> + }
> kfree(txd);
> return NULL;
> }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is there a deadlock risk due
to incompatible lock contexts for sdev->lock?
The spinlock sdev->lock is taken by sun6i_dma_tasklet() in softirq context:
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->lock);
However, sun6i_dma_pause() and sun6i_dma_terminate_all() acquire the lock
without disabling softirqs:
spin_lock(&sdev->lock);
list_del_init(&vchan->node);
spin_unlock(&sdev->lock);
If a process thread holds the lock and a hardware interrupt schedules the
tasklet, could the tasklet execute on the same CPU, attempt to acquire
sdev->lock with spin_lock_irq(), and spin forever because the preempted
process still holds it?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does a TOCTOU race condition exist
between sun6i_dma_interrupt() and sun6i_dma_terminate_all()?
In sun6i_dma_terminate_all(), the channel is stopped and pchan->desc is set
to NULL concurrently under vchan->vc.lock:
vchan->phy = NULL;
pchan->vchan = NULL;
pchan->desc = NULL;
pchan->done = NULL;
Meanwhile, the interrupt handler sun6i_dma_interrupt() processes the
completion:
if (vchan->cyclic) {
vchan_cyclic_callback(&pchan->desc->vd);
} else {
spin_lock(&vchan->vc.lock);
vchan_cookie_complete(&pchan->desc->vd);
In the cyclic case, the handler dereferences pchan->desc->vd locklessly. In
the non-cyclic case, it waits on vchan->vc.lock but doesn't re-validate
pchan->desc after acquiring the lock. Could this lead to a NULL pointer
dereference if the descriptor is cleared by sun6i_dma_terminate_all() on
another CPU?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260611063631.96566-1-zenghongling@kylinos.cn?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-11 6:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-11 6:36 [PATCH] dmaengine: sun6i-dma: Fix use-after-free in error handling paths Hongling Zeng
2026-06-11 6:49 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-05-25 7:35 Hongling Zeng
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