From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 2/2] uio: new driver to support PCI MSI-X Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 17:07:17 +0300 Message-ID: <20151006170037-mutt-send-email-mst@redhat.com> References: <1443652138-31782-1-git-send-email-stephen@networkplumber.org> <1443652138-31782-3-git-send-email-stephen@networkplumber.org> <20151001104505-mutt-send-email-mst@redhat.com> <20151005215455.GA7608@redhat.com> <20151006013000-mutt-send-email-mst@redhat.com> <20151006083356.3da3defa@uryu.home.lan> <5613BB7D.3060202@scylladb.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Stephen Hemminger , dev@dpdk.org, hjk@hansjkoch.de, gregkh@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: Avi Kivity Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5613BB7D.3060202@scylladb.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: dev.dpdk.org On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 03:15:57PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote: > btw, (2) doesn't really add any insecurity. The user could already poke at > the msix tables (as well as perform DMA); they just couldn't get a useful > interrupt out of them. Poking at msix tables won't cause memory corruption unless msix and bus mastering is enabled. It's true root can enable msix and bus mastering through sysfs - but that's easy to block or detect. Even if you don't buy a security story, it seems less likely to trigger as a result of a userspace bug. -- MST