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From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
To: dev@dpdk.org
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>,
	Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] doc: recommend secure random for unpredictable values
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 12:21:16 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260915192207.3926217-19-stephen@networkplumber.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260915192207.3926217-1-stephen@networkplumber.org>

The AI review checks say not to generate keys, IVs and nonces with
rte_rand(), but do not say what to use instead. Name
rte_random_bytes() as the replacement, and extend the rule to the
other values which must not be predictable.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
---
 AGENTS.md | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 813584352b..df4c37f62e 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -544,6 +544,9 @@ or authentication digests. Stays silent on all other patches.
 - **Insecure RNG for keys/IVs** (Error):
   rte_rand()/rand()/random() are not cryptographically secure;
   do not use them to generate keys, IVs, or nonces in crypto/security code.
+  Use rte_random_bytes(), which draws from the random source of the
+  operating system. The same applies to other values that must not be
+  predictable, such as RSS and hash keys, salts and random MAC addresses.
 
 Do NOT flag:
 - IV/nonce reuse -- a runtime property, not determinable from a patch.
@@ -1680,7 +1683,7 @@ Checked by `devtools/checkpatches.sh` -- not duplicated here.
 - [ ] Memory ordering is the weakest correct choice (`relaxed` for counters, `acquire`/`release` for publish/consume)
 - [ ] Auth tag/digest comparisons use rte_memeq_timingsafe(), not memcmp
 - [ ] Key material zeroed before free (rte_free_sensitive / rte_memzero_explicit)
-- [ ] Keys/IVs/nonces not generated with rte_rand()/rand()/random()
+- [ ] Keys/IVs/nonces not generated with rte_rand()/rand()/random(), use rte_random_bytes()
 
 ### API Tags
 
@@ -1795,6 +1798,7 @@ devtools/get-maintainer.sh <patch-file>
 - Non-constant-time comparison of auth tag/digest/MAC/ICV (timing side channel)
 - Key material or session secrets freed without zeroing (rte_free_sensitive/rte_memzero_explicit)
 - Non-cryptographic RNG (rte_rand/rand/random) used to generate keys, IVs, or nonces
+  instead of rte_random_bytes()
 
 *Process and format errors:*
 - Forbidden tokens in code
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-15 19:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-15 19:20 [PATCH 00/18] random number generator improvements Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:20 ` [PATCH 01/18] eal/windows: add getentropy shim Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 02/18] random: always use getentropy Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 03/18] eal: add 32 bit random number function Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 04/18] sched: fix data race in RED random number generation Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 05/18] eal/windows: add getrandom shim Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 06/18] eal: add function to get random bytes Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 07/18] hash: use secure random for Toeplitz hash key Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 08/18] pipeline: use secure random for IPsec salt Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 09/18] net: use secure random for random MAC address Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 10/18] ipsec: use secure random for SAD hash seed Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 11/18] net/intel: use secure random for default RSS key Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 12/18] random: use all 64 bits of the seed Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 13/18] drivers/net: use secure random for RSS key Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 14/18] drivers/net: use common random MAC address helper Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 15/18] random: remove RDSEED fallback for initial seed Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-16  7:44   ` Bruce Richardson
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 16/18] test: allow setting random seed for tests Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` [PATCH 17/18] test: add random number generator tests Stephen Hemminger
2026-09-15 19:21 ` Stephen Hemminger [this message]
2026-09-22 12:32   ` [PATCH 18/18] doc: recommend secure random for unpredictable values Aaron Conole
2026-10-10  2:27 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] random: fix initial seed entropy Stephen Hemminger
2026-10-10  2:27   ` [PATCH v2 1/5] eal/windows: add getentropy shim Stephen Hemminger
2026-10-10  2:27   ` [PATCH v2 2/5] random: always use getentropy Stephen Hemminger
2026-10-10  2:27   ` [PATCH v2 3/5] random: use all 64 bits of the seed Stephen Hemminger
2026-10-10  2:27   ` [PATCH v2 4/5] random: remove RDSEED fallback for initial seed Stephen Hemminger
2026-10-10  2:27   ` [PATCH v2 5/5] test: allow setting random seed for tests Stephen Hemminger

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