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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Cc: Brian Kubisiak <brian.kubisiak@gmail.com>, ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ecryptfs: add mount option for specifying cipher driver.
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 09:49:53 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200219174953.GA2312@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200219163050.GA354535@elm>

On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 10:30:50AM -0600, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 2020-02-18 17:42:18, Brian Kubisiak wrote:
> > Hi Tyler,
> > 
> > > Can you elaborate some on the use case you have?
> > 
> > On many modern embedded SoCs, there are multiple implementations of the same
> > crypto algorithm---usually a CPU-based implementation using ISA extensions and a
> > "security engine" implementation that implements crypto primitives on dedicated
> > silicon. There are a few tradeoffs involved (performance, CPU overhead,
> > resistance to side-channels attacks, etc), so it is not always clear which
> > implementation is best.
> > 
> > An SoC that I've been working on has both the CPU implementation and the
> > security engine implementation of the cbc(aes) algorithm at the same priority,
> > so the one picked to perform the encryption for a given ecryptfs mount is
> > somewhat random.
> 
> Have you looked into the possibility of increasing the priority of the
> implementation that you prefer on your SoC?
> 
> If that's not feasible, have you considered blacklisting the module
> providing the implementation that you don't prefer?
> 
> > My intention with this patch is to be able to select which
> > implementation gets used for the mount using the
> > ecryptfs_cipher_driver option instead of having the kernel pick.
> 
> I don't think allowing users to specify a cipher driver is a good idea.
> eCryptfs has always assumed that the crypto subsystem knows best about
> the ideal implementation of "cbc(aes)" and I believe that this is how
> the crypto subsystem expects eCryptfs to make use of their API.
> 
> In addition to the design objection above, I'm worried about users
> shooting themselves in the foot with this mount option. For example,
> "ecryptfs_cipher_driver=ecb_aes_aesni" and
> "ecryptfs_cipher_driver=xts_aes_aesni" are accepted. eCryptfs is only
> implemented to operated in a (modified) CBC mode and letting users force
> their way into using anything else is dangerous/insecure.
> 
> Lets see if we can address your problem in the crypto subsystem (or with
> the module blacklist) rather than creating this amount of flexibility in
> eCryptfs.
> 
> Tyler

CRYPTO_MSG_UPDATEALG in the crypto_user configuration API can be used to change
the priority of a crypto algorithm at runtime.  It would need to be done before
mounting eCryptfs.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-19 17:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-10 15:39 [PATCH] ecryptfs: add mount option for specifying cipher driver Brian Kubisiak
2020-02-16  1:07 ` Tyler Hicks
2020-02-19  1:42   ` Brian Kubisiak
2020-02-19 16:30     ` Tyler Hicks
2020-02-19 17:49       ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-02-20 18:44       ` Brian Kubisiak

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