From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3372B24DCE6 for ; Tue, 14 Oct 2025 17:52:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760464357; cv=none; b=XXzsGaBhgbNX6viDnIy1EmPdzn9GZdchksGJ6DxC/wp95Qs3ZPMWHIrabeOD54jDSmI2OD8mvv2GtLfsubQIgVclvqmClLOj+q+9HCBzLfbAQuC25rh5TvniVh1sqMhX3RROVzuQzOjDdUpxa5cI5N4ARPRZ0TGOfLo3kNbafyg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760464357; c=relaxed/simple; bh=FmjjXyYDKE/Yk7fJkAB+drvbulYa9bzAOTeJfv02M+I=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=mYEwZE57ff2f4kJzoJc0tzYg1EjniInvIlc2CSqW52J0+g+dz+WjXfMi9mvZG62eGp1wZZztQKaB+XV4S4QgN2lApWUCkjgDE4OWn/J6xvyF8WRiHfZieU+wrgpHinpRTdrMf68zAP31ljI3aqeTmChP+7lN3Ja/476dXbgx7EA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.b=fMH2q/eL; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.b="fMH2q/eL" Received: from trampoline.thunk.org (pool-173-48-113-184.bstnma.fios.verizon.net [173.48.113.184]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 59EHqIud022805 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 14 Oct 2025 13:52:19 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mit.edu; s=outgoing; t=1760464340; bh=YsCObiDZn6NMNieiulOH3PG817/IZ49leYxhOnoaZrs=; h=Date:From:Subject:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=fMH2q/eLPINH4uQNwqu7tmB76SAQn3RBLsxgQAU/Bd97lgA0BSLKgMlnIbUHpanyJ fWP4vQJ4NVu/v+CFqw2tuJVIO5z+YdXB7WkeH1enRdKLeRgxp1oP/yDqStk1Q+WEZH 9JeDZwjWUkfU7WtuOaMZYwFlbyilxzCJQdhhFs+X9a+kS0cFdH2A5YwbfXYreAgVYM iaPZkp7Vo4+QE6mIEfwy5JlNdMuSSdFbHVBtZwxoNtiz0hOmYLexK5NM9y5sBpUgTj jzWV+OVWxYRJgBlWRKJlxc9CCiCh9OPze+xez5mToDDyJFLXhZcoBDXC2sCpibvt9e V0Nm/YwFL5onA== Received: by trampoline.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id 2A7942E00D9; Tue, 14 Oct 2025 13:52:18 -0400 (EDT) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 13:52:18 -0400 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: John Stultz Cc: Arnd Bergmann , Matthew Wilcox , Arnd Bergmann , Tyler Hicks , Damien Le Moal , ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: ecryptfs is unmaintained and untested Message-ID: <20251014175218.GB566507@mit.edu> References: <20241028141955.639633-1-arnd@kernel.org> <20241029043328.GB3213@mit.edu> <20251014143916.GA569133@mit.edu> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 09:38:52AM -0700, John Stultz wrote: > Yeah, though to my understanding fscrypt complicates backing up the > data in its encrypted form. Unfortunately, yes, that's correct. Michael and I did throw around a rough design for doing encrypted backups and saving the encrypted per-file encryption key. Actually doing the _backup_ wasn't that difficult; but doing the *restore* was very tricky/painful. Ultimately, we never implemented it because it wasn't necessarily for the Android/ChromeOS use case, and because we weren't getting a lot of interest for the desktop, without which having a better general-purpose backup is lower priority. > I've wondered if maybe something as simple as fuse mounting a password > protected zip file would do, but I'm guessing something a little more > modern like a fuse + age approach would be better. Unfortunately I'm > not finding anything so far. Darrick is doing a lot of work to significantly improve the performance of fuse2fs. So perhaps fuse mounting a dm-crypt device backed by a loop device might be a possibility? - Ted