From: Xiao Yang <yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: jeffm@suse.com, fstests@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 11:33:50 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5C74B39E.40104@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190225232629.GA7159@magnolia>
On 2019/02/26 7:26, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:47:44PM -0800, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, jeffm@suse.com wrote:
>>> From: Jeff Mahoney<jeffm@suse.com>
>>>
>>> src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because
>>> it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute
>>> is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it
>>> will fail with EPERM.
>>>
>>> We see test failures like:
>>> --- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
>>> +++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500
>>> @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
>>> QA output created by 529
>>> -list attr: Numerical result out of range
>>> +set evm: Operation not permitted
>>>
>>> This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to
>>> do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney<jeffm@suse.com>
>>> ---
>>> src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/src/t_attr_corruption.c b/src/t_attr_corruption.c
>>> index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644
>>> --- a/src/t_attr_corruption.c
>>> +++ b/src/t_attr_corruption.c
>>> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
>>> if (ret)
>>> die("set posix acl");
>>>
>>> - ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
>>> + ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);
>> This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
>>
>> fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
>>
>> Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has
>> a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...
> And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a
> second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.
>
> --D
Hi Darrick,
Sorry, i missed this comment. Your v2 patch is better and simpler to me.
Best Regards,
Xiao Yang
>> --D
>>
>>> if (ret)
>>> die("set evm");
>>>
>>> --
>>> 2.16.4
>>>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-26 3:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-25 19:10 [PATCH] src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm jeffm
2019-02-25 22:47 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-25 23:26 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-02-26 2:07 ` Xiao Yang
2019-02-26 3:33 ` Xiao Yang [this message]
2019-02-26 1:39 ` Jeff Mahoney
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