From: Dhruva G <goledhruva@gmail.com>
To: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>,
linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, fstests@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fstests: generic: add a test case to check fsverity reads
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:19:42 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <745a6dae-ff3c-45de-8bba-1e2efd45ca47@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261010090422.59743-1-wqu@suse.com>
On 10-10-2026 14:34, Qu Wenruo wrote:
> There is a bug report that with the recently enabled large folios
Do you want to perhaps add a link to this bug report? Just for more context,
no hard requirement as such.
> support, fsverity enabled files on btrfs can trigger reproducible
> warnings about file corruption, but in the end no error is returned to
> user space.
>
> It turns out to be a bug in the btrfs fsverity integration, where blocks
> not included in the read range are passed to be verified.
>
> This is a long-standing bug where btrfs fsverity always assumed that one
> folio contains exactly one fs block, ignoring the fact that btrfs had
> block size < page size support before fsverity support was added.
>
> Add a new regression test case for it. The workload is pretty simple:
>
> - Create a 32M file
>
> - Punch a 64K hole for every 128K
> This will limit the read bio size to 64K, which is smaller than
> a lot of large folios, and thus can trigger the btrfs bug.
>
> - Enable fsverity digest and drop page cache
>
> - Read that file
>
> - Verify there is no "FILE CORRUPTED!" warning
>
> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
> ---
> Changelog
> v2:
> - Do not use btrfs specific mount options to limit read bio size
> Use holes to limit the size of read bios instead, now the test case
> can be generic other than btrfs specific.
>
> - Add the missing _require_check_dmesg call
>
> v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20261010032508.36935-1-wqu@suse.com/
> ---
> tests/generic/807 | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tests/generic/807.out | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
> create mode 100755 tests/generic/807
> create mode 100644 tests/generic/807.out
>
> diff --git a/tests/generic/807 b/tests/generic/807
> new file mode 100755
> index 00000000..24e22e8c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tests/generic/807
> @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
> +#! /bin/bash
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +# Copyright (c) 2026 SUSE S.A. All Rights Reserved.
> +#
> +# FS QA Test 807
> +#
> +# Verify that reading a large file with holes won't trigger fsverity warnings
> +#
> +. ./common/preamble
> +_begin_fstest auto quick verity
> +
> +_fixed_by_fs_commit btrfs xxxxxxxxxxxx \
> + "btrfs: fix the fsverity callback where unexpected range is verified"
> +
> +. ./common/verity
> +
> +_require_xfs_io_command "fpunch"
> +_require_check_dmesg
> +_require_scratch_verity
> +
> +filesize=$(( 32 * 1024 * 1024 ))
> +interval=$(( 128 * 1024 ))
> +holesize=$(( 64 * 1024 ))
> +
> +_scratch_mkfs_verity >> $seqres.full
> +_scratch_mount
> +
> +# Create a large enough file so that readahead is triggered, and
> +# large folios are allocated during readahead.
> +_pwrite_byte "0xcd" 0 "$filesize" "$SCRATCH_MNT/foobar" > /dev/null
> +
> +# Create a hole for every $interval bytes. This should limit the read to
> +# $(( $interval - $holesize)), which should be much smaller than the maximum
> +# folio size (2M for x86_64).
> +for (( i = 0; i < $(( $filesize / $interval )); i++ )); do
> + $XFS_IO_PROG -c "fpunch $(( $i * $interval )) $holesize" \
> + "$SCRATCH_MNT/foobar" > /dev/null
> +done
> +
> +_fsv_enable "$SCRATCH_MNT/foobar"
Could this disable signature enforcement with _disable_fsverity_signatures
and restore it from _cleanup(), as generic/572 and generic/788 do?
With fs.verity.require_signatures=1, _require_scratch_verity() succeeds:
_fsv_can_enable() temporarily disables signature enforcement and then
restores it. The later _fsv_enable() therefore fails with EPERM because
foobar is unsigned. I reproduced the output mismatch in the local Btrfs
VM; the same test passed with require_signatures=0
> +
> +# Cycle mount to drop page cache
> +_scratch_cycle_mount
> +
> +# Read the file, unpatched btrfs will verify blocks outside the read range and
> +# trigger fs-verity warnings.
> +# But the read itself should still be fine, as the failed part will be retried.
> +cat "$SCRATCH_MNT/foobar" > /dev/null
> +
> +# Check for any kernel warnings from fs-verity on file corruption.
> +if _check_dmesg_for "FILE CORRUPTED!"; then
> + echo "fs-verity detected corruption"
> +fi
> +echo "Silence is golden"
> +
> +_exit 0
> diff --git a/tests/generic/807.out b/tests/generic/807.out
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000..3752a5f7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tests/generic/807.out
> @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
> +QA output created by 807
> +Silence is golden
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-11 18:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-10 9:04 [PATCH v2] fstests: generic: add a test case to check fsverity reads Qu Wenruo
2026-10-11 18:49 ` Dhruva G [this message]
2026-10-11 21:23 ` Qu Wenruo
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