* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use Song Liu
` (8 more replies)
0 siblings, 9 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Changes v8 => v9:
1. Fix test_progs kfunc_dynptr_param/dynptr_data_null.
Changes v7 => v8:
1. Do not use bpf_dynptr_slice* in the kernel. Add __bpf_dynptr_data* and
use them in ther kernel. (Andrii)
Changes v6 => v7:
1. Change "__const_str" annotation to "__str". (Alexei, Andrii)
2. Add KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag for both new kfuncs. (KP)
3. Only allow bpf_get_file_xattr() to read xattr with "user." prefix.
4. Add Acked-by from Eric Biggers.
Changes v5 => v6:
1. Let fsverity_init_bpf() return void. (Eric Biggers)
2. Sort things in alphabetic orders. (Eric Biggers)
Changes v4 => v5:
1. Revise commit logs. (Alexei)
Changes v3 => v4:
1. Fix error reported by CI.
2. Update comments of bpf_dynptr_slice* that they may return error pointer.
Changes v2 => v3:
1. Rebase and resolve conflicts.
Changes v1 => v2:
1. Let bpf_get_file_xattr() use const string for arg "name". (Alexei)
2. Add recursion prevention with allowlist. (Alexei)
3. Let bpf_get_file_xattr() use __vfs_getxattr() to avoid recursion,
as vfs_getxattr() calls into other LSM hooks.
4. Do not use dynptr->data directly, use helper insteadd. (Andrii)
5. Fixes with bpf_get_fsverity_digest. (Eric Biggers)
6. Add documentation. (Eric Biggers)
7. Fix some compile warnings. (kernel test robot)
This set enables file verification with BPF LSM and fsverity.
In this solution, fsverity is used to provide reliable and efficient hash
of files; and BPF LSM is used to implement signature verification (against
asymmetric keys), and to enforce access control.
This solution can be used to implement access control in complicated cases.
For example: only signed python binary and signed python script and access
special files/devices/ports.
Thanks,
Song
Song Liu (9):
bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use
bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str()
bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR
bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr
bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest
Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs
selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order
selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs
selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file
Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst | 21 +++
Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 24 +++
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 ++
fs/verity/init.c | 1 +
fs/verity/measure.c | 85 +++++++++
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 47 +++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 104 +++++++----
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 74 +++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 10 ++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 3 +-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c | 132 ++++++++++++++
.../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 163 +++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c | 46 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c | 37 ++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c | 82 +++++++++
.../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 8 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 25 +++
19 files changed, 826 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str() Song Liu
` (7 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Different types of bpf dynptr have different internal data storage.
Specifically, SKB and XDP type of dynptr may have non-continuous data.
Therefore, it is not always safe to directly access dynptr->data.
Add __bpf_dynptr_data and __bpf_dynptr_data_rw to replace direct access to
dynptr->data.
Update bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature to use __bpf_dynptr_data instead of
dynptr->data.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 +++++----
3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index b4825d3cdb29..129c5a7c5982 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1222,6 +1222,8 @@ enum bpf_dynptr_type {
int bpf_dynptr_check_size(u32 size);
u32 __bpf_dynptr_size(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr);
+void *__bpf_dynptr_data(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 len);
+void *__bpf_dynptr_data_rw(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 len);
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline *tr);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index e46ac288a108..ddd1a5a81652 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -2611,3 +2611,50 @@ static int __init kfunc_init(void)
}
late_initcall(kfunc_init);
+
+/* Get a pointer to dynptr data up to len bytes for read only access. If
+ * the dynptr doesn't have continuous data up to len bytes, return NULL.
+ */
+void *__bpf_dynptr_data(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 len)
+{
+ enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!ptr->data)
+ return NULL;
+
+ err = bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(ptr, 0, len);
+ if (err)
+ return NULL;
+ type = bpf_dynptr_get_type(ptr);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
+ case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
+ return ptr->data + ptr->offset;
+ case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
+ return skb_pointer_if_linear(ptr->data, ptr->offset, len);
+ case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
+ {
+ void *xdp_ptr = bpf_xdp_pointer(ptr->data, ptr->offset, len);
+
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(xdp_ptr))
+ return NULL;
+ return xdp_ptr;
+ }
+ default:
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "unknown dynptr type %d\n", type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Get a pointer to dynptr data up to len bytes for read write access. If
+ * the dynptr doesn't have continuous data up to len bytes, or the dynptr
+ * is read only, return NULL.
+ */
+void *__bpf_dynptr_data_rw(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 len)
+{
+ if (__bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(ptr))
+ return NULL;
+ return __bpf_dynptr_data(ptr, len);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index df697c74d519..bfe6fb83e8d0 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1378,6 +1378,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr,
struct bpf_dynptr_kern *sig_ptr,
struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring)
{
+ void *data, *sig;
int ret;
if (trusted_keyring->has_ref) {
@@ -1394,10 +1395,11 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr,
return ret;
}
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(data_ptr->data,
- __bpf_dynptr_size(data_ptr),
- sig_ptr->data,
- __bpf_dynptr_size(sig_ptr),
+ data = __bpf_dynptr_data(data_ptr, __bpf_dynptr_size(data_ptr));
+ sig = __bpf_dynptr_data(sig_ptr, __bpf_dynptr_size(sig_ptr));
+
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, __bpf_dynptr_size(data_ptr),
+ sig, __bpf_dynptr_size(sig_ptr),
trusted_keyring->key,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL,
NULL);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str()
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 20:26 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 3/9] bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR Song Liu
` (6 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR is used to specify constant string args for BPF
helpers. The logic that verifies a reg is ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR is
implemented in check_func_arg().
As we introduce kfuncs with constant string args, it is necessary to
do the same check for kfuncs (in check_kfunc_args). Factor out the logic
for ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR to a new check_reg_const_str() so that it can be
reused.
check_func_arg() ensures check_reg_const_str() is only called with reg of
type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Add a redundent type check in check_reg_const_str()
to avoid misuse in the future. Other than this redundent check, there is
no change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2197385d91dc..8d6bbf12c3a8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8718,6 +8718,54 @@ static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type;
}
+static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
+{
+ struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
+ int err;
+ int map_off;
+ u64 map_addr;
+ char *str_ptr;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
+ verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
+ map->value_size - reg->off, false,
+ ACCESS_HELPER);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
+ err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
+ if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
+ verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
@@ -8962,44 +9010,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
}
case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
{
- struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
- int map_off;
- u64 map_addr;
- char *str_ptr;
-
- if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
-
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
-
- if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
- verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
- return -EACCES;
- }
-
- err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
- map->value_size - reg->off, false,
- ACCESS_HELPER);
+ err = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno);
if (err)
return err;
-
- map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
- err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
- return err;
- }
-
- str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
- if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
- verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
break;
}
case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR:
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 3/9] bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str() Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr Song Liu
` (5 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Similar to ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR for BPF helpers, KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR
specifies kfunc args that point to const strings. Annotation "__str" is
used to specify kfunc arg of type KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR. Also, add
documentation for the "__str" annotation.
bpf_get_file_xattr() will be the first kfunc that uses this type.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
index 0d2647fb358d..bfe065f7e23c 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst
@@ -137,6 +137,30 @@ Either way, the returned buffer is either NULL, or of size buffer_szk. Without t
annotation, the verifier will reject the program if a null pointer is passed in with
a nonzero size.
+2.2.5 __str Annotation
+----------------------------
+This annotation is used to indicate that the argument is a constant string.
+
+An example is given below::
+
+ __bpf_kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr(..., const char *name__str, ...)
+ {
+ ...
+ }
+
+In this case, ``bpf_get_file_xattr()`` can be called as::
+
+ bpf_get_file_xattr(..., "xattr_name", ...);
+
+Or::
+
+ const char name[] = "xattr_name"; /* This need to be global */
+ int BPF_PROG(...)
+ {
+ ...
+ bpf_get_file_xattr(..., name, ...);
+ ...
+ }
.. _BPF_kfunc_nodef:
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8d6bbf12c3a8..71c0777ce43b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -10803,6 +10803,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param
return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__nullable");
}
+static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_str(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
+{
+ return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__str");
+}
+
static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf,
const struct btf_param *arg,
const char *name)
@@ -10946,6 +10951,7 @@ enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT,
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE,
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL,
+ KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR,
};
enum special_kfunc_type {
@@ -11090,6 +11096,9 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE;
+ if (is_kfunc_arg_const_str(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
+ return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR;
+
if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) {
if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) {
verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
@@ -11713,6 +11722,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
+ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
/* Trusted by default */
break;
default:
@@ -11984,6 +11994,15 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
break;
+ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
+ if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
+ verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a const string\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ break;
}
}
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 3/9] bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest Song Liu
` (4 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
It is common practice for security solutions to store tags/labels in
xattrs. To implement similar functionalities in BPF LSM, add new kfunc
bpf_get_file_xattr().
The first use case of bpf_get_file_xattr() is to implement file
verifications with asymmetric keys. Specificially, security applications
could use fsverity for file hashes and use xattr to store file signatures.
(kfunc for fsverity hash will be added in a separate commit.)
Currently, only xattrs with "user." prefix can be read with kfunc
bpf_get_file_xattr(). As use cases evolve, we may add a dedicated prefix
for bpf_get_file_xattr().
To avoid recursion, bpf_get_file_xattr can be only called from LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index bfe6fb83e8d0..82eaa099053b 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/fileattr.h>
#include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
@@ -1431,6 +1432,69 @@ static int __init bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init(void)
late_initcall(bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+/* filesystem kfuncs */
+__diag_push();
+__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
+ "kfuncs which will be used in BPF programs");
+
+/**
+ * bpf_get_file_xattr - get xattr of a file
+ * @file: file to get xattr from
+ * @name__str: name of the xattr
+ * @value_ptr: output buffer of the xattr value
+ *
+ * Get xattr *name__str* of *file* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
+ *
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." is allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
+ struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ void *value;
+
+ if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ value = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(value_ptr, __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr));
+ if (!value)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ dentry = file_dentry(file);
+ return __vfs_getxattr(dentry, dentry->d_inode, name__str,
+ value, __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr));
+}
+
+__diag_pop();
+
+BTF_SET8_START(fs_kfunc_set_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_SET8_END(fs_kfunc_set_ids)
+
+static int bpf_get_file_xattr_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+ if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&fs_kfunc_set_ids, kfunc_id))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only allow to attach from LSM hooks, to avoid recursion */
+ return prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ? -EACCES : 0;
+}
+
+const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_fs_kfunc_set = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .set = &fs_kfunc_set_ids,
+ .filter = bpf_get_file_xattr_filter,
+};
+
+static int __init bpf_fs_kfuncs_init(void)
+{
+ return register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_fs_kfunc_set);
+}
+
+late_initcall(bpf_fs_kfuncs_init);
+
static const struct bpf_func_proto *
bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 6/9] Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
` (3 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu, Eric Biggers
fsverity provides fast and reliable hash of files, namely fsverity_digest.
The digest can be used by security solutions to verify file contents.
Add new kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest() so that we can access fsverity from
BPF LSM programs. This kfunc is added to fs/verity/measure.c because some
data structure used in the function is private to fsverity
(fs/verity/fsverity_private.h).
To avoid recursion, bpf_get_fsverity_digest is only allowed in BPF LSM
programs.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 +++++
fs/verity/init.c | 1 +
fs/verity/measure.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
index d071a6e32581..a6a6b2749241 100644
--- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
+++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
#define fsverity_err(inode, fmt, ...) \
fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+/* measure.c */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void __init fsverity_init_bpf(void);
+#else
+static inline void fsverity_init_bpf(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
/* open.c */
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c
index a29f062f6047..1e207c0f71de 100644
--- a/fs/verity/init.c
+++ b/fs/verity/init.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)
fsverity_init_workqueue();
fsverity_init_sysctl();
fsverity_init_signature();
+ fsverity_init_bpf();
return 0;
}
late_initcall(fsverity_init)
diff --git a/fs/verity/measure.c b/fs/verity/measure.c
index eec5956141da..a08177eda96e 100644
--- a/fs/verity/measure.c
+++ b/fs/verity/measure.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include "fsverity_private.h"
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/btf.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/**
@@ -100,3 +102,86 @@ int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
return hash_alg->digest_size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_get_digest);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+
+/* bpf kfuncs */
+__diag_push();
+__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes",
+ "kfuncs which will be used in BPF programs");
+
+/**
+ * bpf_get_fsverity_digest: read fsverity digest of file
+ * @file: file to get digest from
+ * @digest_ptr: (out) dynptr for struct fsverity_digest
+ *
+ * Read fsverity_digest of *file* into *digest_ptr*.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *digest_ptr)
+{
+ const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct fsverity_digest *arg;
+ const struct fsverity_info *vi;
+ const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
+ int out_digest_sz;
+
+ arg = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(digest_ptr, __bpf_dynptr_size(digest_ptr));
+ if (!arg)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)arg, __alignof__(*arg)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (__bpf_dynptr_size(digest_ptr) < sizeof(struct fsverity_digest))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
+ if (!vi)
+ return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
+
+ hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
+
+ arg->digest_algorithm = hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs;
+ arg->digest_size = hash_alg->digest_size;
+
+ out_digest_sz = __bpf_dynptr_size(digest_ptr) - sizeof(struct fsverity_digest);
+
+ /* copy digest */
+ memcpy(arg->digest, vi->file_digest, min_t(int, hash_alg->digest_size, out_digest_sz));
+
+ /* fill the extra buffer with zeros */
+ if (out_digest_sz > hash_alg->digest_size)
+ memset(arg->digest + arg->digest_size, 0, out_digest_sz - hash_alg->digest_size);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__diag_pop();
+
+BTF_SET8_START(fsverity_set_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_fsverity_digest, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_SET8_END(fsverity_set_ids)
+
+static int bpf_get_fsverity_digest_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+ if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&fsverity_set_ids, kfunc_id))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only allow to attach from LSM hooks, to avoid recursion */
+ return prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ? -EACCES : 0;
+}
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_fsverity_set = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .set = &fsverity_set_ids,
+ .filter = bpf_get_fsverity_digest_filter,
+};
+
+void __init fsverity_init_bpf(void)
+{
+ register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_fsverity_set);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 6/9] Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order Song Liu
` (2 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Add a brief introduction for file system kfuncs:
bpf_get_file_xattr()
bpf_get_fsverity_digest()
The documentation highlights the strategy to avoid recursions of these
kfuncs.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst b/Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8762c3233a3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+.. _fs_kfuncs-header-label:
+
+=====================
+BPF filesystem kfuncs
+=====================
+
+BPF LSM programs need to access filesystem data from LSM hooks. The following
+BPF kfuncs can be used to get these data.
+
+ * ``bpf_get_file_xattr()``
+
+ * ``bpf_get_fsverity_digest()``
+
+To avoid recursions, these kfuncs follow the following rules:
+
+1. These kfuncs are only permitted from BPF LSM function.
+2. These kfuncs should not call into other LSM hooks, i.e. security_*(). For
+ example, ``bpf_get_file_xattr()`` does not use ``vfs_getxattr()``, because
+ the latter calls LSM hook ``security_inode_getxattr``.
diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
index aeaeb35e6d4a..0bb5cb8157f1 100644
--- a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ that goes into great technical depth about the BPF Architecture.
helpers
kfuncs
cpumasks
+ fs_kfuncs
programs
maps
bpf_prog_run
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 6/9] Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file Song Liu
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Move CONFIG_VSOCKETS up, so the CONFIGs are in alphabetic order.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
index 3ec5927ec3e5..782876452acf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
CONFIG_TEST_BPF=m
CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=y
+CONFIG_VSOCKETS=y
CONFIG_VXLAN=y
CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS=y
CONFIG_XFRM_INTERFACE=y
-CONFIG_VSOCKETS=y
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file Song Liu
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
Add selftests for two new filesystem kfuncs:
1. bpf_get_file_xattr
2. bpf_get_fsverity_digest
These tests simply make sure the two kfuncs work. Another selftest will be
added to demonstrate how to use these kfuncs to verify file signature.
CONFIG_FS_VERITY is added to selftests config. However, this is not
sufficient to guarantee bpf_get_fsverity_digest works. This is because
fsverity need to be enabled at file system level (for example, with tune2fs
on ext4). If local file system doesn't have this feature enabled, just skip
the test.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 1 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c | 46 ++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c | 37 +++++
5 files changed, 219 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
index 5ca68ff0b59f..c2c084a44eae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
@@ -55,4 +55,7 @@ void *bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(void *) __ksym;
void *bpf_rdonly_cast(void *obj, __u32 btf_id) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name,
+ struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr *digest_ptr) __ksym;
#endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
index 782876452acf..c125c441abc7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ CONFIG_FPROBE=y
CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS=y
CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=y
CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER=y
+CONFIG_FS_VERITY=y
CONFIG_GENEVE=y
CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y
CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3084872ad1f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "test_get_xattr.skel.h"
+#include "test_fsverity.skel.h"
+
+static const char testfile[] = "/tmp/test_progs_fs_kfuncs";
+
+static void test_xattr(void)
+{
+ struct test_get_xattr *skel = NULL;
+ int fd = -1, err;
+
+ fd = open(testfile, O_CREAT | O_RDONLY, 0644);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "create_file"))
+ return;
+
+ close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+
+ err = setxattr(testfile, "user.kfuncs", "hello", sizeof("hello"), 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setxattr"))
+ goto out;
+
+ skel = test_get_xattr__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_get_xattr__open_and_load"))
+ goto out;
+
+ skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid();
+ err = test_get_xattr__attach(skel);
+
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_get_xattr__attach"))
+ goto out;
+
+ fd = open(testfile, O_RDONLY, 0644);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "open_file"))
+ goto out;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr, 1, "found_xattr");
+
+out:
+ close(fd);
+ test_get_xattr__destroy(skel);
+ remove(testfile);
+}
+
+#ifndef SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+static void test_fsverity(void)
+{
+ struct fsverity_enable_arg arg = {0};
+ struct test_fsverity *skel = NULL;
+ struct fsverity_digest *d;
+ int fd, err;
+ char buffer[4096];
+
+ fd = open(testfile, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0644);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "create_file"))
+ return;
+
+ /* Write random buffer, so the file is not empty */
+ err = write(fd, buffer, 4096);
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, 4096, "write_file"))
+ goto out;
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* Reopen read-only, otherwise FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY will fail */
+ fd = open(testfile, O_RDONLY, 0644);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "open_file1"))
+ return;
+
+ /* Enable fsverity for the file.
+ * If the file system doesn't support verity, this will fail. Skip
+ * the test in such case.
+ */
+ arg.version = 1;
+ arg.hash_algorithm = FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256;
+ arg.block_size = 4096;
+ err = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, &arg);
+ if (err) {
+ printf("%s:SKIP:local fs doesn't support fsverity (%d)\n", __func__, errno);
+ test__skip();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skel = test_fsverity__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_fsverity__open_and_load"))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Get fsverity_digest from ioctl */
+ d = (struct fsverity_digest *)skel->bss->expected_digest;
+ d->digest_algorithm = FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256;
+ d->digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ err = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, skel->bss->expected_digest);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "ioctl_FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY"))
+ goto out;
+
+ skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid();
+ err = test_fsverity__attach(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_fsverity__attach"))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Reopen the file to trigger the program */
+ close(fd);
+ fd = open(testfile, O_RDONLY);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "open_file2"))
+ goto out;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->got_fsverity, 1, "got_fsverity");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->digest_matches, 1, "digest_matches");
+out:
+ close(fd);
+ test_fsverity__destroy(skel);
+ remove(testfile);
+}
+
+void test_fs_kfuncs(void)
+{
+ if (test__start_subtest("xattr"))
+ test_xattr();
+
+ if (test__start_subtest("fsverity"))
+ test_fsverity();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ddba2edc8e7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+#ifndef SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+__u32 monitored_pid;
+char expected_digest[sizeof(struct fsverity_digest) + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+char digest[sizeof(struct fsverity_digest) + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+__u32 got_fsverity;
+__u32 digest_matches;
+
+SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
+int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr digest_ptr;
+ __u32 pid;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+ if (pid != monitored_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(digest, sizeof(digest), 0, &digest_ptr);
+ ret = bpf_get_fsverity_digest(f, &digest_ptr);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+ got_fsverity = 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(digest); i++) {
+ if (digest[i] != expected_digest[i])
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ digest_matches = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7eb2a4e5a3e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u32 monitored_pid;
+__u32 found_xattr;
+
+static const char expected_value[] = "hello";
+char value[32];
+
+SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
+int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
+ __u32 pid;
+ int ret;
+
+ pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+ if (pid != monitored_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(value, sizeof(value), 0, &value_ptr);
+
+ ret = bpf_get_file_xattr(f, "user.kfuncs", &value_ptr);
+ if (ret != sizeof(expected_value))
+ return 0;
+ if (bpf_strncmp(value, ret, expected_value))
+ return 0;
+ found_xattr = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 bpf-next 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file
2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 19:01 ` Song Liu
8 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Song Liu @ 2023-11-03 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, fsverity
Cc: ast, daniel, andrii, martin.lau, kernel-team, ebiggers, tytso,
roberto.sassu, kpsingh, vadfed, Song Liu
This selftests shows a proof of concept method to use BPF LSM to enforce
file signature. This test is added to verify_pkcs7_sig, so that some
existing logic can be reused.
This file signature method uses fsverity, which provides reliable and
efficient hash (known as digest) of the file. The file digest is signed
with asymmetic key, and the signature is stored in xattr. At the run time,
BPF LSM reads file digest and the signature, and then checks them against
the public key.
Note that this solution does NOT require FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES.
fsverity is only used to provide file digest. The signature verification
and access control is all implemented in BPF LSM.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 7 +
.../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 163 +++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c | 82 +++++++++
.../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 8 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 25 +++
5 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
index c2c084a44eae..b4e78c1eb37b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h
@@ -58,4 +58,11 @@ void *bpf_rdonly_cast(void *obj, __u32 btf_id) __ksym;
extern int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name,
struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym;
extern int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr *digest_ptr) __ksym;
+
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
+extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
+extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr,
+ struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr,
+ struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym;
#endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index dd7f2bc70048..682b6af8d0a4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -16,9 +16,12 @@
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <test_progs.h>
#include "test_verify_pkcs7_sig.skel.h"
+#include "test_sig_in_xattr.skel.h"
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024
@@ -26,6 +29,10 @@
#define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING (1UL)
#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING (2UL)
+#ifndef SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
@@ -254,7 +261,7 @@ static int populate_data_item_mod(struct data *data_item)
return ret;
}
-void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void)
+static void test_verify_pkcs7_sig_from_map(void)
{
libbpf_print_fn_t old_print_cb;
char tmp_dir_template[] = "/tmp/verify_sigXXXXXX";
@@ -400,3 +407,157 @@ void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void)
skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0;
test_verify_pkcs7_sig__destroy(skel);
}
+
+static int get_signature_size(const char *sig_path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(sig_path, &st) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ return st.st_size;
+}
+
+static int add_signature_to_xattr(const char *data_path, const char *sig_path)
+{
+ char sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE] = {0};
+ int fd, size, ret;
+
+ if (sig_path) {
+ fd = open(sig_path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ size = read(fd, sig, MAX_SIG_SIZE);
+ close(fd);
+ if (size <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ /* no sig_path, just write 32 bytes of zeros */
+ size = 32;
+ }
+ ret = setxattr(data_path, "user.sig", sig, size, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "setxattr"))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_open_file(struct test_sig_in_xattr *skel, char *data_path,
+ pid_t pid, bool should_success, char *name)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ skel->bss->monitored_pid = pid;
+ ret = open(data_path, O_RDONLY);
+ close(ret);
+ skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0;
+
+ if (should_success) {
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(ret, 0, name))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (!ASSERT_LT(ret, 0, name))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_pkcs7_sig_fsverity(void)
+{
+ char data_path[PATH_MAX];
+ char sig_path[PATH_MAX];
+ char tmp_dir_template[] = "/tmp/verify_sigXXXXXX";
+ char *tmp_dir;
+ struct test_sig_in_xattr *skel = NULL;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int ret;
+
+ tmp_dir = mkdtemp(tmp_dir_template);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(tmp_dir, "mkdtemp"))
+ return;
+
+ snprintf(data_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/data-file", tmp_dir);
+ snprintf(sig_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/sig-file", tmp_dir);
+
+ ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "setup");
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "_run_setup_process"))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "fsverity-create-sign");
+
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("%s: SKIP: fsverity [sign|enable] doesn't work.\n", __func__);
+ test__skip();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skel = test_sig_in_xattr__open();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_sig_in_xattr__open"))
+ goto out;
+ ret = get_signature_size(sig_path);
+ if (!ASSERT_GT(ret, 0, "get_signaure_size"))
+ goto out;
+ skel->bss->sig_size = ret;
+ skel->bss->user_keyring_serial = syscall(__NR_request_key, "keyring",
+ "ebpf_testing_keyring", NULL,
+ KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
+ memcpy(skel->bss->digest, "FSVerity", 8);
+
+ ret = test_sig_in_xattr__load(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_sig_in_xattr__load"))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = test_sig_in_xattr__attach(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_sig_in_xattr__attach"))
+ goto out;
+
+ pid = getpid();
+
+ /* Case 1: fsverity is not enabled, open should succeed */
+ if (test_open_file(skel, data_path, pid, true, "open_1"))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Case 2: fsverity is enabled, xattr is missing, open should
+ * fail
+ */
+ ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "fsverity-enable");
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "fsverity-enable"))
+ goto out;
+ if (test_open_file(skel, data_path, pid, false, "open_2"))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Case 3: fsverity is enabled, xattr has valid signature, open
+ * should succeed
+ */
+ ret = add_signature_to_xattr(data_path, sig_path);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "add_signature_to_xattr_1"))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (test_open_file(skel, data_path, pid, true, "open_3"))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Case 4: fsverity is enabled, xattr has invalid signature, open
+ * should fail
+ */
+ ret = add_signature_to_xattr(data_path, NULL);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "add_signature_to_xattr_2"))
+ goto out;
+ test_open_file(skel, data_path, pid, false, "open_4");
+
+out:
+ _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "cleanup");
+ if (!skel)
+ return;
+
+ skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0;
+ test_sig_in_xattr__destroy(skel);
+}
+
+void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void)
+{
+ if (test__start_subtest("pkcs7_sig_from_map"))
+ test_verify_pkcs7_sig_from_map();
+ if (test__start_subtest("pkcs7_sig_fsverity"))
+ test_pkcs7_sig_fsverity();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..820b891171d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+#ifndef SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024
+
+/* By default, "fsverity sign" signs a file with fsverity_formatted_digest
+ * of the file. fsverity_formatted_digest on the kernel side is only used
+ * with CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES. However, BPF LSM doesn't not
+ * require CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES, so vmlinux.h may not have
+ * fsverity_formatted_digest. In this test, we intentionally avoid using
+ * fsverity_formatted_digest.
+ *
+ * Luckily, fsverity_formatted_digest is simply 8-byte magic followed by
+ * fsverity_digest. We use a char array of size fsverity_formatted_digest
+ * plus SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE. The magic part of it is filled by user space,
+ * and the rest of it is filled by bpf_get_fsverity_digest.
+ *
+ * Note that, generating signatures based on fsverity_formatted_digest is
+ * the design choice of this selftest (and "fsverity sign"). With BPF
+ * LSM, we have the flexibility to generate signature based on other data
+ * sets, for example, fsverity_digest or only the digest[] part of it.
+ */
+#define MAGIC_SIZE 8
+char digest[MAGIC_SIZE + sizeof(struct fsverity_digest) + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+__u32 monitored_pid;
+char sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE];
+__u32 sig_size;
+__u32 user_keyring_serial;
+
+SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
+int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr digest_ptr, sig_ptr;
+ struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring;
+ __u32 pid;
+ int ret;
+
+ pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+ if (pid != monitored_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* digest_ptr points to fsverity_digest */
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(digest + MAGIC_SIZE, sizeof(digest) - MAGIC_SIZE, 0, &digest_ptr);
+
+ ret = bpf_get_fsverity_digest(f, &digest_ptr);
+ /* No verity, allow access */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Move digest_ptr to fsverity_formatted_digest */
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(digest, sizeof(digest), 0, &digest_ptr);
+
+ /* Read signature from xattr */
+ bpf_dynptr_from_mem(sig, sizeof(sig), 0, &sig_ptr);
+ ret = bpf_get_file_xattr(f, "user.sig", &sig_ptr);
+ /* No signature, reject access */
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ trusted_keyring = bpf_lookup_user_key(user_keyring_serial, 0);
+ if (!trusted_keyring)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /* Verify signature */
+ ret = bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(&digest_ptr, &sig_ptr, trusted_keyring);
+
+ bpf_key_put(trusted_keyring);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index 7748cc23de8a..f42e9f3831a1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -10,17 +10,11 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(__u32 serial, __u64 flags) __ksym;
-extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
-extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
-extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr,
- struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr,
- struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym;
-
__u32 monitored_pid;
__u32 user_keyring_serial;
__u64 system_keyring_id;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh
index ba08922b4a27..7e6caa134e1a 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh
@@ -60,6 +60,27 @@ cleanup() {
rm -rf ${tmp_dir}
}
+fsverity_create_sign_file() {
+ local tmp_dir="$1"
+
+ data_file=${tmp_dir}/data-file
+ sig_file=${tmp_dir}/sig-file
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=$data_file bs=1 count=12345 2> /dev/null
+ fsverity sign --key ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.pem $data_file $sig_file
+
+ # We do not want to enable fsverity on $data_file yet. Try whether
+ # the file system support fsverity on a different file.
+ touch ${tmp_dir}/tmp-file
+ fsverity enable ${tmp_dir}/tmp-file
+}
+
+fsverity_enable_file() {
+ local tmp_dir="$1"
+
+ data_file=${tmp_dir}/data-file
+ fsverity enable $data_file
+}
+
catch()
{
local exit_code="$1"
@@ -86,6 +107,10 @@ main()
setup "${tmp_dir}"
elif [[ "${action}" == "cleanup" ]]; then
cleanup "${tmp_dir}"
+ elif [[ "${action}" == "fsverity-create-sign" ]]; then
+ fsverity_create_sign_file "${tmp_dir}"
+ elif [[ "${action}" == "fsverity-enable" ]]; then
+ fsverity_enable_file "${tmp_dir}"
else
echo "Unknown action: ${action}"
exit 1
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str()
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str() Song Liu
@ 2023-11-03 20:26 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2023-11-03 20:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: bpf, fsverity, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
Andrii Nakryiko, Martin KaFai Lau, Kernel Team, Eric Biggers,
Theodore Ts'o, Roberto Sassu, KP Singh, Vadim Fedorenko
On Fri, Nov 3, 2023 at 12:02 PM Song Liu <song@kernel.org> wrote:
>
>
> +static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
> +{
> + struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
> + int err;
> + int map_off;
> + u64 map_addr;
> + char *str_ptr;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE))
> + return -EINVAL;
Pls drop WARN. People run kernels with panic_on_warn.
This is not an error that is worth panicking on.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-11-03 20:26 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2023-11-03 19:01 [PATCH v9 bpf-next 0/9] bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str() Song Liu
2023-11-03 20:26 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 3/9] bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 6/9] Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs Song Liu
2023-11-03 19:01 ` [PATCH v9 bpf-next 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file Song Liu
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