Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] openat2: new OPENAT2_REGULAR flag support

Aleksa Sarai
2026-03-12T09:38:12Z

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On 2026-03-11, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 9:49 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 2026-03-09, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > On Sat, 2026-03-07 at 10:56 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > > > I think this needs more clarification as to what "regular" means,
> > > > > > since S_IFREG may not be sufficient. The UAPI group page says:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Use-Case: this would be very useful to write secure programs that want
> > > > > > to avoid being tricked into opening device nodes with special
> > > > > > semantics while thinking they operate on regular files. This is
> > > > > > particularly relevant as many device nodes (or even FIFOs) come with
> > > > > > blocking I/O (or even blocking open()!) by default, which is not
> > > > > > expected from regular files backed by “fast” disk I/O. Consider
> > > > > > implementation of a naive web browser which is pointed to
> > > > > > file://dev/zero, not expecting an endless amount of data to read.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What about procfs? What about sysfs? What about /proc/self/fd/17
> > > > > > where that fd is a memfd? What about files backed by non-"fast" disk
> > > > > > I/O like something on a flaky USB stick or a network mount or FUSE?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Are we concerned about blocking open? (open blocks as a matter of
> > > > > > course.) Are we concerned about open having strange side effects?
> > > > > > Are we concerned about write having strange side effects? Are we
> > > > > > concerned about cases where opening the file as root results in
> > > > > > elevated privilege beyond merely gaining the ability to write to that
> > > > > > specific path on an ordinary filesystem?
> > >
> > > I think this is opening up a barrage of question that I'm not sure are
> > > all that useful. The ability to only open regular file isn't intended to
> > > defend against hung FUSE or NFS servers or other random Linux
> > > special-sauce murder-suicide file descriptor traps. For a lot of those
> > > we have O_PATH which can easily function with the new extension. A lot
> > > of the other special-sauce files (most anonymous inode fds) cannot even
> > > be reopened via e.g., /proc.
> >
> > Indeed, I see OPENAT2_REGULAR as a way of optimising the tedious checks
> > that userspace does using O_PATH+/proc/self/fd/$n re-opening when
> > dealing with regular files.
>
> Can you give a brief decription or a link to what these checks are and
> what problem they solve?

There are a few variations, but in this particular case they are just
doing fstat() and then checking whether the file is a regular file
(i.e., S_IFREG) or not.

A container rootfs can contain arbitrary files (because container images
are just tar archives, usually with no restrictions on inodes -- a fair
few container runtimes assume that the devices cgroup is sufficient to
protect against the container overwriting your rootfs). The S_IFREG
check avoids an administrative process from being tricked into opening a
block device or an endlessly-streaming FIFO -- if you also use
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV you can also make sure that you don't land on procfs or
sysfs by accident.

I will say that in a previous version of this patchset I said that I
would prefer this be done with an allow-bitmask of S_IFMT rather than a
single O_REGULAR toggle -- this would allow for usecases such as "only
open a regular file or directory" (inode_type_can_chattr() from systemd
is a practical example of this kind of usage) or "anything except for
block/char devices", but the definition of S_IFBLK (S_IFCHR|S_IFDIR)
makes this a little too ugly. :/

--
Aleksa Sarai
https://www.cyphar.com/

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