I've just been looking at the code and I see what looks like a (minor)
security hole in the verify-tag feature.  In particular, the tag
verification code doesn't check that the tag is signed by the same
user that created the tag.  To be fair, gpg does output the identity
of the key that created the signature as well as the key used to
create the signature, so an astute user could detect that some
shenanigans is going on.

An attack would simply require getting one's own public key into the
keyring of a user.  This probably wouldn't be very easy at the moment,
but if people were to actually use encrypted email (and if they set
their mail agents to download public keys), it might require no more
then sending a signed email to a mailing list.

Of course, you'd also somehow have to trick them into pulling (or
cloning) your corrupt tag, which probably requires compromising a
server (or mirror) somewhere.  But of course, the whole point of
signing tags is to eliminate precisely this danger.

What should be done about this? First, there ought to be a feature to
limit git verify-tag to use a specific keyring.  Maybe there is an
environment variable, and it's just not documented in the man page?

It would also seem like a good idea to at a minimum check that the
name/email associated with the signature is the same as that of the
tagger.  This doesn't gain you *too* much, since an attacker can
always create his own key with any name and email he likes, but at
least it means that users could feel safe adding keys to their public
keyring, as long as those keys have reasonable names/emails associated
with them, and as long as they run git show on a tag before trusting
that that tag came from a particular person.  i.e. it seems reasonable
for me to expect that if I run:

$ git show v1.0
tag v1.0
Tagger: Linus Torvalds ...
...
[user carefully reads the Tagger line...]
$ git verify-tag v1.0 && make

That I won't be running make on a repository that wasn't signed by a
key that at least *claims* to belong to Linus Torvalds.

Thoughts?
-- 
David Roundy