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From: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] better validation on delta base object offsets
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2008 19:02:45 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1225321372-6570-3-git-send-email-nico@cam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1225321372-6570-2-git-send-email-nico@cam.org>

In one case, it was possible to have a bad offset equal to 0 effectively
pointing a delta onto itself and crashing git after too many recursions.
In the other cases, a negative offset could result due to off_t being
signed.  Catch those.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
---
 builtin-pack-objects.c   |    4 ++--
 builtin-unpack-objects.c |    2 ++
 index-pack.c             |    2 +-
 sha1_file.c              |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/builtin-pack-objects.c b/builtin-pack-objects.c
index 0366277..d4c721b 100644
--- a/builtin-pack-objects.c
+++ b/builtin-pack-objects.c
@@ -1038,10 +1038,10 @@ static void check_object(struct object_entry *entry)
 				c = buf[used_0++];
 				ofs = (ofs << 7) + (c & 127);
 			}
-			if (ofs >= entry->in_pack_offset)
+			ofs = entry->in_pack_offset - ofs;
+			if (ofs <= 0 || ofs >= entry->in_pack_offset)
 				die("delta base offset out of bound for %s",
 				    sha1_to_hex(entry->idx.sha1));
-			ofs = entry->in_pack_offset - ofs;
 			if (reuse_delta && !entry->preferred_base) {
 				struct revindex_entry *revidx;
 				revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, ofs);
diff --git a/builtin-unpack-objects.c b/builtin-unpack-objects.c
index 9f4bdd3..47ed610 100644
--- a/builtin-unpack-objects.c
+++ b/builtin-unpack-objects.c
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ static void unpack_delta_entry(enum object_type type, unsigned long delta_size,
 			base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
 		}
 		base_offset = obj_list[nr].offset - base_offset;
+		if (base_offset <= 0 || base_offset >= obj_list[nr].offset)
+			die("offset value out of bound for delta base object");
 
 		delta_data = get_data(delta_size);
 		if (dry_run || !delta_data) {
diff --git a/index-pack.c b/index-pack.c
index fe75332..60ed41a 100644
--- a/index-pack.c
+++ b/index-pack.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static void *unpack_raw_entry(struct object_entry *obj, union delta_base *delta_
 			base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
 		}
 		delta_base->offset = obj->idx.offset - base_offset;
-		if (delta_base->offset >= obj->idx.offset)
+		if (delta_base->offset <= 0 || delta_base->offset >= obj->idx.offset)
 			bad_object(obj->idx.offset, "delta base offset is out of bound");
 		break;
 	case OBJ_COMMIT:
diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index 88d9cf3..e57949b 100644
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static off_t get_delta_base(struct packed_git *p,
 			base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
 		}
 		base_offset = delta_obj_offset - base_offset;
-		if (base_offset >= delta_obj_offset)
+		if (base_offset <= 0 || base_offset >= delta_obj_offset)
 			return 0;  /* out of bound */
 		*curpos += used;
 	} else if (type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
-- 
1.6.0.3.757.g01be.dirty

  reply	other threads:[~2008-10-29 23:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-10-29 23:02 [PATCH 0/9] more robustness against pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02   ` Nicolas Pitre [this message]
2008-10-29 23:02     ` [PATCH 3/9] make unpack_object_header() non fatal Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02       ` [PATCH 4/9] make packed_object_info() resilient to pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02         ` [PATCH 5/9] make check_object() " Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02           ` [PATCH 6/9] make find_pack_revindex() aware of the nasty world Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02             ` [PATCH 7/9] pack-objects: allow "fixing" a corrupted pack without a full repack Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02               ` [PATCH 8/9] extend test coverage for latest pack corruption resilience improvements Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02                 ` [PATCH 9/9] pack-objects: don't leak pack window reference when splitting packs Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-31  8:46   ` [PATCH 1/9] close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Junio C Hamano
2008-10-31 15:31     ` Nicolas Pitre

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