From: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] make find_pack_revindex() aware of the nasty world
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2008 19:02:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1225321372-6570-7-git-send-email-nico@cam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1225321372-6570-6-git-send-email-nico@cam.org>
It currently calls die() whenever given offset is not found thinking
that such thing should never happen. But this offset may come from a
corrupted pack whych _could_ happen and not be found. Callers should
deal with this possibility gracefully instead.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
---
builtin-pack-objects.c | 2 ++
pack-revindex.c | 3 ++-
sha1_file.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin-pack-objects.c b/builtin-pack-objects.c
index b595d04..963b432 100644
--- a/builtin-pack-objects.c
+++ b/builtin-pack-objects.c
@@ -1053,6 +1053,8 @@ static void check_object(struct object_entry *entry)
if (reuse_delta && !entry->preferred_base) {
struct revindex_entry *revidx;
revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, ofs);
+ if (!revidx)
+ goto give_up;
base_ref = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
}
entry->in_pack_header_size = used + used_0;
diff --git a/pack-revindex.c b/pack-revindex.c
index 6096b62..1de53c8 100644
--- a/pack-revindex.c
+++ b/pack-revindex.c
@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ struct revindex_entry *find_pack_revindex(struct packed_git *p, off_t ofs)
else
lo = mi + 1;
} while (lo < hi);
- die("internal error: pack revindex corrupt");
+ error("bad offset for revindex");
+ return NULL;
}
void discard_revindex(void)
diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
index 384a430..9ce1df0 100644
--- a/sha1_file.c
+++ b/sha1_file.c
@@ -1388,9 +1388,12 @@ static int packed_delta_info(struct packed_git *p,
return OBJ_BAD;
type = packed_object_info(p, base_offset, NULL);
if (type <= OBJ_NONE) {
- struct revindex_entry *revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
- const unsigned char *base_sha1 =
- nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
+ struct revindex_entry *revidx;
+ const unsigned char *base_sha1;
+ revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
+ if (!revidx)
+ return OBJ_BAD;
+ base_sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
mark_bad_packed_object(p, base_sha1);
type = sha1_object_info(base_sha1, NULL);
if (type <= OBJ_NONE)
@@ -1682,9 +1685,12 @@ static void *unpack_delta_entry(struct packed_git *p,
* This is costly but should happen only in the presence
* of a corrupted pack, and is better than failing outright.
*/
- struct revindex_entry *revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
- const unsigned char *base_sha1 =
- nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
+ struct revindex_entry *revidx;
+ const unsigned char *base_sha1;
+ revidx = find_pack_revindex(p, base_offset);
+ if (!revidx)
+ return NULL;
+ base_sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, revidx->nr);
error("failed to read delta base object %s"
" at offset %"PRIuMAX" from %s",
sha1_to_hex(base_sha1), (uintmax_t)base_offset,
--
1.6.0.3.757.g01be.dirty
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-10-29 23:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-10-29 23:02 [PATCH 0/9] more robustness against pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] better validation on delta base object offsets Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] make unpack_object_header() non fatal Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] make packed_object_info() resilient to pack corruptions Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] make check_object() " Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` Nicolas Pitre [this message]
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] pack-objects: allow "fixing" a corrupted pack without a full repack Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] extend test coverage for latest pack corruption resilience improvements Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-29 23:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] pack-objects: don't leak pack window reference when splitting packs Nicolas Pitre
2008-10-31 8:46 ` [PATCH 1/9] close another possibility for propagating pack corruption Junio C Hamano
2008-10-31 15:31 ` Nicolas Pitre
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