git.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Richard Hansen <rhansen@bbn.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sitaramc@gmail.com
Subject: [SECURITY PATCH] git-prompt.sh: don't put unsanitized branch names in $PS1
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2014 15:07:28 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1398107248-32140-1-git-send-email-rhansen@bbn.com> (raw)

Both bash and zsh subject the value of PS1 to parameter expansion,
command substitution, and arithmetic expansion.  Rather than include
the raw, unescaped branch name in PS1 when running in two- or
three-argument mode, construct PS1 to reference a variable that holds
the branch name.  Because the shells do not recursively expand, this
avoids arbitrary code execution by specially-crafted branch names such
as '$(IFS=_;cmd=sudo_rm_-rf_/;$cmd)'.

Signed-off-by: Richard Hansen <rhansen@bbn.com>
---
To see the vulnerability in action, follow the instructions at:
    https://github.com/richardhansen/clonepwn

 contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh b/contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh
index 7b732d2..bd7ff29 100644
--- a/contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh
+++ b/contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh
@@ -207,7 +207,18 @@ __git_ps1_show_upstream ()
 			p=" u+${count#*	}-${count%	*}" ;;
 		esac
 		if [[ -n "$count" && -n "$name" ]]; then
-			p="$p $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref "$upstream" 2>/dev/null)"
+			__git_ps1_upstream_name=$(git rev-parse \
+				--abbrev-ref "$upstream" 2>/dev/null)
+			if [ $pcmode = yes ]; then
+				# see the comments around the
+				# __git_ps1_branch_name variable below
+				p="$p \${__git_ps1_upstream_name}"
+			else
+				p="$p ${__git_ps1_upstream_name}"
+				# not needed anymore; keep user's
+				# environment clean
+				unset __git_ps1_upstream_name
+			fi
 		fi
 	fi
 
@@ -438,8 +449,27 @@ __git_ps1 ()
 		__git_ps1_colorize_gitstring
 	fi
 
+	b=${b##refs/heads/}
+	if [ $pcmode = yes ]; then
+		# In pcmode (and only pcmode) the contents of
+		# $gitstring are subject to expansion by the shell.
+		# Avoid putting the raw ref name in the prompt to
+		# protect the user from arbitrary code execution via
+		# specially crafted ref names (e.g., a ref named
+		# '$(IFS=_;cmd=sudo_rm_-rf_/;$cmd)' would execute
+		# 'sudo rm -rf /' when the prompt is drawn).  Instead,
+		# put the ref name in a new global variable (in the
+		# __git_ps1_* namespace to avoid colliding with the
+		# user's environment) and reference that variable from
+		# PS1.
+		__git_ps1_branch_name=$b
+		# note that the $ is escaped -- the variable will be
+		# expanded later (when it's time to draw the prompt)
+		b="\${__git_ps1_branch_name}"
+	fi
+
 	local f="$w$i$s$u"
-	local gitstring="$c${b##refs/heads/}${f:+$z$f}$r$p"
+	local gitstring="$c$b${f:+$z$f}$r$p"
 
 	if [ $pcmode = yes ]; then
 		if [ "${__git_printf_supports_v-}" != yes ]; then
-- 
1.9.2

             reply	other threads:[~2014-04-21 19:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-21 19:07 Richard Hansen [this message]
2014-04-21 20:24 ` [SECURITY PATCH] git-prompt.sh: don't put unsanitized branch names in $PS1 Jeff King
2014-04-21 21:07   ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-22  8:38   ` Michael Haggerty
2014-04-22 17:38     ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-22 18:38       ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-22 19:47         ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:23 ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:33   ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:58     ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-21 23:53       ` [SECURITY PATCH v2] " Richard Hansen
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-04-24 18:40 [SECURITY PATCH] " Gábor Szeder
2014-04-25  7:37 ` Simon Oosthoek
2014-04-25 16:39   ` Richard Hansen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1398107248-32140-1-git-send-email-rhansen@bbn.com \
    --to=rhansen@bbn.com \
    --cc=git@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sitaramc@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).