Re: [PATCH v2] gpg-interface.c: detect and reject multiple signatures on commits

["Michał Górny" <mgorny@gentoo.org>]

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On Fri, 2018-08-17 at 09:34 +0200, Michał Górny wrote:
> GnuPG supports creating signatures consisting of multiple signature
> packets.  If such a signature is verified, it outputs all the status
> messages for each signature separately.  However, git currently does not
> account for such scenario and gets terribly confused over getting
> multiple *SIG statuses.
> 
> For example, if a malicious party alters a signed commit and appends
> a new untrusted signature, git is going to ignore the original bad
> signature and report untrusted commit instead.  However, %GK and %GS
> format strings may still expand to the data corresponding
> to the original signature, potentially tricking the scripts into
> trusting the malicious commit.
> 
> Given that the use of multiple signatures is quite rare, git does not
> support creating them without jumping through a few hoops, and finally
> supporting them properly would require extensive API improvement, it
> seems reasonable to just reject them at the moment.
> 

Gentle ping.

-- 
Best regards,
Michał Górny

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