From: Thomas Rast <trast@student.ethz.ch>
To: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>,
<meyering@redhat.com>, <git@vger.kernel.org>,
"Shawn O. Pearce" <spearce@spearce.org>,
Jeff King <peff@peff.net>, Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net>
Subject: Re: general protection faults with "git grep" version 1.7.7.1
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 15:50:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201110251550.22248.trast@student.ethz.ch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20111024214949.GA5237@amd.home.annexia.org>
[Shawn, Peff, Nicolas: maybe you can say something on the
(non)raciness of xmalloc() in parallel with read_sha1_file(). See the
last paragraph below.]
Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 10:11:53PM +0200, Markus Trippelsdorf wrote:
> > Suddenly I'm getting strange protection faults when I run "git grep" on
> > the gcc tree:
>
> Jim Meyering and I are trying to chase what looks like a similar or
> identical bug in git-grep. We've not got much further than gdb and
> valgrind so far, but see:
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=747377
>
> It's slightly suspicious that this bug only started to happen with the
> latest glibc, but that could be coincidence, or could be just that
> glibc exposes a latent bug in git-grep.
I'm tempted to write this off as a GCC bug. If that's ok for you,
I'll leave further investigation and communication with the GCC folks
to you.
My findings are as follows:
It's easy to reproduce the behavior described in the above bug report,
using an F16 beta install in a VM. I gave the VM two cores, but
didn't test what happens with only one. By "easy" I mean I didn't
have to do any fiddling and it crashes at least one out of two times.
I looked at how git builds grep.o by saying
rm builtin/grep.o; make V=1
I then modified this to give me the assembly output from the compiler
gcc -S -s builtin/grep.o -c -MF builtin/.depend/grep.o.d -MMD -MP -g -O2 -Wall -I. -DHAVE_PATHS_H -DSHA1_HEADER='<openssl/sha.h>' -DNO_STRLCPY -DNO_MKSTEMPS builtin/grep.c
and looked at the result. To interpret the output, I would like to
remind you of the following snippets:
#define grep_lock() pthread_mutex_lock(&grep_mutex)
#define grep_unlock() pthread_mutex_unlock(&grep_mutex)
...
static struct work_item *get_work(void)
{
struct work_item *ret;
grep_lock();
while (todo_start == todo_end && !all_work_added) {
pthread_cond_wait(&cond_add, &grep_mutex);
}
...
}
...
static void *run(void *arg)
{
int hit = 0;
struct grep_opt *opt = arg;
while (1) {
struct work_item *w = get_work();
...
}
...
}
Getting back to assembly, near the beginning of run() I see (labels
and .p2align snipped):
.loc 1 162 0
movl todo_end(%rip), %ebx
.loc 1 125 0
movl $grep_mutex, %edi
call pthread_mutex_lock
.loc 1 126 0
movl todo_start(%rip), %eax
cmpl %ebx, %eax
I should say that I don't really know much about assembly, in
particular not enough to write two correct lines of it. But I can't
help noticing that it moved the load of todo_end *out of* the section
where grep_mutex is locked. And the comment near the top of the file
does say that the whole todo_* family is supposed to be protected by
that mutex. What's extra odd is that the .loc seems to indicate that
the moved load comes from work_done() instead of get_work(), which is
an entirely separate locked section!
Un-inlining the get_work helper using __attribute__((noinline)) makes
the assembly
movl $grep_mutex, %edi
call pthread_mutex_lock
.loc 1 127 0
movl todo_start(%rip), %eax
cmpl todo_end(%rip), %eax
je .L15
instead; i.e., the load is now after the lock. (Note that line
numbers were wiggled by inserting an __attribute__ line.) The
beginning of run() turns into exactly the same code if I instead
prohibit inlining of work_done().
So AFAICS, we're just unlucky to hit a GCC optimizer bug that voids
all guarantees given on locks.
That being said, I'm not entirely convinced that the code in
builtin/grep.c works in the face of memory pressure. It guards
against concurrent access to read_sha1_file() with the
read_sha1_mutex, but any call to xmalloc() outside of that mutex can
still potentially invoke the try_to_free_routine. Maybe one of the
pack experts can say whether this is safe. (However, I implemented
locking around try_to_free_routine as a quick hack and it did not fix
the issue discussed in the bug report.)
--
Thomas Rast
trast@{inf,student}.ethz.ch
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-10-25 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-10-24 20:11 general protection faults with "git grep" version 1.7.7.1 Markus Trippelsdorf
2011-10-24 21:49 ` Richard W.M. Jones
2011-10-24 22:58 ` Markus Trippelsdorf
2011-10-25 0:00 ` Bernt Hansen
2011-10-25 5:53 ` Jeff King
2011-10-25 11:11 ` Bernt Hansen
2011-10-25 13:50 ` Thomas Rast [this message]
2011-10-25 15:17 ` Jim Meyering
2011-10-25 15:32 ` Markus Trippelsdorf
2011-10-25 16:00 ` Thomas Rast
2011-10-25 16:07 ` Thomas Rast
2011-10-25 16:37 ` Jim Meyering
2011-10-25 16:54 ` Thomas Rast
2011-10-25 20:24 ` Jim Meyering
2011-10-25 15:37 ` Jeff King
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