From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jeff King Subject: Re: git ate my home directory :-( Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:48:04 -0400 Message-ID: <20130326174804.GB10383@sigill.intra.peff.net> References: <5150C3EC.6010608@nod.at> <20130325214343.GF1414@google.com> <7vboa7w2vm.fsf@alter.siamese.dyndns.org> <384BCFE976364F1EA6E56306566D003A@PhilipOakley> <51519DA0.4090201@nod.at> <20130326145637.GA3822@sigill.intra.peff.net> <5151D589.2000002@nod.at> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Cc: Richard Weinberger , Philip Oakley , Junio C Hamano , Jonathan Nieder , git@vger.kernel.org To: demerphq X-From: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Tue Mar 26 18:48:45 2013 Return-path: Envelope-to: gcvg-git-2@plane.gmane.org Received: from vger.kernel.org ([209.132.180.67]) by plane.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1UKXzF-0000ww-Qz for gcvg-git-2@plane.gmane.org; Tue, 26 Mar 2013 18:48:42 +0100 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755362Ab3CZRsK (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:48:10 -0400 Received: from 75-15-5-89.uvs.iplsin.sbcglobal.net ([75.15.5.89]:40445 "EHLO peff.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754693Ab3CZRsI (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:48:08 -0400 Received: (qmail 5374 invoked by uid 107); 26 Mar 2013 17:49:54 -0000 Received: from sigill.intra.peff.net (HELO sigill.intra.peff.net) (10.0.0.7) (smtp-auth username relayok, mechanism cram-md5) by peff.net (qpsmtpd/0.84) with ESMTPA; Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:49:54 -0400 Received: by sigill.intra.peff.net (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:48:04 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 06:20:09PM +0100, demerphq wrote: > Seconded. At $work lots of people started asking anxious questions > about this. It was suggested it is a potential security hole, although > I am not sure I agree, but the general idea being that if you could > manage to set this var in someones environment then they might use git > to do real damage to a system. (The counterargument being that if you > can set that in someones environment you can do worse already... But > im a not a security type so I cant say) IMHO, that is just silly. Setting GIT_WORK_TREE=/ would be just as destructive. Or GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF="rm -rf /" (or GIT_PAGER, etc). If there is a danger to the implicit-workdir behavior, it is due to accidental usage, not from a malicious attack. -Peff