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From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: Richard Hansen <rhansen@bbn.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org, sitaramc@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [SECURITY PATCH] git-prompt.sh: don't put unsanitized branch names in $PS1
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2014 16:24:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140421202454.GA6062@sigill.intra.peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1398107248-32140-1-git-send-email-rhansen@bbn.com>

On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 03:07:28PM -0400, Richard Hansen wrote:

> Both bash and zsh subject the value of PS1 to parameter expansion,
> command substitution, and arithmetic expansion.  Rather than include
> the raw, unescaped branch name in PS1 when running in two- or
> three-argument mode, construct PS1 to reference a variable that holds
> the branch name.  Because the shells do not recursively expand, this
> avoids arbitrary code execution by specially-crafted branch names such
> as '$(IFS=_;cmd=sudo_rm_-rf_/;$cmd)'.

Cute. We already disallow quite a few characters in refnames (including
space, as you probably discovered), and generally enforce that during
ref transfer. I wonder if we should tighten that more as a precuation.
It would be backwards-incompatible, but I wonder if things like "$" and
";" in refnames are actually useful to people.

Did you look into similar exploits with completion? That's probably
slightly less dire (this one hits you as soon as you "cd" into a
malicious clone, whereas completion problems require you to actually hit
<tab>). I'm fairly sure that we miss some quoting on pathnames, for
example. That can lead to bogus completion, but I'm not sure offhand if
it can lead to execution.

-Peff

  reply	other threads:[~2014-04-21 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-21 19:07 [SECURITY PATCH] git-prompt.sh: don't put unsanitized branch names in $PS1 Richard Hansen
2014-04-21 20:24 ` Jeff King [this message]
2014-04-21 21:07   ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-22  8:38   ` Michael Haggerty
2014-04-22 17:38     ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-22 18:38       ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-22 19:47         ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:23 ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:33   ` Junio C Hamano
2014-04-21 22:58     ` Richard Hansen
2014-04-21 23:53       ` [SECURITY PATCH v2] " Richard Hansen
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-04-24 18:40 [SECURITY PATCH] " Gábor Szeder
2014-04-25  7:37 ` Simon Oosthoek
2014-04-25 16:39   ` Richard Hansen

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