From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Git Mailing List <git@vger.kernel.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
"Linux-Kernel@Vger. Kernel. Org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
twaugh@redhat.com, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/1] apply: reject input that touches outside $cwd
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 14:16:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150130191621.GA30156@peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <xmqqegqcccjt.fsf@gitster.dls.corp.google.com>
On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 11:07:34AM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> Jeff King <peff@peff.net> writes:
>
> > It looks like your new --allow-uplevel goes to verify_path(). So this
> > isn't just about "..", but it will also protect against applying a patch
> > inside ".git". Which seems like a good thing to me, but I wonder if the
> > option name is a little misleading.
>
> True; not just misleading but is incorrect, I would say.
> Suggestions?
I think just "--verify-paths" (and "--no-verify-paths", since the former
would be the default) might be fine. That leaves the definition of
"verify" vague, but I think that's OK. It used to mean "no '..' and no
'.git'", and now it has been widened to include "no weird
filesystem-specific variants of .git".
If you wanted to avoid the negative being the commonly used option,
maybe "--unsafe-paths" (or "--allow-unsafe-paths" if you like verbs).
-Peff
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-30 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-26 16:29 patch-2.7.3 no longer applies relative symbolic link patches Josh Boyer
2015-01-26 16:32 ` Josh Boyer
2015-01-26 20:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-01-26 21:01 ` David Kastrup
2015-01-26 21:07 ` Josh Boyer
2015-01-26 21:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-01-26 21:35 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-26 21:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-01-27 15:47 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-31 21:27 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2015-01-26 22:15 ` Josh Boyer
2015-01-27 3:27 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-27 20:39 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-29 6:05 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-29 6:34 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-29 20:45 ` [PATCH] apply: refuse touching a file beyond symlink Junio C Hamano
2015-01-29 22:15 ` Stefan Beller
2015-01-29 23:48 ` [PATCH 2/1] apply: reject input that touches outside $cwd Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 18:24 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 19:07 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 19:16 ` Jeff King [this message]
2015-01-30 9:04 ` [PATCH] apply: refuse touching a file beyond symlink Christian Couder
2015-01-30 18:11 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 19:42 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 19:46 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 19:48 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 20:07 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 20:32 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 20:11 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 20:16 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 20:20 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 20:48 ` Jeff King
2015-01-30 21:10 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-30 21:50 ` Junio C Hamano
2015-01-27 15:26 ` patch-2.7.3 no longer applies relative symbolic link patches Andreas Gruenbacher
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