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From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: Hui Yiqun <huiyiqun@gmail.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org, gitster@pobox.com, pickfire@riseup.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH/RFC/GSoC 1/3] path.c: implement xdg_runtime_dir()
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 13:06:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160316170623.GB4039@sigill.intra.peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458122865-29447-1-git-send-email-huiyiqun@gmail.com>

On Wed, Mar 16, 2016 at 06:07:43PM +0800, Hui Yiqun wrote:

> +	if (runtime_dir && *runtime_dir)
> +		git_runtime_dir = mkpathdup("%s/git/", runtime_dir);
> +	else
> +		git_runtime_dir = mkpathdup("/tmp/git-%d", uid);

Here we allocate the string, but later we may return NULL on error,
leaking the allocated memory.

> +	if (!lstat(git_runtime_dir, &st)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * As described in XDG base dir spec[1], the subdirectory
> +		 * under $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR or its fallback MUST be owned by
> +		 * the user, and its unix access mode MUST be 0700.
> +		 *
> +		 * Calling chmod or chown silently may cause security
> +		 * problem if somebody chdir to it, sleep, and then, try
> +		 * to open our protected runtime cache or socket.
> +		 * So we just put warning and left it to user to solve.
> +		 *
> +		 * [1]https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/
> +		 * basedir-spec-latest.html
> +		 */

OK. I think these checks should be sufficient to deal with the /tmp race
I mentioned elsewhere in the thread (assuming that an attacker cannot
flip the uid back and forth in the same way, but that should be true on
Unix systems).

> +		if ((st.st_mode & 0777) != S_IRWXU) {
> +			fprintf(stderr,
> +					"permission of runtime directory '%s' "
> +					"MUST be 0700 instead of 0%o\n",
> +					git_runtime_dir, (st.st_mode & 0777));
> +			return NULL;
> +		} else if (st.st_uid != uid) {
> +			fprintf(stderr,
> +					"owner of runtime directory '%s' "
> +					"MUST be %d instead of %d\n",
> +					git_runtime_dir, uid, st.st_uid);
> +			return NULL;
> +		}

Should these be using warning(), rather than a raw fprintf?

> +	} else {
> +		if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(git_runtime_dir) < 0) {
> +			fprintf(stderr,
> +					"unable to create directories for '%s'\n",
> +					git_runtime_dir);
> +			return NULL;
> +		}
> +		if (mkdir(git_runtime_dir, 0700) < 0) {
> +			fprintf(stderr,
> +					"unable to mkdir '%s'\n", git_runtime_dir);
> +			return NULL;
> +		}
> +	}

And this retains the un-racy mkdir(). Good.

> +	free(git_runtime_dir);
> +	return mkpathdup("%s/%s", git_runtime_dir, filename);

This mkpathdup accesses the string we just freed?

It might be easier to just use a strbuf here, and then you can append to
it at the end.

-Peff

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-16 17:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-14 14:47 [GSOC] Microproject "Move ~/.git-credential-cache to ~/.config/git" 惠轶群
2016-03-14 15:42 ` Junio C Hamano
2016-03-14 19:53   ` 惠轶群
2016-03-14 20:33     ` Junio C Hamano
2016-03-15  1:32       ` 惠轶群
2016-03-15  2:14         ` Your friend
     [not found]           ` <CAKqreux-m3yHVsEQXdf+8vMNZwC0UCMBWnzbaqYJbdEEM14qiQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-03-15  5:56             ` Ivan Tham
2016-03-15  3:13         ` Jeff King
     [not found]           ` <CAKqreuwv+RRziS-NcaLYZYUN0_KrfgZSe6wp0wGBza4q3_x8RA@mail.gmail.com>
2016-03-15 19:21             ` Jeff King
2016-03-16 10:45               ` 惠轶群
2016-03-16 10:07 ` [PATCH/RFC/GSoC 1/3] path.c: implement xdg_runtime_dir() Hui Yiqun
2016-03-16 10:07   ` [PATCH/RFC/GSoC 2/3] git-credential-cache: put socket to xdg-compatible path Hui Yiqun
2016-03-17 10:26     ` 惠轶群
2016-03-16 10:07   ` [PATCH/RFC/GSoC 3/3] t0301: test credential-cache support of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR Hui Yiqun
2016-03-16 16:17     ` Junio C Hamano
2016-03-16 16:40       ` 惠轶群
2016-03-16 16:55         ` Jeff King
2016-03-16 17:24         ` Junio C Hamano
2016-03-17  3:59           ` 谭俊浩
2016-03-17  8:12             ` Junio C Hamano
2016-03-17 10:10               ` 惠轶群
2016-03-17  9:45           ` 惠轶群
2016-03-16 17:15     ` Jeff King
2016-03-18  4:35       ` 惠轶群
     [not found]       ` <CAKqreuw7Am_wZQjYYjvsxx0Ccr4OOwoF=EnLvMTK9jxeBUFv5Q@mail.gmail.com>
2016-03-18  5:00         ` Jeff King
2016-03-18  5:11           ` 惠轶群
2016-03-18  6:02             ` 惠轶群
2016-03-18  6:12               ` [PATCH] credential-cache--daemon: clarify "exit" action semantics Jeff King
2016-03-16 17:06   ` Jeff King [this message]
2016-03-17 10:20     ` [PATCH/RFC/GSoC 1/3] path.c: implement xdg_runtime_dir() 惠轶群

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