[PATCH 0/1] Restore the ability to clone repositories owned by another user

["brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>]

For a long time, we've told users that the only safe way to operate on
an untrusted repository is to clone or fetch from it.  We've even
mentioned this policy in a variety of places in our documentation.

However, f4aa8c8bb1 ("fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local
repositories", 2024-04-10), this changed in an attempt to make things
more secure.  That broke a lot of user use cases, which have been
reported to the list.

Because our security model hasn't changed and it's still safe to clone
or fetch from an untrusted repository, let's revert a portion of that
change to allow us to clone and fetch from repositories owned by a
different user.  If a malicious repository were a problem for
upload-pack, that would probably also be exploitable on major forges,
and if it were a problem on the client side, then we'd also have a
problem with untrusted HTTPS remotes, so we're not really adding any
security risk here.

This matter was discussed extensively in the thread starting at
https://lore.kernel.org/git/ZqUc8DJ1uKcHYlcy@imp.flyn.org/.

Note that I haven't signed off on this patch because it's based on one
from Junio and I haven't gotten his sign-off yet.  It's fine to add mine
once he's added his.

brian m. carlson (1):
  Allow cloning from repositories owned by another user

 Documentation/git-clone.txt   |  9 +++++++++
 builtin/upload-pack.c         |  5 ++++-
 daemon.c                      |  6 ++++--
 path.c                        | 10 ++++++----
 path.h                        | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh |  3 ---
 t/t5605-clone-local.sh        | 10 ++++++++++
 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)