From: Christian Couder <christian.couder@gmail.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>,
"brian m . carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>,
Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>,
Karthik Nayak <karthik.188@gmail.com>, Jeff King <peff@peff.net>,
Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>,
Christian Couder <christian.couder@gmail.com>,
Christian Couder <chriscool@tuxfamily.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] setup: extract path_allowlist_apply()
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 15:55:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260807135511.1818458-3-christian.couder@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260807135511.1818458-1-christian.couder@gmail.com>
In a following commit we are going to check whether a repository is
part of an allowlist specified in a config variable.
To prepare for that let's extract existing code from
safe_directory_cb() into a new path_allowlist_apply() helper that will
help with such checks.
While at it let's make the helper's code simpler and more generic.
Signed-off-by: Christian Couder <chriscool@tuxfamily.org>
---
setup.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/setup.c b/setup.c
index 95909e9603..39dfa1cc5f 100644
--- a/setup.c
+++ b/setup.c
@@ -1339,6 +1339,64 @@ static int canonicalize_ceiling_entry(struct string_list_item *item,
}
}
+static void path_allowlist_apply(const char *key, const char *value,
+ const char *target_path, int *is_match)
+{
+ char *allowed = NULL;
+ char *normalized = NULL;
+
+ if (!value || !*value) {
+ *is_match = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(value, "*")) {
+ *is_match = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (git_config_pathname(&allowed, key, value) || !allowed)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Setting the config variable to a non-absolute path makes
+ * little sense---it won't be relative to the configuration
+ * file the item is defined in. Except for ".", which means
+ * "if we are at the top level of a repository, then it is
+ * OK", which is slightly tighter than "*" that allows
+ * discovery.
+ */
+ if (!is_absolute_path(allowed) && strcmp(allowed, ".")) {
+ warning(_("%s '%s' not absolute"), key, allowed);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A .gitconfig in $HOME may be shared across different
+ * machines and the config variable entries may or may not
+ * exist as paths on all of these machines. In other words,
+ * it is not a warning worthy event when there is no such path
+ * on this machine---the entry may be useful elsewhere.
+ */
+ normalized = real_pathdup(allowed, 0);
+ if (!normalized)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (ends_with(normalized, "/*")) {
+ size_t len = strlen(normalized);
+ if (!fspathncmp(normalized, target_path, len - 1))
+ *is_match = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!fspathcmp(target_path, normalized))
+ *is_match = 1;
+
+end:
+ free(normalized);
+ free(allowed);
+}
+
struct safe_directory_data {
char *path;
int is_safe;
@@ -1352,54 +1410,7 @@ static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value,
if (strcmp(key, "safe.directory"))
return 0;
- if (!value || !*value) {
- data->is_safe = 0;
- } else if (!strcmp(value, "*")) {
- data->is_safe = 1;
- } else {
- char *allowed = NULL;
-
- if (!git_config_pathname(&allowed, key, value) && allowed) {
- char *normalized = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Setting safe.directory to a non-absolute path
- * makes little sense---it won't be relative to
- * the configuration file the item is defined in.
- * Except for ".", which means "if we are at the top
- * level of a repository, then it is OK", which is
- * slightly tighter than "*" that allows discovery.
- */
- if (!is_absolute_path(allowed) && strcmp(allowed, ".")) {
- warning(_("safe.directory '%s' not absolute"),
- allowed);
- goto next;
- }
-
- /*
- * A .gitconfig in $HOME may be shared across
- * different machines and safe.directory entries
- * may or may not exist as paths on all of these
- * machines. In other words, it is not a warning
- * worthy event when there is no such path on this
- * machine---the entry may be useful elsewhere.
- */
- normalized = real_pathdup(allowed, 0);
- if (!normalized)
- goto next;
-
- if (ends_with(normalized, "/*")) {
- size_t len = strlen(normalized);
- if (!fspathncmp(normalized, data->path, len - 1))
- data->is_safe = 1;
- } else if (!fspathcmp(data->path, normalized)) {
- data->is_safe = 1;
- }
- next:
- free(normalized);
- free(allowed);
- }
- }
+ path_allowlist_apply(key, value, data->path, &data->is_safe);
return 0;
}
--
2.55.0.530.gdb3615d990.dirty
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-07 13:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-10 8:51 [PATCH 0/3] Introduce a 'fromAccepted' option to GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH Christian Couder
2026-07-10 8:51 ` [PATCH 1/3] promisor-remote: factor out lazy_fetch_objects() Christian Couder
2026-07-10 8:51 ` [PATCH 2/3] promisor-remote: introduce enum allow_lazy_fetch Christian Couder
2026-07-10 8:51 ` [PATCH 3/3] promisor-remote: teach 'fromAccepted' to GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH Christian Couder
2026-07-10 19:50 ` [PATCH 0/3] Introduce a 'fromAccepted' option " brian m. carlson
2026-07-12 9:06 ` Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:55 ` [PATCH 0/5] Introduce 'uploadpack.lazyFetchTrusted' Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:55 ` [PATCH 1/5] promisor-remote: factor out lazy_fetch_objects() Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:58 ` Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:55 ` Christian Couder [this message]
2026-08-07 13:55 ` [PATCH 3/5] setup: add 'allow_dot' arg to path_allowlist_apply() Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:55 ` [PATCH 4/5] upload-pack: read uploadpack.lazyFetchTrusted Christian Couder
2026-08-07 13:55 ` [PATCH 5/5] builtin/upload-pack: set GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH to 0 on trusted repo Christian Couder
2026-08-07 18:31 ` [PATCH 0/5] Introduce 'uploadpack.lazyFetchTrusted' Junio C Hamano
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