From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Kevin Smith Subject: Re: Mercurial 0.4b vs git patchbomb benchmark Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 20:24:04 -0400 Message-ID: <4276C4A4.6020103@qualitycode.com> References: <200505022106.OAA28850@emf.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: git@vger.kernel.org X-From: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Tue May 03 02:19:36 2005 Return-path: Received: from vger.kernel.org ([12.107.209.244]) by ciao.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1DSl72-0002IY-D5 for gcvg-git@gmane.org; Tue, 03 May 2005 02:18:09 +0200 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261246AbVECAYR (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 May 2005 20:24:17 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261247AbVECAYR (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 May 2005 20:24:17 -0400 Received: from deuterium.rootr.net ([203.194.209.160]:45666 "EHLO vulcan.rootr.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261246AbVECAYO (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 May 2005 20:24:14 -0400 Received: from [10.10.10.20] (147-49.35-65.tampabay.res.rr.com [65.35.49.147]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by vulcan.rootr.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8E4E3C0A for ; Tue, 3 May 2005 00:24:06 +0000 (UTC) User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (X11/20050325) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en In-Reply-To: <200505022106.OAA28850@emf.net> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.90.2.0 X-Enigmail-Supports: pgp-inline, pgp-mime To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Sender: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org Tom Lord wrote: > More bluntly, given just a (1),(3) pair, Bob is extending his vulnerability > to include a reliance on Alice's patch-computing tools. If Alice were > known to be signing a (1),(2) pair which she had reviewed in detail, > then Bob's vulnerability stays at just his local patch-handling tools > and his general trust of Alice. I'm no expert, but it seems the opposite argument could be made as well. By signing (1)(3), I am asserting that (3) is, in fact, what I intended the end result to be. If I instead sign (1)(2), then it is possible that your patching tools might end up producing something other than (3). Personally, I still like the self-contained nature of signing (1)(2), but I haven't yet heard a security argument in its favor. Kevin