From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Johannes Sixt Subject: Re: [RFC] Authenticate push via PGP signature, not SSH Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2008 09:00:40 +0100 Message-ID: <47A02EA8.50507@viscovery.net> References: <479D5611.4010205@vilain.net> <20080128081258.GE24004@spearce.org> <479E5021.7010404@vilain.net> <20080129041000.GK24004@spearce.org> <20080129190845.GC30093@artemis.madism.org> <20080130042201.GO24004@spearce.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Pierre Habouzit , Sam Vilain , git@vger.kernel.org To: "Shawn O. Pearce" X-From: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Wed Jan 30 09:01:31 2008 Return-path: Envelope-to: gcvg-git-2@gmane.org Received: from vger.kernel.org ([209.132.176.167]) by lo.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.50) id 1JK7su-0006EV-Dw for gcvg-git-2@gmane.org; Wed, 30 Jan 2008 09:01:28 +0100 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752528AbYA3IAq (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2008 03:00:46 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753151AbYA3IAq (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2008 03:00:46 -0500 Received: from lilzmailso01.liwest.at ([212.33.55.23]:19739 "EHLO lilzmailso01.liwest.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752425AbYA3IAp (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2008 03:00:45 -0500 Received: from cm56-163-160.liwest.at ([86.56.163.160] helo=linz.eudaptics.com) by lilzmailso01.liwest.at with esmtpa (Exim 4.66) (envelope-from ) id 1JK7rt-0003Vj-V0; Wed, 30 Jan 2008 09:00:26 +0100 Received: from [127.0.0.1] (J6T.linz.viscovery [192.168.1.42]) by linz.eudaptics.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 980FB69F; Wed, 30 Jan 2008 09:00:40 +0100 (CET) User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.6 (Windows/20070728) In-Reply-To: <20080130042201.GO24004@spearce.org> X-Spam-Score: 1.7 (+) X-Spam-Report: ALL_TRUSTED=-1.8, BAYES_99=3.5 Sender: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: Shawn O. Pearce schrieb: > I'm currently finishing a side-band-64k protocol extension to the > send-pack/receive-pack pair. My next task after I flush those > RFC patches out to the list tonight will be to prototype at least > some of the auth1 extension I described. I propose to make the syntax of the extension server capability: auth=: client response: auth= where is a random sequence of non-blank ASCII text, not necessarily of a fixed length, but perhaps of a minimum length. Then we can extend the list of hash algorithms (that are used for authentication purposes) if people think that SHA1 is not secure enough: auth=SHA1,SHA256:random-stuff-goes-here I'm not a security expert, so take this with a grain of salt. -- Hannes