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Subject: Re: git format-patch --in-reply-to allows header injection. Intended?
Date: Thu, 04 Sep 2014 23:42:29 +0200
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To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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On 04/09/14 23:36, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> While I do not think of a reason to specify such a string to the
> in-reply-to option (I'd rather edit the output in the editor if I
> wanted to do anything fancy [*1*]), I do not think there is a reason
> why you want to add a code to forbid such use, either.

My question was to find out whether I can pass untrusted user input to
--in-reply-to and expect that no header beyond "In-Reply-To" and
"References" is modified, but your answer makes clear that I cannot.

A possible alternative might have been that git verifies that the input
to --in-reply-to matches the format specified RFC2822 (section 3.6.4.).

Thanks!