From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
To: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Cc: "brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>, git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Limited operations in unsafe repositories
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 08:17:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZZ-V-vwnm2hOkrMC@tanuki> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240111070114.GB48154@coredump.intra.peff.net>
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On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 02:01:14AM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 11:34:04PM +0000, brian m. carlson wrote:
>
> > On 2024-01-10 at 12:05:31, Jeff King wrote:
> > > My thinking is to flip that around: run all code, but put protection in
> > > the spots that do unsafe things, like loading config or examining
> > > hooks. I.e., a patch like this:
> >
> > I think that's much what I had intended to do with not invoking binaries
> > at all, except that it was limited to rev-parse. I wonder if perhaps we
> > could do something similar if we had the `--assume-unsafe` argument you
> > proposed, except that we would only allow the `git` binary and always
> > pass that argument to it in such a case.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "invoking binaries". I had assumed that
> meant just running other Git sub-processes. But if "--assume-unsafe" is
> just setting an environment variable, they'd automatically be protected.
>
> > I don't think reading config is intrinsically unsafe; it's more of what
> > we do with it, which is spawning external processes, that's the problem.
> > I suppose an argument could be made for injecting terminal sequences or
> > such, though. Hooks, obviously, are definitely unsafe.
>
> Right, it's not config itself that's unsafe; it's that many options are.
> We could try to annotate them to say "it is OK to parse core.eol but not
> core.pager", presumably with an allow-known-good approach (since so many
> ard bad!). But that feels like an ongoing maintenance headache, and an
> easy way to make a mistake (your mention of terminal sequences makes me
> assume you're thinking of "color.diff.*", etc). A rule like "we do not
> read repo-level config at all" seems easier to explain (to me, anyway).
With the exemption of the repository format, I assume? We have to parse
things like `core.repositoryFormatVersion` and extensions in order to
figure out how a repository has to be accessed. So I agree that we
should not partition config based on safeness, which is going to be a
headache as you rightly point out. But we can partition based on whether
or not config is required in order to access the repository, where the
set of relevant config keys is a whole lot smaller.
Patrick
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-11 7:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-07 19:40 Limited operations in unsafe repositories brian m. carlson
2024-01-10 12:05 ` Jeff King
2024-01-10 23:34 ` brian m. carlson
2024-01-11 0:04 ` Junio C Hamano
2024-01-11 7:01 ` Jeff King
2024-01-11 7:17 ` Patrick Steinhardt [this message]
2024-01-11 7:30 ` Jeff King
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