From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jakub Narebski Subject: Re: Repository Security Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:06:09 +0100 Organization: At home Message-ID: References: <200701221433.13257.andre@masella.no-ip.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit X-From: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Tue Jan 23 12:05:52 2007 Return-path: Envelope-to: gcvg-git@gmane.org Received: from vger.kernel.org ([209.132.176.167]) by lo.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.50) id 1H9JTG-0006pj-F1 for gcvg-git@gmane.org; Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:05:46 +0100 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932965AbXAWLFn (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jan 2007 06:05:43 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S932967AbXAWLFn (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jan 2007 06:05:43 -0500 Received: from main.gmane.org ([80.91.229.2]:53831 "EHLO ciao.gmane.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932965AbXAWLFm (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jan 2007 06:05:42 -0500 Received: from list by ciao.gmane.org with local (Exim 4.43) id 1H9JT5-0002R4-Qt for git@vger.kernel.org; Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:05:35 +0100 Received: from host-81-190-20-200.torun.mm.pl ([81.190.20.200]) by main.gmane.org with esmtp (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:05:35 +0100 Received: from jnareb by host-81-190-20-200.torun.mm.pl with local (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:05:35 +0100 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ To: git@vger.kernel.org X-Complaints-To: usenet@sea.gmane.org X-Gmane-NNTP-Posting-Host: host-81-190-20-200.torun.mm.pl Mail-Copies-To: jnareb@gmail.com User-Agent: KNode/0.10.2 Sender: git-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: Andre Masella wrote: > I've been using git for a while and really like it, but I have a concern about > security. > > As I understand it, none of the repository backends allow any per-user > per-branch access control. SSH and HTTP come the closest with the right > hooks, but since the repository is writeable by those users, there is little > to stop them from changing the repository directly. I wonder if it would be enought for SSH (and perhaps HTTP/WebDAV access) just to rely on filesystem write access to refs/heads files (different files having different access rights), and filesystem ACLs. -- Jakub Narebski Warsaw, Poland ShadeHawk on #git