From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org, "Randall S. Becker" <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] reftable/stack: accept insecure random bytes
Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2025 09:40:58 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqo70hmcet.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z36l--QUjaYYb6Uf@pks.im> (Patrick Steinhardt's message of "Wed, 8 Jan 2025 17:21:15 +0100")
Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> writes:
> Hm. The problem is when Git dies in the middle of a transaction:
>
> 1. We write the temporary table.
> 2. We compute the not-so-random suffix.
> 3. We write the temporary "tables.list" file.
> 4. We move the temporary table into place using the not-so-random
> suffix.
> 5. Git dies before updating "tables.list".
>
> Now we have the temporary table moved into place, but "tables.list"
> hasn't been updated yet. When the next Git process comes along and wants
> to update the table it would result in an error if it computed the same
> suffix.
Here, I hear that we _do_ depend on the suffix being relatively
unique. Once our random number generator decides to give the same
number twice to cause collision, the reftable data gets corrupt?
> The reftable library knows to clean up such stale tables when not
> referenced by the "tables.list" file, but it doesn't do so on every
> write. So this would likely still cause issues in practice.
>
> I already though about this scenario when writing my mail, but didn't
> really think about it as "correctness". But I guess it is.
Hmph. I am not sure how I should feel about this. Our reliance on
hash functions (which can be made to collide) not colliding is one
thing, but is it sensibly safe to rely on a cryptographically
unpredictable random generator not to yield the same suffix twice
during the lifetime of an previous invocation for correctness?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-08 17:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-07 15:26 [PATCH 0/2] reftable/stack: stop dying on exhausted entropy pool Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-07 15:26 ` [PATCH 1/2] wrapper: allow generating insecure random bytes Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-07 15:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] reftable/stack: accept " Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-07 15:37 ` rsbecker
2025-01-07 20:56 ` Junio C Hamano
2025-01-07 21:03 ` rsbecker
2025-01-07 21:09 ` Junio C Hamano
2025-01-07 21:03 ` Junio C Hamano
2025-01-08 6:51 ` Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-08 15:39 ` Junio C Hamano
2025-01-08 16:21 ` Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-08 17:40 ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2025-01-08 18:16 ` Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-07 23:56 ` rsbecker
2025-01-07 23:21 ` [PATCH 0/2] reftable/stack: stop dying on exhausted entropy pool brian m. carlson
2025-01-07 23:54 ` rsbecker
2025-01-08 7:18 ` Patrick Steinhardt
2025-01-08 13:50 ` rsbecker
2025-01-08 22:44 ` brian m. carlson
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