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From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>,
	 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>,
	 git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends
Date: Tue, 28 May 2024 10:47:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqzfs94ynb.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8353645a-a684-417a-8b0e-d8cbd7da6b5a@gmail.com> (Phillip Wood's message of "Tue, 28 May 2024 16:02:37 +0100")

Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> writes:

>> And there is a good reason _not_ to write stuff inside the `.git/`
>> directory unless you happen to be, well, Git itself: Git makes no
>> guarantees whatsoever that you can write into that directory whatever you
>> want. A future Git version might even write a file `.git/annex`, breaking
>> `git-annex`' assumptions, and that'd be totally within the guarantees Git
>> makes.
>
> This seems a bit harsh - many tools store their state under .git/ and
> I think it makes sense for them to do so as it avoids creating
> untracked files in the working copy. I would hope that we'd be
> considerate of widely used tools such as 'git annex' when adding new
> paths under .git/

Yes, a .git/annex file _can_ happen, but between civilized developer
groups, such a thing would not happen without a good reason.  If we
have no good reason (apparently you and I did not think of any) to
create such a file, "it can happen" is a poor straw-man, as we would
be aiming to work well together.

Yes, when we have a symbolic link as a tracked content, updating the
target of the link when we need to update it is simply a bug, and it
does not matter if it points at a file inside our own repository, or
a file inside a different and unrelated repository that is owned by
the same user, or a file in the user's home directory.  Our own
repository is not all that special from that perspective, and a
change to penalize symbolic links that point into our repository
specifically probably did make a bad choice.

Thanks.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-28 17:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-21 19:56 [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 01/12] send-email: drop FakeTerm hack Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  8:19   ` Dragan Simic
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 02/12] send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  8:15   ` Dragan Simic
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 03/12] ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 04/12] ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 05/12] ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 06/12] hook: plug a new memory leak Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 07/12] init: use the correct path of the templates directory again Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 08/12] Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 09/12] tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 22:57   ` Brooke Kuhlmann
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 10/12] clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 11/12] Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 12/12] Revert "fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:43   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  7:27     ` Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-22 17:20       ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:45 ` [rPATCH 13/12] Merge branch 'jc/fix-aggressive-protection-2.39' Junio C Hamano
2024-05-23 10:36   ` Reviewing merge commits, was " Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-23 14:41     ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:45 ` [rPATCH 14/12] Merge branch 'jc/fix-aggressive-protection-2.40' Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 21:33   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 21:14 ` [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-21 21:46   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 22:13     ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22 10:01 ` Joey Hess
2024-05-23  5:49   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-23 16:31     ` Joey Hess
2024-05-27 19:51       ` Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-28  2:25         ` Joey Hess
2024-05-28 15:02         ` Phillip Wood
2024-05-28 16:13           ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-28 17:47           ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2024-05-23 23:32     ` Junio C Hamano

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