From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
To: grub-devel@gnu.org
Cc: jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com, julian.klode@canonical.com,
mate.kukri@canonical.com, pjones@redhat.com, msuchanek@suse.com,
mlewando@redhat.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
ltcgcw@linux.vnet.ibm.com, ssrish@linux.ibm.com,
stefanb@linux.ibm.com, avnish@linux.ibm.com,
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>,
Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 15/23] ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 17:15:32 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250709114540.58608-16-sudhakar@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250709114540.58608-1-sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2 or greater,
enter lockdown.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 2 +-
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 +
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index cfa5d5c0b..67930f63d 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -9060,7 +9060,7 @@ platforms.
@section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
-if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
+if the UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes
limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and
widely used within GRUB.
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index 4113cb0ef..214856b5a 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ kernel = {
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
+ powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
index a5586f85b..f19d5cda9 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
#if defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__i386__)
#include <grub/ieee1275/alloc.h>
#endif
+#if defined(__powerpc__)
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#endif
/* The maximum heap size we're going to claim at boot. Not used by sparc. */
#ifdef __i386__
@@ -995,6 +998,41 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
}
}
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+static void
+grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot (void)
+{
+ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
+ int rc;
+ grub_uint32_t is_sb;
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/", &root);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "couldn't find / node");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_get_integer_property (root, "ibm,secure-boot", &is_sb, sizeof (is_sb), 0);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "couldn't examine /ibm,secure-boot property");
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * ibm,secure-boot:
+ * 0 - disabled
+ * 1 - audit
+ * 2 - enforce
+ * 3 - enforce + OS-specific behaviour
+ *
+ * We only support enforce.
+ */
+ if (is_sb >= 2)
+ grub_lockdown ();
+}
+#endif
+
grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
void
@@ -1020,6 +1058,10 @@ grub_machine_init (void)
#else
grub_install_get_time_ms (grub_rtc_get_time_ms);
#endif
+
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+ grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot ();
+#endif
}
void
diff --git a/include/grub/lockdown.h b/include/grub/lockdown.h
index 40531fa82..ebfee4bf0 100644
--- a/include/grub/lockdown.h
+++ b/include/grub/lockdown.h
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0
#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1
-#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI) || \
+ (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275))
extern void
EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
extern int
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-09 11:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-09 11:45 [PATCH v4 00/23] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] pgp: Factor out rsa_pad Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-24 8:55 ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2025-07-31 12:01 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-01 1:24 ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] appended signatures: Verification tests Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] appended signatures: Documentation Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy [this message]
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] ieee1275: Read the DB and DBX secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] appendedsig: create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] appendedsig: verify the kernel using " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] appendedsig: Read default DB keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 21/23] appendedsig: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] appendedsig: Documentation Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-07-09 11:45 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] appendedsig test: Replace the certificate number with an x.509 certificate Sudhakar Kuppusamy
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