From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
To: grub-devel@gnu.org
Cc: dja@axtens.net, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
julian.klode@canonical.com, mate.kukri@canonical.com,
pjones@redhat.com, msuchanek@suse.com, mlewando@redhat.com,
stefanb@linux.ibm.com, avnish@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
ssrish@linux.ibm.com, Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>,
sridharm@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH v8 16/20] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 13:25:09 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250821075513.82881-17-sudhakar@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250821075513.82881-1-sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Introducing the following db and dbx commands
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes
from the db list.
2. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
hashes from the dbx list.
3. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
4. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
5. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
6. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
must be signed with an appended signature.
3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary
hash file must be signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 427 ++++++++++++++++++-
include/grub/file.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index 146017867..bc2cec977 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
/* Public key type. */
#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0
+#define OPTION_CERT_HASH 1
+
/* Appended signature magic string. */
static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
@@ -102,6 +105,13 @@ static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
*/
static bool check_sigs = false;
+static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
+{
+ {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+ {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+ {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+};
+
static void
register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
static void
@@ -191,10 +201,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), cons
if (grub_pks_is_support_pks == true && grub_pks_use_keystore == false)
build_pks_keystore ();
+ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
grub_pks_use_keystore = true;
+ register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
}
else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
- grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+ {
+ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+ grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+ register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+ }
ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
if (ret == NULL)
@@ -751,6 +767,52 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert)
}
}
+/*
+ * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
+ * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
+ * the same data.
+ * Example: sha256 hash data
+ * 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4|
+ * 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
+ *
+ * An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data
+ * by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex
+ * to display it.
+ * Example: Sha256 hash data
+ * 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34:
+ * b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7
+ */
+static void
+dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
+{
+ grub_size_t i, count = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length - 1; i++)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
+ count++;
+ if (count == 16)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("\n\t ");
+ count = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
+ if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
{
@@ -783,7 +845,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
}
/*
- * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled.
+ * And add it to the db list if it is not already present.
* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
* trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -823,6 +886,14 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
return err;
}
+ /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+ "could not add trusted certificate, as it is present in the dbx list");
+ }
+
if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
{
certificate_release (cert);
@@ -842,6 +913,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
/*
* Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present.
+ * And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is
+ * enabled.
* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
* distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
* The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -851,7 +924,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
* without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
*
* Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command
- * does not persist across reboots.
+ * does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the
+ * append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the
+ * append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console.
*/
static grub_err_t
grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
@@ -862,8 +937,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
if (argc != 1)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
- "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
- "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
+ "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s",
+ ((grub_pks_use_keystore == true) ?
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" :
+ "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n"));
if (*args == NULL)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 certificate file");
@@ -883,8 +960,30 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
/* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
remove_cert_from_db (cert);
- certificate_release (cert);
- grub_free (cert);
+
+ /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+ {
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+ "could not add distrusted certificate, as it is present in the dbx list");
+ }
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added distrusted certificate with CN: %s to the dbx list\n",
+ cert->subject);
+
+ cert->next = dbx.certs;
+ dbx.certs = cert;
+ dbx.cert_entries++;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+ }
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
@@ -909,9 +1008,281 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
}
+ /* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (db.signatures[i] != NULL)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("Binary hash %u:\n", i + 1);
+ grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+ dump_data_to_hex (db.signatures[i], db.signature_size[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+ int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+ for (cert = dbx.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("Certificate %u:\n", cert_num);
+ grub_printf ("\tserial: ");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+ grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+
+ grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+ grub_printf ("\tissuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
+ grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (dbx.signatures[i] != NULL)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("Certificate/Binary hash %u:\n", i + 1);
+ grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+ dump_data_to_hex (dbx.signatures[i], dbx.signature_size[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+read_hash_from_file (char *file_path, grub_uint8_t **hash_data, grub_size_t *hash_data_size)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_file_t hash_file;
+
+ hash_file = grub_file_open (file_path, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+ if (hash_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", file_path);
+
+ rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, hash_data, hash_data_size);
+ grub_file_close (hash_file);
+
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+ * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
+ * signature size from the hash data size because
+ * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
+ * used to get the hash data.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ *hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+ if (grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+ if (grub_memcmp (dbx.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void
+remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n",
+ db.signatures[i][0], db.signatures[i][1], db.signatures[i][2],
+ db.signatures[i][3]);
+ grub_free (db.signatures[i]);
+ db.signatures[i] = NULL;
+ db.signature_size[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present.
+ * And add them to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the db list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char**args)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n");
+
+ if (*args == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash file");
+
+ rc = read_hash_from_file (args[0], &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
+ hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+ /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
+ if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+ {
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted binary hash type");
+ }
+
+ if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (hash_data, hash_data_size) == true)
+ {
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+ "could not add trusted binary hash, as it is present in the dbx list");
+ }
+
+ if (is_hash_present_in_db (hash_data, hash_data_size) == false)
+ {
+ rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db.signatures,
+ &db.signature_size, &db.signature_entries);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ rc = grub_error (rc, "adding of trusted binary hash failed");
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "added trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n to the db list\n",
+ hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3]);
+ }
+ else
+ rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+ "could not add trusted binary hash, as it is present in the db list");
+ }
+
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present.
+ * And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary/certificate hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+ char *file_path;
+
+ if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n"
+ "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+ "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg == NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file");
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg != NULL)
+ file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg;
+ else
+ file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg;
+
+ rc = read_hash_from_file (file_path, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n"
+ " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data[0], hash_data[1],
+ hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+ {
+ /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */
+ if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+ {
+ rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type");
+ goto clean;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Remove distrusted hash from the db list if present. */
+ remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size);
+
+ if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (hash_data, hash_data_size) == true)
+ {
+ rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+ "could not add distrusted certificate/binary hash, "
+ "as it is present in the dbx list");
+ goto clean;
+ }
+
+ rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx.signatures,
+ &dbx.signature_size, &dbx.signature_entries);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ rc = grub_error (rc, "adding of distrusted binary/certificate hash failed");
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "added distrusted binary/certificate hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n to the dbx list\n",
+ hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3]);
+ }
+
+ clean:
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type type,
void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
@@ -932,6 +1303,11 @@ appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type t
* verifier, but we lack the hubris required to take this on. Instead,
* require that it have an appended signature.
*/
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST:
+ /*
+ * This is a certificate/binary hash to add to db/dbx.
+ * This needs to be verified or blocked.
+ */
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
/*
@@ -985,7 +1361,9 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
.fs_read = pseudo_read
};
-static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
+static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash;
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash,
+ cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
/* Check the certificate hash presence in the PKS dbx list. */
static bool
@@ -1287,8 +1665,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
- cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
- N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+ * register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list"));
+ cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
+ N_("Show the list of distrusted certificates and"
+ " certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list"));
+ cmd_db_hash = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash", grub_cmd_db_hash, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
+ N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list."));
+ cmd_dbx_hash = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash", grub_cmd_dbx_hash, 0,
+ N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+ "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
+ N_("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list."), options);
+ }
+ else
+ cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
}
/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
@@ -1299,6 +1696,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+ * unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash);
+ grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash);
+ }
}
GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
diff --git a/include/grub/file.h b/include/grub/file.h
index d678de063..16a4b7d26 100644
--- a/include/grub/file.h
+++ b/include/grub/file.h
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST,
/* File hashed by hashsum. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH,
+ /* File holding certificiate/binary hash to add to db/dbx. */
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST,
/* Keyboard layout. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT,
/* Picture file. */
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-21 7:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-21 7:54 [PATCH v8 00/20] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 01/20] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 02/20] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 03/20] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 04/20] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 05/20] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:54 ` [PATCH v8 06/20] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 07/20] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 08/20] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 09/20] powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 10/20] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 15:23 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-22 15:30 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 11/20] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-22 18:53 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-23 6:53 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 12/20] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 13/20] appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 14/20] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 15/20] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy [this message]
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 17/20] appended signatures: Verification tests Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 18/20] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 19/20] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-21 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 20/20] docs/grub: Document " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
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