* [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (20 more replies)
0 siblings, 21 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
This patch set contains v9 the consolidated version of the patch
sets for secure boot using appended signatures on powerpc,
rebased on top of git HEAD.
The v8 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-08/msg00120.html
Changes since v8:
- Daniel Kiper review comments addressed:
- v9 patch 10, 11: splited into two patch 10 and 11 from patch 10 in v8,
defined SIG_MAGIC and SIG_MAGIC_SIZE constants then
used accross the functions, corrected code sytle.
- v9 patch 12: changed the function name from esd_from_esl to _esd_from_esl and
from is_support_pks to is_pks_present. Also merged the
get_secure_boot_version function with this.
Strict with one variable grub_pks_keystore instead of
grub_pks_use_keystore and grub_pks_is_support_pks.
Linux on Power LPAR secure boot ensures the integrity of the Linux boot
stack. The hypervisor and partition firmware are part of the core root of
trust. The partition firmware verifies the signature on the GRUB image
before handing control to GRUB. Similarly, GRUB verifies the signature on
the kernel image before booting the OS. This ensures that every image
running at the boot time is verified and trusted. UEFI platforms relies
on PECOFF based signature scheme. Since Power is not a UEFI platform, an
alternative mechanism is needed. Power already uses appended signatures
on the Linux Kernel, and is now extended to sign the grub as well.
Linux on Power also allows multiple signers, and if any one of the
signature passes, then the image passes the validation. Appended signature
scheme uses CMS structure to contain signatures. On Power, the multiple
signature support relies on the multiple signers features already supported
by CMS standards. It does require that all the signers should sign at the
same time and are not allowed to add or remove the signatures randomly.
By default, Linux LPAR secure boot uses static key management[1]. This means
that each image embeds the keys it needs to verify the image it loads.
For example, the keys used to verify the GRUB image are built into the
firmware image. Similarly, the keys used for verifying the kernel image
are built into the GRUB image. These are pre-defined keys and they cannot
be modified at runtime. The drawback of this approach is that key rotations
results in both firmware and OS updates. This is where dynamic key
management is useful.
An admin can switch from static keys to dynamic keys by coordinating with
Hardware Management Console(HMC) admin and enabling the required flags
for the given LPAR.
The dynamic key management relies on the Platform KeyStore(PKS)[2] storage
allocation for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to
store sensitive information securely. Once switched to dynamic keys, HMC
advertises this flag to the PowerVM, which then initializes the PKS
with the default secvars. It also creates a variable SB_VERSION that
represents the secure boot key management mode. The default secvars are
used by Partition firmware, grub and the linux kernel to reads keys for
verification. These secvars can be managed by user interface exposed via
linux kernel. The linux kernel already supports this interface and
it is available in the upstream kernel.
This patchset adds the appended signature support both for signing and
verification and the key management to the grub component. The whole
patchset can be split into following four main parts:
The series has following four main parts:
1.) Sign grub.elf with an appended signature. (Patches 1, 19, 20)
These patches provide some infrastructure and documentation for
signing grub's core.elf with a Linux-kernel-module style appended
signature.
An appended signature is a 'dumb' signature over the contents of a
file. (It is distinct from schemes like Authenticode that are aware of
the structure of the file and only sign certain parts.) The signature
is wrapped in a PKCS#7 message, and is appended to the signed file
along with some metadata and a magic string. The signatures are
validated against a public key which is usually provided as an x509
certificate.
Because some platforms, such as powerpc-ieee1275, may load grub from a
raw disk partition rather than a filesystem, we extend grub-install to
add an ELF note that allows us to specify the size and location of the
signature.
2.) Enable lockdown if secure boot is enabled (Patch 9)
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and
If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2,
enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled.
There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification
fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and
If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforced.
3.) Enable appended signature verification using builtin keys (Patches 2 - 8
and 10 - 11).
Part of a secure boot chain is allowing grub to verify the boot
kernel. For UEFI platforms, this is usually delegated to the
shim. However, for platforms that do not implement UEFI, an
alternative scheme is required.
This part teaches grub how to verify Linux kernel-style appended
signatures. Kernels on powerpc are already signed with this scheme and
can be verified by IMA for kexec.
As PKCS#7 messages and x509 certificates are both based on ASN.1, we
import libtasn1 to parse them. Because ASN.1 isn't self-documenting,
we import from GNUTLS the information we need to navigate their
structure.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patches 2 and 3 are small refactorings.
- patch 4 allows x509 certificates to be built in to the grub core
in much the same way as PGP keys.
- patch 5 brings in the code from GNUTLS that allows us to parse
PKCS#7 and x509 with libtasn1.
- patch 6, 7 and 8 is our ASN1 node, PKCS#7 and x509 parser. They're minimal
and fairly strict parsers that extract only the bits we need to verify the
signatures.
- patch 10 and patch 11 is the guts of the appended signature verifier. It uses
the verifier infrastructure like pgp, and adds a number of
user-friendly commands that mirror the pgp module.
4.) Enable accessing keys dynamically from Platform KeyStore (Patch 12 - 17)
This part teaches grub how to read db and dbx variables from platform keystore
using client interface call then load keys from those two variable, and use it
to verify Linux kernel.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patch 12 is an exposes an interface in ieee1275 for reading secure boot
variable db and dbx from Platform Keystore. Read secure boot variables
such as db and dbx from PKS and extract certificates from ESL.
- patch 13 is create the db and dbx lists from PKS.
- patch 14 is verify the kernel using db and dbx lists
- patch 15 sets the use_static_keys flag if DB not available in PKS,
and patch 16 is reads the DB default keys from ELF Note and
store it in trusted lists if use_static_keys flag is set.
- patch 17 adds GRUB commands to access db and dbx.
5.) patch 18 adds unit test and 21 adds GRUB commands and an appended signatures
documentation.
Thanks to Daniel Kiper for providing review comments.
I've pushed this all to
https://github.com/SudhakarKuppusamy1/grub/tree/appendedsig-2.13
[1]https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=servers-guest-secure-boot-static-keys
[2]https://community.ibm.com/community/user/power/blogs/chris-engel1/2020/11/20/powervm-introduces-the-platform-keystore
Daniel Axtens (2):
crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
Sudhakar Kuppusamy (19):
powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended
signature
pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files
appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot
appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note
appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
appended signatures: Verification tests
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
docs/grub: Document appended signature
docs/grub.texi | 559 +++++-
grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 26 +
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 1783 +++++++++++++++++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 116 ++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 96 +
.../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 454 +++++
.../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 +++++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++
grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 6 +-
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 -
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 63 +
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++
.../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 347 ++++
grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 +
grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 344 ++++
grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h | 975 +++++++++
grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c | 1 +
include/grub/crypto.h | 1 +
include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++
include/grub/err.h | 3 +-
include/grub/file.h | 4 +
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 +
include/grub/kernel.h | 3 +-
include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +-
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 +
.../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 140 ++
include/grub/types.h | 4 +
include/grub/util/install.h | 10 +-
include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 +-
util/grub-install-common.c | 42 +-
util/grub-mkimage.c | 32 +-
util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 +-
util/mkimage.c | 50 +-
35 files changed, 6938 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 02/21] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (19 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Rashmica Gupta, Daniel Kiper
Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB
by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially
target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other
platforms.
Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the
ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.)
The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the
end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275
platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition
as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location
of an appended signature more difficult.
To address this, we add a new ELF Note.
The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded
to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values
for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.
The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined
by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple
of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature
structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file
are the appended signature magic.
A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed
under this scheme.
Signed-off-by: Rashmica Gupta <rashmica.g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
include/grub/util/install.h | 7 +++++--
include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 ++--
util/grub-install-common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++---
util/grub-mkimage.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++
util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
util/mkimage.c | 9 ++++++---
6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/grub/util/install.h b/include/grub/util/install.h
index 5c0a52ca2..3aabc4285 100644
--- a/include/grub/util/install.h
+++ b/include/grub/util/install.h
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \
{ "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, \
N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \
+ { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \
+ "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
{ "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
@@ -132,7 +134,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
- GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI,
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE
};
extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
size_t npubkeys,
char *config_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
- int note,
+ int note, size_t appsig_size,
grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file,
const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock,
const int disable_cli);
diff --git a/include/grub/util/mkimage.h b/include/grub/util/mkimage.h
index 9d74f82c5..0d40383eb 100644
--- a/include/grub/util/mkimage.h
+++ b/include/grub/util/mkimage.h
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ grub_mkimage_load_image64 (const char *kernel_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target);
void
grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
- int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+ int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
Elf32_Addr target_addr,
struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
void
grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
- int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+ int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
Elf64_Addr target_addr,
struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
diff --git a/util/grub-install-common.c b/util/grub-install-common.c
index 22bccb6a3..5f24124df 100644
--- a/util/grub-install-common.c
+++ b/util/grub-install-common.c
@@ -467,10 +467,13 @@ static char *sbat;
static int disable_shim_lock;
static grub_compression_t compression;
static int disable_cli;
+static size_t appsig_size;
int
grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
{
+ const char *end;
+
switch (key)
{
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS:
@@ -571,6 +574,19 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
grub_util_error (_("Unrecognized compression `%s'"), arg);
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE:
return 1;
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE:
+ appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+ {
+ grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (appsig_size == 0)
+ {
+ grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero"), arg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
@@ -683,9 +699,10 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
*p = '\0';
grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'"
- " --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n",
+ " --format '%s' --compression '%s'"
+ " --appended-signature-size %zu %s %s %s %s\n",
dir, prefix, outname,
- mkimage_target, compnames[compression],
+ mkimage_target, compnames[compression], appsig_size,
note ? " --note" : "",
disable_shim_lock ? " --disable-shim-lock" : "",
disable_cli ? " --disable-cli" : "", s);
@@ -698,7 +715,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
modules.entries, memdisk_path,
pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
- note, compression, dtb, sbat,
+ note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
while (dc--)
grub_install_pop_module ();
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimage.c b/util/grub-mkimage.c
index 547f7310f..922de021f 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimage.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimage.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
{"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0},
{"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0},
{"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0},
+ {"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0},
{"verbose", 'v', 0, 0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0},
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct arguments
int note;
int disable_shim_lock;
int disable_cli;
+ size_t appsig_size;
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;
grub_compression_t comp;
};
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
/* Get the input argument from argp_parse, which we
know is a pointer to our arguments structure. */
struct arguments *arguments = state->input;
+ const char *end;
switch (key)
{
@@ -172,6 +175,20 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
arguments->note = 1;
break;
+ case 'S':
+ arguments->appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+ {
+ grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (arguments->appsig_size == 0)
+ {
+ grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero"), arg);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
case 'm':
if (arguments->memdisk)
free (arguments->memdisk);
@@ -330,6 +347,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
+ arguments.appsig_size,
arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock,
arguments.disable_cli);
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimagexx.c b/util/grub-mkimagexx.c
index 448862b2e..7dddd987a 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimagexx.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimagexx.c
@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ struct grub_sbat_note {
char name[ALIGN_UP(sizeof(GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
};
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME "Appended-Signature"
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE 0x41536967 /* "ASig" */
+struct grub_appended_signature_note
+{
+ Elf32_Nhdr header;
+ char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
+};
+
static int
is_relocatable (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target)
{
@@ -216,7 +224,7 @@ grub_arm_reloc_jump24 (grub_uint32_t *target, Elf32_Addr sym_addr)
void
SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
- int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+ int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
Elf_Addr target_addr,
struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout)
{
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_sbat_note) + layout->sbat_size, 4);
}
+ if (appsig_size)
+ {
+ phnum++;
+ footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note), 4);
+ }
+
if (image_target->id != IMAGE_LOONGSON_ELF)
phnum += 2;
@@ -518,6 +532,30 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
memcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME, sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME));
memcpy ((char *)(note_ptr + 1), sbat, layout->sbat_size);
+ phdr++;
+ phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
+ phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
+ phdr->p_align = grub_host_to_target32 (image_target->voidp_sizeof);
+ phdr->p_vaddr = 0;
+ phdr->p_paddr = 0;
+ phdr->p_filesz = grub_host_to_target32 (note_size);
+ phdr->p_memsz = 0;
+ phdr->p_offset = grub_host_to_target32 (header_size + program_size + footer_offset);
+ footer += note_size;
+ footer_offset += note_size;
+ }
+
+ if (appsig_size)
+ {
+ int note_size = ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note) + appsig_size, 4);
+ struct grub_appended_signature_note *note_ptr = (struct grub_appended_signature_note *) footer;
+
+ note_ptr->header.n_namesz = grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME));
+ /* Needs to sit at the end, so we round this up and sign some zero padding. */
+ note_ptr->header.n_descsz = grub_host_to_target32 (ALIGN_UP (appsig_size, 4));
+ note_ptr->header.n_type = grub_host_to_target32 (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE);
+ strcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME);
+
phdr++;
phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
index b46df2909..9618b37cf 100644
--- a/util/mkimage.c
+++ b/util/mkimage.c
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
- int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
+ int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
int disable_cli)
{
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
if (sbat_path != NULL && (image_target->id != IMAGE_EFI && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC))
grub_util_error (_("SBAT data can be added only to EFI or powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+ if (appsig_size != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+ grub_util_error (_("appended signature can be support only to powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
if (disable_shim_lock)
total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
@@ -1833,10 +1836,10 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
else
target_addr = image_target->link_addr;
if (image_target->voidp_sizeof == 4)
- grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+ grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
target_addr, &layout);
else
- grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+ grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
target_addr, &layout);
}
break;
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 02/21] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 03/21] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (18 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, sridharm,
Sudhakar Kuppusamy, Vladimir Serbinenko, Daniel Kiper
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the
pgp module is a bit quirky.
include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)
{
grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;
}
This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!
We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP,
so move the storage to crypto.c.
Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on
crypto and mpi. As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new
module dependencies using the PGP verfier.
[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk
and friends (zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name()
to get a cipher handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated
by people calling grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the
symmetric ciphers call it.]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 4 ----
grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
index e61887862..251ed1b06 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
@@ -136,10 +136,6 @@ struct signature_v4_header
grub_uint16_t hashed_sub;
} GRUB_PACKED;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
-
struct
{
const char *name;
diff --git a/grub-core/lib/crypto.c b/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
index dd60dd4ac..292b747b2 100644
--- a/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
+++ b/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ grub_md_unregister (gcry_md_spec_t *cipher)
}
}
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
+
void
grub_crypto_hash (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, void *out, const void *in,
grub_size_t inlen)
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 03/21] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 02/21] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 04/21] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (17 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Alastair D'Silva, Daniel Kiper
Prior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended
signature, current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing
the enum name from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to
differentiate between x509 certificate based appended signature and
GPG certificate based PGP signature.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 +-
include/grub/kernel.h | 2 +-
util/grub-mkimage.c | 2 +-
util/mkimage.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 34b3484dc..bdbc3b82e 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -3347,8 +3347,8 @@ chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
@node check_signatures
@subsection check_signatures
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.
@node chosen
@subsection chosen
@@ -6854,7 +6854,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable
@code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
(@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of
@command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}). @xref{Using
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
@end deffn
@node drivemap
@@ -7270,7 +7270,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of
@code{gpg --fingerprint}). The least significant four bytes (last
eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to
@command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
these keys.
@end deffn
@@ -7305,7 +7305,7 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an
administrator to configure a system to boot only signed
configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
-``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
information.
@end deffn
@@ -7677,7 +7677,7 @@ read. It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block
file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will
no longer be valid on subsequent boots. Care should be taken in such
advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
@end deffn
@@ -8167,7 +8167,7 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to
must itself be properly signed. The @option{--skip-sig} option can be
used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file}
itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
information.
@end deffn
@@ -8208,7 +8208,7 @@ tried.
Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
successfully. If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
@end deffn
@node videoinfo
@@ -8668,13 +8668,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
@chapter Security
@menu
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
@end menu
@node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8750,8 +8750,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication. You can use
adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}
commands.
-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB
+@node Using GPG-style digital signatures
+@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB
GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
index 251ed1b06..a2549f9fd 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)
grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
/* Not an ELF module, skip. */
- if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY)
+ if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY)
continue;
pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
diff --git a/include/grub/kernel.h b/include/grub/kernel.h
index 6121c1e66..885289f5d 100644
--- a/include/grub/kernel.h
+++ b/include/grub/kernel.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ enum
OBJ_TYPE_MEMDISK,
OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
- OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY,
+ OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimage.c b/util/grub-mkimage.c
index 922de021f..000d05822 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimage.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimage.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/
{"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/
- {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0},
+ {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */
{"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
{"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
index 9618b37cf..61c4e78e2 100644
--- a/util/mkimage.c
+++ b/util/mkimage.c
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
curs = grub_util_get_image_size (pubkey_paths[i]);
header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
- header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY);
+ header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY);
header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
offset += sizeof (*header);
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 04/21] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 03/21] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 05/21] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (16 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Alastair D'Silva, Daniel Kiper
To support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to
embed the necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes
in the Linux kernel use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to
be embedded in the GRUB core image in the same way as PGP keys.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
include/grub/kernel.h | 1 +
include/grub/util/install.h | 3 +++
util/grub-install-common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-
util/grub-mkimage.c | 12 +++++++++++-
util/mkimage.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/grub/kernel.h b/include/grub/kernel.h
index 885289f5d..9f3e2031f 100644
--- a/include/grub/kernel.h
+++ b/include/grub/kernel.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum
OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
+ OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY,
OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
diff --git a/include/grub/util/install.h b/include/grub/util/install.h
index 3aabc4285..6f27e2e42 100644
--- a/include/grub/util/install.h
+++ b/include/grub/util/install.h
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \
{ "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, \
N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \
+ { "x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, \
+ N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0}, \
{ "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \
"SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
{ "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
const char *outname, char *mods[],
char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
size_t npubkeys,
+ char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys,
char *config_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note, size_t appsig_size,
diff --git a/util/grub-install-common.c b/util/grub-install-common.c
index 5f24124df..820105771 100644
--- a/util/grub-install-common.c
+++ b/util/grub-install-common.c
@@ -463,6 +463,8 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,
static char **pubkeys;
static size_t npubkeys;
+static char **x509keys;
+static size_t nx509keys;
static char *sbat;
static int disable_shim_lock;
static grub_compression_t compression;
@@ -511,6 +513,10 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI:
disable_cli = 1;
return 1;
+ case 'x':
+ x509keys = xrealloc (x509keys, sizeof (x509keys[0]) * (nx509keys + 1));
+ x509keys[nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+ return 1;
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY:
verbosity++;
@@ -648,6 +654,9 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
for (pk = pubkeys; pk < pubkeys + npubkeys; pk++)
slen += sizeof (" --pubkey ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
+ for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+ slen += sizeof (" --x509key ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
+
for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
slen += sizeof (" ''") + grub_strlen (*md);
@@ -688,6 +697,14 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
*p++ = '\'';
}
+ for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+ {
+ p = grub_stpcpy (p, "--x509key '");
+ p = grub_stpcpy (p, *pk);
+ *p++ = '\'';
+ *p++ = ' ';
+ }
+
for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
{
*p++ = ' ';
@@ -714,7 +731,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
modules.entries, memdisk_path,
- pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
+ pubkeys, npubkeys, x509keys, nx509keys, config_path, tgt,
note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
while (dc--)
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimage.c b/util/grub-mkimage.c
index 000d05822..6fcc20699 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimage.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimage.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
{"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/
{"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
+ {"x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0},
/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */
{"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
{"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
@@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ struct arguments
char *dtb;
char **pubkeys;
size_t npubkeys;
+ char **x509keys;
+ size_t nx509keys;
char *font;
char *config;
char *sbat;
@@ -215,6 +218,12 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
arguments->pubkeys[arguments->npubkeys++] = xstrdup (arg);
break;
+ case 'x':
+ arguments->x509keys = xrealloc (arguments->x509keys,
+ sizeof (arguments->x509keys[0]) * (arguments->nx509keys + 1));
+ arguments->x509keys[arguments->nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+ break;
+
case 'c':
if (arguments->config)
free (arguments->config);
@@ -345,7 +354,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
grub_install_generate_image (arguments.dir, arguments.prefix, fp,
arguments.output, arguments.modules,
arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
- arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
+ arguments.npubkeys, arguments.x509keys,
+ arguments.nx509keys, arguments.config,
arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
arguments.appsig_size,
arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
index 61c4e78e2..f364a5718 100644
--- a/util/mkimage.c
+++ b/util/mkimage.c
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ void
grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
FILE *out, const char *outname, char *mods[],
char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
- size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
+ size_t npubkeys, char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
@@ -929,6 +929,24 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
}
}
+ if (nx509keys != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+ grub_util_error (_("x509 public key can be support only to appended signature"
+ " with powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
+ {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+ {
+ size_t curs;
+
+ curs = ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]));
+ grub_util_info ("the size of x509 public key %u is 0x%" GRUB_HOST_PRIxLONG_LONG,
+ (unsigned) i, (unsigned long long) curs);
+ total_module_size += curs + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+ }
+ }
+
if (memdisk_path)
{
memdisk_size = ALIGN_UP(grub_util_get_image_size (memdisk_path), 512);
@@ -1065,6 +1083,25 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
}
}
+ {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+ {
+ size_t curs;
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+ curs = grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]);
+ header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
+ header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY);
+ header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
+
+ offset += sizeof (*header);
+ grub_util_load_image (x509key_paths[i], kernel_img + offset);
+ offset += ALIGN_ADDR (curs);
+ }
+ }
+
if (memdisk_path)
{
struct grub_module_header *header;
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 05/21] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 04/21] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 06/21] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (15 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
In order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1,
we need some information about how they are encoded.
We get these from GNUTLS, which has the benefit that they support the
features we need and are well tested.
The GNUTLS files are from:
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing
us to import it without issue.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
.../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++++++
.../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 633 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efc0c145a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+/*
+ * Imported from gnutls.asn.
+ * https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
+ */
+const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[] = {
+ { "GNUTLS", 536872976, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "RSAPublicKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "publicExponent", 3, NULL },
+ { "RSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "publicExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "privateExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "prime1", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "prime2", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "exponent1", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "exponent2", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "coefficient", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "otherPrimeInfos", 16386, "OtherPrimeInfos"},
+ { "ProvableSeed", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "seed", 7, NULL },
+ { "OtherPrimeInfos", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "OtherPrimeInfo"},
+ { "OtherPrimeInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "exponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "coefficient", 3, NULL },
+ { "AlgorithmIdentifier", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "parameters", 541081613, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1, NULL },
+ { "DigestInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "digestAlgorithm", 1073741826, "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "digest", 7, NULL },
+ { "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "DSAPublicKey", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "DSAParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "g", 3, NULL },
+ { "DSASignatureValue", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "r", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "s", 3, NULL },
+ { "DSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "g", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "Y", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "priv", 3, NULL },
+ { "DHParameter", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "base", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "privateValueLength", 16387, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-11-ec-Parameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "oId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "curveName", 31, NULL },
+ { "ECParameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "namedCurve", 12, NULL },
+ { "ECPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "Version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "parameters", 1610637314, "ECParameters"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "publicKey", 536895494, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "name-type", 1610620931, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "name-string", 536879115, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+ { NULL, 27, NULL },
+ { "KRB5PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "realm", 1610620955, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "principalName", 536879106, "PrincipalName"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "RSAPSSParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "saltLength", 1610653699, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "20"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+ { "trailerField", 536911875, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "3"},
+ { "RSAOAEPParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "pSourceFunc", 536895490, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+ { "GOSTParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "digestParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+ { "GOSTParametersOld", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "digestParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "encryptionParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+ { "GOSTPrivateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "GOSTPrivateKeyOld", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "IssuerSignTool", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "signTool", 1073741858, NULL },
+ { "cATool", 1073741858, NULL },
+ { "signToolCert", 1073741858, NULL },
+ { "cAToolCert", 34, NULL },
+ { "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "encryptedKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "maskKey", 1610637319, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "macKey", 7, NULL },
+ { "SubjectPublicKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "subjectPublicKey", 6, NULL },
+ { "GostR3410-TransportParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "encryptionParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "ephemeralPublicKey", 1610637314, "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "ukm", 7, NULL },
+ { "GostR3410-KeyTransport", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "sessionEncryptedKey", 1073741826, "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey"},
+ { "transportParameters", 536895490, "GostR3410-TransportParameters"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "TPMKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "emptyAuth", 1610637316, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "parent", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "pubkey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "privkey", 7, NULL },
+ { "MLDSAPrivateKey", 536870917, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "privateKeyAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "publicKey", 536895495, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec5f87bfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+/*
+ * Imported from pkix.asn.
+ * https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
+ */
+const asn1_static_node grub_pkix_asn1_tab[] = {
+ { "PKIX1", 536875024, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "PrivateKeyUsagePeriod", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "notBefore", 1610637349, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "notAfter", 536895525, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "AuthorityKeyIdentifier", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "keyIdentifier", 1610637319, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "authorityCertIssuer", 1610637314, "GeneralNames"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "authorityCertSerialNumber", 536895490, "CertificateSerialNumber"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "2"},
+ { "SubjectKeyIdentifier", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "KeyUsage", 1073741830, NULL },
+ { "DirectoryString", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "teletexString", 1612709918, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 524298, "1"},
+ { "printableString", 1612709919, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 524298, "1"},
+ { "universalString", 1612709920, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 524298, "1"},
+ { "utf8String", 1612709922, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 524298, "1"},
+ { "bmpString", 538968097, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 524298, "1"},
+ { "SubjectAltName", 1073741826, "GeneralNames"},
+ { "GeneralNames", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "GeneralName"},
+ { "GeneralName", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "otherName", 1610620930, "AnotherName"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "rfc822Name", 1610620957, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "dNSName", 1610620957, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "2"},
+ { "x400Address", 1610620941, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "3"},
+ { "directoryName", 1610620939, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "4"},
+ { NULL, 2, "RelativeDistinguishedName"},
+ { "ediPartyName", 1610620941, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "5"},
+ { "uniformResourceIdentifier", 1610620957, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "6"},
+ { "iPAddress", 1610620935, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "7"},
+ { "registeredID", 536879116, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "8"},
+ { "AnotherName", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "type-id", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "value", 541073421, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "type-id", 1, NULL },
+ { "IssuerAltName", 1073741826, "GeneralNames"},
+ { "BasicConstraints", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "cA", 1610645508, NULL },
+ { NULL, 131081, NULL },
+ { "pathLenConstraint", 16387, NULL },
+ { "CRLDistributionPoints", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "DistributionPoint"},
+ { "DistributionPoint", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "distributionPoint", 1610637314, "DistributionPointName"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "reasons", 1610637314, "ReasonFlags"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "cRLIssuer", 536895490, "GeneralNames"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "2"},
+ { "DistributionPointName", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "fullName", 1610620930, "GeneralNames"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer", 536879106, "RelativeDistinguishedName"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "ReasonFlags", 1073741830, NULL },
+ { "ExtKeyUsageSyntax", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 12, NULL },
+ { "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "AccessDescription"},
+ { "AccessDescription", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "accessMethod", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "accessLocation", 2, "GeneralName"},
+ { "Attribute", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "values", 536870927, NULL },
+ { NULL, 13, NULL },
+ { "AttributeTypeAndValue", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "value", 13, NULL },
+ { "Name", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "rdnSequence", 536870923, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "RelativeDistinguishedName"},
+ { "DistinguishedName", 1610612747, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "RelativeDistinguishedName"},
+ { "RelativeDistinguishedName", 1612709903, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "AttributeTypeAndValue"},
+ { "Certificate", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "tbsCertificate", 1073741826, "TBSCertificate"},
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 6, NULL },
+ { "TBSCertificate", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1610653699, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "0"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "serialNumber", 1073741826, "CertificateSerialNumber"},
+ { "signature", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "issuer", 1073741826, "Name"},
+ { "validity", 1073741826, "Validity"},
+ { "subject", 1073741826, "Name"},
+ { "subjectPublicKeyInfo", 1073741826, "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"},
+ { "issuerUniqueID", 1610637314, "UniqueIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "subjectUniqueID", 1610637314, "UniqueIdentifier"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "2"},
+ { "extensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "3"},
+ { "CertificateSerialNumber", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "Validity", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "notBefore", 1073741826, "Time"},
+ { "notAfter", 2, "Time"},
+ { "Time", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "utcTime", 1073741860, NULL },
+ { "generalTime", 37, NULL },
+ { "UniqueIdentifier", 1073741830, NULL },
+ { "SubjectPublicKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "subjectPublicKey", 6, NULL },
+ { "Extensions", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "Extension"},
+ { "Extension", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "extnID", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "critical", 1610645508, NULL },
+ { NULL, 131081, NULL },
+ { "extnValue", 7, NULL },
+ { "CertificateList", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "tbsCertList", 1073741826, "TBSCertList"},
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 6, NULL },
+ { "TBSCertList", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073758211, NULL },
+ { "signature", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "issuer", 1073741826, "Name"},
+ { "thisUpdate", 1073741826, "Time"},
+ { "nextUpdate", 1073758210, "Time"},
+ { "revokedCertificates", 1610629131, NULL },
+ { NULL, 536870917, NULL },
+ { "userCertificate", 1073741826, "CertificateSerialNumber"},
+ { "revocationDate", 1073741826, "Time"},
+ { "crlEntryExtensions", 16386, "Extensions"},
+ { "crlExtensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "AlgorithmIdentifier", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "parameters", 541081613, NULL },
+ { "algorithm", 1, NULL },
+ { "Dss-Sig-Value", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "r", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "s", 3, NULL },
+ { "Dss-Parms", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "g", 3, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-ContentInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "contentType", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "content", 541073421, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "contentType", 1, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-DigestInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "digestAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "digest", 7, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-SignedData", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "digestAlgorithms", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers"},
+ { "encapContentInfo", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-EncapsulatedContentInfo"},
+ { "certificates", 1610637314, "pkcs-7-CertificateSet"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "crls", 1610637314, "pkcs-7-CertificateRevocationLists"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "signerInfos", 2, "pkcs-7-SignerInfos"},
+ { "pkcs-7-DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers", 1610612751, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "pkcs-7-EncapsulatedContentInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "eContentType", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "eContent", 536895501, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "pkcs-7-CertificateRevocationLists", 1610612751, NULL },
+ { NULL, 13, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-CertificateChoices", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "certificate", 13, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-CertificateSet", 1610612751, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "pkcs-7-CertificateChoices"},
+ { "IssuerAndSerialNumber", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "issuer", 1073741826, "Name"},
+ { "serialNumber", 2, "CertificateSerialNumber"},
+ { "pkcs-7-SignerInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "sid", 1073741826, "SignerIdentifier"},
+ { "digestAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signedAttrs", 1610637314, "SignedAttributes"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "unsignedAttrs", 536895490, "SignedAttributes"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "SignedAttributes", 1612709903, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "Attribute"},
+ { "SignerIdentifier", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "issuerAndSerialNumber", 1073741826, "IssuerAndSerialNumber"},
+ { "subjectKeyIdentifier", 536879111, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "pkcs-7-SignerInfos", 1610612751, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "pkcs-7-SignerInfo"},
+ { "pkcs-10-CertificationRequestInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "subject", 1073741826, "Name"},
+ { "subjectPKInfo", 1073741826, "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"},
+ { "attributes", 536879106, "Attributes"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "Attributes", 1610612751, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "Attribute"},
+ { "pkcs-10-CertificationRequest", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "certificationRequestInfo", 1073741826, "pkcs-10-CertificationRequestInfo"},
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 6, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-9-at-challengePassword", 1879048204, NULL },
+ { "iso", 1073741825, "1"},
+ { "member-body", 1073741825, "2"},
+ { "us", 1073741825, "840"},
+ { "rsadsi", 1073741825, "113549"},
+ { "pkcs", 1073741825, "1"},
+ { NULL, 1073741825, "9"},
+ { NULL, 1, "7"},
+ { "pkcs-9-challengePassword", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "printableString", 1073741855, NULL },
+ { "utf8String", 34, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-9-localKeyId", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-8-PrivateKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "privateKeyAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "attributes", 536895490, "Attributes"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "pkcs-8-EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "encryptionAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "encryptedData", 2, "pkcs-8-EncryptedData"},
+ { "pkcs-8-EncryptedData", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-5-des-CBC-params", 1612709895, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1048586, "8"},
+ { "pkcs-5-des-EDE3-CBC-params", 1612709895, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1048586, "8"},
+ { "pkcs-5-aes128-CBC-params", 1612709895, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1048586, "16"},
+ { "pkcs-5-aes192-CBC-params", 1612709895, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1048586, "16"},
+ { "pkcs-5-aes256-CBC-params", 1612709895, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1048586, "16"},
+ { "Gost28147-89-Parameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "iv", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "encryptionParamSet", 12, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-5-PBE-params", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "salt", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "iterationCount", 3, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-5-PBES2-params", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "keyDerivationFunc", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "encryptionScheme", 2, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "pkcs-5-PBMAC1-params", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "keyDerivationFunc", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "messageAuthScheme", 2, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "pkcs-5-PBKDF2-params", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "salt", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "specified", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "otherSource", 2, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "iterationCount", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "keyLength", 1073758211, NULL },
+ { "prf", 16386, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "pkcs-12-PFX", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1610874883, NULL },
+ { "v3", 1, "3"},
+ { "authSafe", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-ContentInfo"},
+ { "macData", 16386, "pkcs-12-MacData"},
+ { "pkcs-12-PbeParams", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "salt", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "iterations", 3, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-12-MacData", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "mac", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-DigestInfo"},
+ { "macSalt", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "iterations", 536903683, NULL },
+ { NULL, 9, "1"},
+ { "pkcs-12-AuthenticatedSafe", 1610612747, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "pkcs-7-ContentInfo"},
+ { "pkcs-12-SafeContents", 1610612747, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "pkcs-12-SafeBag"},
+ { "pkcs-12-SafeBag", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "bagId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "bagValue", 1614815245, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "badId", 1, NULL },
+ { "bagAttributes", 536887311, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "Attribute"},
+ { "pkcs-12-CertBag", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "certId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "certValue", 541073421, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "certId", 1, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-12-CRLBag", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "crlId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "crlValue", 541073421, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "crlId", 1, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-12-SecretBag", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "secretTypeId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "secretValue", 541073421, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "secretTypeId", 1, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-Data", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "pkcs-7-EncryptedData", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+ { "encryptedContentInfo", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-EncryptedContentInfo"},
+ { "unprotectedAttrs", 536895490, "pkcs-7-UnprotectedAttributes"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "pkcs-7-EncryptedContentInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "contentType", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "contentEncryptionAlgorithm", 1073741826, "pkcs-7-ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "encryptedContent", 536895495, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "pkcs-7-ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "pkcs-7-UnprotectedAttributes", 1612709903, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "Attribute"},
+ { "ProxyCertInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "pCPathLenConstraint", 1073758211, NULL },
+ { "proxyPolicy", 2, "ProxyPolicy"},
+ { "ProxyPolicy", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "policyLanguage", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "policy", 16391, NULL },
+ { "certificatePolicies", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "PolicyInformation"},
+ { "PolicyInformation", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "policyIdentifier", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "policyQualifiers", 538984459, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "PolicyQualifierInfo"},
+ { "PolicyQualifierInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "policyQualifierId", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "qualifier", 541065229, NULL },
+ { "policyQualifierId", 1, NULL },
+ { "CPSuri", 1073741853, NULL },
+ { "UserNotice", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "noticeRef", 1073758210, "NoticeReference"},
+ { "explicitText", 16386, "DisplayText"},
+ { "NoticeReference", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "organization", 1073741826, "DisplayText"},
+ { "noticeNumbers", 536870923, NULL },
+ { NULL, 3, NULL },
+ { "DisplayText", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "ia5String", 1612709917, NULL },
+ { "200", 524298, "1"},
+ { "visibleString", 1612709923, NULL },
+ { "200", 524298, "1"},
+ { "bmpString", 1612709921, NULL },
+ { "200", 524298, "1"},
+ { "utf8String", 538968098, NULL },
+ { "200", 524298, "1"},
+ { "OCSPRequest", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "tbsRequest", 1073741826, "TBSRequest"},
+ { "optionalSignature", 536895490, "Signature"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "TBSRequest", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1610653699, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "0"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "requestorName", 1610637314, "GeneralName"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "requestList", 1610612747, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "Request"},
+ { "requestExtensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+ { "Signature", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 1073741830, NULL },
+ { "certs", 536895499, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { NULL, 2, "Certificate"},
+ { "Request", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "reqCert", 1073741826, "CertID"},
+ { "singleRequestExtensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "CertID", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "hashAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "issuerNameHash", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "issuerKeyHash", 1073741831, NULL },
+ { "serialNumber", 2, "CertificateSerialNumber"},
+ { "OCSPResponse", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "responseStatus", 1073741826, "OCSPResponseStatus"},
+ { "responseBytes", 536895490, "ResponseBytes"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "OCSPResponseStatus", 1610874901, NULL },
+ { "successful", 1073741825, "0"},
+ { "malformedRequest", 1073741825, "1"},
+ { "internalError", 1073741825, "2"},
+ { "tryLater", 1073741825, "3"},
+ { "sigRequired", 1073741825, "5"},
+ { "unauthorized", 1, "6"},
+ { "ResponseBytes", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "responseType", 1073741836, NULL },
+ { "response", 7, NULL },
+ { "BasicOCSPResponse", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "tbsResponseData", 1073741826, "ResponseData"},
+ { "signatureAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+ { "signature", 1073741830, NULL },
+ { "certs", 536895499, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { NULL, 2, "Certificate"},
+ { "ResponseData", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "version", 1610653699, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "0"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "responderID", 1073741826, "ResponderID"},
+ { "producedAt", 1073741861, NULL },
+ { "responses", 1610612747, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2, "SingleResponse"},
+ { "responseExtensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "ResponderID", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "byName", 1610620939, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "RelativeDistinguishedName"},
+ { "byKey", 536879111, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+ { "SingleResponse", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "certID", 1073741826, "CertID"},
+ { "certStatus", 1073741826, "CertStatus"},
+ { "thisUpdate", 1073741861, NULL },
+ { "nextUpdate", 1610637349, NULL },
+ { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+ { "singleExtensions", 536895490, "Extensions"},
+ { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+ { "CertStatus", 1610612754, NULL },
+ { "good", 1610620948, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "revoked", 1610620930, "RevokedInfo"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "unknown", 536879106, "UnknownInfo"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "2"},
+ { "RevokedInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "revocationTime", 1073741861, NULL },
+ { "revocationReason", 537157653, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073743880, "0"},
+ { "unspecified", 1, "0"},
+ { "UnknownInfo", 1073741844, NULL },
+ { "NameConstraints", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "permittedSubtrees", 1610637314, "GeneralSubtrees"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "excludedSubtrees", 536895490, "GeneralSubtrees"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "GeneralSubtrees", 1612709899, NULL },
+ { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+ { NULL, 2, "GeneralSubtree"},
+ { "GeneralSubtree", 1610612741, NULL },
+ { "base", 1073741826, "GeneralName"},
+ { "minimum", 1610653699, NULL },
+ { NULL, 1073741833, "0"},
+ { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+ { "maximum", 536895491, NULL },
+ { NULL, 4104, "1"},
+ { "TlsFeatures", 536870923, NULL },
+ { NULL, 3, NULL },
+ { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 06/21] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 05/21] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 07/21] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (14 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
This code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it.
It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 42 +++++++++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91cc040bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
+
+/* Do libtasn1 init. */
+extern int
+asn1_init (void);
+
+/*
+ * Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it.
+ * It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
+ * - Integers
+ * - Octet strings
+ * - DER encoding of other structures
+ * It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
+ * - Strings that require an extra null byte at the end
+ * - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
+ *
+ * If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
+ */
+extern void *
+grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, const char *friendly_name, int *content_size);
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e7ee264b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn = NULL;
+asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn = NULL;
+
+extern const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[];
+extern const asn1_static_node grub_pkix_asn1_tab[];
+
+/*
+ * Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it.
+ * It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
+ * - Integers
+ * - Octet strings
+ * - DER encoding of other structures
+ * It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
+ * - Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
+ * - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
+ * If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
+ */
+void *
+grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, const char *friendly_name, int *content_size)
+{
+ int result;
+ grub_uint8_t *tmpstr = NULL;
+ int tmpstr_size = 0;
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (node, name, NULL, &tmpstr_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_MEM_ERROR)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "reading size of %s did not return expected status: %s",
+ friendly_name, asn1_strerror (result)) ;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tmpstr = grub_malloc (tmpstr_size);
+ if (tmpstr == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not allocate memory to store %s",
+ friendly_name) ;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (node, name, tmpstr, &tmpstr_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ grub_free (tmpstr);
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading %s: %s", friendly_name,
+ asn1_strerror (result)) ;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *content_size = tmpstr_size;
+
+ return tmpstr;
+}
+
+int
+asn1_init (void)
+{
+ int res;
+
+ res = asn1_array2tree (grub_gnutls_asn1_tab, &grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn, NULL);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return res;
+
+ res = asn1_array2tree (grub_pkix_asn1_tab, &grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, NULL);
+
+ return res;
+}
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 07/21] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 06/21] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (13 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
This code allows us to parse:
- PKCS#7 signedData messages. Only a single signerInfo is supported,
which is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating
out-of-the-box. Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported.
Any certificate embedded in the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 36 ++
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 490 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
index 91cc040bb..cac7fb02c 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
@@ -17,11 +17,47 @@
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
#include <libtasn1.h>
extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
+#define MAX_OID_LEN 32
+
+/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
+struct pkcs7_signerInfo
+{
+ const gcry_md_spec_t *hash;
+ gcry_mpi_t sig_mpi;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A PKCS#7 signedData message.
+ * We make no attempt to match intelligently, so we don't save any info about
+ * the signer.
+ */
+struct pkcs7_signedData
+{
+ int signerInfo_count;
+ struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
+ * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
+ * placed in 'msg', which must already be allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_pkcs7_signedData (const void *sigbuf, grub_size_t data_size, struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the message, it must free it.
+ */
+extern void
+pkcs7_signedData_release (struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
/* Do libtasn1 init. */
extern int
asn1_init (void);
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57dc2a981
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+static char asn1_error[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
+
+/* RFC 5652 s 5.1. */
+static const char *signedData_oid = "1.2.840.113549.1.7.2";
+
+/* RFC 4055 s 2.1. */
+static const char *sha256_oid = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1";
+static const char *sha512_oid = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3";
+
+static grub_err_t
+process_content (grub_uint8_t *content, int size, struct pkcs7_signedData *msg)
+{
+ int res;
+ asn1_node signed_part;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ char algo_oid[MAX_OID_LEN];
+ int algo_oid_size;
+ int algo_count;
+ int signer_count;
+ int i;
+ char version;
+ int version_size = sizeof (version);
+ grub_uint8_t *result_buf;
+ int result_size = 0;
+ int crls_size = 0;
+ gcry_error_t gcry_err;
+ bool sha256_in_da, sha256_in_si, sha512_in_da, sha512_in_si;
+ char *da_path;
+ char *si_sig_path;
+ char *si_da_path;
+
+ res = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.pkcs-7-SignedData", &signed_part);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for PKCS#7 signed part");
+
+ res = asn1_der_decoding2 (&signed_part, content, &size,
+ ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "error reading PKCS#7 signed data: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version CMSVersion,
+ * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ * encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
+ * certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
+ * crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
+ * signerInfos SignerInfos }
+ */
+
+ res = asn1_read_value (signed_part, "version", &version, &version_size);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "error reading signedData version: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ /* Signature version must be 1 because appended signature only support v1. */
+ if (version != 1)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "unexpected signature version v%d, only v1 supported", version);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers
+ *
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifer is an X.509 AlgorithmIdentifier (10.1.1)
+ *
+ * RFC 4055 s 2.1:
+ * sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha256, NULL }
+ * sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha512, NULL }
+ *
+ * We only support 1 element in the set, and we do not check parameters atm.
+ */
+ res = asn1_number_of_elements (signed_part, "digestAlgorithms", &algo_count);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "error counting number of digest algorithms: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ if (algo_count <= 0)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "a minimum of 1 digest algorithm is required");
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ if (algo_count > 2)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET, "a maximum of 2 digest algorithms is supported");
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ sha256_in_da = false;
+ sha512_in_da = false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < algo_count; i++)
+ {
+ da_path = grub_xasprintf ("digestAlgorithms.?%d.algorithm", i + 1);
+ if (da_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate path for digest algorithm parsing path");
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ algo_oid_size = sizeof (algo_oid);
+ res = asn1_read_value (signed_part, da_path, algo_oid, &algo_oid_size);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "error reading digest algorithm: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+ grub_free (da_path);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ if (grub_strncmp (sha512_oid, algo_oid, algo_oid_size) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sha512_in_da == false)
+ sha512_in_da = true;
+ else
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "SHA-512 specified twice in digest algorithm list");
+ grub_free (da_path);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp (sha256_oid, algo_oid, algo_oid_size) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sha256_in_da == false)
+ sha256_in_da = true;
+ else
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "SHA-256 specified twice in digest algorithm list");
+ grub_free (da_path);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ "only SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes are supported, found OID %s",
+ algo_oid);
+ grub_free (da_path);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (da_path);
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, at least one of sha{256,512}_in_da must be true. */
+
+ /*
+ * We ignore the certificates, but we don't permit CRLs.
+ * A CRL entry might be revoking the certificate we're using, and we have
+ * no way of dealing with that at the moment.
+ */
+ res = asn1_read_value (signed_part, "crls", NULL, &crls_size);
+ if (res != ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ "PKCS#7 messages with embedded CRLs are not supported");
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the signatures */
+ res = asn1_number_of_elements (signed_part, "signerInfos", &signer_count);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "error counting number of signers: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ if (signer_count <= 0)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "a minimum of 1 signer is required");
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ msg->signerInfos = grub_calloc (signer_count, sizeof (struct pkcs7_signerInfo));
+ if (msg->signerInfos == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate space for %d signers", signer_count);
+ goto cleanup_signed_part;
+ }
+
+ msg->signerInfo_count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < signer_count; i++)
+ {
+ si_da_path = grub_xasprintf ("signerInfos.?%d.digestAlgorithm.algorithm", i + 1);
+ if (si_da_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate path for signer %d's digest algorithm parsing path",
+ i);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ algo_oid_size = sizeof (algo_oid);
+ res = asn1_read_value (signed_part, si_da_path, algo_oid, &algo_oid_size);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "error reading signer %d's digest algorithm: %s", i, asn1_strerror (res));
+ grub_free (si_da_path);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (si_da_path);
+
+ if (grub_strncmp (sha512_oid, algo_oid, algo_oid_size) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sha512_in_da == false)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "signer %d claims a SHA-512 signature which was not "
+ "specified in the outer DigestAlgorithms", i);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sha512_in_si = true;
+ msg->signerInfos[i].hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name ("sha512");
+ }
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp (sha256_oid, algo_oid, algo_oid_size) == 0)
+ {
+ if (sha256_in_da == false)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "signer %d claims a SHA-256 signature which was not "
+ "specified in the outer DigestAlgorithms", i);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sha256_in_si = true;
+ msg->signerInfos[i].hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name ("sha256");
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ "only SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes are supported, found OID %s",
+ algo_oid);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ if (msg->signerInfos[i].hash == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "Hash algorithm for signer %d (OID %s) not loaded", i, algo_oid);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ si_sig_path = grub_xasprintf ("signerInfos.?%d.signature", i + 1);
+ if (si_sig_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate path for signer %d's signature parsing path", i);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ result_buf = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (signed_part, si_sig_path, "signature data", &result_size);
+ grub_free (si_sig_path);
+
+ if (result_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ gcry_err = _gcry_mpi_scan (&(msg->signerInfos[i].sig_mpi), GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
+ result_buf, result_size, NULL);
+ grub_free (result_buf);
+
+ if (gcry_err != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "error loading signature %d into MPI structure: %d",
+ i, gcry_err);
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Use msg->signerInfo_count to track fully populated signerInfos so we
+ * know how many we need to clean up.
+ */
+ msg->signerInfo_count++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Final consistency check of signerInfo.*.digestAlgorithm vs
+ * digestAlgorithms.*.algorithm. An algorithm must be present in both
+ * digestAlgorithms and signerInfo or in neither. We have already checked
+ * for an algorithm in signerInfo that is not in digestAlgorithms, here we
+ * check for algorithms in digestAlgorithms but not in signerInfos.
+ */
+ if (sha512_in_da == true && sha512_in_si == false)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "SHA-512 specified in DigestAlgorithms but did not appear in SignerInfos");
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ if (sha256_in_da == true && sha256_in_si == false)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "SHA-256 specified in DigestAlgorithms but did not appear in SignerInfos");
+ goto cleanup_signerInfos;
+ }
+
+ asn1_delete_structure (&signed_part);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ cleanup_signerInfos:
+ for (i = 0; i < msg->signerInfo_count; i++)
+ _gcry_mpi_release (msg->signerInfos[i].sig_mpi);
+
+ grub_free (msg->signerInfos);
+
+ cleanup_signed_part:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&signed_part);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+grub_err_t
+parse_pkcs7_signedData (const void *sigbuf, grub_size_t data_size, struct pkcs7_signedData *msg)
+{
+ int res;
+ asn1_node content_info;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ char content_oid[MAX_OID_LEN];
+ grub_uint8_t *content;
+ int content_size;
+ int content_oid_size = sizeof (content_oid);
+ int size;
+
+ if (data_size > GRUB_INT_MAX)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "cannot parse a PKCS#7 message where data size > GRUB_INT_MAX");
+
+ size = (int) data_size;
+
+ res = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.pkcs-7-ContentInfo", &content_info);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for PKCS#7 data: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+
+ res = asn1_der_decoding2 (&content_info, sigbuf, &size,
+ ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER | ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_ALLOW_PADDING,
+ asn1_error);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "error decoding PKCS#7 message DER: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * contentType ContentType,
+ * content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
+ *
+ * ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ */
+ res = asn1_read_value (content_info, "contentType", content_oid, &content_oid_size);
+ if (res != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "error reading PKCS#7 content type: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (res));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* OID for SignedData defined in 5.1. */
+ if (grub_strncmp (signedData_oid, content_oid, content_oid_size) != 0)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "unexpected content type in PKCS#7 message: OID %s", content_oid);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ content = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (content_info, "content", "PKCS#7 message content", &content_size);
+ if (content == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ err = process_content (content, content_size, msg);
+ grub_free (content);
+
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&content_info);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the message, it must free it.
+ */
+void
+pkcs7_signedData_release (struct pkcs7_signedData *msg)
+{
+ grub_ssize_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < msg->signerInfo_count; i++)
+ _gcry_mpi_release (msg->signerInfos[i].sig_mpi);
+
+ grub_free (msg->signerInfos);
+}
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 07/21] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 17:10 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 09/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (12 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Javier Martinez Canillas, Daniel Kiper
This code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the
PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will
be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle
it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> # EKU support
Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.com> # key usage issue
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 38 +
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 1000 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
index cac7fb02c..ef172cc40 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
#define MAX_OID_LEN 32
+/*
+ * One or more x509 certificates.
+ * We do limited parsing:
+ * extracting only the version, serial, issuer, subject, RSA public key
+ * and key size.
+ * Also, hold the sha256, sha384, and sha512 fingerprint of the certificate.
+ */
+struct x509_certificate
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *next;
+ grub_uint8_t version;
+ grub_uint8_t *serial;
+ grub_size_t serial_len;
+ char *issuer;
+ grub_size_t issuer_len;
+ char *subject;
+ grub_size_t subject_len;
+ /* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */
+ gcry_mpi_t mpis[2];
+ int modulus_size;
+ char fingerprint[3][64];
+};
+
/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
struct pkcs7_signerInfo
{
@@ -43,6 +66,21 @@ struct pkcs7_signedData
struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
};
+/*
+ * Import a DER-encoded certificate at 'data', of size 'size'.
+ * Place the results into 'results', which must be already allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_x509_certificate (const void *data, grub_size_t size, struct x509_certificate *results);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it.
+ * The caller is also responsible for maintenance of the linked list.
+ */
+extern void
+certificate_release (struct x509_certificate *cert);
+
/*
* Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
* The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a69d30a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,962 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+static char asn1_error[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
+
+
+/* RFC 3279 2.3.1 RSA Keys. */
+static const char *rsaEncryption_oid = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1";
+
+/* RFC 5280 Appendix A. */
+static const char *commonName_oid = "2.5.4.3";
+
+/* RFC 5280 4.2.1.3 Key Usage. */
+static const char *keyUsage_oid = "2.5.29.15";
+
+static const grub_uint8_t digitalSignatureUsage = 0x80;
+
+/* RFC 5280 4.2.1.9 Basic Constraints. */
+static const char *basicConstraints_oid = "2.5.29.19";
+
+/* RFC 5280 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage. */
+static const char *extendedKeyUsage_oid = "2.5.29.37";
+static const char *codeSigningUsage_oid = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3";
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3279 2.3.1
+ *
+ * The RSA public key MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type RSAPublicKey:
+ *
+ * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- n
+ * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
+ *
+ * where modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
+ * exponent e.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_parse_rsa_pubkey (grub_uint8_t *der, int dersize, struct x509_certificate *certificate)
+{
+ int result;
+ asn1_node spk = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t *m_data, *e_data;
+ int m_size, e_size;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ gcry_error_t gcry_err;
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn, "GNUTLS.RSAPublicKey", &spk);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "cannot create storage for public key ASN.1 data");
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&spk, der, &dersize, ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "cannot decode certificate public key DER: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ m_data = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (spk, "modulus", "RSA modulus", &m_size);
+ if (m_data == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ e_data = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (spk, "publicExponent", "RSA public exponent", &e_size);
+ if (e_data == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup_m_data;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert m, e to mpi
+ *
+ * nscanned is not set for FMT_USG, it's only set for FMT_PGP,
+ * so we can't verify it.
+ */
+ gcry_err = _gcry_mpi_scan (&certificate->mpis[0], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, m_data, m_size, NULL);
+ if (gcry_err != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error loading RSA modulus into MPI structure: %d", gcry_err);
+ goto cleanup_e_data;
+ }
+
+ gcry_err = _gcry_mpi_scan (&certificate->mpis[1], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, e_data, e_size, NULL);
+ if (gcry_err != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error loading RSA exponent into MPI structure: %d", gcry_err);
+ goto cleanup_m_mpi;
+ }
+
+ /* RSA key size in bits. */
+ certificate->modulus_size = (m_size * 8) - 8;
+
+ grub_free (e_data);
+ grub_free (m_data);
+ asn1_delete_structure (&spk);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ cleanup_m_mpi:
+ _gcry_mpi_release (certificate->mpis[0]);
+ cleanup_e_data:
+ grub_free (e_data);
+ cleanup_m_data:
+ grub_free (m_data);
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&spk);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 5280:
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
+ *
+ * AlgorithmIdentifiers come from RFC 3279, we are not strictly compilant as we
+ * only support RSA Encryption.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_x509_read_subject_public_key (asn1_node asn, struct x509_certificate *results)
+{
+ int result;
+ grub_err_t err;
+ const char *algo_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm";
+ const char *params_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.parameters";
+ const char *pk_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey";
+ char algo_oid[MAX_OID_LEN];
+ int algo_size = sizeof (algo_oid);
+ char params_value[2];
+ int params_size = sizeof (params_value);
+ grub_uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
+ int key_size = 0;
+ unsigned int key_type;
+
+ /* Algorithm: see notes for rsaEncryption_oid. */
+ result = asn1_read_value (asn, algo_name, algo_oid, &algo_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading x509 public key algorithm: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+
+ if (grub_strncmp (algo_oid, rsaEncryption_oid, sizeof (rsaEncryption_oid)) != 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ "unsupported x509 public key algorithm: %s", algo_oid);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 3279 2.3.1
+ * The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field
+ * of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The parameters field MUST
+ * have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
+ */
+ result = asn1_read_value (asn, params_name, params_value, ¶ms_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading x509 public key parameters: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+
+ if (params_value[0] != ASN1_TAG_NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "invalid x509 public key parameters: expected NULL");
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 3279 2.3.1: The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is the value of the BIT
+ * STRING subjectPublicKey.
+ */
+ result = asn1_read_value_type (asn, pk_name, NULL, &key_size, &key_type);
+ if (result != ASN1_MEM_ERROR)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading size of x509 public key: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ if (key_type != ASN1_ETYPE_BIT_STRING)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "unexpected ASN.1 type when reading x509 public key: %x",
+ key_type);
+
+ /* Length is in bits. */
+ key_size = (key_size + 7) / 8;
+
+ key_data = grub_malloc (key_size);
+ if (key_data == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory for x509 public key");
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (asn, pk_name, key_data, &key_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ grub_free (key_data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading public key data");
+ }
+
+ key_size = (key_size + 7) / 8;
+ err = grub_parse_rsa_pubkey (key_data, key_size, results);
+ grub_free (key_data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Decode a string as defined in Appendix A. */
+static grub_err_t
+decode_string (char *der, int der_size, char **string, grub_size_t *string_size)
+{
+ asn1_node strasn;
+ int result;
+ char *choice;
+ int choice_size = 0;
+ int tmp_size = 0;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.DirectoryString", &strasn);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for certificate: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&strasn, der, &der_size, ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "could not parse DER for DirectoryString: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ choice = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (strasn, "", "DirectoryString choice", &choice_size);
+ if (choice == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (grub_strncmp ("utf8String", choice, choice_size) == 0)
+ {
+ result = asn1_read_value (strasn, "utf8String", NULL, &tmp_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_MEM_ERROR)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading size of UTF-8 string: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_choice;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp ("printableString", choice, choice_size) == 0)
+ {
+ result = asn1_read_value (strasn, "printableString", NULL, &tmp_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_MEM_ERROR)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading size of printableString: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_choice;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+ "only UTF-8 and printable DirectoryStrings are supported, got %s",
+ choice);
+ goto cleanup_choice;
+ }
+
+ /* Read size does not include trailing NUL. */
+ tmp_size++;
+
+ *string = grub_malloc (tmp_size);
+ if (*string == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "cannot allocate memory for DirectoryString contents");
+ goto cleanup_choice;
+ }
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (strasn, choice, *string, &tmp_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading out %s in DirectoryString: %s",
+ choice, asn1_strerror (result));
+ grub_free (*string);
+ *string = NULL;
+ goto cleanup_choice;
+ }
+
+ *string_size = tmp_size + 1;
+ (*string)[tmp_size] = '\0';
+
+ cleanup_choice:
+ grub_free (choice);
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&strasn);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+ * ...
+ *
+ * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+check_version (asn1_node certificate, struct x509_certificate *results)
+{
+ int rc;
+ const char *name = "tbsCertificate.version";
+ grub_uint8_t version;
+ int len = sizeof (version);
+
+ rc = asn1_read_value (certificate, name, &version, &len);
+
+ /* Require version 3. */
+ if (rc != ASN1_SUCCESS || len != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading certificate version");
+
+ if (version != 0x02)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "invalid x509 certificate version, expected v3 (0x02), got 0x%02x.",
+ version);
+
+ results->version = version;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an X.501 Name, which is complex.
+ *
+ * For simplicity, we extract only the CN.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_name (asn1_node asn, const char *name_path, char **name, grub_size_t *name_size)
+{
+ int seq_components, set_components;
+ int result;
+ int i, j;
+ char *top_path, *set_path, *type_path, *val_path;
+ char type[MAX_OID_LEN];
+ int type_len = sizeof (type);
+ int string_size = 0;
+ char *string_der;
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+ *name = NULL;
+
+ top_path = grub_xasprintf ("%s.rdnSequence", name_path);
+ if (top_path == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate memory for %s name parsing path", name_path);
+
+ result = asn1_number_of_elements (asn, top_path, &seq_components);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error counting name components: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= seq_components; i++)
+ {
+ set_path = grub_xasprintf ("%s.?%d", top_path, i);
+ if (set_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate memory for %s name set parsing path",
+ name_path);
+ goto cleanup_set;
+ }
+ /* This brings us, hopefully, to a set. */
+ result = asn1_number_of_elements (asn, set_path, &set_components);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error counting name sub-components components (element %d): %s",
+ i, asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_set;
+ }
+ for (j = 1; j <= set_components; j++)
+ {
+ type_path = grub_xasprintf ("%s.?%d.?%d.type", top_path, i, j);
+ if (type_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate memory for %s name component type path",
+ name_path);
+ goto cleanup_set;
+ }
+ type_len = sizeof (type);
+ result = asn1_read_value (asn, type_path, type, &type_len);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading %s name component type: %s",
+ name_path, asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_type;
+ }
+
+ if (grub_strncmp (type, commonName_oid, type_len) != 0)
+ {
+ grub_free (type_path);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ val_path = grub_xasprintf ("%s.?%d.?%d.value", top_path, i, j);
+ if (val_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate memory for %s name component value path",
+ name_path);
+ goto cleanup_type;
+ }
+
+ string_der = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn, val_path, name_path, &string_size);
+ if (string_der == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup_val_path;
+ }
+
+ err = decode_string (string_der, string_size, name, name_size);
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup_string;
+
+ grub_free (string_der);
+ grub_free (type_path);
+ grub_free (val_path);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (set_path);
+ if (*name)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (top_path);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ cleanup_string:
+ grub_free (string_der);
+ cleanup_val_path:
+ grub_free (val_path);
+ cleanup_type:
+ grub_free (type_path);
+ cleanup_set:
+ grub_free (set_path);
+ cleanup:
+ grub_free (top_path);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the Key Usage extension.
+ * We require the Digital Signature usage.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_key_usage (grub_uint8_t *value, int value_size)
+{
+ asn1_node usageasn;
+ int result;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ grub_uint8_t usage = 0xff;
+ int usage_size = sizeof (usage_size);
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.KeyUsage", &usageasn);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for key usage");
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&usageasn, value, &value_size,
+ ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error parsing DER for Key Usage: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (usageasn, "", &usage, &usage_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading Key Usage value: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!(usage & digitalSignatureUsage))
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "key usage (0x%x) missing Digital Signature usage", usage);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&usageasn);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+ * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_basic_constraints (grub_uint8_t *value, int value_size)
+{
+ asn1_node basicasn;
+ int result;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ char cA[6]; /* FALSE or TRUE. */
+ int cA_size = sizeof (cA);
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.BasicConstraints", &basicasn);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for Basic Constraints");
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&basicasn, value, &value_size,
+ ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error parsing DER for Basic Constraints: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ result = asn1_read_value (basicasn, "cA", cA, &cA_size);
+ if (result == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ /* Not present, default is False, so this is OK. */
+ err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ else if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading Basic Constraints cA value: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* The certificate must not be a CA certificate. */
+ if (grub_strncmp ("FALSE", cA, cA_size) != 0)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "unexpected CA value: %s", cA);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&basicasn);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the Extended Key Usage extension.
+ * We require the Code Signing usage.
+ *
+ * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
+ *
+ * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_extended_key_usage (grub_uint8_t *value, int value_size)
+{
+ asn1_node extendedasn;
+ int result, count, i = 0;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ char usage[MAX_OID_LEN], name[3];
+ int usage_size = sizeof (usage);
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.ExtKeyUsageSyntax", &extendedasn);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for Extended Key Usage");
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&extendedasn, value, &value_size,
+ ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "error parsing DER for Extended Key Usage: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* If EKUs are present, it checks the presents of Code Signing usage. */
+ result = asn1_number_of_elements (extendedasn, "", &count);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error counting number of Extended Key Usages: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < count + 1; i++)
+ {
+ grub_memset (name, 0, sizeof (name));
+ grub_snprintf (name, sizeof (name), "?%d", i);
+ result = asn1_read_value (extendedasn, name, usage, &usage_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading Extended Key Usage: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (grub_strncmp (codeSigningUsage_oid, usage, usage_size) == 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "extended key usage missing Code Signing usage");
+
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&extendedasn);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
+ *
+ * Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+ * extnValue OCTET STRING
+ * -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
+ * -- corresponding to the extension type identified
+ * -- by extnID
+ * }
+ *
+ * A certificate must:
+ * - contain the Digital Signature usage
+ * - not be a CA
+ * - contain no extended usages, or contain the Code Signing extended usage
+ * - not contain any other critical extensions (RFC 5280 s 4.2)
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_extensions (asn1_node cert)
+{
+ int result;
+ int ext, num_extensions = 0;
+ int usage_present = 0, constraints_present = 0, extended_usage_present = 0;
+ char *oid_path, *critical_path, *value_path;
+ char extnID[MAX_OID_LEN];
+ int extnID_size;
+ grub_err_t err;
+ char critical[6]; /* We get either "TRUE" or "FALSE". */
+ int critical_size;
+ grub_uint8_t *value;
+ int value_size;
+
+ result = asn1_number_of_elements (cert, "tbsCertificate.extensions", &num_extensions);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error counting number of extensions: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+
+ if (num_extensions < 2)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "insufficient number of extensions for certificate, need at least 2, got %d",
+ num_extensions);
+
+ for (ext = 1; ext <= num_extensions; ext++)
+ {
+ oid_path = grub_xasprintf ("tbsCertificate.extensions.?%d.extnID", ext);
+ if (oid_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error extension OID path is empty");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ extnID_size = sizeof (extnID);
+ result = asn1_read_value (cert, oid_path, extnID, &extnID_size);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading extension OID: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_oid_path;
+ }
+
+ critical_path = grub_xasprintf ("tbsCertificate.extensions.?%d.critical", ext);
+ if (critical_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error critical path is empty");
+ goto cleanup_oid_path;
+ }
+
+ critical_size = sizeof (critical);
+ result = asn1_read_value (cert, critical_path, critical, &critical_size);
+ if (result == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND)
+ critical[0] = '\0';
+ else if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading extension criticality: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+ goto cleanup_critical_path;
+ }
+
+ value_path = grub_xasprintf ("tbsCertificate.extensions.?%d.extnValue", ext);
+ if (value_path == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error extnValue path is empty");
+ goto cleanup_critical_path;
+ }
+
+ value = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (cert, value_path,
+ "certificate extension value", &value_size);
+ if (value == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup_value_path;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we must see if we recognise the OID.
+ * If we have an unrecognised critical extension we MUST bail.
+ */
+ if (grub_strncmp (keyUsage_oid, extnID, extnID_size) == 0)
+ {
+ err = verify_key_usage (value, value_size);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_value;
+
+ usage_present++;
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp (basicConstraints_oid, extnID, extnID_size) == 0)
+ {
+ err = verify_basic_constraints (value, value_size);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_value;
+
+ constraints_present++;
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp (extendedKeyUsage_oid, extnID, extnID_size) == 0)
+ {
+ err = verify_extended_key_usage (value, value_size);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_value;
+
+ extended_usage_present++;
+ }
+ else if (grub_strncmp ("TRUE", critical, critical_size) == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Per the RFC, we must not process a certificate with
+ * a critical extension we do not understand.
+ */
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "unhandled critical x509 extension with OID %s", extnID);
+ goto cleanup_value;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (value);
+ grub_free (value_path);
+ grub_free (critical_path);
+ grub_free (oid_path);
+ }
+
+ if (usage_present != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "unexpected number of Key Usage extensions - expected 1, got %d",
+ usage_present);
+
+ if (constraints_present != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "unexpected number of basic constraints extensions - expected 1, got %d",
+ constraints_present);
+
+ if (extended_usage_present > 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "unexpected number of Extended Key Usage extensions - expected 0 or 1, got %d",
+ extended_usage_present);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ cleanup_value:
+ grub_free (value);
+ cleanup_value_path:
+ grub_free (value_path);
+ cleanup_critical_path:
+ grub_free (critical_path);
+ cleanup_oid_path:
+ grub_free (oid_path);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a certificate whose DER-encoded form is in @data, of size @data_size.
+ * Return the results in @results, which must point to an allocated x509 certificate.
+ */
+grub_err_t
+parse_x509_certificate (const void *data, grub_size_t data_size, struct x509_certificate *results)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ asn1_node cert;
+ grub_err_t err;
+ int size;
+ int tmp_size;
+
+ if (data_size > GRUB_INT_MAX)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "cannot parse a certificate where data size > GRUB_INT_MAX");
+ size = (int) data_size;
+
+ result = asn1_create_element (grub_gnutls_pkix_asn, "PKIX1.Certificate", &cert);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not create ASN.1 structure for certificate: %s",
+ asn1_strerror (result));
+
+ result = asn1_der_decoding2 (&cert, data, &size, ASN1_DECODE_FLAG_STRICT_DER, asn1_error);
+ if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+ "could not parse DER for certificate: %s", asn1_error);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1
+ */
+ err = check_version (cert, results);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /*
+ * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
+ *
+ * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+ */
+ results->serial = grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (cert, "tbsCertificate.serialNumber",
+ "certificate serial number", &tmp_size);
+ if (results->serial == NULL)
+ {
+ err = grub_errno;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ /*
+ * It's safe to cast the signed int to an unsigned here, we know
+ * length is non-negative.
+ */
+ results->serial_len = tmp_size;
+
+ /*
+ * signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *
+ * We don't load the signature or issuer at the moment,
+ * as we don't attempt x509 verification.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * validity Validity,
+ *
+ * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * notBefore Time,
+ * notAfter Time }
+ *
+ * We can't validate this reasonably, we have no true time source on several
+ * platforms. For now we do not parse them.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * issuer Name,
+ *
+ * This is an X501 name, we parse out just the CN.
+ */
+ err = read_name (cert, "tbsCertificate.issuer", &results->issuer, &results->issuer_len);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_serial;
+
+ /*
+ * subject Name,
+ *
+ * This is an X501 name, we parse out just the CN.
+ */
+ err = read_name (cert, "tbsCertificate.subject", &results->subject, &results->subject_len);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_issuer;
+
+ /*
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * ...
+ * subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ * ...
+ */
+ err = grub_x509_read_subject_public_key (cert, results);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_name;
+
+ /*
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * ...
+ * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
+ * -- If present, version MUST be v3
+ * }
+ */
+ err = verify_extensions (cert);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ goto cleanup_mpis;
+
+ /*
+ * We do not read or check the signature on the certificate:
+ * as discussed we do not try to validate the certificate but trust
+ * it implictly.
+ */
+ asn1_delete_structure (&cert);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ cleanup_mpis:
+ _gcry_mpi_release (results->mpis[0]);
+ _gcry_mpi_release (results->mpis[1]);
+ cleanup_name:
+ grub_free (results->subject);
+ cleanup_issuer:
+ grub_free (results->issuer);
+ cleanup_serial:
+ grub_free (results->serial);
+ cleanup:
+ asn1_delete_structure (&cert);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it.
+ * The caller is also responsible for maintenance of the linked list.
+ */
+void
+certificate_release (struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+ grub_free (cert->issuer);
+ grub_free (cert->subject);
+ grub_free (cert->serial);
+ _gcry_mpi_release (cert->mpis[0]);
+ _gcry_mpi_release (cert->mpis[1]);
+}
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 09/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (11 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and if
the secure boot mode is enforced, enter lockdown. Else it is
considered as disabled. There are three secure boot modes.
They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification
fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and
If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforced.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 2 +-
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 +
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +-
4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index bdbc3b82e..15f087f27 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -8912,7 +8912,7 @@ platforms.
@section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
-if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
+if the UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes
limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and
widely used within GRUB.
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index b3f71196a..b72f322b1 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ kernel = {
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
+ powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
index a5586f85b..132d027c7 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@
#if defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__i386__)
#include <grub/ieee1275/alloc.h>
#endif
+#if defined(__powerpc__)
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+#define GRUB_SB_DISABLED ((grub_uint32_t) 0)
+#define GRUB_SB_ENFORCED ((grub_uint32_t) 2)
+#endif
/* The maximum heap size we're going to claim at boot. Not used by sparc. */
#ifdef __i386__
@@ -995,6 +1003,50 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
}
}
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+static void
+grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
+{
+ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
+ grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/", &root);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "couldn't find / node");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_get_integer_property (root, "ibm,secure-boot", &sb_mode, sizeof (sb_mode), 0);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "couldn't examine /ibm,secure-boot property");
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Secure Boot Mode:
+ * 0 - disabled
+ * No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
+ * 1 - audit
+ * Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
+ * post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
+ * 2 - enforced
+ * Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails,
+ * post the errors and stop the boot.
+ *
+ * Now, only support disabled and enforced.
+ */
+ if (sb_mode == GRUB_SB_ENFORCED)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Enabled\n");
+ grub_lockdown ();
+ }
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");
+}
+#endif /* __powerpc__ */
+
grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
void
@@ -1020,6 +1072,10 @@ grub_machine_init (void)
#else
grub_install_get_time_ms (grub_rtc_get_time_ms);
#endif
+
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot ();
+#endif
}
void
diff --git a/include/grub/lockdown.h b/include/grub/lockdown.h
index 40531fa82..ebfee4bf0 100644
--- a/include/grub/lockdown.h
+++ b/include/grub/lockdown.h
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0
#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1
-#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI) || \
+ (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275))
extern void
EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
extern int
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 09/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 15:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (10 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as
well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying
appended signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and
GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures.
If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig
module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted
keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and
locked automatically.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 15 +
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 597 +++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/err.h | 3 +-
include/grub/file.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index b72f322b1..d91694de0 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -980,6 +980,21 @@ module = {
cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
};
+module = {
+ name = appendedsig;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+ common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+ enable = emu;
+ enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+ cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+ cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+ depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
module = {
name = hdparm;
common = commands/hdparm.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5eb7b768a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+/* Max size of hash data. */
+#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64
+
+/* Public key type. */
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+/* Appended signature magic string and size. */
+#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
+#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
+
+/*
+ * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
+ * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
+ */
+struct module_signature
+{
+ grub_uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
+ grub_uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
+ grub_uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
+ grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
+ grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
+ grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
+ grub_uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+#define SIG_METADATA_SIZE (sizeof (struct module_signature))
+#define APPENDED_SIG_SIZE(pkcs7_data_size) \
+ (pkcs7_data_size + SIG_MAGIC_SIZE + SIG_METADATA_SIZE)
+
+/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
+struct grub_appended_signature
+{
+ grub_size_t signature_len; /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
+ struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
+ struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7; /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
+};
+
+/* This represents a trusted certificates. */
+struct grub_database
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
+ grub_uint32_t cert_entries; /* Number of certificates. */
+};
+
+/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
+
+/*
+ * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
+ * check_sigs: false
+ * - No signature verification. This is the default.
+ * check_sigs: true
+ * - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails,
+ * post the errors and stop the boot.
+ */
+static bool check_sigs = false;
+
+static grub_ssize_t
+pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
+{
+ grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* Filesystem descriptor. */
+static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
+ .name = "pseudo",
+ .fs_read = pseudo_read
+};
+
+static void
+add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+ struct x509_certificate *const cert)
+{
+ gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
+
+ /* Add SHA256 hash of certificate. */
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+ grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+ grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0], data, data_size);
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *cert1, const struct x509_certificate *cert2)
+{
+ if (grub_memcmp (cert1->subject, cert2->subject, cert2->subject_len) == 0
+ && grub_memcmp (cert1->issuer, cert2->issuer, cert2->issuer_len) == 0
+ && grub_memcmp (cert1->serial, cert2->serial, cert2->serial_len) == 0
+ && grub_memcmp (cert1->mpis[0], cert2->mpis[0], sizeof (cert2->mpis[0])) == 0
+ && grub_memcmp (cert1->mpis[1], cert2->mpis[1], sizeof (cert2->mpis[1])) == 0
+ && grub_memcmp (cert1->fingerprint[0], cert2->fingerprint[0], 32) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
+ if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate into the db list */
+static grub_err_t
+add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+ struct grub_database *database)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is not available");
+
+ cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
+ cert->subject);
+ grub_free (cert);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
+
+ if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list",
+ cert->subject);
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
+ }
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
+ cert->subject);
+
+ cert->next = database->certs;
+ database->certs = cert;
+ database->cert_entries++;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
+{
+ grub_off_t full_file_size;
+ grub_size_t file_size, total_read_size = 0;
+ grub_ssize_t read_size;
+
+ full_file_size = grub_file_size (file);
+ if (full_file_size == GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "cannot read a file of unknown size into a buffer");
+
+ if (full_file_size > GRUB_SIZE_MAX)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "file is too large to read: %" PRIuGRUB_OFFSET " bytes",
+ full_file_size);
+
+ file_size = (grub_size_t) full_file_size;
+ *buf = grub_malloc (file_size);
+ if (*buf == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "could not allocate file data buffer size %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE,
+ file_size);
+
+ while (total_read_size < file_size)
+ {
+ read_size = grub_file_read (file, *buf + total_read_size, file_size - total_read_size);
+ if (read_size < 0)
+ {
+ grub_free (*buf);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+ else if (read_size == 0)
+ {
+ grub_free (*buf);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO,
+ "could not read full file size "
+ "(%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "), only %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes read",
+ file_size, total_read_size);
+ }
+
+ total_read_size += read_size;
+ }
+
+ *len = file_size;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,
+ struct grub_appended_signature *sig)
+{
+ grub_size_t appendedsig_pkcs7_size;
+ grub_size_t signed_data_size = bufsize;
+ const grub_uint8_t *signed_data = buf;
+
+ if (signed_data_size < SIG_MAGIC_SIZE)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature magic");
+
+ /* Fast-forwarding pointer and get signature magic string. */
+ signed_data += signed_data_size - SIG_MAGIC_SIZE;
+ if (grub_strncmp ((const char *) signed_data, SIG_MAGIC, SIG_MAGIC_SIZE))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "missing or invalid signature magic");
+
+ signed_data_size -= SIG_MAGIC_SIZE;
+ if (signed_data_size < SIG_METADATA_SIZE)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature metadata");
+
+ /* Rewind pointer and extract signature metadata. */
+ signed_data -= SIG_METADATA_SIZE;
+ grub_memcpy (&(sig->sig_metadata), signed_data, SIG_METADATA_SIZE);
+
+ if (sig->sig_metadata.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "wrong signature type");
+
+ appendedsig_pkcs7_size = grub_be_to_cpu32 (sig->sig_metadata.sig_len);
+
+ signed_data_size -= SIG_METADATA_SIZE;
+ if (appendedsig_pkcs7_size > signed_data_size)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for PKCS#7 message");
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "sig len %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", appendedsig_pkcs7_size);
+
+ /* Appended signature size. */
+ sig->signature_len = APPENDED_SIG_SIZE (appendedsig_pkcs7_size);
+ /* Rewind pointer and parse appended pkcs7 data. */
+ signed_data -= appendedsig_pkcs7_size;
+
+ return parse_pkcs7_signedData (signed_data, appendedsig_pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare
+ * the S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_signature (const gcry_mpi_t *pkmpi, const gcry_mpi_t hmpi,
+ const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const grub_uint8_t *hval)
+{
+ gcry_sexp_t hsexp, pubkey, sig;
+ grub_size_t errof;
+
+ if (_gcry_sexp_build (&hsexp, &errof, "(data (flags %s) (hash %s %b))", "pkcs1",
+ hash->name, hash->mdlen, hval) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+ if (_gcry_sexp_build (&pubkey, &errof, "(public-key (dsa (n %M) (e %M)))",
+ pkmpi[0], pkmpi[1]) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+ if (_gcry_sexp_build (&sig, &errof, "(sig-val (rsa (s %M)))", hmpi) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+ _gcry_sexp_dump (sig);
+ _gcry_sexp_dump (hsexp);
+ _gcry_sexp_dump (pubkey);
+
+ if (grub_crypto_pk_rsa->verify (sig, hsexp, pubkey) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+ return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+ grub_size_t datasize;
+ void *context;
+ unsigned char *hash;
+ struct x509_certificate *pk;
+ struct grub_appended_signature sig;
+ struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ if (!db.cert_entries)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "no trusted keys to verify against");
+
+ err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
+ datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
+
+ /* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
+ {
+ /*
+ * This could be optimised in a couple of ways:
+ * - we could only compute hashes once per hash type.
+ * - we could track signer information and only verify where IDs match.
+ * For now we do the naive O(trusted keys * pkcs7 signers) approach.
+ */
+ si = &sig.pkcs7.signerInfos[i];
+ context = grub_zalloc (si->hash->contextsize);
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return grub_errno;
+
+ si->hash->init (context, 0);
+ si->hash->write (context, buf, datasize);
+ si->hash->final (context);
+ hash = si->hash->read (context);
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "data size %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ", signer %d hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n",
+ datasize, i, hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+
+ for (pk = db.certs; pk != NULL; pk = pk->next)
+ {
+ err = verify_signature (pk->mpis, si->sig_mpi, si->hash, hash);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' succeeded\n",
+ i, pk->subject);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' failed\n",
+ i, pk->subject);
+ }
+
+ grub_free (context);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
+
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return grub_error (err, "failed to verify signature against a trusted key");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header,
+ * parse it, and add it to the db list.
+ */
+static void
+build_static_db_list (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
+ struct grub_file pseudo_file;
+ grub_uint8_t *cert_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t cert_data_size = 0;
+
+ FOR_MODULES (header)
+ {
+ /* Not an X.509 certificate, skip. */
+ if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
+ continue;
+
+ grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
+ pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
+ pseudo_file.size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+ pseudo_file.data = (char *) header + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "found an X.509 certificate, size=%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
+ pseudo_file.size);
+
+ err = file_read_whole (&pseudo_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+ return;
+ else if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ continue;
+
+ err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
+ grub_free (cert_data);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Free db list memory */
+static void
+free_db_list (void)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ while (db.certs != NULL)
+ {
+ cert = db.certs;
+ db.certs = db.certs->next;
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+ }
+
+ grub_memset (&db, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
+}
+
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ if (check_sigs == true)
+ return "enforce";
+
+ return "no";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
+ * (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ {
+ ret = grub_strdup ("enforce");
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string enforce");
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
+ check_sigs = true;
+ else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
+ check_sigs = false;
+
+ ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
+ grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type type,
+ void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
+{
+ if (check_sigs == false)
+ {
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
+ {
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST:
+ /*
+ * This is a certificate to add to trusted keychain.
+ *
+ * This needs to be verified or blocked. Ideally we'd write an x509
+ * verifier, but we lack the hubris required to take this on. Instead,
+ * require that it have an appended signature.
+ */
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
+ /*
+ * Appended signatures are only defined for ELF binaries.
+ * Out of an abundance of caution, we only verify Linux kernels
+ * and GRUB modules at this point.
+ */
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
+ /*
+ * It is possible to use appended signature verification without
+ * lockdown - like the PGP verifier. When combined with an embedded
+ * config file in a signed GRUB binary, this could still be a meaningful
+ * secure-boot chain - so long as it isn't subverted by something like a
+ * rouge ACPI table or DT image. Defer them explicitly.
+ */
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ default:
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+appendedsig_write (void *ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size)
+{
+ return grub_verify_appended_signature (buf, size);
+}
+
+struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
+ .name = "appendedsig",
+ .init = appendedsig_init,
+ .write = appendedsig_write,
+};
+
+GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
+{
+ grub_int32_t rc;
+
+ /*
+ * If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode and GRUB is locked down,
+ * enable signature verification.
+ */
+ if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ check_sigs = true;
+
+ /*
+ * This is appended signature verification environment variable.
+ * It is automatically set to "no" or "enforce" based on the
+ * ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property.
+ *
+ * "no": No signature verification. This is the default.
+ *
+ * "enforce": Enforce signature verification. When GRUB is locked down,
+ * user cannot change the value by setting the check_appended_signatures
+ * variable back to ‘no’
+ */
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
+ grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
+
+ rc = asn1_init ();
+ if (rc != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+ grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc, asn1_strerror (rc));
+
+ /* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */
+ build_static_db_list ();
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
+ db.cert_entries);
+
+ grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
+ grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
+}
+
+GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
+{
+ /*
+ * grub_dl_set_persistent should prevent this from actually running, but
+ * it does still run under emu.
+ */
+
+ free_db_list ();
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures");
+ grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
+}
diff --git a/include/grub/err.h b/include/grub/err.h
index 202fa8a7a..6ab905c93 100644
--- a/include/grub/err.h
+++ b/include/grub/err.h
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ typedef enum
GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE,
GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED,
- GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH
+ GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH,
+ GRUB_ERR_EXISTS
}
grub_err_t;
diff --git a/include/grub/file.h b/include/grub/file.h
index a5bf3a792..d678de063 100644
--- a/include/grub/file.h
+++ b/include/grub/file.h
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY,
/* File holding public key to add to trused keys. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST,
+ /* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys. */
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST,
/* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,
/* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed. */
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 15:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (9 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index 5eb7b768a..932bf2a7a 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
*/
static bool check_sigs = false;
+/* Appended signature size. */
+static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
+
+static void
+register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+static void
+unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+
static grub_ssize_t
pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
{
@@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
.fs_read = pseudo_read
};
+/*
+ * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
+ * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
+ * the same data.
+ * Example: sha256 hash data
+ * 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4|
+ * 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
+ *
+ * An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data
+ * by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex
+ * to display it.
+ * Example: Sha256 hash data
+ * 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34:
+ * b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7
+ */
+static void
+dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
+{
+ grub_size_t i, count = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length - 1; i++)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
+ count++;
+ if (count == 16)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("\n ");
+ count = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
+}
+
+static void
+print_certificate (const struct x509_certificate *cert, const grub_uint32_t cert_num)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ grub_printf ("\nCertificate: %u\n", cert_num);
+ grub_printf (" Data:\n");
+ grub_printf (" Version: %u (0x%u)\n", cert->version + 1, cert->version);
+ grub_printf (" Serial Number:\n ");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+ grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+
+ grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+ grub_printf (" Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
+ grub_printf (" Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
+ grub_printf (" Subject Public Key Info:\n");
+ grub_printf (" Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption\n");
+ grub_printf (" RSA Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", cert->modulus_size);
+ grub_printf (" Fingerprint: sha256\n ");
+ dump_data_to_hex ((grub_uint8_t *) &cert->fingerprint[0], grub_strlen (cert->fingerprint[0]));
+}
+
static void
add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
struct x509_certificate *const cert)
@@ -193,6 +258,63 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
return rc;
}
+static void
+_remove_cert_from_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i = 1;
+ struct x509_certificate *curr_cert, *prev_cert;
+
+ for (curr_cert = prev_cert = db.certs; curr_cert != NULL; curr_cert = curr_cert->next, i++)
+ {
+ if (is_cert_match (curr_cert, cert) == true)
+ {
+ if (i == 1) /* Match with first certificate in the db list. */
+ db.certs = curr_cert->next;
+ else
+ prev_cert->next = curr_cert->next;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "removed distrusted certificate with CN: %s from the db list\n",
+ curr_cert->subject);
+ curr_cert->next = NULL;
+ certificate_release (curr_cert);
+ grub_free (curr_cert);
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ prev_cert = curr_cert;
+ }
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is not available");
+
+ cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n");
+ grub_free (cert);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
+
+ /* Remove certificate from the db list. */
+ _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
{
@@ -336,6 +458,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
return err;
+ append_sig_len = sig.signature_len;
datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
/* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */
@@ -387,6 +510,165 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
return err;
}
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+{
+ grub_file_t signed_file;
+ grub_err_t err;
+ grub_uint8_t *signed_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t signed_data_size = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a signed file is expected\nExample:\n\tappend_verify <SIGNED FILE>\n");
+
+ if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing signed file");
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verifying %s\n", args[0]);
+
+ signed_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE);
+ if (signed_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "could not open %s file", args[0]);
+
+ err = file_read_whole (signed_file, &signed_data, &signed_data_size);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ err = grub_verify_appended_signature (signed_data, signed_data_size);
+
+ grub_file_close (signed_file);
+ grub_free (signed_data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
+ * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the certificate is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the trusted certificate without
+ * an appended signature and add it to the db list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the trusted certificate using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+ grub_file_t cert_file;
+ grub_uint8_t *cert_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t cert_data_size = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a trusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
+
+ if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted X.509 certificate file");
+
+ cert_file = grub_file_open (args[0],
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+ if (cert_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "could not open %s file", args[0]);
+
+ err = file_read_whole (cert_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size);
+ grub_file_close (cert_file);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+ * obtain the actual certificate size by subtracting the appended
+ * signature size from the certificate size because
+ * the certificate has an appended signature, and this actual certificate size is
+ * used to get the X.509 certificate.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ cert_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+ err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
+ grub_free (cert_data);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
+ * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the certificate is not removed.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the distrusted certificate
+ * without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command
+ * does not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+ grub_file_t cert_file;
+ grub_uint8_t *cert_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t cert_data_size = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
+
+ if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 certificate file");
+
+ cert_file = grub_file_open (args[0],
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+ if (cert_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "could not open %s file", args[0]);
+
+ err = file_read_whole (cert_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size);
+ grub_file_close (cert_file);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+ * obtain the actual certificate size by subtracting the appended
+ * signature size from the certificate size because
+ * the certificate has an appended signature, and this actual certificate size is
+ * used to get the X.509 certificate.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ cert_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+ /* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
+ err = remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size);
+ grub_free (cert_data);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+ for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
+ print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
/*
* Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header,
* parse it, and add it to the db list.
@@ -545,6 +827,32 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
.write = appendedsig_write,
};
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
+
+/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
+static void
+register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
+{
+ cmd_verify = grub_register_command ("append_verify", grub_cmd_verify_signature, N_("SIGNED_FILE"),
+ N_("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list"));
+ cmd_list_db = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list_db, 0,
+ N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
+ cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
+ cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
+}
+
+/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
+static void
+unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
+{
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
+}
+
GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
{
grub_int32_t rc;
@@ -579,6 +887,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
db.cert_entries);
+ register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
}
@@ -594,4 +903,5 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", NULL, NULL);
grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures");
grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
+ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
}
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 16:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (8 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature,
which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables
from PKS.
If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx
from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be
saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would
read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
Note:-
SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 2 +
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 -
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 7 +
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++++++++
.../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 328 ++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 +
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 ++
.../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 139 ++++++++
9 files changed, 640 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
index e50db8106..8577462d5 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
endif
if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index d91694de0..16cdbadcb 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ kernel = {
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
+ powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
+ powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
#define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
-#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
\f
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
index 132d027c7..46bfaa9a8 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
#endif
#if defined(__powerpc__)
#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
#endif
#ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
static void
grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
{
+ grub_err_t err;
grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
int rc;
@@ -1044,6 +1047,10 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
}
else
grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");
+
+ err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n");
}
#endif /* __powerpc__ */
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ddad4ab4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/* ieee1275.c - Access the Open Firmware client interface. */
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2003,2004,2005,2007,2008,2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+
+grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_test (const grub_uint8_t *name, grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing)
+{
+ struct test_args
+ {
+ struct grub_ieee1275_common_hdr common;/* The header information like interface name, number of inputs and outputs. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t name; /* The interface name. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing;
+ } args;
+
+ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "test", 1, 1);
+ args.name = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) name;
+
+ if (IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (args.missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+ return -1;
+
+ *missing = args.missing;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_ieee1275_cell_t *result)
+{
+ struct mos_args
+ {
+ struct grub_ieee1275_common_hdr common;/* The header information like interface name, number of inputs and outputs. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t size; /* The maximum object size for a PKS object. */
+ } args;
+
+ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "pks-max-object-size", 0, 1);
+
+ if (IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (args.size == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+ return -1;
+
+ *result = args.size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (const grub_uint8_t consumer, const grub_uint8_t *label,
+ const grub_size_t label_len, const grub_size_t buffer_len,
+ grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_uint32_t *data_len,
+ grub_uint32_t *policies)
+{
+ struct pks_read_args
+ {
+ struct grub_ieee1275_common_hdr common; /* The header information like interface name, number of inputs and outputs. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t consumer; /* The object belonging to consumer with the label. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t label; /* Object label buffer logical real address. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t label_len; /* The byte length of the object label. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t buffer; /* Output buffer logical real address. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t buffer_len; /* Length of the output buffer. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t data_len; /* The number of bytes copied to the output buffer. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t policies; /* The object policies. */
+ grub_int32_t rc; /* The return code. */
+ } args;
+
+ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "pks-read-object", 5, 3);
+ args.consumer = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) consumer;
+ args.label = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) label;
+ args.label_len = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) label_len;
+ args.buffer = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) buffer;
+ args.buffer_len = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) buffer_len;
+
+ if (IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (args.data_len == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+ return -1;
+
+ *data_len = args.data_len;
+ *policies = args.policies;
+
+ return args.rc;
+}
+
+grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (const grub_uint8_t sbvar_flags, const grub_uint8_t sbvar_type,
+ const grub_size_t buffer_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+ grub_size_t *data_len)
+{
+ struct pks_read_sbvar_args
+ {
+ struct grub_ieee1275_common_hdr common; /* The header information like interface name, number of inputs and outputs. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t sbvar_flags; /* The sbvar operation flags. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t sbvar_type; /* The sbvar being requested. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t buffer; /* Output buffer logical real address. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t buffer_len; /* Length of the Output buffer. */
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t data_len; /* The number of bytes copied to the output buffer. */
+ grub_int32_t rc; /* The return code. */
+ } args;
+
+ INIT_IEEE1275_COMMON (&args.common, "pks-read-sbvar", 4, 2);
+ args.sbvar_flags = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) sbvar_flags;
+ args.sbvar_type = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) sbvar_type;
+ args.buffer = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) buffer;
+ args.buffer_len = (grub_ieee1275_cell_t) buffer_len;
+
+ if (IEEE1275_CALL_ENTRY_FN (&args) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (args.data_len == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+ return -1;
+
+ *data_len = args.data_len;
+
+ return args.rc;
+}
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eeb569fd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 9
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
+#endif
+
+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
+#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+
+/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */
+#define PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE ((grub_uint8_t *) "pks-max-object-size")
+
+/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN ((grub_size_t) 10)
+
+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
+#define DB ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+#define DBX ((grub_uint8_t) 2)
+
+static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
+
+/*
+ * Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability
+ * of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management.
+ *
+ * pks_supported:
+ * False: No PKS support. This is default.
+ * True: PKS support available.
+ *
+ * use_keystore:
+ * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default.
+ * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
+ */
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0,
+ .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false};
+
+/*
+ * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
+ * and its size into the PKS Signature Database (SD) (i.e pks_sd buffer) and pks_sd entries
+ * from the EFI Signature List (ESL).
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+_esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+ const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
+ grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+ grub_esd_t *esd;
+ grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
+ grub_uint32_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
+ grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
+
+ /* Reads the ESD from ESL. */
+ while (esl_size > 0)
+ {
+ esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
+ data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
+
+ signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+ if (signature == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
+ if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Allocated memory will be freed by
+ * grub_free_platform_keystore.
+ */
+ *pks_sd = signature;
+ *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+ }
+
+ grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
+ signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
+ signature[entries].guid = *guid;
+ entries++;
+ esl_size -= signature_size;
+ offset += signature_size;
+ }
+
+ *pks_sd = signature;
+ *pks_sd_entries = entries;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the ESD after removing the ESL header from ESL. */
+static grub_err_t
+esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t *next_esl,
+ grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+ grub_packed_guid_t guid;
+ grub_esl_t *esl;
+ grub_size_t offset, esl_size, signature_size, signature_header_size;
+
+ /* Convert the ESL data into the ESL. */
+ esl = (grub_esl_t *) esl_data;
+ if (*next_esl < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL");
+
+ esl_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_list_size);
+ signature_header_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_header_size);
+ signature_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_size);
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &esl->signature_type, sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t));
+
+ if (esl_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_size > *next_esl)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL size (%u)\n", esl_size);
+
+ *next_esl = esl_size;
+ offset = sizeof (grub_esl_t) + signature_header_size;
+ esl_size = esl_size - offset;
+
+ return _esl_to_esd (esl_data + offset, esl_size, signature_size, &guid,
+ pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the EFI Signature Database (ESD) and the number of ESD from the ESL
+ * into the pks_sd buffer and pks_sd entries.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+pks_sd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+ grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_size_t next_esl = esl_size;
+
+ do
+ {
+ rc = esl_to_esd (esl_data, &next_esl, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ break;
+
+ esl_data += next_esl;
+ esl_size -= next_esl;
+ next_esl = esl_size;
+ }
+ while (esl_size > 0);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the secure boot version from PKS as an object.
+ * Caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbversion_from_pks (grub_uint8_t **out, grub_uint32_t *outlen, grub_uint32_t *policy)
+{
+ grub_int32_t rc;
+
+ *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+ if (*out == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (PKS_CONSUMER_FW, SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME,
+ SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN, pks_max_object_size, *out,
+ outlen, policy);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "SB version read failed (%d)\n", rc);
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the secure boot variable from PKS, unpacks it, read the ESD
+ * from ESL, and store the information in the pks_sd buffer.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbvar_from_pks (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+ grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+ grub_int32_t rc;
+ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ grub_uint8_t *esl_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t esl_data_size = 0;
+
+ esl_data = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+ if (esl_data == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (sbvarflags, sbvartype, pks_max_object_size,
+ esl_data, &esl_data_size);
+ if (rc == IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, "secure boot variable %s not found (%d)",
+ ((sbvartype == DB) ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+ goto clean;
+ }
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ {
+ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "secure boot variable %s reading (%d)",
+ ((sbvartype == DB) ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+ goto clean;
+ }
+
+ if (esl_data_size != 0)
+ err = pks_sd_from_esl (esl_data, esl_data_size, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+
+ clean:
+ grub_free (esl_data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the availability of PKS support. If PKS support is avaialble and
+ * objects present, it reads the secure boot version (SB_VERSION) from PKS.
+ *
+ * SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
+ * 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
+ and use them for signature verification.
+ * 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
+ * use it for signature verification.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+is_pks_present (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+ grub_int32_t rc;
+ grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
+ grub_uint32_t len = 0, policy = 0;
+
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_test (PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE, &missing);
+ if (rc < 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support\n");
+ else
+ {
+ rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects\n");
+ }
+
+ grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported = true;
+
+ err = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
+ {
+ grub_free (data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
+ }
+ else if (*data)
+ grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
+
+ grub_free (data);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+void
+grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
+{
+ grub_size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+ grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+ grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+
+ grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db);
+ grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx);
+ grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+}
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform KeyStore. */
+grub_err_t
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "trying to load Platform KeyStore\n");
+
+ rc = is_pks_present ();
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "switch to static key\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true)
+ {
+ grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+ /* Read db from PKS. */
+ rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ {
+ /* Read dbx from PKS. */
+ rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (0, DBX, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+ rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h b/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
index c445d0499..157ed57be 100644
--- a/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
+++ b/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND ((grub_int32_t) -7)
+
#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
diff --git a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
index 4eb207018..19a4772bf 100644
--- a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
+++ b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
@@ -28,4 +28,24 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;
#define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T
#define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_test (const grub_uint8_t *name, grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_ieee1275_cell_t *result);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (const grub_uint8_t consumer, const grub_uint8_t *label,
+ const grub_size_t label_len, const grub_size_t buffer_len,
+ grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_uint32_t *data_len,
+ grub_uint32_t *policies);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (const grub_uint8_t sbvar_flags, const grub_uint8_t sbvar_type,
+ const grub_uint32_t buffer_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+ grub_size_t *data_len);
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
diff --git a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b6ba2e5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. This
+ * program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
+ * under the terms and conditions of the 2-Clause BSD License which
+ * accompanies this distribution.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging (edk2-staging repo of tianocore),
+ * the ImageAuthentication.h file under it, and here's the copyright and license.
+ *
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corp.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_HEADER
+#define PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_HEADER 1
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI Signature Database (ESD). */
+struct grub_esd
+{
+ /*
+ * An identifier which identifies the agent which added
+ * the signature to the list.
+ */
+ grub_packed_guid_t signature_owner;
+ /* The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType. */
+ grub_uint8_t signature_data[];
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+typedef struct grub_esd grub_esd_t;
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI Signature List (ESL). */
+struct grub_esl
+{
+ /* Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below. */
+ grub_packed_guid_t signature_type;
+ /* Total size of the signature list, including this header. */
+ grub_uint32_t signature_list_size;
+ /*
+ * Size of the signature header which precedes
+ * the array of signatures.
+ */
+ grub_uint32_t signature_header_size;
+ /* Size of each signature.*/
+ grub_uint32_t signature_size;
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+typedef struct grub_esl grub_esl_t;
+
+/* The structure of a PKS Signature Database (SD). */
+struct grub_pks_sd
+{
+ grub_packed_guid_t guid; /* Signature type. */
+ grub_uint8_t *data; /* Signature data. */
+ grub_size_t data_size; /* Size of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+typedef struct grub_pks_sd grub_pks_sd_t;
+
+/* The structure of a Platform KeyStore (PKS). */
+struct grub_pks
+{
+ grub_pks_sd_t *db; /* Signature database. */
+ grub_pks_sd_t *dbx; /* Forbidden signature database. */
+ grub_uint32_t db_entries; /* Size of signature database. */
+ grub_uint32_t dbx_entries;/* Size of forbidden signature database. */
+ bool pks_supported; /* Flag to indicate the availability of PKS support. */
+ bool use_keystore; /* Flag to indicate the key management mode. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
+
+#if defined(__powerpc__)
+
+/*
+ * Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability
+ * of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management.
+ *
+ * pks_supported:
+ * False: No PKS support. This is default.
+ * True: PKS support available.
+ *
+ * use_keystore:
+ * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default.
+ * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
+ */
+extern grub_pks_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_keystore);
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
+extern grub_err_t
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void);
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+extern void
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_pks_free_keystore) (void);
+
+#else
+
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore;
+
+static inline void
+grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
+{
+
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#endif
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 16:57 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 14/21] appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (7 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted
certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted
certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS
and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash
are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists are introduced by
a subsequent patch.
Note:-
If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then
do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++-
include/grub/crypto.h | 1 +
include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++++
include/grub/types.h | 4 +
4 files changed, 613 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index 932bf2a7a..faf54c374 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
#include <libtasn1.h>
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/lockdown.h>
-
+#include <grub/efi/pks.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
#include "appendedsig.h"
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -80,10 +81,21 @@ struct grub_database
{
struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
grub_uint32_t cert_entries; /* Number of certificates. */
+ grub_uint8_t **hashes; /* Certificate/binary hashes. */
+ grub_size_t *hash_size; /* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
+ grub_uint32_t hash_entries; /* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */
};
/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
-struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .hashes = NULL,
+ .hash_size = NULL, .hash_entries = 0};
+
+/*
+ * The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates/kernel binaries are
+ * rejected during appended signatures/hashes validation.
+ */
+struct grub_database dbx = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .hashes = NULL,
+ .hash_size = NULL, .hash_entries = 0};
/*
* Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
@@ -116,6 +128,187 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
.fs_read = pseudo_read
};
+
+/*
+ * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
+ * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+ grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+ gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
+
+ if (guid == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "GUID is not available");
+
+ if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+ else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
+ else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
+ else
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "unsupported GUID hash");
+
+ grub_memset (hash, 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+ grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size);
+ *hash_size = hash_func->mdlen;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+generate_cert_hash (const grub_size_t cert_hash_size, const grub_uint8_t *data,
+ const grub_size_t data_size, grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+ grub_packed_guid_t guid = { 0 };
+
+ /* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for certificate hash */
+ if (cert_hash_size == 32)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else if (cert_hash_size == 48)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else if (cert_hash_size == 64)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ") and "
+ "skipped\n", cert_hash_size);
+ return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND;
+ }
+
+ return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size);
+}
+
+/* Check the hash presence in the dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_dbx (grub_uint8_t *const hash, const grub_size_t hash_size)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] &&
+ grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored"
+ " because it is on the dbx list\n", hash[0], hash[1],
+ hash[2], hash[3]);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Check the hash presence in the db list. */
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
+ if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+ struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
+{
+ grub_uint8_t **hashes;
+ grub_size_t *hash_size;
+
+ if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available");
+
+ if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a hash, as it is present in the %s list",
+ ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
+
+ return ((is_db == true) ? GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED : GRUB_ERR_EXISTS);
+ }
+
+ if (is_db == true)
+ {
+ if (is_hash_present_in_db (data, data_size) == true)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+ "cannot a add hash, as it is present in the db list");
+ }
+
+ hashes = grub_realloc (database->hashes, sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (database->hash_entries + 1));
+ if (hashes == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ hash_size = grub_realloc (database->hash_size, sizeof (grub_size_t) * (database->hash_entries + 1));
+ if (hash_size == NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Allocated memory will be freed by
+ * free_db_list/free_dbx_list.
+ */
+ hashes[database->hash_entries] = NULL;
+ database->hashes = hashes;
+ database->hash_entries++;
+
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+ }
+
+ hashes[database->hash_entries] = grub_malloc (data_size);
+ if (hashes[database->hash_entries] != NULL)
+ grub_memcpy (hashes[database->hash_entries], data, data_size);
+
+ hash_size[database->hash_entries] = data_size;
+ database->hash_size = hash_size;
+
+ if (hashes[database->hash_entries] == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "added the hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " to the %s list\n",
+ data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3], data_size, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
+
+ database->hashes = hashes;
+ database->hash_entries++;
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+ /* GUID type of the binary hash. */
+ if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ /* GUID type of the certificate hash. */
+ if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+ grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+ if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
* displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
@@ -183,6 +376,16 @@ add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0], data, data_size);
+
+ /* Add SHA384 hash of certificate. */
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
+ grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[1], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+ grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[1], data, data_size);
+
+ /* Add SHA512 hash of certificate. */
+ hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
+ grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[2], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+ grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[2], data, data_size);
}
static bool
@@ -199,6 +402,46 @@ is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *cert1, const struct x509_certifica
return false;
}
+static bool
+is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
+ if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+ grub_size_t cert_hash_size = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t cert_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ rc = generate_cert_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, cert_hash, &cert_hash_size);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ continue;
+
+ if (cert_hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] &&
+ grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], cert_hash, cert_hash_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "a certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored "
+ "because this certificate hash is on the dbx list\n",
+ cert_hash[0], cert_hash[1], cert_hash[2], cert_hash[3]);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static bool
is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
{
@@ -211,10 +454,13 @@ is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
return false;
}
-/* Add the certificate into the db list */
+/*
+ * Add the certificate into the db list if it is not present in the dbx and db list
+ * when is_db is true. Add the certificate into the dbx list when is_db is false.
+ */
static grub_err_t
add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
- struct grub_database *database)
+ struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
{
grub_err_t rc;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
@@ -229,32 +475,64 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
- grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
- cert->subject);
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n",
+ cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
grub_free (cert);
return rc;
}
add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
- if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
+ if (is_db == false && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
{
- grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
- "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list",
- cert->subject);
- certificate_release (cert);
- grub_free (cert);
+ if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list",
+ cert->subject);
+ rc = GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
+ goto clean_exit;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ if (is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true ||
+ is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list",
+ cert->subject);
+ rc = GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto clean_exit;
+ }
+ }
- return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
+ if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list",
+ cert->subject);
+ rc = GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
+ goto clean_exit;
+ }
}
- grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
- cert->subject);
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n",
+ cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
cert->next = database->certs;
database->certs = cert;
database->cert_entries++;
+ return rc;
+
+ clean_exit:
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+
return rc;
}
@@ -590,7 +868,7 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
cert_data_size -= append_sig_len;
- err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
+ err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
grub_free (cert_data);
if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
return err;
@@ -669,6 +947,68 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
+/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_db_list (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+ {
+ rc = add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+ grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+ {
+ rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+ grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+ "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_dbx_list (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+ {
+ rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+ grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+ {
+ rc = add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+ grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ else
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+ "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
/*
* Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header,
* parse it, and add it to the db list.
@@ -702,18 +1042,43 @@ build_static_db_list (void)
else if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
continue;
- err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
+ err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
grub_free (cert_data);
if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
return;
}
}
+/*
+ * Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in
+ * the db and dbx list.
+ */
+static void
+build_pks_keystore (void)
+{
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+ err = create_dbx_list ();
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
+
+ err = create_db_list ();
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
+
+ grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
+ "the dbx list now has %u keys\n",
+ db.hash_entries + db.cert_entries,
+ dbx.hash_entries + dbx.cert_entries);
+}
+
/* Free db list memory */
static void
free_db_list (void)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
while (db.certs != NULL)
{
@@ -723,9 +1088,37 @@ free_db_list (void)
grub_free (cert);
}
+ for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
+ grub_free (db.hashes[i]);
+
+ grub_free (db.hashes);
+ grub_free (db.hash_size);
grub_memset (&db, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
}
+/* Free dbx list memory */
+static void
+free_dbx_list (void)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+
+ while (dbx.certs != NULL)
+ {
+ cert = dbx.certs;
+ dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next;
+ certificate_release (cert);
+ grub_free (cert);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
+ grub_free (dbx.hashes[i]);
+
+ grub_free (dbx.hashes);
+ grub_free (dbx.hash_size);
+ grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
+}
+
static const char *
grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
@@ -767,6 +1160,55 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const cha
return ret;
}
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ return "dynamic";
+
+ return "static";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not allow the value to be changed if check_sigs is set to enforce and
+ * GRUB is locked down.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ {
+ ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'd'))
+ {
+ /*
+ * If dynamic key management is disabled and PKS support is available,
+ * load the PKS.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
+ build_pks_keystore ();
+
+ grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
+ }
+ else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
+ grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
+
+ ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static grub_err_t
appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type type,
void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
@@ -877,15 +1319,45 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
*/
grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
+ /*
+ * This is appended signature key management environment variable.
+ * It is automatically set to "static" or "dynamic" based on the
+ * ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property and Platform KeyStore
+ * (grub_pks_use_keystore).
+ *
+ * "static": Enforce static key management signature verification.
+ * This is the default. When the GRUB is locked down,
+ * user cannot change the value by setting the
+ * appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
+ *
+ * "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification.
+ * When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value
+ * by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
+ */
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", grub_env_read_key_mgmt,
+ grub_env_write_key_mgmt);
+ grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
rc = asn1_init ();
if (rc != ASN1_SUCCESS)
grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc, asn1_strerror (rc));
- /* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */
- build_static_db_list ();
- grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
- db.cert_entries);
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management,
+ * load the Platform KeyStore(PKS).
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ build_pks_keystore ();
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with the static key management,
+ * extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list.
+ */
+ else if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
+ {
+ build_static_db_list ();
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
+ db.cert_entries);
+ }
register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
@@ -900,8 +1372,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
*/
free_db_list ();
+ free_dbx_list ();
grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", NULL, NULL);
grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures");
+ grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", NULL, NULL);
+ grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
}
diff --git a/include/grub/crypto.h b/include/grub/crypto.h
index b0d7add1d..00d074df8 100644
--- a/include/grub/crypto.h
+++ b/include/grub/crypto.h
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ grub_crypto_hmac_buffer (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,
extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5;
extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha1;
extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_crc32;
extern gcry_cipher_spec_t _gcry_cipher_spec_aes;
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/pks.h b/include/grub/efi/pks.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ff306f591
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/efi/pks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. This
+ * program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
+ * under the terms and conditions of the 2-Clause BSD License which
+ * accompanies this distribution.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging (edk2-staging repo of tianocore),
+ * the ImageAuthentication.h file under it, and here's the copyright and license.
+ *
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corp.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PKS_HEADER
+#define PKS_HEADER 1
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_X509_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0xa159c0a5, 0xe494, 0xa74a, \
+ { 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0x2616c4c1, 0x4c50, 0x9240, \
+ { 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0x07533eff, 0xd09f, 0xc948, \
+ { 0x85, 0xf1, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x1e, 0x1 } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0xae0f3e09, 0xc4a6, 0x504f, \
+ { 0x9f, 0x1b, 0xd4, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x9a } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0x92a4d23b, 0xc096, 0x7940, \
+ { 0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0x6e877670, 0xc280, 0xe64e, \
+ { 0xaa, 0xd2, 0x28, 0xb3, 0x49, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x5b } \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID.
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ */
+#define GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID \
+ (grub_guid_t) \
+ { 0x63bf6d44, 0x0225, 0xda4c, \
+ { 0xbc, 0xfa, 0x24, 0x65, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0x9d } \
+ }
+
+#endif
diff --git a/include/grub/types.h b/include/grub/types.h
index 45079bf65..b3ba762fc 100644
--- a/include/grub/types.h
+++ b/include/grub/types.h
@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ struct grub_guid
} __attribute__ ((aligned(4)));
typedef struct grub_guid grub_guid_t;
+#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_guid_t))
+
struct grub_packed_guid
{
grub_uint32_t data1;
@@ -388,4 +390,6 @@ struct grub_packed_guid
} GRUB_PACKED;
typedef struct grub_packed_guid grub_packed_guid_t;
+#define GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t))
+
#endif /* ! GRUB_TYPES_HEADER */
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 14/21] appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 15/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (6 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
Signature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes
that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list
then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index faf54c374..83e97814a 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -685,6 +685,83 @@ extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,
return parse_pkcs7_signedData (signed_data, appendedsig_pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7);
}
+static grub_err_t
+get_binary_hash (const grub_size_t binary_hash_size, const grub_uint8_t *data,
+ const grub_size_t data_size, grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+ grub_packed_guid_t guid = { 0 };
+
+ /* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for binary hash */
+ if (binary_hash_size == 32)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else if (binary_hash_size == 48)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else if (binary_hash_size == 64)
+ grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+ else
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ") and "
+ "skipped\n", binary_hash_size);
+ return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND;
+ }
+
+ return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list.
+ * The following errors can occur:
+ * - GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: indicates that the hash is in dbx list.
+ * - GRUB_ERR_EOF: the hash could not be found in the db and dbx list.
+ * - GRUB_ERR_NONE: the hash is found in db list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+ grub_size_t hash_size = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (dbx.hashes[i] == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = get_binary_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ continue;
+
+ if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] &&
+ grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is present in the dbx list\n",
+ hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+ return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (db.hashes[i] == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = get_binary_hash (db.hash_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ continue;
+
+ if (hash_size == db.hash_size[i] &&
+ grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verified with a trusted hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n",
+ hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_EOF;
+}
+
/*
* Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare
* the S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.
@@ -729,7 +806,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
grub_uint32_t i;
- if (!db.cert_entries)
+ if (!db.cert_entries && !db.hash_entries)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "no trusted keys to verify against");
err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -739,6 +816,21 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
append_sig_len = sig.signature_len;
datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+ * Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ err = verify_binary_hash (buf, datasize);
+ if (err == GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
+ return grub_error (err,
+ "failed to verify the binary hash against a trusted binary hash");
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */
for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
{
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 15/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 14/21] appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (5 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
Introduce the use_static_keys flag to indicate that static keys are to be used
rather than keys from the PKS storage's db variable. This flag is set when
Secure Boot is enabled with PKS but the db variable is not present in the PKS storage.
The appendedsig module would use this flag to extract the static keys from
the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db list.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
.../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++-
.../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
index eeb569fd1..4a68f21a8 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
@@ -56,9 +56,18 @@ static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
* use_keystore:
* False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default.
* True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
+ *
+ * use_static_keys:
+ * False: Does not enforce the use of the static key as a default key from
+ the GRUB ELF Note. This is default.
+ * True: Enforce the use of the static key as a default key from the
+ * GRUB ELF Note if db variable is not available in PKS when use_keystore
+ * is set to true
+ *
*/
grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0,
- .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false};
+ .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false,
+ .use_static_keys = false};
/*
* Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
@@ -312,6 +321,16 @@ grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
/* Read db from PKS. */
rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+ if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+ {
+ rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ /*
+ * The db variable won't be available by default in PKS.
+ * So, it will use the static key as a default key from the GRUB ELF Note.
+ */
+ grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys = true;
+ }
+
if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
/* Read dbx from PKS. */
diff --git a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
index 8b6ba2e5f..d75cac5e1 100644
--- a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
+++ b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct grub_pks
grub_uint32_t dbx_entries;/* Size of forbidden signature database. */
bool pks_supported; /* Flag to indicate the availability of PKS support. */
bool use_keystore; /* Flag to indicate the key management mode. */
+ bool use_static_keys; /* Flag to indicate use of static keys. */
} GRUB_PACKED;
typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 15/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 17:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (4 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
If Secure Boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode and the
use_static_keys flag is not set, then read the keys from the PKS
keystore as well from ELF Note, and add them into the db.
Otherwise, it only reads the static keys from the ELF Note and
adds them into the db.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index 83e97814a..5da603eb6 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -1154,9 +1154,17 @@ build_pks_keystore (void)
if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
- err = create_db_list ();
- if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
- grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true)
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "db variable is not available at PKS and "
+ "using a static keys as a default key in db list\n");
+
+ build_static_db_list ();
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == false)
+ {
+ err = create_db_list ();
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
+ }
grub_pks_free_keystore ();
grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 18:03 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 18/21] appended signatures: Verification tests Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (3 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
Introducing the following db and dbx commands
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes
from the db list.
2. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
hashes from the dbx list.
3. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
4. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
5. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
6. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
must be signed with an appended signature.
3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary
hash file must be signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 319 ++++++++++++++++++-
include/grub/file.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
index 5da603eb6..ea1937a7e 100644
--- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
+#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0
+#define OPTION_CERT_HASH 1
+
/*
* This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
* source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
@@ -110,6 +113,13 @@ static bool check_sigs = false;
/* Appended signature size. */
static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
+static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
+{
+ {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+ {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+ {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+};
+
static void
register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
static void
@@ -593,6 +603,53 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
return rc;
}
+static bool
+is_cert_fingerprint_match (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size,
+ const struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+ if (grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[0], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
+ || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[1], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
+ || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[2], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void
+remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size,
+ const bool is_binary_hash)
+{
+ grub_uint32_t i;
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ if (is_binary_hash == true)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+ {
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n",
+ db.hashes[i][0], db.hashes[i][1], db.hashes[i][2], db.hashes[i][3]);
+ grub_free (db.hashes[i]);
+ db.hashes[i] = NULL;
+ db.hash_size[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
+ {
+ if (is_cert_fingerprint_match (hash_data, hash_data_size, cert) == true)
+ {
+ _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static grub_err_t
file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
{
@@ -913,6 +970,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
/*
* Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled.
+ * And add it to the db list if it is not already present.
* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
* trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -970,6 +1029,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
/*
* Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present.
+ * And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is
+ * enabled.
* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
* distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
* The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -979,7 +1040,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
* without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
*
* Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command
- * does not persist across reboots.
+ * does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the
+ * append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the
+ * append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console.
*/
static grub_err_t
grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
@@ -991,8 +1054,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
if (argc != 1)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
- "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
- "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
+ "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s",
+ ((grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) ?
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" :
+ "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n"));
if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 certificate file");
@@ -1019,9 +1084,21 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
/* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
err = remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size);
- grub_free (cert_data);
if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
- return err;
+ {
+ grub_free (cert_data);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Only add the certificate to the dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &dbx, false);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ grub_free (cert_data);
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
@@ -1036,9 +1113,196 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
+ /* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (db.hashes[i] != NULL)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("\nBinary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
+ grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n ", db.hash_size[i] * 8);
+ dump_data_to_hex (db.hashes[i], db.hash_size[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+ int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+ for (cert = dbx.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
+ print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
+ {
+ if (dbx.hashes[i] != NULL)
+ {
+ grub_printf ("\nCertificate/Binary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
+ grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n ", dbx.hash_size[i] * 8);
+ dump_data_to_hex (dbx.hashes[i], dbx.hash_size[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present.
+ * And add them to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the db list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char**args)
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_file_t hash_file;
+ grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 1)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n");
+
+ if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash file");
+
+ hash_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+ if (hash_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", args[0]);
+
+ rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+ grub_file_close (hash_file);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+ * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
+ * signature size from the hash data size because
+ * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
+ * used to get the hash data.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
+ hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+ /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
+ if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+ {
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted binary hash type");
+ }
+
+ rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db, true);
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present.
+ * And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary/certificate hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+ grub_err_t rc;
+ grub_file_t hash_file;
+ grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+ grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+ char *file_path;
+
+ if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+ "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n"
+ "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+ "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg == NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file");
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg != NULL)
+ file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg;
+ else
+ file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg;
+
+ hash_file = grub_file_open (file_path, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+ if (hash_file == NULL)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", file_path);
+
+ rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+ grub_file_close (hash_file);
+ if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+ * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
+ * signature size from the hash data size because
+ * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
+ * used to get the hash data.
+ */
+ if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+ hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+ grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+ "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n"
+ " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data[0], hash_data[1],
+ hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+ if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+ {
+ /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */
+ if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+ {
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ "unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Remove distrusted binary hash/certificate from the db list if present. */
+ remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size,
+ ((ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set) ? true : false));
+
+ rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx, false);
+ grub_free (hash_data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
static grub_err_t
create_db_list (void)
@@ -1297,10 +1561,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), cons
if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
build_pks_keystore ();
+ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
+ register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
}
else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
- grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
+ {
+ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+ grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
+ register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+ }
ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
if (ret == NULL)
@@ -1369,7 +1639,9 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
.write = appendedsig_write,
};
-static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
+static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash;
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash,
+ cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
static void
@@ -1381,8 +1653,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
- cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
- N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+ * register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list"));
+ cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
+ N_("Show the list of distrusted certificates and"
+ " certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list"));
+ cmd_db_hash = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash", grub_cmd_db_hash, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
+ N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list."));
+ cmd_dbx_hash = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash", grub_cmd_dbx_hash, 0,
+ N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+ "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
+ N_("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list."), options);
+ }
+ else
+ cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+ N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
}
/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
@@ -1393,6 +1684,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
+ /*
+ * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+ * unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+ */
+ if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
+ {
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
+ grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash);
+ grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash);
+ }
}
GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
diff --git a/include/grub/file.h b/include/grub/file.h
index d678de063..16a4b7d26 100644
--- a/include/grub/file.h
+++ b/include/grub/file.h
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST,
/* File hashed by hashsum. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH,
+ /* File holding certificiate/binary hash to add to db/dbx. */
+ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST,
/* Keyboard layout. */
GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT,
/* Picture file. */
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 18/21] appended signatures: Verification tests
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 19/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (2 subsequent siblings)
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm, Daniel Kiper
These tests are run through all_functional_test and test a range
of commands and behaviours.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 8 +
grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 344 ++++++++
grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h | 975 ++++++++++++++++++++++
grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 1328 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
index 16cdbadcb..849f55d1d 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -2214,6 +2214,14 @@ module = {
cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
};
+module = {
+ name = appended_signature_test;
+ common = tests/appended_signature_test.c;
+ common = tests/appended_signatures.h;
+ enable = emu;
+ enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+};
+
module = {
name = signature_test;
common = tests/signature_test.c;
diff --git a/grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c b/grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71066b3c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/time.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/test.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/procfs.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+
+#include "appended_signatures.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+#define PROC_FILE(identifier, file_name) \
+ static char *get_##identifier (grub_size_t *sz) \
+ { \
+ char *ret; \
+ \
+ *sz = identifier##_len; \
+ ret = grub_malloc (*sz); \
+ if (ret != NULL) \
+ grub_memcpy (ret, identifier, *sz); \
+ return ret; \
+ } \
+ \
+ static struct grub_procfs_entry identifier##_entry = { .name = file_name, \
+ .get_contents = get_##identifier };
+
+#define DEFINE_TEST_CASE(case_name) PROC_FILE (case_name, #case_name)
+
+#define DO_TEST(case_name, is_valid) \
+ { \
+ grub_procfs_register (#case_name, &case_name##_entry); \
+ do_verify ("(proc)/" #case_name, is_valid); \
+ grub_procfs_unregister (&case_name##_entry); \
+ }
+
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hi_signed);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hi_signed_sha256);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hj_signed);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (short_msg);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (unsigned_msg);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hi_signed_2nd);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hi_double);
+DEFINE_TEST_CASE (hi_double_extended);
+
+PROC_FILE (certificate_der, "certificate.der")
+PROC_FILE (certificate2_der, "certificate2.der")
+PROC_FILE (certificate_printable_der, "certificate_printable.der")
+PROC_FILE (certificate_eku_der, "certificate_eku.der")
+
+static void
+do_verify (const char *f, int is_valid)
+{
+ grub_command_t cmd;
+ char *args[] = { (char *) f, NULL };
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+ cmd = grub_command_find ("append_verify");
+ if (cmd == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (0, "can't find command `%s'", "append_verify");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ err = (cmd->func) (cmd, 1, args);
+ if (is_valid)
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "verification of %s failed: %d: %s",
+ f, grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE,
+ "verification of %s unexpectedly succeeded", f);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+appended_signature_test (void)
+{
+ grub_command_t cmd_trust, cmd_distrust;
+ char *trust_args[] = { (char *) "(proc)/certificate.der", NULL };
+ char *trust_args2[] = { (char *) "(proc)/certificate2.der", NULL };
+ char *trust_args_printable[] = { (char *) "(proc)/certificate_printable.der", NULL };
+ char *trust_args_eku[] = { (char *) "(proc)/certificate_eku.der", NULL };
+ const char *key_mgmt;
+ grub_err_t err;
+
+ grub_procfs_register ("certificate.der", &certificate_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_register ("certificate2.der", &certificate2_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_register ("certificate_printable.der", &certificate_printable_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_register ("certificate_eku.der", &certificate_eku_der_entry);
+
+ /* Set appended signature key managment to static. */
+ err = grub_env_set ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", "static");
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "set of key management is failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ /* Get appended signatures key management. */
+ key_mgmt = grub_env_get ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
+ grub_test_assert (grub_strncmp (key_mgmt, "static", grub_strlen(key_mgmt)) == 0,
+ "getting unexpected key management: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ cmd_trust = grub_command_find ("append_add_db_cert");
+ if (cmd_trust == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (0, "can't find command `%s'", "append_add_db_cert");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "loading certificate failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ /* If we have no certificate the remainder of the tests are meaningless. */
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Reload the command: this works around some 'interesting' behaviour in the
+ * dynamic command dispatcher. The first time you call cmd->func you get a
+ * dispatcher that loads the module, finds the real cmd, calls it, and then
+ * releases some internal storage. This means it's not safe to call a second
+ * time and we need to reload it.
+ */
+ cmd_trust = grub_command_find ("append_add_db_cert");
+
+ /* The hi, signed with key 1, SHA-512. */
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+
+ /* The hi, signed with key 1, SHA-256. */
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_sha256, 1);
+
+ /* The hi, key 1, SHA-512, second byte corrupted. */
+ DO_TEST (hj_signed, 0);
+
+ /* Message too short for a signature. */
+ DO_TEST (short_msg, 0);
+
+ /* Lorem ipsum. */
+ DO_TEST (unsigned_msg, 0);
+
+ /* The hi, signed with both keys, SHA-512. */
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * The hi, signed with both keys and with empty space to test we haven't broken
+ * support for adding more signatures after the fact.
+ */
+ DO_TEST (hi_double_extended, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * In enforcing mode, we shouldn't be able to load a certificate that isn't
+ * signed by an existing trusted key.
+ *
+ * However, procfs files automatically skip the verification test, so we can't
+ * easily test this.
+ */
+
+ /* Verify that testing with 2 trusted certs works. */
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 0);
+
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE, "unexpectedly reloaded certificate 1: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "loading certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double_extended, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Check certificate removal. They're added to the _top_ of the db list and
+ * removed by position in the list. Current the list looks like [#2, #1].
+ */
+ cmd_distrust = grub_command_find ("append_rm_dbx_cert");
+ if (cmd_distrust == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (0, "can't find command `%s'", "append_rm_dbx_cert");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove the certificate #1. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 1 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Now reload certificate #1. */
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "reloading certificate 1 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Remove the certificate #2. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Now reload certificate #2. */
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "reloading certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Remove the certificate #1. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 1 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ /* Remove the certificate #2. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ /* Set appended signature key managment to dynamic. */
+ err = grub_env_set ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", "dynamic");
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "set of key management is failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ /* Get appended signatures key management. */
+ key_mgmt = grub_env_get ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
+ grub_test_assert (grub_strncmp (key_mgmt, "dynamic", grub_strlen(key_mgmt)) == 0,
+ "getting unexpected key management: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ cmd_trust = grub_command_find ("append_add_db_cert");
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "loading certificate 1 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double_extended, 1);
+
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "loading certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double_extended, 1);
+
+ cmd_distrust = grub_command_find ("append_add_dbx_cert");
+ if (cmd_distrust == NULL)
+ {
+ grub_test_assert (0, "can't find command `%s'", "append_add_dbx_cert");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Now remove certificate #1. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 1 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Now reload certificate #1. */
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args);
+ grub_test_assert (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE, "unexpectedly reloaded certificate 1: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 1);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 1);
+
+ /* Remove the certificate #2. */
+ err = (cmd_distrust->func) (cmd_distrust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "distrusting certificate 2 failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 0);
+
+ /* Now reload certificate #2. */
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args2);
+ grub_test_assert (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE, "unexpectedly reloaded certificate 2: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed_2nd, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_signed, 0);
+ DO_TEST (hi_double, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Lastly, check a certificate that uses printableString rather than
+ * utf8String loads properly, and that a certificate with an appropriate
+ * extended key usage loads.
+ */
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args_printable);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "trusting printable certificate failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ err = (cmd_trust->func) (cmd_trust, 1, trust_args_eku);
+ grub_test_assert (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE, "trusting certificate with extended key usage failed: %d: %s",
+ grub_errno, grub_errmsg);
+
+ grub_procfs_unregister (&certificate_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_unregister (&certificate2_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_unregister (&certificate_printable_der_entry);
+ grub_procfs_unregister (&certificate_eku_der_entry);
+}
+
+GRUB_FUNCTIONAL_TEST (appended_signature_test, appended_signature_test);
diff --git a/grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h b/grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6aa12d86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
@@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
+unsigned char certificate_der[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x45, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x31, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
+ 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47, 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65,
+ 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75,
+ 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74,
+ 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68,
+ 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x30, 0x20, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30,
+ 0x36, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x38, 0x33, 0x36, 0x31, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x18, 0x0f,
+ 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x36, 0x30, 0x35, 0x30, 0x38, 0x33, 0x36,
+ 0x31, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x33, 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x2f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x28, 0x47, 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74,
+ 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67,
+ 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x22,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x02, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x0a,
+ 0x02, 0x82, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0xb9, 0x09, 0xb2, 0xf6, 0x24, 0x34, 0xdc,
+ 0x62, 0xe6, 0x4e, 0xee, 0x04, 0xdb, 0x29, 0xdc, 0x94, 0xcc, 0xee, 0x8a,
+ 0x5b, 0xc3, 0x9e, 0x06, 0xba, 0xa7, 0x9b, 0xa4, 0x5f, 0x15, 0x59, 0x8e,
+ 0xb8, 0x6e, 0x3c, 0xeb, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xac, 0x21, 0x42, 0xbd, 0x30, 0xa1,
+ 0x39, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x4f, 0xa0, 0x53, 0xd5, 0x42, 0xdc, 0x8a, 0x87, 0x30,
+ 0x38, 0x93, 0x44, 0x80, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x7e, 0x9e, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xea, 0x45,
+ 0xa0, 0x11, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x78, 0xe4, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x6b, 0x73, 0xea, 0x6e,
+ 0xdf, 0x7c, 0x5b, 0x63, 0x7e, 0x5b, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x76, 0x19, 0xb5,
+ 0x01, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x65, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x56, 0x69, 0x69, 0xe8, 0x20,
+ 0xf9, 0x13, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x6f, 0xdd, 0xce, 0x94, 0x96, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xd6,
+ 0xfa, 0xa4, 0x91, 0x5f, 0xb3, 0x9c, 0xc7, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xff, 0x66, 0x5f,
+ 0xf3, 0xab, 0x5e, 0xdf, 0x4e, 0xca, 0x11, 0xcf, 0xbf, 0xf8, 0xad, 0x65,
+ 0xb1, 0x49, 0x8b, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0xad, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x0b, 0xfa, 0x5b, 0x6a,
+ 0x6a, 0x20, 0x12, 0x77, 0xef, 0x4b, 0xb6, 0xbe, 0x92, 0xba, 0x14, 0x9c,
+ 0x5e, 0xea, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x6d, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x64, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x12, 0xe8,
+ 0x7d, 0x5e, 0x9c, 0xd6, 0xf9, 0x75, 0x68, 0x7f, 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x05,
+ 0x94, 0x91, 0x4f, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x50, 0x72, 0x3b, 0x11, 0x1f, 0x28, 0x13,
+ 0xe8, 0x25, 0x6b, 0xdf, 0xff, 0x72, 0x46, 0x25, 0xe9, 0x05, 0x6f, 0x02,
+ 0xc7, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0xcf, 0x99, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0xe2, 0xae, 0xbc, 0xc1, 0x22,
+ 0x32, 0x73, 0x2d, 0xa3, 0x70, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0x5f, 0x74, 0x05,
+ 0x1b, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x97, 0x3c, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x86, 0x0d, 0xf6, 0x38, 0xdb,
+ 0xd2, 0x39, 0x47, 0x82, 0x00, 0x44, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x40, 0x24, 0x0b, 0x3a,
+ 0xd4, 0x19, 0x31, 0xba, 0x4e, 0x8e, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa6, 0x78, 0xef, 0x72,
+ 0x9f, 0x06, 0x37, 0x01, 0x9b, 0x79, 0x0d, 0x04, 0xbf, 0xba, 0xd5, 0x1f,
+ 0x27, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xbb, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x60, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x3f, 0x66, 0xce,
+ 0x9f, 0xa2, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x8d, 0xee, 0x14, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x93, 0xf1, 0x38,
+ 0xac, 0x4f, 0xd8, 0x29, 0xf3, 0x6f, 0xd4, 0xfd, 0x4d, 0x34, 0x77, 0x58,
+ 0x99, 0xdb, 0x16, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0xc7, 0x43, 0x41, 0x70, 0xc4, 0xad, 0x01,
+ 0x29, 0x65, 0x22, 0x43, 0x00, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x00, 0x27, 0x38, 0xc1, 0x4f,
+ 0xda, 0x28, 0x96, 0x42, 0xdc, 0xbc, 0x3e, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x14, 0xb8, 0xf3,
+ 0x86, 0x4a, 0xea, 0x16, 0x90, 0xf9, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x8f, 0x66, 0x0c, 0xbf,
+ 0x29, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xfc, 0x4d, 0x38, 0x68, 0xe2, 0xe7, 0x64, 0x32, 0x47,
+ 0xdd, 0x56, 0xc9, 0xe4, 0x47, 0x9f, 0x18, 0x89, 0xfc, 0x30, 0x7a, 0xae,
+ 0x63, 0xe4, 0xec, 0x93, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x61, 0xe7, 0xbf, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x29,
+ 0xc2, 0xa6, 0xd5, 0x53, 0x5d, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x4d,
+ 0x46, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0xff, 0x52, 0x5e, 0x92, 0x7e, 0x75, 0x08, 0xa4, 0x63,
+ 0x0a, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x0c, 0x52, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0xcd, 0x08, 0xeb,
+ 0xb3, 0xbd, 0xad, 0x8b, 0x8b, 0x9b, 0x8d, 0x71, 0x42, 0x30, 0x8e, 0xc7,
+ 0xfd, 0xec, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x26, 0x96, 0xf2, 0x74, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x95, 0x22,
+ 0x14, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0xd3, 0x79, 0x11, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x61, 0x60,
+ 0x5c, 0x47, 0x50, 0xf3, 0xca, 0x84, 0x4c, 0x5c, 0x30, 0x2c, 0x6a, 0x18,
+ 0x26, 0xb0, 0xf3, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x19, 0x39, 0xc3, 0x23, 0x13, 0x0f, 0x9c,
+ 0x97, 0x2b, 0x97, 0x93, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0xd6, 0xd3,
+ 0xf5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x5b, 0x30, 0x0c,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00,
+ 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07,
+ 0x80, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14,
+ 0x8f, 0xba, 0x8b, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0x77, 0xb2, 0xa4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x43, 0xb1,
+ 0x8b, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x47, 0xb5, 0x2a, 0x48, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x59, 0x1c, 0xb5,
+ 0x52, 0x62, 0x83, 0x05, 0x3b, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0xf4, 0x8c,
+ 0xe6, 0xd7, 0xda, 0x87, 0x54, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x36, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0xcb, 0x49, 0x54, 0x75, 0xd7, 0xca, 0x21, 0x86,
+ 0xae, 0x40, 0x0f, 0x63, 0x10, 0x35, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xba, 0x28, 0x31, 0x33,
+ 0x07, 0x08, 0x64, 0x03, 0x6c, 0xd3, 0xd5, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x79, 0x11, 0x0c,
+ 0xa8, 0x9e, 0xfd, 0x34, 0xa2, 0xba, 0x77, 0x15, 0x15, 0x2d, 0x2c, 0x96,
+ 0xae, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x82, 0x89, 0x09, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0x95, 0x69, 0x9b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0x6f, 0x4e, 0x68, 0xf6, 0xe7, 0x5f, 0x54, 0xa1, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0xa4,
+ 0xbf, 0x7a, 0xb6, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0xd8, 0xd7, 0x99, 0xcb, 0xae, 0x88, 0x6d,
+ 0x7a, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x9e, 0x44, 0x2f, 0x30, 0xa8, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0x75, 0xa0,
+ 0x82, 0xd6, 0xb0, 0xe3, 0x03, 0xb3, 0x12, 0xa3, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x93,
+ 0xd4, 0x30, 0xea, 0xce, 0x96, 0x92, 0x07, 0xf8, 0xba, 0xe4, 0x0f, 0x41,
+ 0xe3, 0x04, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x1a, 0x34, 0x60, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0x05, 0xd2,
+ 0x5a, 0xa8, 0x66, 0xef, 0xe0, 0x94, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0x0f, 0xff, 0xdc, 0x70,
+ 0xfb, 0xe2, 0x9d, 0x61, 0x51, 0x25, 0x02, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xfd, 0x66,
+ 0xb9, 0xeb, 0x0c, 0xc8, 0x50, 0xd3, 0xb1, 0x08, 0x1e, 0x09, 0x54, 0x87,
+ 0xe8, 0xa3, 0x4b, 0xef, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x0a, 0x6c, 0xec, 0x27, 0x22, 0xba,
+ 0x7f, 0xdc, 0x52, 0x27, 0x31, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0xf9, 0xeb, 0xc8,
+ 0xb5, 0x8d, 0x12, 0xed, 0x94, 0xab, 0x3d, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0x4e, 0x04, 0x05,
+ 0xd2, 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xed, 0x46, 0x1b, 0x7c, 0xb5, 0x6c, 0x40, 0xb8,
+ 0xc1, 0xbf, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0x93, 0x8e, 0xa8, 0x0f, 0xde, 0x78, 0xf3, 0x8c,
+ 0xd8, 0x9f, 0xf8, 0xdc, 0xa1, 0x23, 0x20, 0x40, 0x17, 0xb4, 0xdb, 0xb7,
+ 0x09, 0x74, 0xa7, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x12, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x79, 0x5b, 0x71, 0xa9,
+ 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x57, 0x48, 0xe8, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xc2, 0x6e, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x5a,
+ 0x07, 0xf0, 0x33, 0xc1, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x34, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0xb0, 0xb7, 0xdb,
+ 0xeb, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x59, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0x36, 0x58, 0xa9, 0xb8, 0x52, 0xdd,
+ 0xf9, 0xfd, 0x1c, 0x22, 0x2f, 0x93, 0x3d, 0x53, 0x89, 0x80, 0xde, 0xa2,
+ 0xb5, 0xa5, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0x92, 0x03, 0xf3, 0x93, 0xc8, 0xc7, 0x4a,
+ 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x62, 0xfe, 0xd0, 0xf8, 0x0d, 0x7a, 0x32, 0xb4, 0x39, 0x1a,
+ 0xb7, 0x4e, 0xaa, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x32, 0x90, 0x8c, 0xab, 0xd4, 0xae, 0xa5,
+ 0xa4, 0x85, 0xcf, 0xba, 0xe1, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x7f, 0x74, 0x02, 0x12, 0x09,
+ 0x89, 0x56, 0xe4, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x91, 0xde, 0x88, 0xe7, 0x1c, 0xed, 0x80,
+ 0x05, 0xa8, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x97, 0xd5, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xcc, 0xf0,
+ 0x32, 0xf2, 0x93, 0x09, 0x94, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0xd9, 0x58, 0xca, 0x68, 0x0b,
+ 0xde, 0x3f, 0x73, 0x64, 0xb7, 0xf4, 0xd7, 0x5f, 0x2b, 0xe7, 0x7b, 0x06,
+ 0xca, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x29, 0xc1, 0x95, 0x87, 0xad, 0xd6,
+ 0x63, 0x69, 0xb8, 0x1f, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xeb, 0xc7, 0x11, 0x7d, 0xe2, 0x99,
+ 0x64, 0x6a, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x2a, 0x21, 0xda, 0xef, 0x44,
+ 0x1d, 0xad, 0x97, 0xa1, 0xfe, 0x14, 0xa7, 0x88, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x1e, 0xb0,
+ 0x61, 0x88, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xd1, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x04, 0xbe,
+ 0x06, 0x44, 0xd2, 0x30, 0x5e, 0x95, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0xd0,
+ 0x4d, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x71, 0x72, 0xa9, 0xbd, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0xb3, 0x78,
+ 0xb4, 0x8a, 0x44, 0xbd, 0x58, 0xd5, 0x21, 0xb6, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x88, 0x1f,
+ 0xbc, 0xbd, 0x54, 0xfa, 0x1d, 0x49, 0xec, 0x51, 0xd9, 0x43, 0x49, 0x9c,
+ 0x0c, 0xfa, 0x18, 0xdb, 0xeb, 0x05, 0x77, 0xa2, 0x9a
+};
+unsigned int certificate_der_len = 1377;
+
+unsigned char hi_signed[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xb4, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x02, 0xa5, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x02, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x7e, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x55, 0x30, 0x3d,
+ 0x31, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64,
+ 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63,
+ 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74,
+ 0x79, 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x3f, 0xac, 0x77,
+ 0x97, 0x74, 0x9b, 0x4b, 0x25, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x09, 0x8d, 0x53, 0xa6, 0x03,
+ 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x10, 0x52, 0xe5, 0x3f, 0xd4, 0x72, 0x75, 0x30, 0xd4, 0x6e,
+ 0x77, 0x32, 0x49, 0x84, 0xe2, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xac, 0xb0, 0x52,
+ 0x55, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x57, 0x12, 0x08, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x01,
+ 0xc2, 0x1a, 0x4a, 0x2e, 0x3d, 0xd5, 0xc8, 0x56, 0xac, 0xd1, 0x83, 0x75,
+ 0x88, 0xd4, 0xcc, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0xcf, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x91, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xb1,
+ 0xd1, 0x24, 0x9c, 0xd0, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x15, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x33, 0x8d,
+ 0xe3, 0x67, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x48, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x1e,
+ 0x45, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x25, 0xb5, 0xf9, 0x7f,
+ 0x86, 0xef, 0xa2, 0x6d, 0x78, 0xcc, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0xae,
+ 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x58, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x22, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0xd5,
+ 0x27, 0x87, 0x39, 0x62, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0x17, 0x3d, 0x5e, 0xb1, 0x32, 0x7a,
+ 0xf1, 0x70, 0xce, 0xfa, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x92, 0xa8, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0xb2, 0x33,
+ 0x1a, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x60, 0x39, 0xdf, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x4d, 0xc2,
+ 0x8d, 0x55, 0x00, 0x49, 0x94, 0x04, 0x17, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xf4, 0xac, 0xa9,
+ 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0xf3, 0x70,
+ 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x54, 0x36, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x67,
+ 0x04, 0xd5, 0x53, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0xad, 0x63, 0x55, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x06, 0x3a,
+ 0x9a, 0xc5, 0xfe, 0x38, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x69, 0x42, 0x90, 0x35, 0x1f, 0xe3,
+ 0x1c, 0x57, 0xea, 0xdb, 0x51, 0x35, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xfe, 0x72, 0x33,
+ 0xd6, 0x8a, 0x46, 0x74, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xba, 0xa2, 0xc4,
+ 0xe9, 0xc9, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x3e, 0x98, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd1,
+ 0x60, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0x26,
+ 0x83, 0x3f, 0x02, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x46, 0x41,
+ 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0x17, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x42, 0xef, 0x66, 0xda,
+ 0x35, 0x03, 0xd1, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x22, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xf7, 0x4e, 0x04, 0xe3,
+ 0x0f, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xaa, 0x58, 0xba, 0xef, 0x9a, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x7c, 0x98,
+ 0xa0, 0xc2, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0xec, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xb0, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0xe5,
+ 0xaa, 0xcf, 0x10, 0x73, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x12, 0x5c, 0xd2, 0x0e,
+ 0xe2, 0x60, 0x17, 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x44, 0x08, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xcd, 0x75, 0xbe,
+ 0xc3, 0x7a, 0x12, 0x90, 0x90, 0xc7, 0x94, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x45, 0x02, 0x5c,
+ 0x24, 0xae, 0x82, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0x30, 0xa6, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0xa7, 0xa6,
+ 0xe6, 0xea, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x45, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x24, 0x8b, 0x76, 0xc5,
+ 0x5e, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x07, 0x1e, 0x26, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x80, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x1f,
+ 0x74, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x11, 0xee, 0x96, 0x56, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xcb,
+ 0x3b, 0xde, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0x08, 0xf5, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x71, 0xe0,
+ 0x8a, 0xfa, 0xdd, 0x19, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xd2, 0xd4,
+ 0xdc, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x2b,
+ 0x83, 0x7a, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x40, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x53, 0xd4, 0x52,
+ 0x21, 0xe7, 0xe4, 0x1f, 0x01, 0xf6, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x28, 0xba, 0x51, 0x6f,
+ 0x51, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x23, 0x25, 0x77, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x1c,
+ 0x19, 0x8a, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x61, 0x13, 0x37, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x83, 0x17,
+ 0x35, 0x23, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x02, 0xb8, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
+ 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hi_signed_len = 739;
+
+unsigned char hj_signed[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xb4, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x02, 0xa5, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x02, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x7e, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x55, 0x30, 0x3d,
+ 0x31, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64,
+ 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63,
+ 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74,
+ 0x79, 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x3f, 0xac, 0x77,
+ 0x97, 0x74, 0x9b, 0x4b, 0x25, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x09, 0x8d, 0x53, 0xa6, 0x03,
+ 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x10, 0x52, 0xe5, 0x3f, 0xd4, 0x72, 0x75, 0x30, 0xd4, 0x6e,
+ 0x77, 0x32, 0x49, 0x84, 0xe2, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xac, 0xb0, 0x52,
+ 0x55, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x57, 0x12, 0x08, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x01,
+ 0xc2, 0x1a, 0x4a, 0x2e, 0x3d, 0xd5, 0xc8, 0x56, 0xac, 0xd1, 0x83, 0x75,
+ 0x88, 0xd4, 0xcc, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0xcf, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x91, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xb1,
+ 0xd1, 0x24, 0x9c, 0xd0, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x15, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x33, 0x8d,
+ 0xe3, 0x67, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x48, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x1e,
+ 0x45, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x25, 0xb5, 0xf9, 0x7f,
+ 0x86, 0xef, 0xa2, 0x6d, 0x78, 0xcc, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0xae,
+ 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x58, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x22, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0xd5,
+ 0x27, 0x87, 0x39, 0x62, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0x17, 0x3d, 0x5e, 0xb1, 0x32, 0x7a,
+ 0xf1, 0x70, 0xce, 0xfa, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x92, 0xa8, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0xb2, 0x33,
+ 0x1a, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x60, 0x39, 0xdf, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x4d, 0xc2,
+ 0x8d, 0x55, 0x00, 0x49, 0x94, 0x04, 0x17, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xf4, 0xac, 0xa9,
+ 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0xf3, 0x70,
+ 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x54, 0x36, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x67,
+ 0x04, 0xd5, 0x53, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0xad, 0x63, 0x55, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x06, 0x3a,
+ 0x9a, 0xc5, 0xfe, 0x38, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x69, 0x42, 0x90, 0x35, 0x1f, 0xe3,
+ 0x1c, 0x57, 0xea, 0xdb, 0x51, 0x35, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xfe, 0x72, 0x33,
+ 0xd6, 0x8a, 0x46, 0x74, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xba, 0xa2, 0xc4,
+ 0xe9, 0xc9, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x3e, 0x98, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd1,
+ 0x60, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0x26,
+ 0x83, 0x3f, 0x02, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x46, 0x41,
+ 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0x17, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x42, 0xef, 0x66, 0xda,
+ 0x35, 0x03, 0xd1, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x22, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xf7, 0x4e, 0x04, 0xe3,
+ 0x0f, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xaa, 0x58, 0xba, 0xef, 0x9a, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x7c, 0x98,
+ 0xa0, 0xc2, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0xec, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xb0, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0xe5,
+ 0xaa, 0xcf, 0x10, 0x73, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x12, 0x5c, 0xd2, 0x0e,
+ 0xe2, 0x60, 0x17, 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x44, 0x08, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xcd, 0x75, 0xbe,
+ 0xc3, 0x7a, 0x12, 0x90, 0x90, 0xc7, 0x94, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x45, 0x02, 0x5c,
+ 0x24, 0xae, 0x82, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0x30, 0xa6, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0xa7, 0xa6,
+ 0xe6, 0xea, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x45, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x24, 0x8b, 0x76, 0xc5,
+ 0x5e, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x07, 0x1e, 0x26, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x80, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x1f,
+ 0x74, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x11, 0xee, 0x96, 0x56, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xcb,
+ 0x3b, 0xde, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0x08, 0xf5, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x71, 0xe0,
+ 0x8a, 0xfa, 0xdd, 0x19, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xd2, 0xd4,
+ 0xdc, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x2b,
+ 0x83, 0x7a, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x40, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x53, 0xd4, 0x52,
+ 0x21, 0xe7, 0xe4, 0x1f, 0x01, 0xf6, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x28, 0xba, 0x51, 0x6f,
+ 0x51, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x23, 0x25, 0x77, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x1c,
+ 0x19, 0x8a, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x61, 0x13, 0x37, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x83, 0x17,
+ 0x35, 0x23, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x02, 0xb8, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
+ 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hj_signed_len = 739;
+
+unsigned char hi_signed_sha256[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xb4, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x02, 0xa5, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x02, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x7e, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x55, 0x30, 0x3d,
+ 0x31, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64,
+ 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63,
+ 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74,
+ 0x79, 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0x96, 0x02, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0x07,
+ 0xa7, 0x39, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x0b, 0xde, 0x33, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0xec, 0x24, 0x5d,
+ 0x06, 0x81, 0xe7, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0x53, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x5a, 0xf3, 0xee,
+ 0xe5, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xf7, 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x36, 0x62, 0x35, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xc3,
+ 0xeb, 0x85, 0x1d, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x6e, 0x2a, 0xb4, 0x3a, 0x76, 0x48, 0x4f,
+ 0x8b, 0x29, 0xd4, 0x9e, 0x5c, 0xd2, 0x41, 0x4d, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x0f, 0x97,
+ 0xe0, 0x7d, 0x88, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xb0, 0xde, 0x1b, 0x21, 0xa6, 0x0c, 0x19,
+ 0xd8, 0xb0, 0x12, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0x19, 0x03, 0xbd, 0x77, 0x83, 0x23,
+ 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x68, 0x0a, 0x7b, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0x25, 0x44, 0xe1, 0x64, 0x8d,
+ 0x43, 0x5a, 0x1c, 0x9f, 0x74, 0x79, 0x31, 0x3f, 0xc7, 0x8e, 0xae, 0xe1,
+ 0xf9, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x12, 0x36, 0x85, 0xf2, 0x55, 0xba, 0x42, 0x60, 0x64,
+ 0x25, 0x9f, 0x73, 0x62, 0x42, 0xd2, 0x1c, 0x5e, 0x39, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x91,
+ 0xb8, 0xf9, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x84, 0x76, 0x6d, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0xcb,
+ 0x2d, 0x14, 0x27, 0x16, 0xdc, 0x20, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x6b, 0xc9, 0xda, 0x9f,
+ 0xef, 0xe2, 0x2d, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xd8, 0xf9, 0x94, 0x18, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0x8f,
+ 0xa9, 0x44, 0xad, 0xff, 0x1b, 0xcb, 0x86, 0x30, 0x96, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0x7a,
+ 0x4b, 0x73, 0x1b, 0xa9, 0xc3, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0xd7, 0x44, 0xa8, 0x4d, 0xd6,
+ 0x92, 0xb6, 0x00, 0x04, 0x09, 0x05, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x02, 0x90, 0x19, 0x8c,
+ 0x9a, 0xa5, 0xee, 0x58, 0x24, 0xb0, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x6f, 0x73, 0xdb, 0xf5,
+ 0xa1, 0xf4, 0xf0, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xdc, 0x55, 0x9f, 0x8f, 0x7a, 0xd0,
+ 0xf7, 0xb6, 0xaa, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xab, 0xb8, 0x65, 0xad, 0x12, 0x32,
+ 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x99, 0x71, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb4, 0x1e, 0x21, 0x27, 0x52, 0xea,
+ 0x8c, 0xc8, 0x79, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x60, 0x57, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x8c, 0x0d,
+ 0x07, 0xa7, 0x12, 0x83, 0x0a, 0x76, 0x6a, 0x64, 0xed, 0xbe, 0x8d, 0xaf,
+ 0xdf, 0x51, 0x05, 0xdd, 0xf2, 0xd3, 0xb8, 0x93, 0xa9, 0x13, 0xa5, 0x96,
+ 0xe8, 0xfa, 0x82, 0x02, 0x18, 0x71, 0x7a, 0x71, 0xbb, 0x39, 0x6f, 0x85,
+ 0xee, 0x16, 0x82, 0x27, 0x42, 0x9f, 0x83, 0xc8, 0xab, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x99,
+ 0xba, 0x38, 0x92, 0x38, 0xae, 0x59, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x95,
+ 0xca, 0x5e, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0x00, 0xbd, 0xb9, 0x63, 0x25, 0x8d, 0xc7, 0x22,
+ 0xaf, 0xe5, 0x67, 0x76, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xc9, 0x7e, 0x9e, 0xec, 0x9b,
+ 0x1f, 0x7d, 0x3b, 0xfe, 0xa1, 0x20, 0x52, 0xac, 0xd0, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0xf1,
+ 0xfd, 0x4c, 0x08, 0x59, 0x7d, 0x50, 0xbb, 0x0c, 0xcf, 0xd8, 0xb6, 0x0f,
+ 0xc7, 0x19, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x96, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x71, 0x56, 0x72, 0xd1,
+ 0x06, 0x29, 0x0f, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x46, 0x3e, 0x58, 0x42, 0xc4, 0x8c, 0xe0,
+ 0x6e, 0xe9, 0x37, 0xd5, 0x2f, 0x74, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x10, 0x0e,
+ 0x7d, 0x67, 0xbd, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xa4, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0x78, 0x4d, 0x0d,
+ 0x15, 0x42, 0x70, 0x20, 0xe0, 0x1d, 0x83, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x02, 0xa1,
+ 0x51, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0x5d, 0x69, 0x90, 0x58, 0x82, 0x94, 0x50, 0x36, 0x22,
+ 0xb3, 0xa4, 0x15, 0x77, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xb0, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x3f, 0xd0, 0x0e,
+ 0x1b, 0xfc, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0x63, 0x94, 0x22, 0xf3, 0x87, 0x0a,
+ 0x41, 0x8a, 0x27, 0x48, 0xcb, 0x6c, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x11, 0x6f,
+ 0x74, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x74, 0x45, 0x3f, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xc8, 0x80, 0xe2,
+ 0x71, 0x08, 0x93, 0xbd, 0x4d, 0x18, 0x78, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0xb9, 0x3a, 0xd6,
+ 0x1a, 0xde, 0xf9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x02, 0xb8, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
+ 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hi_signed_sha256_len = 739;
+
+unsigned char short_msg[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int short_msg_len = 3;
+
+unsigned char unsigned_msg[] = {
+ 0x53, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x75, 0x74, 0x20, 0x70, 0x65, 0x72, 0x73, 0x70,
+ 0x69, 0x63, 0x69, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20,
+ 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x73, 0x20, 0x65, 0x72, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x73, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x61, 0x63, 0x63, 0x75, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x69,
+ 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x75,
+ 0x65, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x75, 0x64, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x69, 0x75, 0x6d,
+ 0x2c, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20,
+ 0x61, 0x70, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x71,
+ 0x75, 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x70, 0x73, 0x61, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x61, 0x62, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x76,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74,
+ 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x65, 0x74, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x73,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x61, 0x72, 0x63, 0x68, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x6f,
+ 0x20, 0x62, 0x65, 0x61, 0x74, 0x61, 0x65, 0x20, 0x76, 0x69, 0x74, 0x61,
+ 0x65, 0x20, 0x64, 0x69, 0x63, 0x74, 0x61, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x2e, 0x20,
+ 0x4e, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x69, 0x70,
+ 0x73, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x61, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75,
+ 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x20, 0x61, 0x75, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x6f, 0x64, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x75, 0x74, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x67,
+ 0x69, 0x74, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x61,
+ 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x65, 0x71, 0x75, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x75,
+ 0x72, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x6f,
+ 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x20,
+ 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75,
+ 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69,
+ 0x20, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x73, 0x63, 0x69, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x4e,
+ 0x65, 0x71, 0x75, 0x65, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x71,
+ 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x2c,
+ 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6d,
+ 0x20, 0x69, 0x70, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x61, 0x20,
+ 0x64, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6d,
+ 0x65, 0x74, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x65,
+ 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x64, 0x69, 0x70, 0x69, 0x73, 0x63,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x76, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x74, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64,
+ 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x61, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x75,
+ 0x6d, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x65, 0x69, 0x75, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6d,
+ 0x6f, 0x64, 0x69, 0x20, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x61, 0x20,
+ 0x69, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x69, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x75, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x6c, 0x61, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f,
+ 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20,
+ 0x61, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x65,
+ 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x6d, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x55, 0x74, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x20,
+ 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x20, 0x76, 0x65,
+ 0x6e, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6e,
+ 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x72, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x65, 0x72, 0x63,
+ 0x69, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x75, 0x6c,
+ 0x6c, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x73,
+ 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x73, 0x63, 0x69, 0x70, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6c, 0x61,
+ 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x69,
+ 0x73, 0x69, 0x20, 0x75, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69,
+ 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d,
+ 0x6f, 0x64, 0x69, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x65, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61,
+ 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x3f, 0x20, 0x51, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x75,
+ 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x65, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20,
+ 0x69, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x70, 0x72, 0x65, 0x68, 0x65,
+ 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x69, 0x20, 0x69,
+ 0x6e, 0x20, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x70, 0x74, 0x61,
+ 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x76, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73,
+ 0x65, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6c,
+ 0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x69, 0x61, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63,
+ 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x65, 0x71, 0x75, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x2c, 0x20,
+ 0x76, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x65, 0x75,
+ 0x6d, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x67, 0x69, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6f,
+ 0x20, 0x76, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x70, 0x74, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x75,
+ 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x20, 0x70, 0x61, 0x72, 0x69, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72,
+ 0x3f, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int unsigned_msg_len = 866;
+
+unsigned char certificate2_der[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0x52, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x91, 0xff, 0x30,
+ 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3a, 0x31, 0x38, 0x30, 0x36, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
+ 0x03, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x32, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
+ 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20,
+ 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69,
+ 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69,
+ 0x74, 0x79, 0x30, 0x20, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x30, 0x30, 0x37, 0x32, 0x38,
+ 0x31, 0x33, 0x32, 0x34, 0x32, 0x39, 0x5a, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32,
+ 0x30, 0x30, 0x37, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x33, 0x32, 0x34, 0x32, 0x39, 0x5a,
+ 0x30, 0x2b, 0x31, 0x29, 0x30, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c,
+ 0x20, 0x47, 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x32, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
+ 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69,
+ 0x67, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x02, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0xb0, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x01, 0x9c, 0x0e,
+ 0xd6, 0x8c, 0x07, 0xca, 0xc1, 0xcf, 0xbc, 0x03, 0xdd, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0xe3,
+ 0x4f, 0x71, 0xc1, 0x30, 0xaa, 0x09, 0x96, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x6c, 0x42, 0x93,
+ 0xdb, 0x35, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x1b, 0x67, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x2d, 0x5b, 0xec, 0xca,
+ 0x35, 0x06, 0x32, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x2c, 0xd3, 0x71, 0x2b, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x19,
+ 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x4d, 0x6e, 0x28, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x49, 0x4a,
+ 0xbc, 0xea, 0x47, 0x67, 0xb8, 0x36, 0xa6, 0xf5, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x20, 0x14,
+ 0x0c, 0x66, 0x67, 0x28, 0xb5, 0x97, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0x32, 0x06, 0x29,
+ 0x9c, 0x99, 0x92, 0x0f, 0x73, 0xac, 0xfd, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0xf2, 0xa8, 0x55,
+ 0x9d, 0x1b, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xb0, 0x76, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0x6c, 0x9f, 0x62, 0x37,
+ 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xef, 0x44, 0xb3, 0x0d, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xbd, 0xdb,
+ 0xd8, 0x75, 0x5f, 0x68, 0xe3, 0xf0, 0xec, 0x82, 0x66, 0x7c, 0x31, 0x70,
+ 0xa9, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x38, 0x9f, 0xdf, 0xf5, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x23, 0x9d, 0x34,
+ 0xa5, 0x85, 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x68, 0x41, 0xfc, 0x4f, 0x89, 0x45, 0x3c, 0x24,
+ 0x81, 0xa6, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x26, 0x09, 0x48, 0xdd, 0xfe, 0x4b, 0xb6,
+ 0x66, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xf0, 0x5d, 0x8a, 0x61, 0x2e, 0x5f, 0x9f,
+ 0x80, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0xe6, 0x41, 0xd8, 0x10, 0x5e, 0x7a, 0xc6, 0xdb, 0x89,
+ 0xc7, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0xb1, 0x4e, 0x7d, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xfd, 0x50, 0xca,
+ 0xbf, 0xbb, 0xe2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x3d, 0x75, 0xfa, 0xd1, 0xcc,
+ 0xd6, 0xf9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0xdc, 0x53, 0xad, 0x62, 0xfb, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x26,
+ 0x7f, 0x21, 0x54, 0x5c, 0xb7, 0xdc, 0xe7, 0x96, 0x8c, 0xce, 0x75, 0xe0,
+ 0x17, 0x01, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x77, 0x6e, 0xa4, 0x8b, 0x7a, 0x83, 0x28, 0x7a,
+ 0xf7, 0xb0, 0x5f, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x63,
+ 0x74, 0xd0, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x19, 0xe4, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x4a, 0x8a, 0x54, 0xa4,
+ 0xe0, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xbf, 0x53, 0x30, 0xaf, 0xd0, 0xeb, 0x96, 0xc3, 0xbb,
+ 0x65, 0xf7, 0x67, 0xf5, 0xae, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf2, 0x63, 0xc8, 0x69, 0xf7,
+ 0x47, 0xcb, 0x27, 0x79, 0xe1, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x68, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xb3, 0xb8,
+ 0x0c, 0xc5, 0x58, 0x73, 0xcc, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xda, 0x4e, 0x3b, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0xcd, 0xcb, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x06, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0x76, 0x8c,
+ 0x0c, 0x83, 0x75, 0x09, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xdb, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0xf2,
+ 0x0c, 0x7b, 0x87, 0x38, 0x9e, 0x22, 0x67, 0xbd, 0xd1, 0x97, 0x57, 0x24,
+ 0xf1, 0x46, 0x07, 0xf9, 0xd2, 0x1b, 0xec, 0x25, 0x5e, 0x67, 0xd9, 0x66,
+ 0x23, 0x1b, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0xaa, 0xec, 0x88, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x83, 0x51,
+ 0x31, 0x67, 0x51, 0x76, 0x5f, 0x55, 0xd7, 0x36, 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x84, 0x0b,
+ 0x6f, 0x5c, 0xbb, 0x5b, 0x8f, 0x37, 0x23, 0x7f, 0xf8, 0x17, 0x84, 0xa2,
+ 0x70, 0x20, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x3a, 0x04, 0xfd, 0xf0, 0x08, 0x4a, 0xb1,
+ 0x16, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x40, 0x51, 0x83, 0xd2, 0x87, 0x40, 0x9c, 0x1c,
+ 0x9f, 0x13, 0x38, 0x17, 0xd3, 0x34, 0x58, 0xad, 0x05, 0x71, 0xa0, 0x73,
+ 0xca, 0x40, 0xa6, 0xa4, 0x81, 0x02, 0xee, 0xa8, 0x72, 0x41, 0xa1, 0x41,
+ 0x18, 0x64, 0x8a, 0x86, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0xc5, 0x95, 0x98,
+ 0xf9, 0x78, 0xfe, 0x19, 0x0d, 0xc9, 0xb3, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0x09, 0xbe,
+ 0xf1, 0xd2, 0x04, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0x28, 0xf5, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x20, 0x4f, 0xc5,
+ 0x41, 0x9d, 0x8c, 0x85, 0xd8, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xc1, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x24,
+ 0x4d, 0x67, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x5b, 0x30,
+ 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30,
+ 0x00, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x07, 0x80, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04,
+ 0x14, 0xac, 0xf5, 0x47, 0x17, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0xc1, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x41, 0xe1,
+ 0x41, 0x60, 0xcb, 0x37, 0x11, 0x60, 0x28, 0x78, 0x5f, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x21, 0x94,
+ 0xfb, 0xf9, 0xb2, 0x43, 0xe9, 0x33, 0xd7, 0x50, 0x7d, 0xc7, 0x37, 0xdb,
+ 0xd5, 0x82, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xbe, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x96, 0x70, 0x65, 0x26, 0x42, 0xf8, 0xdc, 0x69, 0xde, 0xcf,
+ 0x41, 0x3a, 0x2e, 0x7f, 0x5b, 0xf1, 0xf9, 0x3b, 0x9b, 0xd2, 0x4e, 0x64,
+ 0x48, 0x81, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x1e, 0x22, 0xce, 0x68, 0x63, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x1b,
+ 0x9b, 0xf2, 0xc7, 0x12, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9b, 0x90, 0x84, 0x79, 0x48, 0x12,
+ 0xe6, 0x21, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x77, 0xdb, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0xd1, 0x0d,
+ 0x91, 0xbf, 0x39, 0x22, 0x0f, 0x64, 0xcf, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x8c, 0x1f, 0x91,
+ 0x81, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0x6c, 0x02, 0x3a, 0xf8, 0x07, 0xa2, 0x6f, 0x46, 0x5d,
+ 0x7b, 0xfd, 0x43, 0xff, 0x41, 0x0f, 0xe2, 0x57, 0x1c, 0xbd, 0x48, 0x60,
+ 0x53, 0x11, 0x48, 0x87, 0x88, 0x9d, 0x13, 0x82, 0x40, 0x68, 0x44, 0x2c,
+ 0xc6, 0xc8, 0x95, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xb6, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x22, 0x0a, 0xfd, 0xe4,
+ 0x46, 0x8f, 0x35, 0x12, 0x98, 0x5a, 0x34, 0x6f, 0x2b, 0x57, 0x62, 0xa1,
+ 0x4d, 0x8d, 0x79, 0x37, 0xe4, 0x6b, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0xef, 0x79,
+ 0x11, 0xed, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0x7a, 0x1c, 0xbd, 0x86, 0xdc, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xfd,
+ 0xd3, 0x51, 0xbb, 0x73, 0xad, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x1b, 0xf9, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x4a,
+ 0xe4, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x63, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x5f, 0x18, 0x08, 0x2f, 0x42, 0xb7,
+ 0x23, 0x4b, 0x48, 0x46, 0x1f, 0x63, 0x87, 0xae, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0xdb, 0x60,
+ 0xf8, 0x5f, 0xd3, 0x13, 0xec, 0xca, 0xdd, 0x60, 0x60, 0x79, 0x52, 0x70,
+ 0x47, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x78, 0x71, 0xcf, 0xb3, 0x04, 0x03, 0xbe, 0xba,
+ 0x81, 0xba, 0x74, 0xb1, 0x30, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x21, 0x4a, 0x9b, 0x70,
+ 0xfb, 0xd6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x78, 0x0c, 0x4d, 0x39, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xe5, 0x75,
+ 0xba, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x22, 0x37, 0x64, 0xb7, 0xf2, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x11, 0x2d,
+ 0x8e, 0x58, 0xa6, 0xcf, 0x83, 0xf1, 0xcb, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0x02, 0xbd, 0xda,
+ 0x03, 0x92, 0xa9, 0x45, 0x24, 0x56, 0xc5, 0xbd, 0x41, 0xd1, 0x20, 0x86,
+ 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xe8, 0xa7, 0xb2, 0x46, 0xf7, 0x8e, 0xa9, 0x38, 0x0e,
+ 0x23, 0x77, 0x3c, 0x0d, 0x66, 0x83, 0x6a, 0x1a, 0x6b, 0x7f, 0x54, 0x11,
+ 0x58, 0x0d, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x74, 0x60, 0xca, 0xed, 0xff, 0x91, 0x47, 0xd9,
+ 0x29, 0xe0, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x10, 0x4c, 0x15, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x95,
+ 0xf9, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x18, 0x38, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0x91, 0x17, 0x3f,
+ 0xfa, 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x09, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x4e, 0x53, 0xf7, 0xfa, 0x4f, 0x20,
+ 0xa3, 0xf4, 0x4a, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x17, 0x1c, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x6f, 0x03, 0x48,
+ 0xdf, 0xad, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0xbc, 0x71, 0xc4, 0x72, 0x32, 0x11, 0x84, 0xac,
+ 0x09, 0xd2, 0x18, 0x44, 0x35, 0xf1, 0xcd, 0xaf, 0xa8, 0x98, 0xe0, 0x8b,
+ 0xec, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x85, 0xd6, 0xd8, 0x1b, 0xe0, 0x75,
+ 0xdc, 0xfd, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x0f, 0xd3, 0x4c, 0x2f, 0x71,
+ 0xdc, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x14, 0xeb, 0xda, 0x00, 0x24, 0x24, 0x9e, 0xa3, 0x8e,
+ 0x3e, 0x08, 0x6f, 0x22, 0x24, 0xd6, 0xc4, 0x85, 0x8f, 0x68, 0x00, 0x4a,
+ 0x82, 0x4c, 0x33, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x35, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0x4b, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6,
+ 0x65, 0x6f, 0x5a, 0x7a, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x52, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x59,
+ 0x22, 0x7f, 0xe1, 0x96, 0x1b, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0x44, 0x9f, 0x91,
+ 0x03, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0xa1, 0x2a, 0xb6, 0x5a, 0x51, 0xa0, 0xce, 0x4a, 0x88,
+ 0x22, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xdc, 0xc0, 0x47, 0x76, 0x35, 0x84, 0x75, 0x9b, 0x87,
+ 0x5c, 0xd3, 0xcf, 0xe7, 0xdd, 0xa3, 0x57, 0x14, 0xdf, 0x00, 0xfd, 0x19,
+ 0x2a, 0x7d, 0x89, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x78, 0x97, 0x04, 0x58, 0x48
+};
+unsigned int certificate2_der_len = 1366;
+
+unsigned char hi_signed_2nd[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x02, 0xa2, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x02, 0x9e, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x02,
+ 0x7b, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x52, 0x30, 0x3a,
+ 0x31, 0x38, 0x30, 0x36, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x32, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74,
+ 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x14,
+ 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07,
+ 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x91, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06,
+ 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x30, 0x38, 0x81, 0x23, 0x68, 0x90,
+ 0xae, 0x5f, 0xce, 0xf7, 0x27, 0xb1, 0x8c, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x99,
+ 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0xda, 0xe4, 0x32, 0x10, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x16, 0x07,
+ 0x87, 0x66, 0x55, 0xff, 0x64, 0x1c, 0x61, 0x25, 0xd5, 0xb9, 0xe1, 0xfe,
+ 0xea, 0x5a, 0xcd, 0x56, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xbe, 0xb1, 0x61, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0x5f,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x12, 0x78, 0xb6, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x44, 0x4f,
+ 0x60, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0x83, 0x3b, 0xc2, 0x83, 0xd5, 0x14, 0x1f, 0x6f,
+ 0x3e, 0xb2, 0x47, 0xb5, 0x58, 0xc5, 0xa7, 0xb4, 0x82, 0x53, 0x2e, 0x53,
+ 0x95, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0xe4, 0x62, 0xe8, 0xa1, 0xaf, 0xae, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0xd2,
+ 0x22, 0x07, 0xbe, 0x71, 0x37, 0x2c, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x14, 0xc0,
+ 0x6c, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x15, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x68, 0x45, 0xdf,
+ 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x6a, 0x54, 0xcd, 0x67, 0xb9, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x05,
+ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xcc, 0x77, 0x8e, 0x97, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0x11, 0x09, 0x3d,
+ 0x90, 0x54, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x23, 0x03, 0x44, 0xbf, 0x7d,
+ 0x2c, 0xc9, 0x15, 0x42, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0xa2, 0xd1, 0x5b, 0x73, 0x81,
+ 0xff, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x2f, 0x86, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x36,
+ 0x94, 0xa2, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0xa0, 0x5f, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xd5,
+ 0x2f, 0x8d, 0xd6, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x5b, 0x09, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x78, 0xcc,
+ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xda, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0x43, 0xe7, 0xe1, 0x3c, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x70,
+ 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0x09, 0xac, 0x94,
+ 0xaf, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xb3, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0xf5, 0x16, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0xe3,
+ 0xcc, 0xe2, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x06, 0xbb, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x43, 0x20,
+ 0x04, 0xee, 0x99, 0x2f, 0xd8, 0x9f, 0xda, 0x3f, 0xfd, 0x49, 0xb8, 0xc2,
+ 0xbd, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x72, 0xfd, 0xe3, 0xce, 0x1c, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x39, 0xac,
+ 0x2a, 0x99, 0xe9, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x10, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xcc, 0xdb,
+ 0xf1, 0x04, 0x63, 0x36, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe2, 0x73, 0xd4, 0xd8, 0x49,
+ 0x31, 0xa8, 0x55, 0xcc, 0xa7, 0x76, 0x36, 0x6e, 0x18, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0xb0,
+ 0x29, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x49, 0xbf, 0xf9, 0xdb, 0x7f, 0x24, 0x42, 0x02, 0xcb,
+ 0xc1, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xba, 0x18, 0x85, 0x86, 0xc7, 0xf4, 0x1c, 0x62, 0x76,
+ 0xbc, 0x73, 0xfb, 0xe4, 0x15, 0xb8, 0xdd, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x39, 0xa5,
+ 0x3d, 0x33, 0xaf, 0xd5, 0x92, 0x4d, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x22, 0xc0, 0xdc, 0x49,
+ 0x5f, 0x7b, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x62, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x93, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x6b,
+ 0x23, 0xba, 0xd4, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x29, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x34, 0xe3, 0xac, 0x25,
+ 0xa7, 0x15, 0xad, 0xab, 0xb3, 0xb7, 0x25, 0xca, 0x37, 0x88, 0x40, 0x2e,
+ 0x47, 0x6e, 0x92, 0x20, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x5a, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xfb, 0xb3, 0xa0,
+ 0x16, 0xb6, 0x93, 0xf2, 0xf5, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0x25, 0xee, 0x2e, 0x98,
+ 0x6c, 0x0a, 0xfe, 0xae, 0x0b, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x80, 0xe9, 0x8b,
+ 0xaf, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0xc7, 0x83,
+ 0xb5, 0x48, 0x58, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x9e, 0x9b, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x3e,
+ 0x50, 0x5a, 0x91, 0xad, 0x21, 0x1b, 0x97, 0x5b, 0xe8, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x8a,
+ 0xa4, 0x17, 0xe8, 0xab, 0x87, 0x02, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x8c, 0x9f, 0x65, 0xb7,
+ 0x2a, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x5f, 0x77, 0x30, 0x6c, 0x04, 0x22, 0xe6, 0x58, 0x26,
+ 0x14, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x0a, 0x82, 0x77, 0xdb, 0x40, 0xa1, 0x58, 0xac,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0xb5,
+ 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e,
+ 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64,
+ 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hi_signed_2nd_len = 736;
+
+unsigned char hi_double[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0x20, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x05, 0x1c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x04,
+ 0xf9, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x52, 0x30, 0x3a,
+ 0x31, 0x38, 0x30, 0x36, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x32, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74,
+ 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x14,
+ 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07,
+ 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x91, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06,
+ 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x30, 0x38, 0x81, 0x23, 0x68, 0x90,
+ 0xae, 0x5f, 0xce, 0xf7, 0x27, 0xb1, 0x8c, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x99,
+ 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0xda, 0xe4, 0x32, 0x10, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x16, 0x07,
+ 0x87, 0x66, 0x55, 0xff, 0x64, 0x1c, 0x61, 0x25, 0xd5, 0xb9, 0xe1, 0xfe,
+ 0xea, 0x5a, 0xcd, 0x56, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xbe, 0xb1, 0x61, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0x5f,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x12, 0x78, 0xb6, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x44, 0x4f,
+ 0x60, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0x83, 0x3b, 0xc2, 0x83, 0xd5, 0x14, 0x1f, 0x6f,
+ 0x3e, 0xb2, 0x47, 0xb5, 0x58, 0xc5, 0xa7, 0xb4, 0x82, 0x53, 0x2e, 0x53,
+ 0x95, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0xe4, 0x62, 0xe8, 0xa1, 0xaf, 0xae, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0xd2,
+ 0x22, 0x07, 0xbe, 0x71, 0x37, 0x2c, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x14, 0xc0,
+ 0x6c, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x15, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x68, 0x45, 0xdf,
+ 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x6a, 0x54, 0xcd, 0x67, 0xb9, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x05,
+ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xcc, 0x77, 0x8e, 0x97, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0x11, 0x09, 0x3d,
+ 0x90, 0x54, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x23, 0x03, 0x44, 0xbf, 0x7d,
+ 0x2c, 0xc9, 0x15, 0x42, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0xa2, 0xd1, 0x5b, 0x73, 0x81,
+ 0xff, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x2f, 0x86, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x36,
+ 0x94, 0xa2, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0xa0, 0x5f, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xd5,
+ 0x2f, 0x8d, 0xd6, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x5b, 0x09, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x78, 0xcc,
+ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xda, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0x43, 0xe7, 0xe1, 0x3c, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x70,
+ 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0x09, 0xac, 0x94,
+ 0xaf, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xb3, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0xf5, 0x16, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0xe3,
+ 0xcc, 0xe2, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x06, 0xbb, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x43, 0x20,
+ 0x04, 0xee, 0x99, 0x2f, 0xd8, 0x9f, 0xda, 0x3f, 0xfd, 0x49, 0xb8, 0xc2,
+ 0xbd, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x72, 0xfd, 0xe3, 0xce, 0x1c, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x39, 0xac,
+ 0x2a, 0x99, 0xe9, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x10, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xcc, 0xdb,
+ 0xf1, 0x04, 0x63, 0x36, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe2, 0x73, 0xd4, 0xd8, 0x49,
+ 0x31, 0xa8, 0x55, 0xcc, 0xa7, 0x76, 0x36, 0x6e, 0x18, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0xb0,
+ 0x29, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x49, 0xbf, 0xf9, 0xdb, 0x7f, 0x24, 0x42, 0x02, 0xcb,
+ 0xc1, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xba, 0x18, 0x85, 0x86, 0xc7, 0xf4, 0x1c, 0x62, 0x76,
+ 0xbc, 0x73, 0xfb, 0xe4, 0x15, 0xb8, 0xdd, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x39, 0xa5,
+ 0x3d, 0x33, 0xaf, 0xd5, 0x92, 0x4d, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x22, 0xc0, 0xdc, 0x49,
+ 0x5f, 0x7b, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x62, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x93, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x6b,
+ 0x23, 0xba, 0xd4, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x29, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x34, 0xe3, 0xac, 0x25,
+ 0xa7, 0x15, 0xad, 0xab, 0xb3, 0xb7, 0x25, 0xca, 0x37, 0x88, 0x40, 0x2e,
+ 0x47, 0x6e, 0x92, 0x20, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x5a, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xfb, 0xb3, 0xa0,
+ 0x16, 0xb6, 0x93, 0xf2, 0xf5, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0x25, 0xee, 0x2e, 0x98,
+ 0x6c, 0x0a, 0xfe, 0xae, 0x0b, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x80, 0xe9, 0x8b,
+ 0xaf, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0xc7, 0x83,
+ 0xb5, 0x48, 0x58, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x9e, 0x9b, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x3e,
+ 0x50, 0x5a, 0x91, 0xad, 0x21, 0x1b, 0x97, 0x5b, 0xe8, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x8a,
+ 0xa4, 0x17, 0xe8, 0xab, 0x87, 0x02, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x8c, 0x9f, 0x65, 0xb7,
+ 0x2a, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x5f, 0x77, 0x30, 0x6c, 0x04, 0x22, 0xe6, 0x58, 0x26,
+ 0x14, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x0a, 0x82, 0x77, 0xdb, 0x40, 0xa1, 0x58, 0xac,
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x55, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x31,
+ 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47, 0x72,
+ 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20,
+ 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65,
+ 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61,
+ 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79,
+ 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5, 0x3a,
+ 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x3f, 0xac, 0x77, 0x97,
+ 0x74, 0x9b, 0x4b, 0x25, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x09, 0x8d, 0x53, 0xa6, 0x03, 0xdf,
+ 0x9a, 0x10, 0x52, 0xe5, 0x3f, 0xd4, 0x72, 0x75, 0x30, 0xd4, 0x6e, 0x77,
+ 0x32, 0x49, 0x84, 0xe2, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xac, 0xb0, 0x52, 0x55,
+ 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x57, 0x12, 0x08, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x01, 0xc2,
+ 0x1a, 0x4a, 0x2e, 0x3d, 0xd5, 0xc8, 0x56, 0xac, 0xd1, 0x83, 0x75, 0x88,
+ 0xd4, 0xcc, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0xcf, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x91, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xb1, 0xd1,
+ 0x24, 0x9c, 0xd0, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x15, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x33, 0x8d, 0xe3,
+ 0x67, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x48, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x45,
+ 0xa8, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x25, 0xb5, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0x86,
+ 0xef, 0xa2, 0x6d, 0x78, 0xcc, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0xae, 0xcd,
+ 0x0f, 0x58, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x22, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0xd5, 0x27,
+ 0x87, 0x39, 0x62, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0x17, 0x3d, 0x5e, 0xb1, 0x32, 0x7a, 0xf1,
+ 0x70, 0xce, 0xfa, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x92, 0xa8, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0xb2, 0x33, 0x1a,
+ 0x16, 0xf3, 0x60, 0x39, 0xdf, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x4d, 0xc2, 0x8d,
+ 0x55, 0x00, 0x49, 0x94, 0x04, 0x17, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xf4, 0xac, 0xa9, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0xf3, 0x70, 0xa1,
+ 0xc1, 0x54, 0x36, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x67, 0x04,
+ 0xd5, 0x53, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0xad, 0x63, 0x55, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x06, 0x3a, 0x9a,
+ 0xc5, 0xfe, 0x38, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x69, 0x42, 0x90, 0x35, 0x1f, 0xe3, 0x1c,
+ 0x57, 0xea, 0xdb, 0x51, 0x35, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xfe, 0x72, 0x33, 0xd6,
+ 0x8a, 0x46, 0x74, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xba, 0xa2, 0xc4, 0xe9,
+ 0xc9, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x3e, 0x98, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd1, 0x60,
+ 0x94, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0x26, 0x83,
+ 0x3f, 0x02, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x46, 0x41, 0xd7,
+ 0x5c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0x17, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x42, 0xef, 0x66, 0xda, 0x35,
+ 0x03, 0xd1, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x22, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xf7, 0x4e, 0x04, 0xe3, 0x0f,
+ 0x98, 0x7d, 0xaa, 0x58, 0xba, 0xef, 0x9a, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x7c, 0x98, 0xa0,
+ 0xc2, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0xec, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xb0, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0xe5, 0xaa,
+ 0xcf, 0x10, 0x73, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x12, 0x5c, 0xd2, 0x0e, 0xe2,
+ 0x60, 0x17, 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x44, 0x08, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xcd, 0x75, 0xbe, 0xc3,
+ 0x7a, 0x12, 0x90, 0x90, 0xc7, 0x94, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x45, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x24,
+ 0xae, 0x82, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0x30, 0xa6, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0xe6,
+ 0xea, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x45, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x24, 0x8b, 0x76, 0xc5, 0x5e,
+ 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x07, 0x1e, 0x26, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x80, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0x74,
+ 0xe6, 0xae, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x11, 0xee, 0x96, 0x56, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xcb, 0x3b,
+ 0xde, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0x08, 0xf5, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x71, 0xe0, 0x8a,
+ 0xfa, 0xdd, 0x19, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0xdc,
+ 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0x83,
+ 0x7a, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x40, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x53, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x21,
+ 0xe7, 0xe4, 0x1f, 0x01, 0xf6, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x28, 0xba, 0x51, 0x6f, 0x51,
+ 0x69, 0xf4, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x23, 0x25, 0x77, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x19,
+ 0x8a, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x61, 0x13, 0x37, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x83, 0x17, 0x35,
+ 0x23, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x05, 0x33, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69,
+ 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65,
+ 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hi_double_len = 1374;
+
+unsigned char hi_double_extended[] = {
+ 0x68, 0x69, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0x20, 0x30, 0x82,
+ 0x05, 0x1c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x31, 0x82, 0x04,
+ 0xf9, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x52, 0x30, 0x3a,
+ 0x31, 0x38, 0x30, 0x36, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x47,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x32, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74,
+ 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x14,
+ 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x91, 0x07,
+ 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x91, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06,
+ 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x30, 0x38, 0x81, 0x23, 0x68, 0x90,
+ 0xae, 0x5f, 0xce, 0xf7, 0x27, 0xb1, 0x8c, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x99,
+ 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0xda, 0xe4, 0x32, 0x10, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x16, 0x07,
+ 0x87, 0x66, 0x55, 0xff, 0x64, 0x1c, 0x61, 0x25, 0xd5, 0xb9, 0xe1, 0xfe,
+ 0xea, 0x5a, 0xcd, 0x56, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xbe, 0xb1, 0x61, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0x5f,
+ 0x69, 0x20, 0x64, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x12, 0x78, 0xb6, 0x0c, 0x72, 0x44, 0x4f,
+ 0x60, 0x0f, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0x83, 0x3b, 0xc2, 0x83, 0xd5, 0x14, 0x1f, 0x6f,
+ 0x3e, 0xb2, 0x47, 0xb5, 0x58, 0xc5, 0xa7, 0xb4, 0x82, 0x53, 0x2e, 0x53,
+ 0x95, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0xe4, 0x62, 0xe8, 0xa1, 0xaf, 0xae, 0xbf, 0xa9, 0xd2,
+ 0x22, 0x07, 0xbe, 0x71, 0x37, 0x2c, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x14, 0xc0,
+ 0x6c, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x15, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x68, 0x45, 0xdf,
+ 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x6a, 0x54, 0xcd, 0x67, 0xb9, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x05,
+ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xcc, 0x77, 0x8e, 0x97, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0x11, 0x09, 0x3d,
+ 0x90, 0x54, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x23, 0x03, 0x44, 0xbf, 0x7d,
+ 0x2c, 0xc9, 0x15, 0x42, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0xa2, 0xd1, 0x5b, 0x73, 0x81,
+ 0xff, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x7b, 0x2f, 0x86, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x36,
+ 0x94, 0xa2, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0xa0, 0x5f, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xd5,
+ 0x2f, 0x8d, 0xd6, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x5b, 0x09, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x78, 0xcc,
+ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xda, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0x43, 0xe7, 0xe1, 0x3c, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x70,
+ 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0x09, 0xac, 0x94,
+ 0xaf, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xb3, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0xf5, 0x16, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0xe3,
+ 0xcc, 0xe2, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x06, 0xbb, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x43, 0x20,
+ 0x04, 0xee, 0x99, 0x2f, 0xd8, 0x9f, 0xda, 0x3f, 0xfd, 0x49, 0xb8, 0xc2,
+ 0xbd, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x72, 0xfd, 0xe3, 0xce, 0x1c, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x39, 0xac,
+ 0x2a, 0x99, 0xe9, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x10, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xcc, 0xdb,
+ 0xf1, 0x04, 0x63, 0x36, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe2, 0x73, 0xd4, 0xd8, 0x49,
+ 0x31, 0xa8, 0x55, 0xcc, 0xa7, 0x76, 0x36, 0x6e, 0x18, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0xb0,
+ 0x29, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x49, 0xbf, 0xf9, 0xdb, 0x7f, 0x24, 0x42, 0x02, 0xcb,
+ 0xc1, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xba, 0x18, 0x85, 0x86, 0xc7, 0xf4, 0x1c, 0x62, 0x76,
+ 0xbc, 0x73, 0xfb, 0xe4, 0x15, 0xb8, 0xdd, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x39, 0xa5,
+ 0x3d, 0x33, 0xaf, 0xd5, 0x92, 0x4d, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x22, 0xc0, 0xdc, 0x49,
+ 0x5f, 0x7b, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x62, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x93, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x6b,
+ 0x23, 0xba, 0xd4, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x29, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x34, 0xe3, 0xac, 0x25,
+ 0xa7, 0x15, 0xad, 0xab, 0xb3, 0xb7, 0x25, 0xca, 0x37, 0x88, 0x40, 0x2e,
+ 0x47, 0x6e, 0x92, 0x20, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x5a, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xfb, 0xb3, 0xa0,
+ 0x16, 0xb6, 0x93, 0xf2, 0xf5, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0x25, 0xee, 0x2e, 0x98,
+ 0x6c, 0x0a, 0xfe, 0xae, 0x0b, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x80, 0xe9, 0x8b,
+ 0xaf, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0xc7, 0x83,
+ 0xb5, 0x48, 0x58, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x9e, 0x9b, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x3e,
+ 0x50, 0x5a, 0x91, 0xad, 0x21, 0x1b, 0x97, 0x5b, 0xe8, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x8a,
+ 0xa4, 0x17, 0xe8, 0xab, 0x87, 0x02, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x8c, 0x9f, 0x65, 0xb7,
+ 0x2a, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x5f, 0x77, 0x30, 0x6c, 0x04, 0x22, 0xe6, 0x58, 0x26,
+ 0x14, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x0a, 0x82, 0x77, 0xdb, 0x40, 0xa1, 0x58, 0xac,
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x55, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x31,
+ 0x3b, 0x30, 0x39, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x32, 0x47, 0x72,
+ 0x75, 0x62, 0x20, 0x41, 0x70, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20,
+ 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65,
+ 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61,
+ 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79,
+ 0x02, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x4c, 0x8e, 0xc5, 0x3a,
+ 0x91, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0xd0, 0x7f, 0x92, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0b,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x30,
+ 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x3f, 0xac, 0x77, 0x97,
+ 0x74, 0x9b, 0x4b, 0x25, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x09, 0x8d, 0x53, 0xa6, 0x03, 0xdf,
+ 0x9a, 0x10, 0x52, 0xe5, 0x3f, 0xd4, 0x72, 0x75, 0x30, 0xd4, 0x6e, 0x77,
+ 0x32, 0x49, 0x84, 0xe2, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xac, 0xb0, 0x52, 0x55,
+ 0xbf, 0xa9, 0x57, 0x12, 0x08, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x01, 0xc2,
+ 0x1a, 0x4a, 0x2e, 0x3d, 0xd5, 0xc8, 0x56, 0xac, 0xd1, 0x83, 0x75, 0x88,
+ 0xd4, 0xcc, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0xcf, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x91, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xb1, 0xd1,
+ 0x24, 0x9c, 0xd0, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x15, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x33, 0x8d, 0xe3,
+ 0x67, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x48, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x45,
+ 0xa8, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x35, 0x25, 0xb5, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0x86,
+ 0xef, 0xa2, 0x6d, 0x78, 0xcc, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0xae, 0xcd,
+ 0x0f, 0x58, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x22, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0xd5, 0x27,
+ 0x87, 0x39, 0x62, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0x17, 0x3d, 0x5e, 0xb1, 0x32, 0x7a, 0xf1,
+ 0x70, 0xce, 0xfa, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x92, 0xa8, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0xb2, 0x33, 0x1a,
+ 0x16, 0xf3, 0x60, 0x39, 0xdf, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x4d, 0xc2, 0x8d,
+ 0x55, 0x00, 0x49, 0x94, 0x04, 0x17, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xf4, 0xac, 0xa9, 0xc5,
+ 0x3a, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0xf3, 0x70, 0xa1,
+ 0xc1, 0x54, 0x36, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x67, 0x04,
+ 0xd5, 0x53, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0xad, 0x63, 0x55, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x06, 0x3a, 0x9a,
+ 0xc5, 0xfe, 0x38, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x69, 0x42, 0x90, 0x35, 0x1f, 0xe3, 0x1c,
+ 0x57, 0xea, 0xdb, 0x51, 0x35, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xfe, 0x72, 0x33, 0xd6,
+ 0x8a, 0x46, 0x74, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x94, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xba, 0xa2, 0xc4, 0xe9,
+ 0xc9, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0xda, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x3e, 0x98, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd1, 0x60,
+ 0x94, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x82, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0x26, 0x83,
+ 0x3f, 0x02, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x46, 0x41, 0xd7,
+ 0x5c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0x17, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x50, 0x42, 0xef, 0x66, 0xda, 0x35,
+ 0x03, 0xd1, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x22, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xf7, 0x4e, 0x04, 0xe3, 0x0f,
+ 0x98, 0x7d, 0xaa, 0x58, 0xba, 0xef, 0x9a, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x7c, 0x98, 0xa0,
+ 0xc2, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0xec, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xb0, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0xe5, 0xaa,
+ 0xcf, 0x10, 0x73, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x12, 0x5c, 0xd2, 0x0e, 0xe2,
+ 0x60, 0x17, 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x44, 0x08, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xcd, 0x75, 0xbe, 0xc3,
+ 0x7a, 0x12, 0x90, 0x90, 0xc7, 0x94, 0x4c, 0x98, 0x45, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x24,
+ 0xae, 0x82, 0x2f, 0xcd, 0x30, 0xa6, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0xe6,
+ 0xea, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x45, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x24, 0x8b, 0x76, 0xc5, 0x5e,
+ 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x07, 0x1e, 0x26, 0x94, 0x7a, 0x80, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0x74,
+ 0xe6, 0xae, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x11, 0xee, 0x96, 0x56, 0x6c, 0xff, 0xcb, 0x3b,
+ 0xde, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0x08, 0xf5, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x71, 0xe0, 0x8a,
+ 0xfa, 0xdd, 0x19, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0xdc,
+ 0x5c, 0xc4, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0x83,
+ 0x7a, 0x63, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x40, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x53, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x21,
+ 0xe7, 0xe4, 0x1f, 0x01, 0xf6, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x28, 0xba, 0x51, 0x6f, 0x51,
+ 0x69, 0xf4, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x23, 0x25, 0x77, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x19,
+ 0x8a, 0x66, 0x8c, 0x61, 0x13, 0x37, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x83, 0x17, 0x35,
+ 0x23, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x05, 0x34, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
+ 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x74, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x70,
+ 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x0a
+};
+unsigned int hi_double_extended_len = 1375;
+
+unsigned char certificate_printable_der[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x39, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x21, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x22, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0x86, 0x02,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x2a, 0x31, 0x28, 0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x1f, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x32, 0x20, 0x28, 0x62, 0x65, 0x74, 0x61, 0x29, 0x30,
+ 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x34, 0x31, 0x30, 0x33, 0x31, 0x31, 0x34, 0x31,
+ 0x39, 0x32, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x33, 0x37, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x35,
+ 0x31, 0x34, 0x31, 0x39, 0x32, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x2f, 0x31, 0x2d, 0x30,
+ 0x2b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x24, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20,
+ 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20,
+ 0x33, 0x20, 0x28, 0x62, 0x65, 0x74, 0x61, 0x29, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a,
+ 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xbd, 0xda, 0xa1, 0xed, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x15,
+ 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x01, 0x77, 0x48, 0x4a, 0x60, 0x96, 0xf9, 0x27, 0xfa, 0xe2,
+ 0xb1, 0x69, 0x0f, 0x51, 0x19, 0x52, 0x7e, 0xc4, 0x34, 0x8e, 0xe1, 0x9b,
+ 0x9c, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x5c, 0xd6, 0x81, 0x98, 0x78, 0xfe, 0xa9, 0xe5, 0x0b,
+ 0x00, 0xba, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x11,
+ 0x07, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x20, 0x96, 0x8b, 0x99, 0x39, 0xde, 0xdb, 0xfa, 0x3d,
+ 0x45, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x7b, 0x0c, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x0c, 0xb5, 0x5d, 0x92, 0x74,
+ 0x39, 0x96, 0xe1, 0x97, 0x97, 0xa1, 0xad, 0x2e, 0xcc, 0xd0, 0x1b, 0x4d,
+ 0x9d, 0xbd, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x36, 0x8e, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x39,
+ 0x5e, 0x0b, 0x8d, 0xca, 0xe4, 0x83, 0xe9, 0x3b, 0x5c, 0x86, 0x47, 0xd4,
+ 0xba, 0x7d, 0x98, 0x26, 0xa1, 0xf4, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x6b,
+ 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xa2, 0x80, 0x3c, 0x96, 0xf1, 0x0a, 0xb6, 0x66, 0xc0, 0x4b,
+ 0x61, 0xf7, 0x74, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0x7b, 0x8e, 0x5e, 0x39, 0xda, 0x99, 0x20,
+ 0x33, 0x93, 0xd3, 0xf0, 0x7f, 0xad, 0x35, 0xe9, 0x88, 0x8d, 0x9c, 0xbf,
+ 0x65, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x02, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x27, 0x5f, 0x4a, 0x65, 0x3c,
+ 0xcf, 0x5f, 0x0e, 0x88, 0x95, 0x74, 0xde, 0xfb, 0x9e, 0x2e, 0x91, 0x9b,
+ 0x45, 0x37, 0xc8, 0x85, 0xff, 0xe3, 0x41, 0x70, 0xfe, 0xd5, 0xef, 0x0e,
+ 0x82, 0x22, 0x08, 0xb7, 0x3b, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x5b, 0x7f, 0xba, 0xbf,
+ 0xe6, 0x58, 0x9d, 0x02, 0x6e, 0x75, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xec, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0xa5,
+ 0x91, 0x0a, 0xe2, 0x59, 0x2c, 0xc3, 0xe7, 0x05, 0x03, 0xe8, 0xf2, 0x6f,
+ 0x2a, 0x04, 0x68, 0x9a, 0x31, 0x32, 0x8f, 0x04, 0x35, 0xcd, 0x1f, 0x34,
+ 0xcc, 0x4f, 0x79, 0x5a, 0x99, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xf5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x5b, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d,
+ 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07, 0x80, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x65, 0xc5, 0xbe, 0xca,
+ 0xe6, 0x59, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0x6c, 0x71, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x98, 0xc6, 0x25, 0x8d,
+ 0x7b, 0x67, 0x05, 0xd0, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04,
+ 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x81, 0xf8, 0xee, 0x47, 0x5c, 0x3e, 0xed,
+ 0xfb, 0xce, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xbe, 0xd7, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0x64, 0xb3,
+ 0x2a, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x66, 0x1e, 0x3d,
+ 0x1d, 0x53, 0x33, 0xde, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0xdf, 0xda, 0x18, 0x19,
+ 0x8a, 0xa9, 0xff, 0xe2, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xbe, 0xf2, 0x61, 0x63, 0xe2, 0xf6,
+ 0xed, 0x47, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x02, 0xec, 0x2a, 0xef, 0x89, 0x77, 0xe3, 0xfd,
+ 0x86, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x3f, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0xf9, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x26, 0x47,
+ 0xb7, 0xf2, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x3b, 0xcb, 0x6d, 0x9e, 0x03,
+ 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x69, 0x73, 0x9f, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0x0f, 0x6f, 0xf8, 0xab, 0x4d,
+ 0x36, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x20, 0x43, 0x90, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x61, 0x93,
+ 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x51, 0x59, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0x88, 0x70, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x04, 0xa9,
+ 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x38, 0x8b, 0x8e, 0x46, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x6c,
+ 0xb4, 0xf3, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x4b, 0xf0, 0x88, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0xe2, 0x71, 0xe1,
+ 0x8b, 0xe2, 0x14, 0xf1, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x00, 0x48, 0x1c, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x8d,
+ 0x65, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x72, 0x4f, 0x92, 0x44, 0xf3, 0xe6, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xdf,
+ 0x85, 0xa8, 0x13, 0x4a, 0xfb, 0x99, 0xca, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x97, 0x80, 0x93,
+ 0x27, 0xd3, 0x20, 0xf8, 0x6d, 0x29, 0x28, 0x2c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xea, 0xb1,
+ 0x63, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0x53, 0xfd, 0x4a, 0x62, 0x64, 0x0b, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xae,
+ 0x11, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0x8d, 0x63, 0xd4, 0x15, 0x55, 0xc6, 0x4c, 0x74, 0xf5,
+ 0x5f, 0xa0, 0xb9, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x9a, 0x7a, 0x87, 0x6e, 0xf0, 0x5e, 0x25,
+ 0xed, 0xfc, 0xd8, 0xc4, 0x34, 0x33, 0x32, 0xad, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x4b, 0x49,
+ 0x51, 0xc2, 0x07, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x6d, 0xea, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x41, 0x71, 0x64,
+ 0xeb, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xa3, 0x1f, 0x64, 0xa2, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xa1, 0x67,
+ 0x99, 0x8d, 0x98, 0x1c, 0xb8, 0x53, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x1d, 0xae, 0x32, 0x56,
+ 0xd2
+};
+unsigned int certificate_printable_der_len = 829;
+
+unsigned char certificate_eku_der[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x90, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x78, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x33, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x45,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x47, 0x31, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x18, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x36, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63,
+ 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x40, 0x72, 0x65, 0x64, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74,
+ 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32,
+ 0x31, 0x35, 0x31, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x34, 0x34, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x33,
+ 0x38, 0x30, 0x31, 0x31, 0x37, 0x31, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x34, 0x34, 0x5a,
+ 0x30, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x28, 0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c,
+ 0x1f, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63,
+ 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67,
+ 0x6e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x36, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16,
+ 0x13, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x40, 0x72, 0x65,
+ 0x64, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a,
+ 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xbb, 0x92, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x15,
+ 0xef, 0x88, 0x80, 0x88, 0xc0, 0xe7, 0x89, 0xeb, 0x35, 0x76, 0xf4, 0x85,
+ 0x05, 0x0f, 0x19, 0xe4, 0x5f, 0x25, 0xdd, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x5c, 0x06,
+ 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x06, 0xb5, 0x65, 0x45, 0xcb, 0xbd, 0x19, 0x33, 0x54, 0xb5,
+ 0x1a, 0xcd, 0xe4, 0xa8, 0x35, 0x2a, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0x53, 0xf4, 0xc6, 0x76,
+ 0xdb, 0x1f, 0x8a, 0xd4, 0x7b, 0x18, 0x11, 0xaf, 0xa3, 0x90, 0xd4, 0xdd,
+ 0x4d, 0xd5, 0x42, 0xcc, 0x14, 0x9a, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0x1c,
+ 0x94, 0x47, 0x4d, 0x79, 0xbd, 0x57, 0x9a, 0xbf, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x96, 0xa9,
+ 0x31, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0xe7, 0x14, 0x65, 0x86, 0xc8, 0xac, 0x79, 0x5e, 0x78,
+ 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x00, 0x24, 0xd3, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0x12, 0xad, 0xa0, 0x29,
+ 0xe5, 0xfe, 0x80, 0xae, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x60, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x94, 0xcb,
+ 0xe9, 0xd1, 0xcc, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0xf7, 0xde, 0xeb, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x09,
+ 0x28, 0xdf, 0x48, 0x99, 0x53, 0x9f, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0xd4, 0x36, 0xa3, 0xc6,
+ 0x5e, 0x8d, 0xbe, 0xd5, 0xdc, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xb8, 0x26, 0x18, 0x27,
+ 0xfb, 0xf2, 0xfb, 0xd0, 0x9b, 0x3d, 0x7f, 0x10, 0xe2, 0xab, 0x44, 0xc7,
+ 0x88, 0x7f, 0xb4, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0xa3, 0xff, 0x6d, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x3e, 0x55,
+ 0xb2, 0x84, 0xf4, 0xad, 0x54, 0x88, 0x81, 0xc3, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0xb6, 0x68,
+ 0x96, 0x38, 0x8b, 0xcd, 0x90, 0x6d, 0x25, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x90,
+ 0xa5, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x40, 0x2f, 0xbb, 0x0d, 0xa8, 0x4b, 0x8a, 0x62,
+ 0x82, 0x46, 0x46, 0x18, 0x38, 0xae, 0x82, 0x07, 0xd0, 0xb4, 0x2f, 0x16,
+ 0x79, 0x55, 0x9f, 0x1b, 0xc5, 0x08, 0x6d, 0x85, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0x9b,
+ 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x28, 0xd3, 0x58, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x37, 0x11, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x78, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d,
+ 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07, 0x80,
+ 0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x0c,
+ 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x03,
+ 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x6c,
+ 0xe4, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0x0d, 0x4b, 0x74, 0x21, 0xa4, 0xf6, 0x5f,
+ 0x87, 0xb5, 0x31, 0xfe, 0x10, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+ 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xe8, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xab,
+ 0x2c, 0x48, 0xf9, 0x60, 0x36, 0xa2, 0xf0, 0x7b, 0x8e, 0xd2, 0x9d, 0xb4,
+ 0x2a, 0x28, 0x98, 0xc8, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x55, 0x34, 0xe2, 0xfa, 0xf6, 0x89, 0x86, 0xad, 0x92, 0x21, 0xec, 0xb9,
+ 0x54, 0x0e, 0x18, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x1b, 0xa7, 0x58, 0xad, 0x69, 0xe4, 0xef,
+ 0x3b, 0xe6, 0x8d, 0xdd, 0xda, 0x0c, 0x45, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0x96, 0xa4, 0x29,
+ 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x16, 0xae, 0x93, 0xd0, 0xcb, 0x2a, 0x26, 0x1a, 0x7b,
+ 0xfc, 0x51, 0x22, 0x76, 0x98, 0x31, 0xa7, 0x0f, 0x29, 0x35, 0x79, 0xbf,
+ 0xe2, 0x4f, 0x0f, 0x14, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xcb, 0xbf, 0x87, 0x65, 0x13, 0x32,
+ 0xa3, 0x19, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x3f, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x4b, 0xe2, 0x00, 0x26, 0xa9,
+ 0x3e, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0x37, 0x9f, 0xf5, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe2, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x74,
+ 0x24, 0x53, 0xf2, 0x78, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x2c, 0x27, 0x88, 0x46, 0xcb,
+ 0xe4, 0x60, 0xca, 0xf5, 0x06, 0x24, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xd0,
+ 0x81, 0xb1, 0x15, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0x2b, 0x4f, 0xca, 0x6e, 0xaa, 0x24,
+ 0x31, 0xb3, 0xac, 0xa6, 0x75, 0x05, 0xfe, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0x41, 0xc4, 0x06,
+ 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x0a, 0x83, 0x4e, 0x49, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x83, 0x50, 0xec, 0x57,
+ 0x04, 0x97, 0x14, 0x49, 0xf5, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0x09, 0x4f, 0x61,
+ 0x87, 0xc3, 0x97, 0x22, 0x17, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0xcc, 0x32, 0x81, 0x31, 0x21,
+ 0x3f, 0x10, 0x57, 0x5b, 0x43, 0xbe, 0xcd, 0x68, 0x82, 0xbe, 0xe5, 0xc1,
+ 0x65, 0x94, 0x7e, 0xc2, 0x34, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xcf, 0x89, 0x3c, 0x2b, 0x81,
+ 0x23, 0x72, 0x95, 0xcf, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x19, 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0xca, 0xa3,
+ 0x46, 0xbd, 0x48, 0x06, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x50, 0x28, 0xc7, 0x7e,
+ 0xcf, 0x62, 0xf2, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0x53, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0xe8, 0x2e, 0xdd,
+ 0x29, 0x37, 0x07, 0x47, 0xff, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x32, 0xbd, 0xa2, 0xb7, 0x21,
+ 0x89, 0xa0, 0x55, 0xf7
+};
+unsigned int certificate_eku_der_len = 916;
diff --git a/grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c b/grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c
index 38e981f2c..23048919d 100644
--- a/grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c
+++ b/grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ grub_functional_all_tests (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),
grub_dl_load ("xnu_uuid_test");
grub_dl_load ("pbkdf2_test");
grub_dl_load ("signature_test");
+ grub_dl_load ("appended_signature_test");
grub_dl_load ("sleep_test");
grub_dl_load ("bswap_test");
grub_dl_load ("ctz_test");
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 19/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 18/21] appended signatures: Verification tests Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
20 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, sridharm,
Sudhakar Kuppusamy, Daniel Kiper
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Before adding information about how GRUB is signed with an appended
signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it
can currently be signed for UEFI.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 15f087f27..72ee8d08c 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -8675,6 +8675,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
@end menu
@node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8755,7 +8756,7 @@ commands.
GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
-This document does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
+This section does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
platform's firmware (e.g., Coreboot) validates @file{core.img}.
If environment variable @code{check_signatures}
@@ -9363,6 +9364,21 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
+@node Signing GRUB itself
+@section Signing GRUB itself
+To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
+loads GRUB to verify the integrity of the core image.
+This is ultimately platform-specific and individual platforms can define their
+own mechanisms. However, there are general-purpose mechanisms that can be used
+with GRUB.
+@section Signing GRUB for UEFI secure boot
+On UEFI platforms, @file{core.img} is a PE binary. Therefore, it can be signed
+with a tool such as @command{pesign} or @command{sbsign}. Refer to the
+suggestions in @pxref{UEFI secure boot and shim} to ensure that the final
+image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
+will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
+key database.
+
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 19/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-09-02 14:59 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a
bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch
so document it here.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 100 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 72ee8d08c..3ee4989b8 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -9379,6 +9379,106 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
key database.
+@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature
+The @file{core.elf} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style
+appended signature (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
+To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly
+from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.elf}
+can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF
+Note added by @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from
+the Linux kernel:
+
+@itemize
+@item Signing a GRUB image using a single signer key. The grub.key is your
+private key used for GRUB signing, grub.der is a corresponding public key
+(certificate) used for GRUB signature verification, and the kernel.der is
+your public key (certificate) used for kernel signature verification.
+@example
+@group
+# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the
+# signing key (certificate) and the hash algorithm.
+#
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der /dev/null ./empty.sig
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.sig`
+
+# Remove the empty file signature.
+
+rm ./empty.sig
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel.der \
+ --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+ or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der \
+ -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
+ --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+@end group
+@end example
+@item Signing a GRUB image using more than one signer key. The grub1.key and
+grub2.key are private keys used for GRUB signing, grub1.der and grub2.der
+are corresponding public keys (certificates) used for GRUB signature verification.
+The kernel1.der and kernel2.der are your public keys (certificates) used for
+kernel signature verification.
+@example
+@group
+# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer \
+ grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
+ -out ./empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s ./empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null ./empty.signed
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.signed`
+
+# Remove the empty file signatures.
+
+rm ./empty.signed ./empty.p7s
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel1.der \
+ kernel2.der --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+ or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel1.der \
+ kernel2.der -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
+ --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer \
+ grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
+ -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+@end group
+@end example
+@item Don't forget to install the signed image as required
+(e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition).
+@end itemize
+
+As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build-in the required modules,
+or sign them if they are not part of the GRUB image.
+
@node Platform limitations
@chapter Platform limitations
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document appended signature
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-25 11:08 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-09-02 18:11 ` Daniel Kiper
20 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-25 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: grub-devel
Cc: dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri, pjones, msuchanek,
mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish, Sudhakar Kuppusamy,
sridharm
This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of
a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables
introduced.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 405 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 405 insertions(+)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index 3ee4989b8..f4c80c176 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ GRUB. Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files.
These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
@menu
+* appendedsig_key_mgmt::
* biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
* check_signatures::
* chosen::
* cmdpath::
@@ -3331,6 +3333,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
@end menu
+@node appendedsig_key_mgmt
+@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt
+
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation
+using @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically
+set by GRUB to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the
+@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore(PKS).
+Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by
+executing @code{set appendedsig_key_mgmt} command from the GRUB console
+when the GRUB is not locked down.
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+
@node biosnum
@subsection biosnum
@@ -3343,6 +3358,17 @@ this.
For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the
chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures
+
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB
+to @code{no} or @code{enforce} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device
+tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{no} or @code{enforce} by
+executing @code{set check_appended_signatures} command from the GRUB console
+when the GRUB is not locked down.
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@node check_signatures
@subsection check_signatures
@@ -6414,6 +6440,14 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
@menu
* [:: Check file types and compare values
* acpi:: Load ACPI tables
+* append_add_db_cert:: Add trusted certificate to the db list
+* append_add_db_hash:: Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list
+* append_add_dbx_cert:: Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list
+* append_add_dbx_hash:: Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
+* append_list_db:: List all trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_list_dbx:: List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
+* append_rm_dbx_cert:: Remove distrusted certificate from the db list
+* append_verify:: Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists
* authenticate:: Check whether user is in user list
* background_color:: Set background color for active terminal
* background_image:: Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6535,6 +6569,231 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
unsigned code.
@end deffn
+@node append_add_db_cert
+@subsection append_add_db_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the
+environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
+is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify})
+command is executed from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
+ variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce},
+ the @command{append_add_db_cert} command only accepts the file @var{X509_certificate}
+ that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ the certificate is not added.
+ When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+ it accepts files @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
+ certificate is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_cert} command
+does not persist across reboots, and this command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_db_hash
+@subsection append_add_db_hash
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file>
+Read binary hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These
+hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel binary hashes when the
+environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{enforce} or the
+@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed
+from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the
+ environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is
+ set to @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_db_hash} command only accepts
+ the file @var{hash_file} that is signed with an appended signature
+ (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ the binary hash is not added.
+ When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+ it accepts files @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
+ binary hash is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_hash}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@example
+
+# Generate the hash of the binary file using OpenSSL
+# in binary format. The vmlinux (kernel image) file
+# should be unsigned.
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
+
+@end example
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_add_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
+are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
+Also, These certificates are used to block adding the distrusted
+certificates to the db list in the future.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the
+ environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to
+ @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} command only accepts
+ the file @var{X509_certificate} that is signed with an appended signature
+ (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ the certificate is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ the certificate is not added.
+ When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+ it accepts file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
+ certificate is added to the dbx list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_cert}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_hash
+@subsection append_add_dbx_hash
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file>
+Read binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes.
+These hashes are used to ensure that the distrusted binary hashes/certificates
+are rejected during Linux kernel binary hashes and appended signatures validation
+when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
+is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command
+is executed from the GRUB console. Also,these hashes are used to block adding the distrusted
+binary hashes and certificates to the db list in the future.
+
+The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify binary hash file and
+@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify certificate hash file.
+
+Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the environment
+ variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
+ @command{append_add_dbx_hash} command only accepts the file @var{hash_file}
+ that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ the binary/certificate hash is not added.
+ When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+ it accepts the file @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
+ binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_hash}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@example
+
+# Generate the hash of the binary/certificate file
+# using OpenSSL in binary format. The vmlinux
+# (kernel image) file should be unsigned, kernel.der
+# is certificate.
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash.bin kernel.der
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
+
+@end example
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_db
+@subsection append_list_db
+
+@deffn Command append_list_db
+List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
+appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
+showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
+public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint.
+
+Note that the @command{append_list_db} command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_dbx
+@subsection append_list_dbx
+
+@deffn Command append_list_dbx
+List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
+showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
+public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint.
+
+Note that the @command{append_list_dbx} command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_rm_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and remove it from GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
+are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
+ variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
+ @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} command only accepts the files @var{X509_certificate}
+ that are signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ the certificate is not removed.
+ When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+ it accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and
+ certificate is removed from the db list.
+
+Also, note that the removing of the certificate using @command{append_rm_dbx_cert}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+static key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_verify
+@subsection append_verify
+
+@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file>
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
+and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}, and
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
+If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+
+Note that the @command{append_verify} command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
@node authenticate
@subsection authenticate
@@ -7307,6 +7566,15 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
information.
+
+On Linux on Power LPAR, the signature validation on the environment block file
+is not supported with or without the @option{--skip-sig} option.
+If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to
+@code{enforce} and GRUB is in locked down mode, the user is not allowed to set
+@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env}
+command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for
+more information.
@end deffn
@@ -8670,11 +8938,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
@menu
* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures:: An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing certificate and hash file:: Certificate and hash file signing
* Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
@end menu
@@ -8835,6 +9105,113 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
(attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a
secure boot chain.
+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR
+secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
+
+where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'}
+device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{2 - enforced}),
+GRUB enters lockdown. There are three secure boot modes. They are
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default.
+@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting
+ @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to
+ @code{enforce} and do not to lockdown the GRUB.
+@item @samp{2 - enforced}: Lockdown the GRUB and enforce signature verification by setting
+ @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{enforce}.
+@end itemize
+
+Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforced}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+X.509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core GRUB image is recommended.
+
+Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default.
+ When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the
+ @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable back to @samp{dynamic}.
+@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB is
+ locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+ variable back to @samp{static}.
+@end itemize
+
+In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using
+the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+It is possible to list the trusted certificates available at boot time using
+@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}). The distrusted certificates can be
+explicitly removed from the db using the @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+The trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using the
+@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}).
+
+
+In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore(PKS). If
+db is not present in PKS, static key (built-in keys) is used as the default key.
+It is possible to list the trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time using
+@command{append_list_dbx} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and list the distrusted
+certificates and binary/certificate hashes available at boot time using @command{append_list_dbx}
+(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added
+to the db using the @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and
+@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). The distrusted certificates can be
+explicitly added to the dbx using the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert})
+and the distrusted certificate/binary hases can be explicitly added to the dbx using the
+@command{append_add_dbx_hash} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}).
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable
+@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}).
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default.
+@item @samp{enforce}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
+ post the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting
+ the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}.
+@end itemize
+
+A file can be explicitly verified using the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}).
+
+Only signatures generated using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithms are supported,
+and only RSA signatures generated using 2048, 3076, or 4096 bit key are supported.
+Only binary/certificate hash generated using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 algorithms
+are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux kernels
+@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image
+@item Any new certificate and binary hash files to be trusted
+@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted
+@end enumerate
+
+When GRUB is locked down (when secure boot modes is @code{enforced}),
+signature verification cannot be @strong{disabled} by setting the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) variable
+to @code{no} or using the @command{load_env} (@pxref{load_env}) command from
+the GRUB console.
+
@node UEFI secure boot and shim
@section UEFI secure boot and shim support
@@ -9364,6 +9741,34 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
+@node Signing certificate and hash file
+@section Signing certificate and hash file
+The X.509 certificate (public key) file and hash file (binary/certificate hash file)
+can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style appended signature.
+
+The signer.key is your private key used for signing, signer.der is corresponding
+public key (certificate) used for appended signature verification. Note that the
+signer.der (certificate) should exist in the db (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
+
+@itemize
+@item Signing the X.509 certificate file using @file{sign-file}.
+The kernel.der is your X.509 certificate file.
+@example
+
+sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der kernel.der \
+ kernel.der.signed
+
+@end example
+@item Signing the hash file using @file{sign-file}.
+The binary_hash.bin is your binary hash file.
+@example
+
+sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der binary_hash.bin \
+ binary_hash.signed
+
+@end example
+@end itemize
+
@node Signing GRUB itself
@section Signing GRUB itself
To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
--
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-27 15:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-27 16:27 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
0 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-27 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:32PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as
> well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying
> appended signatures.
>
> This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and
> GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
>
> Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures.
> If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig
> module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted
> keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and
> locked automatically.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Except two nits below Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>...
[...]
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..5eb7b768a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
> +/*
> + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
> + * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
> + * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
> + *
> + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
> + * (at your option) any later version.
> + *
> + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
> + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
> + */
> +
> +#include <grub/types.h>
> +#include <grub/misc.h>
> +#include <grub/mm.h>
> +#include <grub/err.h>
> +#include <grub/dl.h>
> +#include <grub/file.h>
> +#include <grub/command.h>
> +#include <grub/crypto.h>
> +#include <grub/i18n.h>
> +#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
> +#include <grub/kernel.h>
> +#include <grub/extcmd.h>
> +#include <grub/verify.h>
> +#include <libtasn1.h>
> +#include <grub/env.h>
> +#include <grub/lockdown.h>
> +
> +#include "appendedsig.h"
> +
> +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
> +
> +/* Max size of hash data. */
> +#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64
> +
> +/* Public key type. */
> +#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
> +
> +/* Appended signature magic string and size. */
> +#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
> +#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
> +
> +/*
> + * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
> + * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
> + */
> +struct module_signature
> +{
> + grub_uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
> + grub_uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
> + grub_uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
> + grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
> + grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
> + grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
> + grub_uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data. */
> +} GRUB_PACKED;
> +
> +#define SIG_METADATA_SIZE (sizeof (struct module_signature))
> +#define APPENDED_SIG_SIZE(pkcs7_data_size) \
> + (pkcs7_data_size + SIG_MAGIC_SIZE + SIG_METADATA_SIZE)
> +
> +/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
> +struct grub_appended_signature
> +{
> + grub_size_t signature_len; /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
> + struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
> + struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7; /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
> +};
> +
> +/* This represents a trusted certificates. */
> +struct grub_database
> +{
> + struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
> + grub_uint32_t cert_entries; /* Number of certificates. */
> +};
> +
> +/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
> +struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
> +
> +/*
> + * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
> + * check_sigs: false
> + * - No signature verification. This is the default.
> + * check_sigs: true
> + * - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails,
> + * post the errors and stop the boot.
> + */
> +static bool check_sigs = false;
> +
> +static grub_ssize_t
> +pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
> +{
> + grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len);
> + return len;
> +}
> +
> +/* Filesystem descriptor. */
> +static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
> + .name = "pseudo",
> + .fs_read = pseudo_read
> +};
> +
> +static void
> +add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> + struct x509_certificate *const cert)
> +{
> + gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
> +
> + /* Add SHA256 hash of certificate. */
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
> + grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
> + grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0], data, data_size);
grub_crypto_hash ((gcry_md_spec_t *) &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256, ...
And you can drop hash_func vaiable then...
> +}
[...]
> +static char *
> +grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
> +{
> + char *ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
s/If/if/
> + * (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down.
> + */
> + if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> + {
> + ret = grub_strdup ("enforce");
> + if (ret == NULL)
> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string enforce");
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
> + check_sigs = true;
> + else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
> + check_sigs = false;
> +
> + ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
> + if (ret == NULL)
> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
> + grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-27 15:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-27 16:37 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
0 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-27 15:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:33PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
>
> 1. append_list_db:
> Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
> 2. append_add_db_cert:
> Add the trusted certificate to the db list
> 3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
> Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
> 4. append_verify:
> Verify the signed file using db list
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Just three nits below...
> ---
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> index 5eb7b768a..932bf2a7a 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
> */
> static bool check_sigs = false;
>
> +/* Appended signature size. */
> +static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
> +
> +static void
> +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
> +static void
> +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
> +
> static grub_ssize_t
> pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
> {
> @@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
> .fs_read = pseudo_read
> };
>
> +/*
> + * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
> + * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
> + * the same data.
> + * Example: sha256 hash data
> + * 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4|
> + * 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
> + *
> + * An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data
> + * by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex
> + * to display it.
> + * Example: Sha256 hash data
> + * 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34:
> + * b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7
> + */
> +static void
> +dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
s/dump_data_to_hex/hexdump_colon/
> +{
> + grub_size_t i, count = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < length - 1; i++)
> + {
> + grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
> + count++;
> + if (count == 16)
> + {
> + grub_printf ("\n ");
> + count = 0;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
> +}
[...]
> +static grub_err_t
> +remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +
> + if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is not available");
> +
> + cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
> + if (cert == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> +
> + rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n");
s/a certificate/an invalid certificate/
> + grub_free (cert);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
> +
> + /* Remove certificate from the db list. */
> + _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
[...]
> +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
> +
> +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> +static void
> +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> +{
> + cmd_verify = grub_register_command ("append_verify", grub_cmd_verify_signature, N_("SIGNED_FILE"),
> + N_("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list"));
> + cmd_list_db = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list_db, 0,
> + N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
> + cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> + N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
> + cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> + N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
> +}
> +
> +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> +static void
> +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> +{
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
> +}
I cannot seen any reason to have register_appended_signatures_cmd() and
unregister_appended_signatures_cmd() functions. Please put their code
directly into GRUB_MOD_INIT() and GRUB_MOD_FINI().
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
2025-08-27 15:13 ` Daniel Kiper
@ 2025-08-27 16:27 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-27 16:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Kiper
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
Thank you Daniel for the review.
> On 27 Aug 2025, at 8:43 PM, Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:32PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
>> Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as
>> well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying
>> appended signatures.
>>
>> This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and
>> GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
>>
>> Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures.
>> If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig
>> module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted
>> keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and
>> locked automatically.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Except two nits below Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>...
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000..5eb7b768a
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
>> +/*
>> + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
>> + * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
>> + * Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
>> + *
>> + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
>> + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
>> + * (at your option) any later version.
>> + *
>> + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
>> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
>> + *
>> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
>> + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <grub/types.h>
>> +#include <grub/misc.h>
>> +#include <grub/mm.h>
>> +#include <grub/err.h>
>> +#include <grub/dl.h>
>> +#include <grub/file.h>
>> +#include <grub/command.h>
>> +#include <grub/crypto.h>
>> +#include <grub/i18n.h>
>> +#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
>> +#include <grub/kernel.h>
>> +#include <grub/extcmd.h>
>> +#include <grub/verify.h>
>> +#include <libtasn1.h>
>> +#include <grub/env.h>
>> +#include <grub/lockdown.h>
>> +
>> +#include "appendedsig.h"
>> +
>> +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
>> +
>> +/* Max size of hash data. */
>> +#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64
>> +
>> +/* Public key type. */
>> +#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
>> +
>> +/* Appended signature magic string and size. */
>> +#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
>> +#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
>> + * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
>> + */
>> +struct module_signature
>> +{
>> + grub_uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
>> + grub_uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
>> + grub_uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
>> + grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
>> + grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
>> + grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
>> + grub_uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data. */
>> +} GRUB_PACKED;
>> +
>> +#define SIG_METADATA_SIZE (sizeof (struct module_signature))
>> +#define APPENDED_SIG_SIZE(pkcs7_data_size) \
>> + (pkcs7_data_size + SIG_MAGIC_SIZE + SIG_METADATA_SIZE)
>> +
>> +/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
>> +struct grub_appended_signature
>> +{
>> + grub_size_t signature_len; /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
>> + struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
>> + struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7; /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* This represents a trusted certificates. */
>> +struct grub_database
>> +{
>> + struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
>> + grub_uint32_t cert_entries; /* Number of certificates. */
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
>> +struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
>> + * check_sigs: false
>> + * - No signature verification. This is the default.
>> + * check_sigs: true
>> + * - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails,
>> + * post the errors and stop the boot.
>> + */
>> +static bool check_sigs = false;
>> +
>> +static grub_ssize_t
>> +pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
>> +{
>> + grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len);
>> + return len;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* Filesystem descriptor. */
>> +static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
>> + .name = "pseudo",
>> + .fs_read = pseudo_read
>> +};
>> +
>> +static void
>> +add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
>> + struct x509_certificate *const cert)
>> +{
>> + gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
>> +
>> + /* Add SHA256 hash of certificate. */
>> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
>> + grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
>> + grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0], data, data_size);
>
> grub_crypto_hash ((gcry_md_spec_t *) &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256, ...
>
> And you can drop hash_func vaiable then…
Sure, will do it.
>
>> +}
>
> [...]
>
>> +static char *
>> +grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
>> +{
>> + char *ret;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
>
> s/If/if/
Sure, will change it.
Thanks,
Sudhakar
>
>> + * (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down.
>> + */
>> + if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
>> + {
>> + ret = grub_strdup ("enforce");
>> + if (ret == NULL)
>> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string enforce");
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
>> + check_sigs = true;
>> + else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
>> + check_sigs = false;
>> +
>> + ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
>> + if (ret == NULL)
>> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
>> + grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>
> Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
2025-08-27 15:41 ` Daniel Kiper
@ 2025-08-27 16:37 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 14:49 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 1 reply; 34+ messages in thread
From: Sudhakar Kuppusamy @ 2025-08-27 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Kiper
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
Thank you Daniel for the review.
> On 27 Aug 2025, at 9:11 PM, Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:33PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
>> Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
>>
>> 1. append_list_db:
>> Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
>> 2. append_add_db_cert:
>> Add the trusted certificate to the db list
>> 3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
>> Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
>> 4. append_verify:
>> Verify the signed file using db list
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
>
> Just three nits below...
>
>> ---
>> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
>> index 5eb7b768a..932bf2a7a 100644
>> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
>> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
>> @@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
>> */
>> static bool check_sigs = false;
>>
>> +/* Appended signature size. */
>> +static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
>> +
>> +static void
>> +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
>> +static void
>> +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
>> +
>> static grub_ssize_t
>> pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
>> {
>> @@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
>> .fs_read = pseudo_read
>> };
>>
>> +/*
>> + * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
>> + * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
>> + * the same data.
>> + * Example: sha256 hash data
>> + * 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4|
>> + * 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
>> + *
>> + * An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data
>> + * by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex
>> + * to display it.
>> + * Example: Sha256 hash data
>> + * 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34:
>> + * b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7
>> + */
>> +static void
>> +dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
>
> s/dump_data_to_hex/hexdump_colon/
Sure, will change it.
>
>> +{
>> + grub_size_t i, count = 0;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < length - 1; i++)
>> + {
>> + grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
>> + count++;
>> + if (count == 16)
>> + {
>> + grub_printf ("\n ");
>> + count = 0;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
>> +}
>
> [...]
>
>> +static grub_err_t
>> +remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
>> +{
>> + grub_err_t rc;
>> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
>> +
>> + if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
>> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is not available");
>> +
>> + cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
>> + if (cert == NULL)
>> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
>> +
>> + rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
>> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
>> + {
>> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n");
>
> s/a certificate/an invalid certificate/
Sure, will do it.
>
>> + grub_free (cert);
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> +
>> + add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
>> +
>> + /* Remove certificate from the db list. */
>> + _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
>> +
>> + return rc;
>> +}
>
> [...]
>
>> +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
>> +
>> +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
>> +static void
>> +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
>> +{
>> + cmd_verify = grub_register_command ("append_verify", grub_cmd_verify_signature, N_("SIGNED_FILE"),
>> + N_("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list"));
>> + cmd_list_db = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list_db, 0,
>> + N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
>> + cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
>> + N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
>> + cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
>> + N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
>> +static void
>> +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
>> +{
>> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
>> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
>> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
>> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
>> +}
>
> I cannot seen any reason to have register_appended_signatures_cmd() and
> unregister_appended_signatures_cmd() functions. Please put their code
> directly into GRUB_MOD_INIT() and GRUB_MOD_FINI().
Subsequent patches (patch 17) use these functions to register/unregister the static and
dynamic key support GRUB commands based on key management. That's why I kept it as a separate functions.
Thanks,
Sudhakar
>
> Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-27 16:40 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-27 16:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:34PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature,
> which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables
> from PKS.
>
> If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx
> from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be
> saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would
> read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
>
> In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
> 1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
> 2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
> 3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
>
> Note:-
>
> SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
> 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
> and use them for signature verification.
> 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
> use it for signature verification.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 +
> grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 2 +
> grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 -
> grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 7 +
> grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++++++++
> .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 328 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 +
> include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 ++
> .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 139 ++++++++
> 9 files changed, 640 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
> create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
> create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
> index e50db8106..8577462d5 100644
> --- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
> +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
> @@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h
> KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h
> KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h
> KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h
> +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
> +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
> endif
>
> if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
> diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> index d91694de0..16cdbadcb 100644
> --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> @@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ kernel = {
> powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
> powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
> powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
> + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
> + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;
>
> sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
> sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
> diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
> index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
> --- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
> +++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
> @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
>
> #define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
> #define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
> -#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
>
> \f
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> index 132d027c7..46bfaa9a8 100644
> --- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> +++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
> @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
> #endif
> #if defined(__powerpc__)
> #include <grub/lockdown.h>
> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
> #endif
>
> #ifdef __powerpc__
> @@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
> static void
> grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
> {
> + grub_err_t err;
> grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
> grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
> int rc;
> @@ -1044,6 +1047,10 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
> }
> else
> grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");
> +
> + err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
> + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n");
This should be a part of grub_pks_keystore_init().
> }
> #endif /* __powerpc__ */
>
Please drop this empty line.
[...]
> diff --git a/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..eeb569fd1
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
> +/*
> + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
> + * Copyright (C) 2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
> + * Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
> + *
> + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
> + * (at your option) any later version.
> + *
> + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + *
> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
> + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
> + */
> +
> +#include <grub/mm.h>
> +#include <grub/types.h>
> +#include <grub/misc.h>
> +#include <grub/lockdown.h>
> +#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
> +
> +#if __GNUC__ >= 9
> +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
> +#endif
Is it really needed? If yes it begs for a comment.
> +/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
> +#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
> +
> +/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */
> +#define PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE ((grub_uint8_t *) "pks-max-object-size")
> +
> +/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
> +#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
> +#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN ((grub_size_t) 10)
#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN (sizeof (SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME) - 1)
> +/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
> +#define DB ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
> +#define DBX ((grub_uint8_t) 2)
> +
> +static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
> +
> +/*
> + * Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability
> + * of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management.
s/key management/key management mode in the GRUB/
> + * pks_supported:
> + * False: No PKS support. This is default.
> + * True: PKS support available.
The pks_supported member does not make a lot of sense for me. It makes
code more complicated for nothing. In real we care about use_keystore
only.
> + * use_keystore:
> + * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default.
> + * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
> + */
> +grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0,
> + .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false};
> +
> +/*
> + * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
> + * and its size into the PKS Signature Database (SD) (i.e pks_sd buffer) and pks_sd entries
> + * from the EFI Signature List (ESL).
It should be made clear it is copied from the platform PKS into the pks_sd
in the GRUB. Otherwise the comment and whole code in this patch is confusing.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +_esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
> + const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
> + grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
> +{
> + grub_esd_t *esd;
> + grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
> + grub_uint32_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
> + grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
> +
> + /* Reads the ESD from ESL. */
> + while (esl_size > 0)
> + {
> + esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
> + data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
> +
> + signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
> + if (signature == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> +
> + signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
> + if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
> + {
> + /*
> + * Allocated memory will be freed by
> + * grub_free_platform_keystore.
> + */
> + *pks_sd = signature;
> + *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> + }
> +
> + grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
> + signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
> + signature[entries].guid = *guid;
> + entries++;
> + esl_size -= signature_size;
> + offset += signature_size;
> + }
> +
> + *pks_sd = signature;
> + *pks_sd_entries = entries;
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
[...]
> +/*
> + * Test the availability of PKS support. If PKS support is avaialble and
> + * objects present, it reads the secure boot version (SB_VERSION) from PKS.
> + *
> + * SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
> + * 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
> + and use them for signature verification.
> + * 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
> + * use it for signature verification.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +is_pks_present (void)
This function should return bool.
> +{
> + grub_err_t err;
> + grub_int32_t rc;
> + grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
> + grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
> + grub_uint32_t len = 0, policy = 0;
> +
> + rc = grub_ieee1275_test (PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE, &missing);
> + if (rc < 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support\n");
> + else
> + {
> + rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects\n");
> + }
> +
> + grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported = true;
We do not care...
> + err = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);
> + if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
> + {
> + grub_free (data);
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
> + }
> + else if (*data)
> + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
This should happen in the grub_pks_keystore_init().
> + grub_free (data);
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* Free allocated memory. */
> +void
> +grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
> +{
> + grub_size_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
> + grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
> + grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
> +
> + grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db);
> + grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx);
> + grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
> +}
> +
> +/* Initialization of the Platform KeyStore. */
> +grub_err_t
return void...
> +grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> +
> + grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "trying to load Platform KeyStore\n");
> +
> + rc = is_pks_present ();
if (is_pks_present () == false)
{
grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Platform PKS is not available\n");
return;
}
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "switch to static key\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true)
> + {
> + grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
> + /* Read db from PKS. */
> + rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
> + if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + {
> + /* Read dbx from PKS. */
> + rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (0, DBX, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries);
> + if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
> + rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> + }
> +
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + grub_pks_free_keystore ();
> + }
grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
> + return rc;
> +}
[...]
> diff --git a/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..8b6ba2e5f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
> +#if defined(__powerpc__)
> +
> +/*
> + * Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability
> + * of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management.
> + *
> + * pks_supported:
> + * False: No PKS support. This is default.
> + * True: PKS support available.
> + *
> + * use_keystore:
> + * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default.
> + * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
> + */
> +extern grub_pks_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_keystore);
> +
> +/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
> +extern grub_err_t
> +grub_pks_keystore_init (void);
> +
> +/* Free allocated memory. */
> +extern void
> +EXPORT_FUNC (grub_pks_free_keystore) (void);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore;
This clearly shows it should not be a global variable. You should have
a function which returns pointer to PKS or NULL. And even this makes
use_keystore usage questionable...
> +static inline void
> +grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
I am not convinced this function should be called of outside
platform_keystore.c above.
> +{
> +
Please drop this empty line if this function is really needed.
> +}
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
2025-08-27 16:37 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-28 14:49 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-28 14:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 10:07:35PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Thank you Daniel for the review.
>
> > On 27 Aug 2025, at 9:11 PM, Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl> wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:33PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
[...]
> >> +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
> >> +
> >> +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> >> +static void
> >> +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> >> +{
> >> + cmd_verify = grub_register_command ("append_verify", grub_cmd_verify_signature, N_("SIGNED_FILE"),
> >> + N_("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list"));
> >> + cmd_list_db = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list_db, 0,
> >> + N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
> >> + cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> >> + N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
> >> + cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> >> + N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> >> +static void
> >> +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> >> +{
> >> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
> >> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
> >> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
> >> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
> >> +}
> >
> > I cannot seen any reason to have register_appended_signatures_cmd() and
> > unregister_appended_signatures_cmd() functions. Please put their code
> > directly into GRUB_MOD_INIT() and GRUB_MOD_FINI().
>
> Subsequent patches (patch 17) use these functions to register/unregister the static and
> dynamic key support GRUB commands based on key management. That's why I kept it as a separate functions.
I have checked the code. I think this is not needed. It should be enough
to change use_keystore flag. If it is not then probably something is wrong
in the code...
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-28 16:57 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-28 16:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:35PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted
> certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
>
> If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted
> certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS
> and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash
> are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists are introduced by
> a subsequent patch.
>
> Note:-
>
> If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then
> do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++-
> include/grub/crypto.h | 1 +
> include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++++
> include/grub/types.h | 4 +
> 4 files changed, 613 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> index 932bf2a7a..faf54c374 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
> #include <libtasn1.h>
> #include <grub/env.h>
> #include <grub/lockdown.h>
> -
> +#include <grub/efi/pks.h>
> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
> #include "appendedsig.h"
>
> GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
> @@ -80,10 +81,21 @@ struct grub_database
The grub_database is too generic... s/database/sb_database/
You do not need "grub_" prefix if it is an internal struct...
> {
> struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
> grub_uint32_t cert_entries; /* Number of certificates. */
> + grub_uint8_t **hashes; /* Certificate/binary hashes. */
> + grub_size_t *hash_size; /* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
s/hash_size/hash_sizes/
> + grub_uint32_t hash_entries; /* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */
> };
typedef struct sb_database sb_database_t;
... and then use it...
> /* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
> -struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
> +struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .hashes = NULL,
> + .hash_size = NULL, .hash_entries = 0};
> +
> +/*
> + * The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates/kernel binaries are
> + * rejected during appended signatures/hashes validation.
> + */
> +struct grub_database dbx = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .hashes = NULL,
> + .hash_size = NULL, .hash_entries = 0};
>
> /*
> * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
> @@ -116,6 +128,187 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
> .fs_read = pseudo_read
> };
>
> +
> +/*
> + * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
> + * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> + grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
> +{
> + gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
> +
> + if (guid == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "GUID is not available");
> +
> + if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
> + else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
> + else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
> + else
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "unsupported GUID hash");
> +
> + grub_memset (hash, 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
Do we really need that grub_memset() call?
> + grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size);
> + *hash_size = hash_func->mdlen;
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +static grub_err_t
> +generate_cert_hash (const grub_size_t cert_hash_size, const grub_uint8_t *data,
> + const grub_size_t data_size, grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
> +{
> + grub_packed_guid_t guid = { 0 };
> +
> + /* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for certificate hash */
> + if (cert_hash_size == 32)
> + grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
> + else if (cert_hash_size == 48)
> + grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
> + else if (cert_hash_size == 64)
> + grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
> + else
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ") and "
> + "skipped\n", cert_hash_size);
> + return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND;
> + }
> +
> + return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size);
> +}
> +
> +/* Check the hash presence in the dbx list. */
> +static bool
> +is_hash_present_in_dbx (grub_uint8_t *const hash, const grub_size_t hash_size)
> +{
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] &&
> + grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored"
> + " because it is on the dbx list\n", hash[0], hash[1],
> + hash[2], hash[3]);
> + return true;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* Check the hash presence in the db list. */
> +static bool
> +is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
Why is_hash_present_in_dbx() and is_hash_present_in_db() have different
logic? I think both should be the same. Even I think it could be one
function getting a pointer to relevant Secure Boot database...
> +{
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> + if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */
> +static grub_err_t
> +add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> + struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
> +{
> + grub_uint8_t **hashes;
> + grub_size_t *hash_size;
> +
> + if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available");
> +
> + if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a hash, as it is present in the %s list",
> + ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
> +
> + return ((is_db == true) ? GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED : GRUB_ERR_EXISTS);
> + }
> +
> + if (is_db == true)
> + {
> + if (is_hash_present_in_db (data, data_size) == true)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
> + "cannot a add hash, as it is present in the db list");
> + }
> +
> + hashes = grub_realloc (database->hashes, sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (database->hash_entries + 1));
> + if (hashes == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> +
> + hash_size = grub_realloc (database->hash_size, sizeof (grub_size_t) * (database->hash_entries + 1));
> + if (hash_size == NULL)
> + {
> + /*
> + * Allocated memory will be freed by
> + * free_db_list/free_dbx_list.
> + */
> + hashes[database->hash_entries] = NULL;
> + database->hashes = hashes;
> + database->hash_entries++;
> +
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> + }
> +
> + hashes[database->hash_entries] = grub_malloc (data_size);
> + if (hashes[database->hash_entries] != NULL)
> + grub_memcpy (hashes[database->hash_entries], data, data_size);
> +
> + hash_size[database->hash_entries] = data_size;
> + database->hash_size = hash_size;
> +
> + if (hashes[database->hash_entries] == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
Why is not this check immediately after grub_malloc() call?
If it is done deliberately then it begs for a comment...
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "added the hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " to the %s list\n",
> + data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3], data_size, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
> +
> + database->hashes = hashes;
> + database->hash_entries++;
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
> +{
> + /* GUID type of the binary hash. */
> + if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + return true;
> +
> + /* GUID type of the certificate hash. */
> + if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
> + grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
> +{
> + if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
> * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
> @@ -183,6 +376,16 @@ add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
> grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
> grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0], data, data_size);
> +
> + /* Add SHA384 hash of certificate. */
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
> + grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[1], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
You are asking yourself for problems. Using plain numbers for indexing
cert->fingerprint is very problematic. Please define meaningful
constants and use them...
> + grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[1], data, data_size);
> +
> + /* Add SHA512 hash of certificate. */
> + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
> + grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[2], 0, MAX_HASH_SIZE);
Again... I am not convinced we really need these grub_memset() calls.
> + grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[2], data, data_size);
> }
>
> static bool
> @@ -199,6 +402,46 @@ is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *cert1, const struct x509_certifica
> return false;
> }
>
> +static bool
> +is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
> +{
> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +
> + for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
> + if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true)
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */
> +static bool
> +is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> + grub_size_t cert_hash_size = 0;
> + grub_uint8_t cert_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
> + {
> + rc = generate_cert_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, cert_hash, &cert_hash_size);
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + continue;
> +
> + if (cert_hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] &&
> + grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], cert_hash, cert_hash_size) == 0)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "a certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored "
> + "because this certificate hash is on the dbx list\n",
> + cert_hash[0], cert_hash[1], cert_hash[2], cert_hash[3]);
> + return true;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> static bool
> is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
> {
> @@ -211,10 +454,13 @@ is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
> return false;
> }
>
> -/* Add the certificate into the db list */
> +/*
> + * Add the certificate into the db list if it is not present in the dbx and db list
> + * when is_db is true. Add the certificate into the dbx list when is_db is false.
> + */
> static grub_err_t
> add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> - struct grub_database *database)
> + struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
Define is_db as a bool in the struct grub_database and you are done.
And in general I suggest s/database/sb_database/ all over the code...
> {
> grub_err_t rc;
> struct x509_certificate *cert;
> @@ -229,32 +475,64 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
> rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
> if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> {
> - grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
> - cert->subject);
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n",
> + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
> grub_free (cert);
> return rc;
> }
>
> add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert);
>
> - if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
> + if (is_db == false && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
When I look at the code below I think this condition is wrong. I think
you should have first "if" checking for "grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true"
and then another checking is_db...
> {
> - grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> - "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list",
> - cert->subject);
> - certificate_release (cert);
> - grub_free (cert);
> + if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list",
> + cert->subject);
> + rc = GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
> + goto clean_exit;
> + }
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + {
> + if (is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true ||
> + is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list",
> + cert->subject);
> + rc = GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
> + goto clean_exit;
> + }
> + }
>
> - return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
> + if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list",
> + cert->subject);
> + rc = GRUB_ERR_EXISTS;
> + goto clean_exit;
> + }
> }
>
> - grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n",
> - cert->subject);
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n",
> + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
>
> cert->next = database->certs;
> database->certs = cert;
> database->cert_entries++;
>
> + return rc;
> +
> + clean_exit:
s/clean_exit/fail/
> + certificate_release (cert);
> + grub_free (cert);
> +
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -590,7 +868,7 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
> if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> cert_data_size -= append_sig_len;
>
> - err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
> + err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
> grub_free (cert_data);
> if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> return err;
> @@ -669,6 +947,68 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
> return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> }
>
> +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
> +static grub_err_t
> +create_db_list (void)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
> + {
> + rc = add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
> + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
> + if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
> + {
> + rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
> + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
> + if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + else
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
> + "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
> + }
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */
> +static grub_err_t
> +create_dbx_list (void)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
> + {
> + rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
> + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
> + if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
> + {
> + rc = add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
> + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + else
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
> + "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
> + }
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header,
> * parse it, and add it to the db list.
> @@ -702,18 +1042,43 @@ build_static_db_list (void)
> else if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> continue;
>
> - err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db);
> + err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
> grub_free (cert_data);
> if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
> return;
> }
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in
> + * the db and dbx list.
> + */
> +static void
> +build_pks_keystore (void)
s/build_pks_keystore/create_dbs_from_pks/
> +{
> + grub_err_t err;
> +
> + err = create_dbx_list ();
> + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
> +
> + err = create_db_list ();
> + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
> +
> + grub_pks_free_keystore ();
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
> + "the dbx list now has %u keys\n",
> + db.hash_entries + db.cert_entries,
> + dbx.hash_entries + dbx.cert_entries);
> +}
> +
> /* Free db list memory */
> static void
> free_db_list (void)
> {
> struct x509_certificate *cert;
> + grub_uint32_t i;
>
> while (db.certs != NULL)
> {
> @@ -723,9 +1088,37 @@ free_db_list (void)
> grub_free (cert);
> }
>
> + for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> + grub_free (db.hashes[i]);
> +
> + grub_free (db.hashes);
> + grub_free (db.hash_size);
> grub_memset (&db, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
> }
>
> +/* Free dbx list memory */
> +static void
> +free_dbx_list (void)
> +{
> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> +
> + while (dbx.certs != NULL)
> + {
> + cert = dbx.certs;
> + dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next;
> + certificate_release (cert);
> + grub_free (cert);
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
> + grub_free (dbx.hashes[i]);
> +
> + grub_free (dbx.hashes);
> + grub_free (dbx.hash_size);
> + grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
> +}
> +
> static const char *
> grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
> const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
> @@ -767,6 +1160,55 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const cha
> return ret;
> }
Starting from here...
> +static const char *
> +grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
> + const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
> +{
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + return "dynamic";
> +
> + return "static";
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
> +{
> + char *ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * Do not allow the value to be changed if check_sigs is set to enforce and
> + * GRUB is locked down.
> + */
> + if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> + {
> + ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
> + if (ret == NULL)
> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'd'))
> + {
> + /*
> + * If dynamic key management is disabled and PKS support is available,
> + * load the PKS.
> + */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
> + build_pks_keystore ();
> +
> + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
> + }
> + else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
> + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
> +
> + ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
> + if (ret == NULL)
> + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static grub_err_t
> appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type type,
> void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
> @@ -877,15 +1319,45 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
> */
> grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
> grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
> + /*
> + * This is appended signature key management environment variable.
> + * It is automatically set to "static" or "dynamic" based on the
> + * ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property and Platform KeyStore
> + * (grub_pks_use_keystore).
> + *
> + * "static": Enforce static key management signature verification.
> + * This is the default. When the GRUB is locked down,
> + * user cannot change the value by setting the
> + * appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
> + *
> + * "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification.
> + * When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value
> + * by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
> + */
> + grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", grub_env_read_key_mgmt,
> + grub_env_write_key_mgmt);
> + grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
>
> rc = asn1_init ();
> if (rc != ASN1_SUCCESS)
> grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc, asn1_strerror (rc));
>
> - /* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */
> - build_static_db_list ();
> - grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
> - db.cert_entries);
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management,
> + * load the Platform KeyStore(PKS).
> + */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + build_pks_keystore ();
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled with the static key management,
> + * extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list.
> + */
> + else if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
> + {
> + build_static_db_list ();
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
> + db.cert_entries);
> + }
>
> register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
> @@ -900,8 +1372,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
> */
>
> free_db_list ();
> + free_dbx_list ();
> grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", NULL, NULL);
> grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures");
> + grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", NULL, NULL);
> + grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
> grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
> unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> }
... until at least here it seems to me the code does not belong to this patch...
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-28 17:10 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-28 17:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm, Javier Martinez Canillas, Daniel Kiper
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:30PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> This code allows us to parse:
>
> - X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the
> PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will
> be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
>
> - X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle
> it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
>
> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> # EKU support
> Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.com> # key usage issue
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
> ---
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 38 +
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 1000 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
> index cac7fb02c..ef172cc40 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,29 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
>
> #define MAX_OID_LEN 32
>
> +/*
> + * One or more x509 certificates.
> + * We do limited parsing:
> + * extracting only the version, serial, issuer, subject, RSA public key
> + * and key size.
> + * Also, hold the sha256, sha384, and sha512 fingerprint of the certificate.
> + */
> +struct x509_certificate
> +{
> + struct x509_certificate *next;
> + grub_uint8_t version;
> + grub_uint8_t *serial;
> + grub_size_t serial_len;
> + char *issuer;
> + grub_size_t issuer_len;
> + char *subject;
> + grub_size_t subject_len;
> + /* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */
> + gcry_mpi_t mpis[2];
> + int modulus_size;
> + char fingerprint[3][64];
This should be grub_uint8_t and here you should define all constants
mentioned earlier in the comments to another patch.
... and if you use plain numbers for mpis[] indexing you should define
relevant constants as well...
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-28 17:40 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-28 17:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:38PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> If Secure Boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode and the
> use_static_keys flag is not set, then read the keys from the PKS
> keystore as well from ELF Note, and add them into the db.
> Otherwise, it only reads the static keys from the ELF Note and
> adds them into the db.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 14 +++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> index 83e97814a..5da603eb6 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -1154,9 +1154,17 @@ build_pks_keystore (void)
> if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
>
> - err = create_db_list ();
> - if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> - grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true)
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "db variable is not available at PKS and "
> + "using a static keys as a default key in db list\n");
> +
> + build_static_db_list ();
I find some function names very confusing...
s/build_static_db_list/load_elf2db/
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == false)
> + {
> + err = create_db_list ();
s/create_db_list/load_pks2db/, etc...
> + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
> + }
If you shuffle the code a bit then you need one if/else only.
> grub_pks_free_keystore ();
s/grub_pks_free_keystore/grub_pks_tmp_free/, etc...
> grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-08-28 18:03 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-08-28 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:39PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Introducing the following db and dbx commands
>
> 1. append_list_db:
> Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes
> from the db list.
> 2. append_list_dbx:
> Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
> hashes from the dbx list.
> 3. append_add_db_cert:
> Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
> 4. append_add_db_hash:
> Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
> 5. append_add_dbx_cert:
> Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
> 6. append_add_dbx_hash:
> Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
>
> Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
> 1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
> then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
> 2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
> must be signed with an appended signature.
> 3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary
> hash file must be signed with an appended signature.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 319 ++++++++++++++++++-
> include/grub/file.h | 2 +
> 2 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> index 5da603eb6..ea1937a7e 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
> #define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
> #define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
>
> +#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0
> +#define OPTION_CERT_HASH 1
> +
> /*
> * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
> * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
> @@ -110,6 +113,13 @@ static bool check_sigs = false;
> /* Appended signature size. */
> static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
>
> +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
> +{
> + {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
> + {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
> + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
> +};
> +
> static void
> register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
> static void
> @@ -593,6 +603,53 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static bool
> +is_cert_fingerprint_match (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size,
> + const struct x509_certificate *cert)
s/is_cert_fingerprint_match/cert_fingerprint_match/
> +{
> + if (grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[0], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
> + || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[1], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
> + || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[2], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
Why are you comparing all hashes instead of chosen one?
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size,
> + const bool is_binary_hash)
s/is_binary_hash/bin_hash/
> +{
> + grub_uint32_t i;
> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +
> + if (is_binary_hash == true)
> + {
> + for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
> + {
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n",
> + db.hashes[i][0], db.hashes[i][1], db.hashes[i][2], db.hashes[i][3]);
> + grub_free (db.hashes[i]);
> + db.hashes[i] = NULL;
> + db.hash_size[i] = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
> + {
> + if (is_cert_fingerprint_match (hash_data, hash_data_size, cert) == true)
> + {
> + _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> static grub_err_t
> file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
> {
> @@ -913,6 +970,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
>
> /*
> * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
> + * Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled.
> + * And add it to the db list if it is not already present.
> * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
> * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
> * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> @@ -970,6 +1029,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
>
> /*
> * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present.
> + * And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is
> + * enabled.
> * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
> * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
> * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
> @@ -979,7 +1040,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
> * without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
> *
> * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command
> - * does not persist across reboots.
> + * does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the
> + * append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the
> + * append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console.
> */
> static grub_err_t
> grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
> @@ -991,8 +1054,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
>
> if (argc != 1)
> return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> - "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
> - "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
> + "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s",
> + ((grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) ?
> + "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" :
> + "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n"));
>
> if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
> return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 certificate file");
> @@ -1019,9 +1084,21 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
>
> /* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
> err = remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size);
> - grub_free (cert_data);
> if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> - return err;
> + {
> + grub_free (cert_data);
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + /* Only add the certificate to the dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + {
> + err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &dbx, false);
> + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + grub_free (cert_data);
>
> return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> }
> @@ -1036,9 +1113,196 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
> for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
> print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
>
> + /* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */
Why?
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + {
> + for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (db.hashes[i] != NULL)
> + {
> + grub_printf ("\nBinary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
> + grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n ", db.hash_size[i] * 8);
> + dump_data_to_hex (db.hashes[i], db.hash_size[i]);
> + }
> + }
> + }
This change does not seem to belong to this patch...
> +
> return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> }
>
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
> + int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
> +{
> + struct x509_certificate *cert;
> + grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
> +
> + for (cert = dbx.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
> + print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
> + {
> + if (dbx.hashes[i] != NULL)
> + {
> + grub_printf ("\nCertificate/Binary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
> + grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n ", dbx.hash_size[i] * 8);
> + dump_data_to_hex (dbx.hashes[i], dbx.hash_size[i]);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present.
> + * And add them to the db list if it is not already present.
> + * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
> + * the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
> + * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + * the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + * the binary hash is not added.
> + * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without
> + * an appended signature and adds it to the db list.
> + *
> + * Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does
> + * not persist across reboots.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char**args)
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + grub_file_t hash_file;
> + grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
> + grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
> +
> + if (argc != 1)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> + "a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
> + "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n");
> +
> + if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash file");
> +
> + hash_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
> + if (hash_file == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", args[0]);
> +
> + rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
> + grub_file_close (hash_file);
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + return rc;
> +
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
> + * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
> + * signature size from the hash data size because
> + * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
> + * used to get the hash data.
> + */
> + if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
> +
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
> + hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
> +
> + /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
> + if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
> + {
> + grub_free (hash_data);
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted binary hash type");
> + }
> +
> + rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db, true);
> + grub_free (hash_data);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present.
> + * And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present.
> + * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
> + * the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
> + * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + * the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + * the binary/certificate hash is not added.
> + * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without
> + * an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list.
> + *
> + * Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does
> + * not persist across reboots.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
> + char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
> +{
> + grub_err_t rc;
> + grub_file_t hash_file;
> + grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
> + grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
> + char *file_path;
> +
> + if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> + "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
> + "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n"
> + "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
> + "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
> +
> + if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg == NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file");
> +
> + if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg != NULL)
> + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg;
> + else
> + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg;
> +
> + hash_file = grub_file_open (file_path, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
> + if (hash_file == NULL)
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", file_path);
> +
> + rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
> + grub_file_close (hash_file);
> + if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> + return rc;
> +
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
> + * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
> + * signature size from the hash data size because
> + * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
> + * used to get the hash data.
> + */
> + if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
> +
> + grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> + "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n"
> + " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data[0], hash_data[1],
> + hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
> +
> + if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
> + {
> + /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */
> + if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
> + {
> + grub_free (hash_data);
> + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
> + "unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type");
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* Remove distrusted binary hash/certificate from the db list if present. */
> + remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size,
> + ((ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set) ? true : false));
> +
> + rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx, false);
> + grub_free (hash_data);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
> static grub_err_t
> create_db_list (void)
> @@ -1297,10 +1561,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), cons
> if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
> build_pks_keystore ();
>
> + unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
> + register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> }
> else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
> - grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
> + {
> + unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
> + register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> + }
>
> ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
> if (ret == NULL)
> @@ -1369,7 +1639,9 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
> .write = appendedsig_write,
> };
>
> -static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
> +static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash;
> +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash,
> + cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
>
> /* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> static void
> @@ -1381,8 +1653,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
> cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
> - cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> - N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
> + * register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
> + */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + {
> + cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> + N_("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list"));
> + cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
> + N_("Show the list of distrusted certificates and"
> + " certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list"));
> + cmd_db_hash = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash", grub_cmd_db_hash, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
> + N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list."));
> + cmd_dbx_hash = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash", grub_cmd_dbx_hash, 0,
> + N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
> + "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
> + N_("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list."), options);
> + }
> + else
> + cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> + N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
> }
>
> /* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> @@ -1393,6 +1684,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
> grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
> grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
> grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
> + /*
> + * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
> + * unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
Why? I think these commands should be always enabled and do not print
anything if relevant databases are empty. It is also worth considering
a command which would print state of PKS and static keys.
> + */
> + if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> + {
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
> + grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash);
> + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash);
> + }
> }
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-09-02 14:59 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-09-02 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:42PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a
> bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch
> so document it here.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> docs/grub.texi | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> index 72ee8d08c..3ee4989b8 100644
> --- a/docs/grub.texi
> +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> @@ -9379,6 +9379,106 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
> will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
> key database.
>
> +@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature
> +The @file{core.elf} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style
> +appended signature (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
> +To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly
> +from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.elf}
> +can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF
> +Note added by @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
> +An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from
> +the Linux kernel:
> +
> +@itemize
> +@item Signing a GRUB image using a single signer key. The grub.key is your
> +private key used for GRUB signing, grub.der is a corresponding public key
> +(certificate) used for GRUB signature verification, and the kernel.der is
> +your public key (certificate) used for kernel signature verification.
> +@example
> +@group
> +# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the
> +# signing key (certificate) and the hash algorithm.
s/ (certificate)//
> +# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
> +
> +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der /dev/null ./empty.sig
> +
> +# Get the size of the signature.
> +
> +EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.sig`
> +
> +# Remove the empty file signature.
> +
> +rm ./empty.sig
> +
> +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
> +
> +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel.der \
> + --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
> + or
I think the grub-install does not make a lot of sense here because it
installs unsigned version of GRUB image to the partition. So, I would
simply drop it...
> +grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der \
> + -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
> + --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
> +
> +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
> +
> +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
I think installation step is missing here. Please add an example how the
signed image should be installed to the partition.
> +@end group
> +@end example
> +@item Signing a GRUB image using more than one signer key. The grub1.key and
> +grub2.key are private keys used for GRUB signing, grub1.der and grub2.der
> +are corresponding public keys (certificates) used for GRUB signature verification.
> +The kernel1.der and kernel2.der are your public keys (certificates) used for
> +kernel signature verification.
> +@example
> +@group
> +# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL.
> +
> +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer \
> + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
> + -out ./empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
> +
> +# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
> +
> +sign-file -s ./empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null ./empty.signed
> +
> +# Get the size of the signature.
> +
> +EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.signed`
> +
> +# Remove the empty file signatures.
> +
> +rm ./empty.signed ./empty.p7s
> +
> +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
> +
> +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel1.der \
> + kernel2.der --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
Again, I would drop grub-install from here...
> + or
> +grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel1.der \
> + kernel2.der -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
> + --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
> +
> +# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL.
> +
> +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer \
> + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
> + -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
> +
> +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
> +
> +sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
As above, please add an example how signed image should be installed...
> +@end group
> +@end example
> +@item Don't forget to install the signed image as required
> +(e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition).
And here it is... Though I think you should add example install commands
as I stated above.
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document appended signature
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
@ 2025-09-02 18:11 ` Daniel Kiper
0 siblings, 0 replies; 34+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Kiper @ 2025-09-02 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Cc: grub-devel, dja, jan.setjeeilers, julian.klode, mate.kukri,
pjones, msuchanek, mlewando, stefanb, avnish, nayna, ssrish,
sridharm
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:43PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of
> a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables
> introduced.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> docs/grub.texi | 405 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 405 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> index 3ee4989b8..f4c80c176 100644
> --- a/docs/grub.texi
> +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> @@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ GRUB. Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files.
> These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
>
> @menu
> +* appendedsig_key_mgmt::
> * biosnum::
> +* check_appended_signatures::
> * check_signatures::
> * chosen::
> * cmdpath::
> @@ -3331,6 +3333,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
> @end menu
>
>
> +@node appendedsig_key_mgmt
> +@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt
> +
> +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation
> +using @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically
> +set by GRUB to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the
> +@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore(PKS).
s/KeyStore(PKS)/KeyStore (PKS)/
> +Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by
> +executing @code{set appendedsig_key_mgmt} command from the GRUB console
> +when the GRUB is not locked down.
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +
> @node biosnum
> @subsection biosnum
>
> @@ -3343,6 +3358,17 @@ this.
> For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the
> chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
>
> +@node check_appended_signatures
> +@subsection check_appended_signatures
> +
> +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
> +loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB
> +to @code{no} or @code{enforce} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device
> +tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{no} or @code{enforce} by
> +executing @code{set check_appended_signatures} command from the GRUB console
> +when the GRUB is not locked down.
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
>
> @node check_signatures
> @subsection check_signatures
> @@ -6414,6 +6440,14 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
> @menu
> * [:: Check file types and compare values
> * acpi:: Load ACPI tables
> +* append_add_db_cert:: Add trusted certificate to the db list
> +* append_add_db_hash:: Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list
> +* append_add_dbx_cert:: Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list
> +* append_add_dbx_hash:: Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
> +* append_list_db:: List all trusted certificates from the db list
> +* append_list_dbx:: List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
> +* append_rm_dbx_cert:: Remove distrusted certificate from the db list
> +* append_verify:: Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists
> * authenticate:: Check whether user is in user list
> * background_color:: Set background color for active terminal
> * background_image:: Load background image for active terminal
> @@ -6535,6 +6569,231 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
> unsigned code.
> @end deffn
>
> +@node append_add_db_cert
> +@subsection append_add_db_cert
> +
> +@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate>
> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
> +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
> +These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the
> +environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
> +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify})
> +command is executed from the GRUB console.
> +
> +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
> + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce},
> + the @command{append_add_db_cert} command only accepts the file @var{X509_certificate}
> + that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
> + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + the certificate is not added.
> + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
> + it accepts files @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
> + certificate is added to the db list.
> +
> +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_cert} command
> +does not persist across reboots, and this command is available if either static
> +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
If you change the code as I asked for then everything after second comma can be
dropped.
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_add_db_hash
> +@subsection append_add_db_hash
> +
> +@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file>
> +Read binary hash from the file @var{hash_file}
> +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These
> +hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel binary hashes when the
What about GRUB modules?
> +environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures}
> +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{enforce} or the
> +@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed
> +from the GRUB console.
> +
> +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the
> + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is
> + set to @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_db_hash} command only accepts
> + the file @var{hash_file} that is signed with an appended signature
> + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
> + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + the binary hash is not added.
> + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
> + it accepts files @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
> + binary hash is added to the db list.
> +
> +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_hash}
> +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
> +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Again, probably everything after second comma can be dropped. Here and below...
> +@example
> +
> +# Generate the hash of the binary file using OpenSSL
s/the hash/the SHA-256 hash/
> +# in binary format. The vmlinux (kernel image) file
> +# should be unsigned.
> +
> +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
This jumps out of the blue. Probably this should be moved behind the
GRUB appendedsig module commands list or got proper title here...
> +@end example
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_add_dbx_cert
> +@subsection append_add_dbx_cert
> +
> +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
> +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates.
> +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
> +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
> +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
> +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
> +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
> +Also, These certificates are used to block adding the distrusted
s/These/these/
> +certificates to the db list in the future.
> +
> +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the
> + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to
> + @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} command only accepts
> + the file @var{X509_certificate} that is signed with an appended signature
> + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
> + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + the certificate is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + the certificate is not added.
> + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
> + it accepts file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
> + certificate is added to the dbx list.
> +
> +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_cert}
s/adding of the certificate/adding the certificates/
> +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
> +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_add_dbx_hash
> +@subsection append_add_dbx_hash
> +
> +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file>
> +Read binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
> +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes.
> +These hashes are used to ensure that the distrusted binary hashes/certificates
> +are rejected during Linux kernel binary hashes and appended signatures validation
> +when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
> +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command
I think it does not make a lot of sense repeating in every command when
validation happens. It seems to me it should be stated once probably at
the beginning of section.
> +is executed from the GRUB console. Also,these hashes are used to block adding the distrusted
> +binary hashes and certificates to the db list in the future.
> +
> +The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify binary hash file and
> +@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify certificate hash file.
> +
> +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the environment
> + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
> + @command{append_add_dbx_hash} command only accepts the file @var{hash_file}
Ditto and here and there...
> + that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
> + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + the binary/certificate hash is not added.
> + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
> + it accepts the file @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
> + binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list.
> +
> +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_hash}
> +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
> +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Would not it be better to state that once somewhere and list all
commands to which this applies?
> +@example
> +
> +# Generate the hash of the binary/certificate file
> +# using OpenSSL in binary format. The vmlinux
> +# (kernel image) file should be unsigned, kernel.der
> +# is certificate.
> +
> +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash.bin kernel.der
> +
> +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
Again, this jumps out of the blue...
> +@end example
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_list_db
> +@subsection append_list_db
> +
> +@deffn Command append_list_db
> +List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
> +appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
> +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
> +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint.
> +
> +Note that the @command{append_list_db} command is available if either static
> +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Again, when you change the code then probably this is not needed...
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_list_dbx
> +@subsection append_list_dbx
> +
> +@deffn Command append_list_dbx
> +List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
> +The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
> +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
> +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint.
> +
> +Note that the @command{append_list_dbx} command is only available when
> +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Ditto and below...
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_rm_dbx_cert
> +@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
> +
> +@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
> +Read DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
> +and remove it from GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
> +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
> +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
> +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
> +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
> +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
> +
> +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
> + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
> + @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} command only accepts the files @var{X509_certificate}
> + that are signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
> + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
> + the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + the certificate is not removed.
> + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
> + it accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and
> + certificate is removed from the db list.
> +
> +Also, note that the removing of the certificate using @command{append_rm_dbx_cert}
> +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
> +static key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
> +
> +@node append_verify
> +@subsection append_verify
> +
> +@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file>
> +Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
> +and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
> +@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}, and
> +@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
> +If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
> +
> +Note that the @command{append_verify} command is available if either static
> +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
> +
> +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
> +@end deffn
>
> @node authenticate
> @subsection authenticate
> @@ -7307,6 +7566,15 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
> configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
> ``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
> information.
> +
> +On Linux on Power LPAR, the signature validation on the environment block file
> +is not supported with or without the @option{--skip-sig} option.
I am not sure what you mean here...
> +If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to
> +@code{enforce} and GRUB is in locked down mode, the user is not allowed to set
> +@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
> +to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env}
> +command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for
> +more information.
> @end deffn
>
>
> @@ -8670,11 +8938,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
> @menu
> * Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
> * Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
> +* Using appended signatures:: An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
> * UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
> * Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
> * Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
> * Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
> * TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
> +* Signing certificate and hash file:: Certificate and hash file signing
> * Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
> @end menu
>
> @@ -8835,6 +9105,113 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
> (attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a
> secure boot chain.
>
> +@node Using appended signatures
> +@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
> +
> +GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR
> +secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
> +contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
> +with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
> +
> +@example
> +~Module signature appended~\n
> +@end example
> +
> +where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
> +
> +Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'}
> +device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{2 - enforced}),
> +GRUB enters lockdown. There are three secure boot modes. They are
> +
> +@itemize
> +@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default.
> +@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting
> + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to
> + @code{enforce} and do not to lockdown the GRUB.
Something is off or not properly explained here...
> +@item @samp{2 - enforced}: Lockdown the GRUB and enforce signature verification by setting
> + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{enforce}.
> +@end itemize
> +
> +Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforced}.
What does GRUB when it is set to something different than 0 or 2?
> +To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
> +X.509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
> +core GRUB image is recommended.
> +
> +Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
> +(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
> +
> +@itemize
> +@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default.
> + When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the
> + @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable back to @samp{dynamic}.
> +@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB is
> + locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
> + variable back to @samp{static}.
> +@end itemize
> +
> +In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using
> +the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
I think grub-install should not be mentioned in the context of this documentation.
> +It is possible to list the trusted certificates available at boot time using
> +@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}). The distrusted certificates can be
> +explicitly removed from the db using the @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
Is it possible to do that when Secure Boot is enabled?
> +The trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using the
> +@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}).
> +
> +
> +In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore(PKS). If
> +db is not present in PKS, static key (built-in keys) is used as the default key.
> +It is possible to list the trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time using
> +@command{append_list_dbx} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and list the distrusted
> +certificates and binary/certificate hashes available at boot time using @command{append_list_dbx}
> +(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added
> +to the db using the @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and
> +@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). The distrusted certificates can be
> +explicitly added to the dbx using the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert})
> +and the distrusted certificate/binary hases can be explicitly added to the dbx using the
> +@command{append_add_dbx_hash} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}).
> +
> +Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable
> +@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}).
> +
> +@itemize
> +@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default.
> +@item @samp{enforce}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
> + post the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting
> + the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}.
> +@end itemize
> +
> +A file can be explicitly verified using the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}).
> +
> +Only signatures generated using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithms are supported,
> +and only RSA signatures generated using 2048, 3076, or 4096 bit key are supported.
> +Only binary/certificate hash generated using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 algorithms
> +are supported.
Too many "only" words. Could you rephrase these two sentences to make
them more readable, meaningful and consistent?
> +A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
> +Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
> +key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key:
> +
> +@example
> +sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
> +@end example
> +
> +Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
> +appended signatures:
> +
> +@enumerate
> +@item Linux kernels
> +@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image
> +@item Any new certificate and binary hash files to be trusted
> +@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted
> +@end enumerate
> +
> +When GRUB is locked down (when secure boot modes is @code{enforced}),
s/modes/mode/
And I think you are still using "enforced" instead of "enforce" here and
there...
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 34+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-09-02 18:12 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2025-08-25 11:08 [PATCH v9 00/21] Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 02/21] crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 03/21] pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 04/21] grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 05/21] appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 06/21] appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 07/21] appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 17:10 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 09/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 15:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-27 16:27 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 15:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-27 16:37 ` Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 14:49 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-27 16:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 16:57 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 14/21] appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 15/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 17:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-28 18:03 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 18/21] appended signatures: Verification tests Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 19/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-09-02 14:59 ` Daniel Kiper
2025-08-25 11:08 ` [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document " Sudhakar Kuppusamy
2025-09-02 18:11 ` Daniel Kiper
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).