From: Frank Li <Frank.li@oss.nxp.com>
To: pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>, Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>,
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>,
Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>,
Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v46 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 14:49:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <apnPQSI84U39K5Fu@SMW015318> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260903-imx-se-if-v46-5-aefaab525034@nxp.com>
On Thu, Sep 03, 2026 at 03:16:12AM +0530, pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com wrote:
> From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
>
> Adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave, that
> enables exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s)
> like EdgeLock Enclave, from:
> - User-Space Applications via character driver.
>
> ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver.
>
> User-space library using this driver:
> - i.MX Secure Enclave library:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
> - i.MX Secure Middle-Ware:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
>
> Following checks are performed on the incoming msg-header,
> to block exchanging invalid arbitrary commands:
> - maximum allowed words,
> - check if command-tag & response-tag are valid
> - version,
> - command id validation check, to allow limited base-line API(s)
> and restrict following:
> - exchanging power management commands.
> - reset requests.
> - BBSM configuration requests.
> - re-initializing the FW.
> - RNG init
> - CAAM resource release management
> - SE's internal memory management.
> from user-space.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
> ---
> Changes from v45 to v46:
>
> - Moved mutex_init() outside the conditional block so every probe path
> initializes the mutex, matching the unconditional mutex_destroy() in
> the release path.
>
> Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260902-imx-se-if-v45-0-6e400879d8ec@nxp.com?part=5
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev | 45 +
> drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile | 2 +-
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 103 +-
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 19 +
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 377 +++++-
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 82 ++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c | 403 +++++++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h | 105 ++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c | 635 ++++++++++
> drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 1820 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 114 ++
> include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h | 97 ++
> 12 files changed, 3710 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..0a353caeaab2
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
> @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
> +What: /dev/<se>_mu[0-9]+_ch[0-9]+
> +Date: Mar 2025
> +KernelVersion: 6.8
> +Contact: linux-imx@nxp.com, pankaj.gupta@nxp.com
> +Description:
> + NXP offers multiple hardware IP(s) for secure enclaves like EdgeLock-
> + Enclave(ELE), SECO. The character device file descriptors
> + /dev/<se>_mu*_ch* are the interface between userspace NXP's secure-
> + enclave shared library and the kernel driver.
> +
> + The ioctl(2)-based ABI is defined and documented in
> + [include]<uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h>
> + ioctl(s) are used primarily for:
> +
> + - shared memory management
> + - allocation of I/O buffers
> + - getting mu info
> + - setting a dev-ctx as receiver to receive all the commands from FW
> + - getting SoC info
> + - send command and receive command response
> +
> + The following file operations are supported:
> +
> + open(2)
> + Currently the only useful flags are O_RDWR.
> +
> + read(2)
> + Every read() from the opened character device context is waiting on
> + wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout, that gets set by the
> + registered mailbox callback function, indicating a message received
> + from the firmware on message-unit.
> +
> + write(2)
> + Every write() to the opened character device context needs to acquire
> + `fops_lock` + `se_if_cmd_lock` lock before sending message on to the
> + message unit.
> +
> + close(2)
> + Stops and frees up the I/O contexts that were associated
> + with the file descriptor.
> +
> +Users: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
> + https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git,
> + crypto/skcipher,
> + drivers/nvmem/imx-ocotp-ele.c
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> index 4412b15846b1..33f30eaedad5 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> @@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_SCU) += imx-scu.o misc.o imx-scu-irq.o rm.o imx-scu-soc.o
> obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_CPU_DRV} += sm-cpu.o
> obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_MISC_DRV} += sm-misc.o
> obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_LMM_DRV} += sm-lmm.o
> -sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o
> +sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o ele_fw_api.o ele_msg_addr_field.o
> obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE} += sec_enclave.o
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> index 12febd3c4936..2615c344ef9d 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> @@ -15,13 +15,66 @@
>
> #define FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR "ELE"
>
> -static void ele_get_info_cleanup(struct se_if_priv *priv, u32 *buf, dma_addr_t d_addr,
> - size_t size)
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz)
> {
> - if (priv->mem_pool)
> - gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool, (unsigned long)buf, size);
> - else
> - dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, size, buf, d_addr);
> + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
> + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + /*
> + * Identify the command first. Only commands in this allow-list may be
> + * issued from userspace; everything else is rejected. Once a command is
> + * known to be supported, decide whether it needs a DMA-address boundary
> + * check and, if so, run it before returning.
> + */
> + switch (header->command) {
> + case ELE_PING_REQ:
> + case ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ:
> + case ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ:
> + case ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ:
> + case ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ:
> + case ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ:
> + case ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ:
> + case ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ:
> + case ELE_COMMIT_REQ:
> + case ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ:
> + case ELE_WRITE_FUSE:
> + case ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ:
> + return 0;
> + default:
> + /* Base commands that embed DMA addresses. */
> + fields = ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count);
> + if (!count)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void ele_get_info_cleanup(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> +{
> + /* For the case when priv->mem_pool != NULL:
> + *
> + * If this probe-time transaction timed out, the firmware may
> + * still write into the SRAM buffer after this function returns.
> + * Do not release it back to the pool while the firmware-busy
> + * circuit breaker still marks this context as owning an
> + * outstanding transaction. The buffer is reclaimed with the
> + * device on unbind; leaking this fixed-size probe buffer is
> + * preferable to letting the firmware corrupt reused pool memory.
> + * This mirrors the guard already applied on the shared-memory
> + * cleanup path below.
> + */
> +
> + if (priv->mem_pool) {
> + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx))
> + return;
> + se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true);
> + } else {
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
> + }
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -45,6 +98,7 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
> if (!priv)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + guard(mutex)(&priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> memset(s_info, 0x0, sizeof(*s_info));
>
> struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
> @@ -58,24 +112,23 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> get_info_len = ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ;
> - if (priv->mem_pool)
> - get_info_data = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool,
> - get_info_len,
> - &get_info_addr);
> - else
> - get_info_data = dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev,
> - get_info_len,
> - &get_info_addr,
> - GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!get_info_data) {
> - dev_err(priv->dev,
> - "%s: Failed to allocate get_info_addr.\n", __func__);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (priv->mem_pool) {
> + ret = se_get_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, &get_info_data,
> + &get_info_addr, get_info_len);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to alloc from gen_pool.\n", ret);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + } else {
> + ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx,
> + &get_info_len, &get_info_addr,
> + &get_info_data);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate buffer.\n");
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> }
>
> - /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */
> - memset(get_info_data, 0, get_info_len);
> -
> se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, true);
>
> @@ -86,7 +139,7 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
> ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ,
> rx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ);
> if (ret < 0) {
> - ele_get_info_cleanup(priv, get_info_data, get_info_addr, get_info_len);
> + ele_get_info_cleanup(priv);
> return ret;
> }
>
> @@ -94,13 +147,13 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
> ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ,
> priv->if_defs->base_api_ver);
> if (ret < 0) {
> - ele_get_info_cleanup(priv, get_info_data, get_info_addr, get_info_len);
> + ele_get_info_cleanup(priv);
> return ret;
> }
>
> memcpy(s_info, get_info_data, sizeof(*s_info));
>
> - ele_get_info_cleanup(priv, get_info_data, get_info_addr, get_info_len);
> + ele_get_info_cleanup(priv);
>
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
> index 02525d5e2873..50e2a1a75716 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,19 @@
> #define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ 0x4
> #define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ 0x5c
>
> +#define ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ 0x87
> +#define ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ 0x88
> +#define ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ 0x89
> +#define ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0x95
> +#define ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ 0x97
> +#define ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ 0x9d
> +#define ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0xa0
> +#define ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ 0xa2
> +#define ELE_COMMIT_REQ 0xa8
> +#define ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ 0xaf
> +#define ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ 0xc5
> +#define ELE_WRITE_FUSE 0xd6
> +
> #define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ 0xda
> #define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x10
> #define ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08
> @@ -71,6 +84,10 @@ struct ele_dev_info {
> #define ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ (sizeof(struct ele_dev_info) \
> + ELE_DEV_INFO_EXTRA_SZ)
>
> +#define ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ 0xdb
> +#define ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf2
> +#define ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf3
> +
> #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ 0xdf
> #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x18
> #define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x0c
> @@ -97,4 +114,6 @@ int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t addr,
> int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t contnr_addr,
> dma_addr_t img_addr);
> int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv);
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz);
> #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> index 10fb4f60b429..1e7ee8100f84 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
> @@ -5,6 +5,176 @@
>
> #include "ele_base_msg.h"
> #include "ele_common.h"
> +#include "ele_fw_api.h"
> +#include "se_ctrl.h"
> +
> +int se_chk_tx_rsp_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + if (!header->size || header->size > MAX_WORD_SIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + else if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver)
> + return ele_uapi_allowed_fw_rsp(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz);
> +
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +int se_chk_tx_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + if (!header->size || header->size > MAX_WORD_SIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)
> + return ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz);
> + else if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver)
> + return ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz, rx_msg_sz);
> +
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Reject a command that embeds a DMA physical address which does not point
> + * inside this context's shared-memory window. The userspace library stages all
> + * command buffers in that coherent region (see get_shared_mem_slot), so any
> + * address outside [dma_addr, dma_addr + size) is not one the driver handed out
> + * and must not be forwarded to firmware. Absent optional buffers are encoded as
> + * a zero address and skipped; polymorphic key words are only range-checked when
> + * their gating flag marks them as a plaintext-key buffer rather than an integer
> + * key identifier. An address may occupy one word (FW-API, low 32 bits only) or
> + * two words (some base-API commands split it into low and high halves).
> + *
> + * When a field also names a size word, the buffer length carried there is
> + * validated too: the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the
> + * window, not just its start address. The check is written as len > end - addr
> + * (addr is already known to be < end) so it cannot overflow.
> + */
> +int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields,
> + size_t count)
> +{
> + const struct se_shared_mem *mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
> + u32 payload_words;
> + size_t i;
> + u64 base, end;
> +
> + if (!fields || !count)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!msg)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Number of complete u32 payload words present after the header. */
> + if (tx_msg_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /*
> + * The caller-supplied byte count must agree with the size the firmware
> + * will act on (header word-size field, in 32-bit words), so a lying
> + * header cannot make us validate fewer words than are actually sent.
> + */
> + if (tx_msg_sz != (u32)msg->header.size * sizeof(u32))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + payload_words = (tx_msg_sz - SE_MU_HDR_SZ) / sizeof(u32);
> +
> + base = (u64)mem->dma_addr;
> + end = base + mem->size;
> +
> + /* A zero-sized or wrapping window can never contain a valid buffer. */
> + if (end <= base)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *f = &fields[i];
> + u64 addr;
> +
> + /* Every word the field references must lie within the message. */
> + if (f->lsb_idx >= payload_words)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (f->has_msb && f->msb_idx >= payload_words)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (f->flag_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS) {
> + bool flag_set;
> +
> + if (f->flag_idx >= payload_words)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + flag_set = !!(msg->data[f->flag_idx] & f->flag_mask);
> + /*
> + * When the flag does not select DMA-address mode the
> + * word holds an integer key identifier; leave it alone.
> + */
> + if (flag_set != f->is_addr_when_set)
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + addr = msg->data[f->lsb_idx];
> + if (f->has_msb)
> + addr |= (u64)msg->data[f->msb_idx] << 32;
> +
> + /* Zero marks an absent optional buffer. */
> + if (!addr)
> + continue;
> +
> + if (addr < base || addr >= end)
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /*
> + * When the message also carries this buffer's length, the whole
> + * buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the window, not just
> + * its start. addr is already >= base and < end here, so end - addr
> + * is a positive value and the comparison cannot overflow.
> + */
> + if (f->size_idx == SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE) {
> + struct cmd_rcvr_data_info *crcvr_info =
> + &dev_ctx->priv->crcvr_info;
> + /*
> + * Export-response buffer: the size was supplied by FW
> + * in the preceding export command and stored per SE
> + * interface in cmd_rcvr_var_size.
> + */
> + if ((u64)crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_var_size > end - addr)
> + return -EACCES;
> + } else if (f->size_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE) {
> + u64 len;
> +
> + if (f->size_idx >= payload_words)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* size_mask == 0 with a valid size_idx is a descriptor bug. */
> + if (!f->size_mask)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Widen to u64 before shifting: size_shift is u8 and
> + * shifting a u32 by >= 32 is undefined behaviour.
> + */
> + len = ((u64)msg->data[f->size_idx] >> f->size_shift) & f->size_mask;
> + if (len > end - addr)
> + return -EACCES;
> + } else if (f->buf_size) {
> + /* buf_size: literal byte count (FW-defined constant). */
> + if ((u64)f->buf_size > end - addr)
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
>
> /**
> * se_update_msg_chksum() - calculate and update message checksum word.
> @@ -45,6 +215,25 @@ int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void se_mark_fw_busy(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> + if (!priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx) {
> + kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount);
> + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
> + atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
> + }
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
> +void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 timeout_ms)
> +{
> + dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(timeout_ms);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * ele_msg_rcv() - wait for a response from the secure enclave.
> * @dev_ctx: pointer to the SE dev context data.
> @@ -65,15 +254,26 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
> struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> bool is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = false;
> bool wait_uninterruptible = false;
> + bool wait_killable = false;
> unsigned long remaining_jiffies;
> unsigned long deadline_jiffies;
> unsigned long flags;
> int ret;
>
> - remaining_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
> + remaining_jiffies = dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies;
> if (se_clbk_hdl == &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl) {
> is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = true;
> deadline_jiffies = jiffies + remaining_jiffies;
> +
> + /*
> + * Internal kernel transactions run on priv_dev_ctx (probe
> + * get_info/ping, FW auth, PM IMEM swap). They are not tied to a
> + * restartable syscall, so wait uninterruptibly: PM freezer fake
> + * signals must not abort them with -ERESTARTSYS. Userspace
> + * waiters stay interruptible via the deferred-signal path below.
> + */
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == priv->priv_dev_ctx)
> + wait_uninterruptible = true;
> }
>
> do {
> @@ -84,8 +284,14 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
> /* Deadline hit: fence hung FW, like the ret==0 path. */
> spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> - if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
> - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
> + /* rx_delivered is set only after a real response has
> + * been copied under clbk_rx_lock, so it correctly
> + * distinguishes a genuine timeout (no response → mark
> + * busy) from a spurious teardown-forced wakeup where
> + * the data is not yet safe to free.
> + */
> + if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered)
> + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
> break;
> @@ -96,23 +302,80 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
> if (wait_uninterruptible)
> ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
> remaining_jiffies);
> + else if (wait_killable)
> + ret = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
> + remaining_jiffies);
> else
> ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
> remaining_jiffies);
> if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) {
> /*
> - * Record that a signal was observed, then continue waiting non-
> - * interruptibly until the response arrives or the timeout
> - * expires. The caller can surface the interruption to userspace
> - * after the protocol transaction is brought back to a
> - * synchronized state.
> + * First, non-fatal signal on the interruptible userspace
> + * path: defer it. Record that a signal was observed and keep
> + * waiting - now only killably - until the response arrives or
> + * the timeout expires. ele_msg_send_rcv() then surfaces the
> + * interruption to userspace as -ERESTARTSYS once the protocol
> + * transaction has resynchronised, so the in-flight command is
> + * neither abandoned nor re-sent.
> + *
> + * Waiting killably rather than fully uninterruptibly is what
> + * keeps a fatal signal (SIGKILL) able to terminate the task:
> + * a non-fatal signal no longer aborts the wait, but the task
> + * can never get stuck for the multi-thousand-second long
> + * timeout and trip the hung-task watchdog.
> */
> - if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout &&
> + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && !wait_killable &&
> READ_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg)) {
> WRITE_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->signal_rcvd, true);
> - wait_uninterruptible = true;
> + wait_killable = true;
> continue;
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * Reached here either on the command-receiver path (no
> + * response buffer of the caller's to protect) or because a
> + * fatal signal fired on the killable path above. In the
> + * latter case the task is being killed but the enclave may
> + * still DMA into the caller's response buffer, which is about
> + * to be freed. Quarantine it under clbk_rx_lock - drop rx_msg
> + * so a late se_if_rx_callback() cannot copy into freed memory,
> + * and arm the circuit breaker - exactly like the timeout path
> + * below.
> + *
> + * The exception is a genuine response that raced in just
> + * before the fatal signal: se_if_rx_callback() has already
> + * copied it and set rx_delivered under the same lock, so the
> + * enclave is done with the buffer. Report it as a normal
> + * receive (rx_msg_sz) so the handle it carries is still
> + * recorded and later closed, rather than leaked.
> + */
> + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout) {
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) {
> + /*
> + * A genuine FW response raced in just
> + * before the fatal signal. The enclave
> + * is done with the buffer. Report the
> + * real received size so the handle it
> + * carries is still recorded and closed.
> + */
> + ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + break;
> + }
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
> + /*
> + * The enclave may still DMA into this
> + * buffer (either a normal timeout or
> + * a teardown complete_all() wakeup).
> + * Quarantine the buffer and arm the
> + * circuit breaker unconditionally.
> + */
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
> + }
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + }
> break;
> }
>
> @@ -132,8 +395,15 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
>
> spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> - if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
> - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
> + /*
> + * rx_delivered helps to decide if the circuit breaker is armed
> + * or not. rx_delivered is set only after a real response has
> + * been copied under clbk_rx_lock, so it correctly distinguishes
> + * a genuine timeout (no response → mark busy) from a spurious
> + * teardown-forced wakeup where the data is not yet safe to free.
> + */
> + if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered)
> + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
>
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
> @@ -142,8 +412,35 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
> get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
> break;
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * A positive wait return normally means a real response. During
> + * teardown, se_if_probe_cleanup() forces this wait to return via
> + * complete_all() with no response, while the enclave may still
> + * DMA into the shared buffer. Treat that as a failed transaction
> + * and arm the circuit breaker so the buffer is quarantined, not
> + * freed.
> + *
> + * rx_delivered tells the two apart: se_if_rx_callback() sets it
> + * under clbk_rx_lock only after copying a real response. This
> + * keeps teardown-time session/storage close responses from being
> + * mistaken for the forced abort, which would fail the close and
> + * leak its DMA buffer.
> + */
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && atomic_read(&priv->going_away) &&
> + !se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) {
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> + se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + break;
> + }
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> +
> ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
> break;
> +
> } while (ret < 0);
>
> return ret;
> @@ -231,16 +528,42 @@ int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg,
>
> guard(mutex)(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
>
> + /*
> + * Arm the transaction under clbk_rx_lock. se_if_probe_cleanup() sets
> + * going_away under this same lock, then complete_all()s, so checking
> + * going_away and arming (reinit_completion() + publish) together makes
> + * teardown and arming mutually exclusive and closes the lost-wakeup
> + * window. priv_dev_ctx teardown-close commands are still let through.
> + *
> + * Check going_away before fw_busy so a caller racing unbind gets
> + * -ENODEV, not a misleading retryable -EBUSY. fw_busy is only
> + * atomic_read() here, so no fw_busy_lock is taken and there is no
> + * deadlock.
> + */
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away) &&
> + (dev_ctx != priv->priv_dev_ctx ||
> + !is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(tx_msg))) {
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +
> if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) {
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: ELE became unresponsive.\n", dev_ctx->devname);
> return -EBUSY;
> }
> +
> reinit_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
> - /* Publish rx_msg/rx_msg_sz under the lock read by se_if_rx_callback(). */
> - spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
> priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = exp_rx_msg_sz;
> priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = rx_msg;
> + /*
> + * Arm a fresh transaction: clear the delivered flag so a stale value
> + * from a previous response cannot make ele_msg_rcv() mistake a
> + * teardown-forced complete_all() for a genuine firmware response.
> + */
> + priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_delivered = false;
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
>
> err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz);
> @@ -295,6 +618,7 @@ static bool check_hdr_exception_for_sz(struct se_if_priv *priv,
> void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
> {
> struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
> + bool schedule_fw_busy_work = false;
> struct device *dev = mbox_cl->dev;
> /*
> * devname_snap: a local copy of dev_ctx->devname taken while
> @@ -377,9 +701,24 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
> se_clbk_hdl = &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl;
> spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
> - /* Close circuit breaker on spinlock race */
> - atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
> + /*
> + * Only schedule fw_busy_work when going_away is clear.
> + * se_if_probe_cleanup() sets going_away under
> + * clbk_rx_lock before calling cancel_work_sync(). If
> + * going_away is already set here, teardown has already
> + * run (or is running) cancel_work_sync(); scheduling
> + * the work again after that point would re-queue it
> + * against the freed priv object, causing a
> + * use-after-free when the work executes.
> + */
> + if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy) &&
> + !atomic_read(&priv->going_away))
> + schedule_fw_busy_work = true;
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> +
> + if (schedule_fw_busy_work)
> + schedule_work(&priv->fw_busy_work);
> +
> dev_info(dev, "ELE responded (late), recovery FW available.\n");
> return;
> }
> @@ -401,6 +740,12 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
> strscpy(devname_snap, se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname,
> sizeof(devname_snap));
> memcpy(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg, msg, se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz);
> + /*
> + * Mark that a genuine firmware response was delivered. ele_msg_rcv()
> + * reads this under clbk_rx_lock to avoid mistaking this response for
> + * a teardown-forced complete_all() wakeup.
> + */
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered = true;
> complete(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
> index ec6fbf1c89ba..d2e0bcf0779d 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
> @@ -9,11 +9,15 @@
> #include "se_ctrl.h"
>
> #define SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS 3000
> +#define SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS 5000000
>
> #define ELE_SUCCESS_IND 0xD6
>
> #define IMX_ELE_FW_DIR "imx/ele/"
>
> +#define MAX_WORD_SIZE 0x20
> +
> +void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 val);
> int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len);
>
> int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
> @@ -28,6 +32,79 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg);
> int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg,
> u8 msg_id, u8 sz, u8 version);
>
> +/**
> + * struct se_cmd_addr_field - One DMA address embedded in an ELE command
> + * message payload.
> + *
> + * A number of ELE commands carry DMA physical addresses inside their message
> + * payload. se_val_cmd_addrs() range-checks each such address against the
> + * calling context's shared-memory window before the message reaches firmware.
> + *
> + * data[] index = message WORD index - 1, because the 4-byte se_msg_hdr is
> + * message WORD 0 and se_api_msg.data[0] is message WORD 1.
> + *
> + * @lsb_idx: data[] index of the low 32 bits of the address.
> + * @msb_idx: data[] index of the high 32 bits; valid only when @has_msb is
> + * set. Some base-API commands split the address into two words;
> + * FW-API commands do not.
> + * @has_msb: true when the address occupies two words (@lsb_idx + @msb_idx).
> + * @flag_idx: data[] index of the flag word that selects whether
> + * data[@lsb_idx] is a DMA address or an integer key identifier;
> + * %SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS when the word is always a DMA address.
> + * @flag_mask: the selecting flag bit, already shifted to its position inside
> + * the 32-bit little-endian flag word.
> + * @is_addr_when_set: true when the word is a DMA address if the flag bit is
> + * set; false when it is an address if the bit is clear
> + * (inverse polarity, e.g. VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY).
> + * @size_idx: data[] index of the word carrying the length in bytes of the
> + * buffer at this address. se_val_cmd_addrs() uses it to confirm
> + * the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) fits inside the
> + * shared-memory window, not just its start.
> + * %SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE when the message carries no length for
> + * this buffer.
> + * @size_shift: right shift applied to the size word before masking, for a
> + * length packed into the high half of a word.
> + * @size_mask: bitmask applied after @size_shift to extract the length from
> + * the message word (0xFFFFFFFF for a full 32-bit length, 0xFFFF
> + * for a u16, 0xFF for a u8). Used only when @size_idx !=
> + * %SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE; zero otherwise.
> + * @buf_size: literal byte count used when @size_idx == %SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE
> + * and @buf_size != 0: the whole buffer [addr, addr + @buf_size)
> + * must fit inside the shared-memory window. Use this for buffers
> + * whose size is a firmware-defined constant not carried in the
> + * message. Zero means no end-bound check (start-address check
> + * only; see comments at each descriptor entry for the accepted
> + * exception rationale).
> + * When @size_idx == %SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE the size is taken
> + * from se_if_priv.cmd_rcvr_var_size, which the command-receiver
> + * path writes before calling se_val_cmd_addrs(). Use this for
> + * export-response buffers whose size was supplied in the preceding
> + * FW command and must be stored per SE interface.
> + */
> +struct se_cmd_addr_field {
> + u8 lsb_idx;
> + u8 msb_idx;
> + bool has_msb;
> + u8 flag_idx;
> + u32 flag_mask;
> + bool is_addr_when_set;
> + u8 size_idx;
> + u8 size_shift;
> + u32 size_mask;
> + u32 buf_size;
> +};
> +
> +#define SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS 0xEFu
> +#define SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE 0xFEu /* size from se_if_priv.cmd_rcvr_var_size */
> +#define SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE 0xFFu
> +
> +int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields,
> + size_t count);
> +
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
> /* Fill a command message header with a given command ID and length in bytes. */
> static inline void se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *hdr,
> u8 cmd, u32 len, bool is_base_api)
> @@ -42,4 +119,9 @@ int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
>
> int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
>
> +int se_chk_tx_rsp_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz);
> +int se_chk_tx_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz);
> +
> #endif /*__ELE_COMMON_H__ */
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..72cecc5c8e25
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2026 NXP
> + */
> +
> +#include "se_ctrl.h"
> +#include "ele_common.h"
> +#include "ele_fw_api.h"
> +
> +static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + u8 cmd = msg->header.command;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
> + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
> + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->sess_hdl)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
> + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->strg_hdl)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ: {
> + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(cmd, &count);
> + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
> + }
> + default:
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct cmd_rcvr_data_info *crcvr_info = &dev_ctx->priv->crcvr_info;
> + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
> + u8 cmd = msg->header.command;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ:
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ:
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ:
> + return 0;
> + default:
> + /*
> + * These responses supply a kernel buffer address to firmware.
> + * Range-check the embedded DMA address against the calling
> + * context's shared-memory window before the message is sent.
> + */
> + if (crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id != cmd)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + fields = ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(cmd, &count);
> + if (!count)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz);
> +}
> +
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
> + bool is_cmd_receiver = false;
> + size_t count;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + if (dev_ctx == priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
> + is_cmd_receiver = true;
> +
> + if (is_cmd_receiver && header->tag == priv->if_defs->cmd_tag)
> + return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz);
> +
> + /* Reject any response message with non-command receiver */
> + if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /* Reject any other tag */
> + if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /*
> + * Identify the command first. Session/storage commands enforce their
> + * own-handle checks; crypto commands that embed DMA addresses defer to
> + * the shared range check below. Any command not named here is left with
> + * ret == 0 (permitted) as before.
> + */
> + switch (header->command) {
> + case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ:
> + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
> + ret = dev_ctx->sess_hdl ? -EEXIST : 0;
> + if (rx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_OPEN_RSP_SZ)
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
> + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
> + if (!dev_ctx->sess_hdl) {
> + ret = -ENXIO;
> + break;
> + }
> + /*
> + * A close request must target this context's own session. The
> + * handle to close is carried in the payload (data[0]); reject a
> + * request whose buffer is too short to hold it, or whose handle
> + * does not match this context. Checking the buffer size first
> + * also keeps the data[0] read in bounds. This stops one process
> + * from closing - and leaking - another process's session with a
> + * spoofed handle.
> + */
> + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
> + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->sess_hdl)
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ:
> + case ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ:
> + case ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ:
> + case ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ:
> + case ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ:
> + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + case ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ:
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ:
> + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
> + if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl) {
> + ret = -EEXIST;
> + break;
> + }
> + /*
> + * Reject the storage-open request when another context is
> + * already registered as the command receiver. If we let the
> + * command through, FW would allocate a new storage handle and
> + * start sending NVM callbacks for it; those callbacks would be
> + * routed to the existing receiver (process A), not to the
> + * caller (process B). This would let process A observe and
> + * tamper with process B's NVM traffic. Reject early, before
> + * the command reaches FW, so no handle is allocated and the
> + * state stays consistent.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx &&
> + priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx)
> + ret = -EBUSY;
at function beginning:
scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
if (dev_ctx == priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
is_cmd_receiver = true;
Does work "if (!is_cmd_receiver)" here. not sure if priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx
is NULL.
suppose previous also need check it.
Frank
> + if (rx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_RSP_SZ)
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
> + if (!dev_ctx->strg_hdl) {
> + ret = -ENXIO;
> + break;
> + }
> + /* Same self-ownership check as the session close above. */
> + if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
> + msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->strg_hdl)
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ:
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> + default:
> + /* FW commands that embed DMA addresses. */
> + fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count);
> + if (!count) {
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + ret = se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +void cmd_receiver_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg)
> +{
> + struct cmd_rcvr_data_info *crcvr_info = &dev_ctx->priv->crcvr_info;
> + struct se_msg_hdr *header = &rx_msg->header;
> +
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id = 0;
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_var_size = 0;
> + switch (header->command) {
> + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ:
> + /*
> + * FW sent an export-start command with key_store_size at
> + * data[1]. Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the
> + * response buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address.
> + */
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id = ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ;
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_var_size = rx_msg->data[1];
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ:
> + /*
> + * FW sent a chunk-export command with chunk_size at data[1].
> + * Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the response
> + * buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address.
> + */
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id = ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ;
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_var_size = rx_msg->data[1];
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ:
> + crcvr_info->cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id = ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ;
> + break;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg,
> + bool is_cmd_interrupted)
> +{
> + struct se_msg_hdr *header = &rx_msg->header;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + switch (header->command) {
> + case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ:
> + dev_ctx->sess_hdl = rx_msg->data[1];
> + if (is_cmd_interrupted) {
> + if (se_close_session(dev_ctx, dev_ctx->sess_hdl))
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close session.\n");
> + dev_ctx->sess_hdl = 0;
> + }
> + break;
> + case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
> + dev_ctx->sess_hdl = 0;
> + break;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ: {
> + int rc;
> +
> + /*
> + * Record the storage handle before registering as command
> + * receiver. FW has already allocated the handle; if we assigned
> + * it only after a successful registration, a failing
> + * set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver() (e.g. -EBUSY) would leave
> + * strg_hdl at 0 while the ioctl still returns success to
> + * userspace. The kernel would then never close the handle on
> + * teardown, leaking it in FW. Storing it first guarantees
> + * cleanup_dev_ctx() closes it on the next close(), regardless
> + * of whether registration succeeded.
> + */
> + dev_ctx->strg_hdl = rx_msg->data[1];
> +
> + if (is_cmd_interrupted) {
> + if (se_close_storage(dev_ctx, dev_ctx->strg_hdl))
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close storage.\n");
> + dev_ctx->strg_hdl = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + rc = set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
> + if (rc)
> + dev_err(priv->dev,
> + "Failed to register %s as CMD-Receiver: %d\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, rc);
> + break;
> + }
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
> + dev_ctx->strg_hdl = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return true when tx_msg is one of the close requests the driver issues
> + * from its own teardown path (session/storage close). ele_msg_send_rcv()
> + * uses this to let those close messages through even after going_away is
> + * set, so the kernel can still resynchronise session/storage state with FW.
> + */
> +bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg)
> +{
> + struct se_msg_hdr *header = &((struct se_api_msg *)tx_msg)->header;
> +
> + return (header->command == ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ ||
> + header->command == ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ);
> +}
> +
> +int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!tx_msg || !rx_msg)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + /*
> + * Session close is a FW-API command; pass is_base_api=false so the
> + * header carries fw_api_ver.
> + */
> + se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false);
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = session_hdl;
> +
> + /*
> + * Transmit on the caller's own context. Using dev_ctx (rather than
> + * hardcoding priv->priv_dev_ctx) keeps a userspace close() subject to
> + * the going_away check in ele_msg_send_rcv(): if unbind has begun and
> + * freed priv->tx_chan, the send is rejected with -ENODEV instead of
> + * touching the freed mailbox channel. The teardown path passes
> + * priv_dev_ctx so its resync closes are still let through.
> + */
> + ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx,
> + tx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ,
> + ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ,
> + priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl)
> +{
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!tx_msg || !rx_msg)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + /* Same FW-API version handling as se_close_session() above. */
> + se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false);
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = storage_hdl;
> +
> + /* Transmit on the caller's own context; see se_close_session(). */
> + ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx,
> + tx_msg,
> + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv,
> + rx_msg,
> + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ,
> + ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ,
> + priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver);
> + return ret;
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..93fe3427471f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2026 NXP
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef ELE_FW_API_H
> +#define ELE_FW_API_H
> +#include "se_ctrl.h"
> +
> +#define ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ 0x10u
> +#define ELE_SESSION_OPEN_RSP_SZ 0x0Cu
> +
> +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u
> +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u
> +#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ 0x11u
> +
> +/*
> + * Session-scoped FW-API service, key-management and close command opcodes
> + * (SAB command IDs, PSA_COMPLIANT message layout). These commands do not
> + * embed DMA staging-buffer addresses that require range-checking; they are
> + * defined here for completeness and for use by the command allow-list.
> + * ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ is the FW-API get-info opcode and is intentionally
> + * distinct from the base-API ELE_GET_INFO_REQ (0xda) in ele_base_msg.h.
> + */
> +#define ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ 0x16u
> +#define ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ 0x30u
> +#define ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ 0x31u
> +#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ 0x40u
> +#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ 0x41u
> +#define ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ 0x45u
> +#define ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ 0x4Cu
> +#define ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ 0x4Eu
> +#define ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ 0x50u
> +#define ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ 0x51u
> +#define ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ 0x60u
> +#define ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ 0x61u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ 0x70u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ 0x71u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ 0x80u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ 0x81u
> +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xA0u
> +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xA1u
> +#define ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ 0xA4u
> +
> +/*
> + * FW-API crypto command opcodes that embed one or more DMA physical addresses
> + * in their message payload. ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() range-checks those
> + * addresses against the calling context's shared-memory window before the
> + * message is handed to firmware. Opcodes match the SAB command IDs emitted by
> + * the userspace library (PSA_COMPLIANT message layout).
> + */
> +#define ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ 0x32u
> +#define ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ 0x3Fu
> +#define ELE_KEYGEN_REQ 0x42u
> +#define ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ 0x47u
> +#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ 0x4Fu
> +#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT 0x4Fu
> +#define ELE_MAC_REQ 0x52u
> +#define ELE_CIPHER_REQ 0x62u
> +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ 0x64u
> +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ 0x65u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ 0x72u
> +#define ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ 0x74u
> +#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ 0x82u
> +#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA2u
> +#define ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA3u
> +#define ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ 0x92u
> +
> +#define ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ 0xC2u
> +#define ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ 0xC8u
> +#define ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ 0xC9u
> +#define ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ 0xCAu
> +#define ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ 0xCBu
> +#define ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ 0xCCu
> +#define ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ 0xCDu
> +
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xE0u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_RSP_SZ 0x0Cu
> +
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xE1u
> +
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ 0xE2u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ 0xE3u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ 0xE4u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ 0xE5u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ 0xE6u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ 0xE7u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ 0xE9u
> +#define ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ 0xEAu
> +
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz);
> +int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
> + u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz);
> +void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg,
> + bool is_cmd_interrupted);
> +void cmd_receiver_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg);
> +bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg);
> +int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl);
> +int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl);
> +
> +#endif /* ELE_FW_API_H */
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..97c0f082bdf9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2026 NXP
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +#include "ele_common.h"
> +#include "ele_base_msg.h"
> +#include "ele_fw_api.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * Base-API commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in their
> + * payload. Unlike the FW-API crypto commands, GET_INFO and DEV_ATTEST split
> + * their response-buffer address across two words: the high half is written
> + * first (lower word index) and the low half next, so has_msb is set and the
> + * msb_idx precedes the lsb_idx. GEN_KEY_BLOB uses single-word LSB addresses.
> + * See struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_get_info_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1];
> + * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_dev_attest_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1];
> + * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * Container Header address: a 64-bit physical address split across two
> + * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB
> + * (ELE API spec Table 27, word size = 0x3, so the command is header +
> + * MSB + LSB only). The message carries no length word for this buffer;
> + * the container size is variable and not communicated in the MU payload,
> + * and no static firmware-defined maximum is specified. Because this is a
> + * read-only input buffer (the ELE ROM/FW copies the container header
> + * into its internal memory for authentication and does not write back
> + * through this address), enforcing only the start-address range check is
> + * acceptable: a rogue caller can at most cause firmware to read within
> + * the shared-memory window, which is memory the caller already owns.
> + * Output buffers must be fully bounded; input-only buffers are safe with
> + * addr-only checks.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* container_hdr_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * GENERATE ELE KEY BLOB command (ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ, 0xAF).
> + * ELE API spec Table 73, word size = 0x8 (header + 7 data words):
> + * data[0] = key_identifier
> + * data[1] = Reserved
> + * data[2] = load_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned)
> + * data[3] = Reserved
> + * data[4] = store_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned)
> + * data[5] = Reserved[31:16] | max_export_size[15:0]
> + * data[6] = CRC
> + *
> + * load_addr points to the input: a blob header (8 bytes, Table 77) followed
> + * by the plaintext payload. No size word is present in the message for this
> + * input buffer. The maximum input size is determined by the largest supported
> + * payload type: OTFAD key configuration (0x28 bytes per Table 79) plus the
> + * 8-byte header gives 0x30 bytes. That is the literal upper bound used as
> + * buf_size so se_val_cmd_addrs() can verify [load_addr, load_addr+0x30)
> + * lies within the shared-memory window. This is an input-only buffer
> + * (firmware reads it to generate the blob) so start-address-plus-fixed-max
> + * is a safe and sufficient check.
> + */
> +#define OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ 0x30 /* blob hdr (8) + OTFAD payload (0x28) */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE,
> + .buf_size = OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ }, /* load_address */
> + /* store_address @ data[4]; max_export_size is u16 in low half of data[5] */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* store_address */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the address-field descriptor table for a base-API command, or NULL
> + * when the command embeds no DMA addresses. count is set to the number of
> + * entries.
> + */
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
> +{
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields);
> + return ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields);
> + return ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GET_INFO_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_get_info_addr_fields);
> + return ele_get_info_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_dev_attest_addr_fields);
> + return ele_dev_attest_addr_fields;
> + default:
> + *count = 0;
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * FW-API crypto commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in
> + * their payload. On the PSA_COMPLIANT ABI most addresses are written by the
> + * userspace library as a single little-endian 32-bit LSB word (the high half
> + * is always zero), so has_msb is left false for those entries. A few commands
> + * (pub-key-export 0x32, keystore reprov-enable 0x3F) carry an explicit ext/MSB
> + * word ahead of the LSB word, matching the base-API two-word address layout;
> + * their entries set has_msb = true so the MSB word is validated too. See
> + * struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * out_key_addr: the recovered public key output buffer. Its high half
> + * out_key_addr_ext is data[2] and its low half out_key_addr is data[3];
> + * the library always writes it via set_phy_addr_to_words(), so it is
> + * always a DMA address. Its length is out_key_size, the u16 in the low
> + * half of data[4]. key_identifier (data[1]) is an integer, not an
> + * address.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .msb_idx = 2, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* out_key_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * Signed message address: a 64-bit physical address split across two
> + * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB
> + * (ELE API spec Table 202, word size = 0x3, so the command is header +
> + * MSB + LSB only). The address points to the start of the complete
> + * signed message block (header + 12-byte payload from Table 204 +
> + * signature); the total block size depends on the signing format and is
> + * not carried anywhere in the MU payload words. No static
> + * firmware-defined maximum for the full block is specified. Because this
> + * is a read-only input buffer (firmware reads and verifies the signed
> + * block, does not write back through this address), enforcing only the
> + * start-address range check is acceptable: a rogue caller can at most
> + * cause firmware to read within the shared-memory window, which is
> + * memory the caller already owns. Output buffers must be fully bounded;
> + * input-only buffers are safe with addr-only checks.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* signed_msg_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keygen_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * key @ data[1]: a plaintext private-key output buffer only when the
> + * KEY_GENERATION PLAINTEXT_KEY flag (bit 3 of the flags byte in the low
> + * 8 bits of data[8]) is set; otherwise it is an integer key identifier.
> + * Its length is priv_key_sz, the u16 in the high half of data[8].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 8, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_addr */
> + /*
> + * pub_key_addr @ data[9]: always a DMA address. Its length is
> + * pub_key_sz, the u16 in the low half of data[2].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_key_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_exchange_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT key-exchange payload. key_management_handle is data[0]
> + * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the four buffer addresses that follow
> + * are each written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single
> + * LSB word, high half always zero), so all are always DMA addresses.
> + * Each address is immediately followed by its full u32 byte length.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_content_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_pub_buffer_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* user_fixed_info_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_import_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT key-import payload. key_management_handle is data[0]
> + * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the single input buffer address that
> + * follows is written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words()
> + * (single LSB word, high half always zero), so it is always a DMA
> + * address. Its length is the full u32 input_size in data[3].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_MAC_REQ: MAC one-go operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_mac_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the MAC PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* payload_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* mac_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_CIPHER_REQ: symmetric cipher one-go operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_cipher_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the CIPHER PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 3, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * AEAD encrypt/decrypt legacy command (ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ, 0x64).
> + * ELE API spec Table 287, word size = 0xD (header + 12 data words):
> + * data[0] = cipher_handle
> + * data[1] = key_identifier
> + * data[2] = IV LSB address
> + * data[3] = Reserved[31:24] | Flags[23:16] | IV_size[15:0]
> + * data[4] = algorithm
> + * data[5] = AAD LSB address
> + * data[6] = Reserved[31:16] | AAD_size[15:0]
> + * data[7] = Input LSB address
> + * data[8] = Output LSB address
> + * data[9] = Input size (u32)
> + * data[10] = Output size (u32)
> + * data[11] = CRC
> + * IV size is the 16-bit low half of data[3]; AAD size is the 16-bit low half
> + * of data[6]; input and output sizes are full u32 words.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* iv_address (size[15:0] @ data[3]) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
> + /* aad_address (size[15:0] @ data[6]) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
> + /* input_address (size[31:0] @ data[9]) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu },
> + /* output_address (size[31:0] @ data[10]) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu },
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ: AEAD encrypt/decrypt with internally-generated IV output. */
> +#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE 12 /* firmware always writes exactly 12 bytes */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* iv_address_in length is packed in the high half of the iv-size word */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address_in */
> + /* iv_address_out has a fixed firmware-defined length, not carried in msg */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE,
> + .buf_size = ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE }, /* iv_address_out */
> + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = 2, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* tag_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 14, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 15, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ: digital signature generation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_sign_gen_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when GENERATE_SIGN PLAINTEXT_KEY is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* message_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* signature_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_pub_key_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 11, .size_shift = 16,
> + .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT public-key-attestation payload. sig_gen_hdl is data[0],
> + * key_identifier data[1], key_attestation_id data[2], attest_algo
> + * data[3]. The two buffer addresses that follow are each written
> + * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high
> + * half always zero), so both are always DMA addresses. Each address is
> + * immediately followed by its full u32 byte length.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* auth_challenge_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* certificate_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ: digital signature verification. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_verify_sign_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key: plaintext-key buffer unless the VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY flag is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 7, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = false,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* msg_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sig_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_data_storage_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is data[0],
> + * flags/reserved is data[1], data_id is data[2]. data_address (data[3])
> + * is the plaintext data buffer, written unconditionally via
> + * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so
> + * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 data_size in
> + * data[4].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ: asymmetric encryption/decryption. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_asym_enc_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key_id_addr: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
> + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_plainkey_size */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* plaintext_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* ciphertext_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* label_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ: generic crypto operation with a raw key. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields[] = {
> + /* key_address length is the u8 key_size in the third byte of the iv-size word */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFu }, /* key_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* aad_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ: GC symmetric cipher operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* iv_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ: GC AEAD operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_aead_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* nonce_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* tag_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ: GC asymmetric crypto operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff1_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff2_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff1_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff2_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* rsa_label_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ: GC asymmetric key generation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* modulus_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_buff_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_buff_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/* ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ: hash one-go operation. */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 6, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* ctx_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_addr */
> + { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT encrypted-data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is
> + * data[0] and data_id is data[1]. data_address (data[2]) is written
> + * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high
> + * half always zero), so it is always a DMA address; its length is the
> + * full u32 data_size in data[3]. iv_address (data[8]) is only written
> + * when an IV is supplied and is left zero otherwise, so it is an
> + * optional always-address handled by the zero-address skip; its length
> + * is the u16 iv_size in the low half of data[9].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */
> + { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * PSA_COMPLIANT get-random payload. reserved/flags is data[0]; rnd_addr
> + * (data[1]) is the output buffer, written unconditionally via
> + * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so
> + * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 rnd_size in
> + * data[2].
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* rnd_addr */
> +};
> +
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields[] = {
> + /*
> + * Storage master-import command (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ).
> + * Payload layout (data[] = message word minus header word 0):
> + * data[0] = storage_handle
> + * data[1] = key_store_address (LSB; high half always zero)
> + * data[2] = key_store_size
> + * The address is set unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() and
> + * its length is the full u32 key_store_size.
> + */
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_store_address */
> +};
> +
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
> +{
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields);
> + return ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields);
> + return ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_KEYGEN_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keygen_addr_fields);
> + return ele_keygen_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_exchange_addr_fields);
> + return ele_key_exchange_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_import_addr_fields);
> + return ele_key_import_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_MAC_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_mac_addr_fields);
> + return ele_mac_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_CIPHER_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_cipher_addr_fields);
> + return ele_cipher_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_addr_fields);
> + return ele_auth_enc_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields);
> + return ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_sign_gen_addr_fields);
> + return ele_sign_gen_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields);
> + return ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_verify_sign_addr_fields);
> + return ele_verify_sign_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_data_storage_addr_fields);
> + return ele_data_storage_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields);
> + return ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_asym_enc_addr_fields);
> + return ele_asym_enc_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields);
> + return ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields);
> + return ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_aead_addr_fields);
> + return ele_gc_aead_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields);
> + return ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields);
> + return ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields);
> + return ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields);
> + return ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields);
> + return ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields;
> + default:
> + *count = 0;
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * FW API for Command Receiver.
> + *
> + * Storage master-export response (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ).
> + * The cmd_receiver sends this response to firmware to supply the
> + * output buffer address. Payload layout:
> + * data[0] = storage_handle
> + * data[1] = rsp_code
> + * data[2] = key_store_export_address (LSB; high half always zero)
> + * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is
> + * taken from the FW command received earlier (key_store_size) and stored
> + * in se_if_priv.cmd_rcvr_var_size by cmd_receiver_specific_ops().
> + * se_val_cmd_addrs() reads it when size_idx == SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE
> + * to range-check the full response buffer before it is forwarded to FW.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE }, /* key_store_export_address */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Storage chunk-get response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ).
> + * The cmd_receiver fills in the chunk buffer address and its size so
> + * firmware can DMA the chunk data into the kernel's coherent buffer.
> + * Payload layout:
> + * data[0] = chunk_size
> + * data[1] = chunk_addr (LSB; high half always zero)
> + * data[2] = rsp_code
> + * The size word precedes the address in the message.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = 0, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* chunk_addr */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Storage chunk-export response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ).
> + * The cmd_receiver supplies the output buffer address. Payload layout:
> + * data[0] = rsp_code
> + * data[1] = chunk_export_address (LSB; high half always zero)
> + * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is
> + * taken from the FW command received earlier (chunk_size) and stored
> + * in se_if_priv.cmd_rcvr_var_size by cmd_receiver_specific_ops().
> + * se_val_cmd_addrs() reads it when size_idx == SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE
> + * to range-check the full response buffer before it is forwarded to FW.
> + */
> +static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields[] = {
> + { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
> + .size_idx = SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE }, /* chunk_export_address */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the address-field descriptor table for a cmd_receiver response
> + * message (rsp_tag), or NULL when the response embeds no DMA addresses.
> + * count is set to the number of entries. Only the three storage responses
> + * that supply a kernel buffer address to firmware are covered here;
> + * ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ, and
> + * ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ carry no DMA addresses and return NULL.
> + */
> +const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
> +{
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields);
> + return ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields);
> + return ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields;
> + case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ:
> + *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields);
> + return ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields;
> + default:
> + *count = 0;
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> index 0792e5152436..baeb28929b2d 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/bitfield.h>
> +#include <linux/cleanup.h>
> #include <linux/completion.h>
> #include <linux/delay.h>
> #include <linux/dev_printk.h>
> @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/genalloc.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/io.h>
> +#include <linux/kref.h>
> #include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> #include <linux/of_platform.h>
> @@ -23,18 +25,18 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/sys_soc.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h>
>
> #include "ele_base_msg.h"
> #include "ele_common.h"
> +#include "ele_fw_api.h"
> #include "se_ctrl.h"
>
> -#define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256
> -#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
> -#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
> -
> -#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
> +/* Maximum response buffer size in bytes for debug-dump replies. */
> +#define MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ
> +#define MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ SZ_4K
>
> -#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
> +#define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256
>
> struct se_soc_dev_regn {
> bool soc_dev_registered;
> @@ -137,6 +139,13 @@ char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id)
> return "unknown";
> }
>
> +static u32 get_se_soc_id(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> +{
> + const struct se_if_node *if_node = device_get_match_data(priv->dev);
> +
> + return if_node->se_info->soc_id;
> +}
> +
> static struct se_fw_load_info *get_load_fw_instance(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> {
> return &priv->load_fw;
> @@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ static int se_soc_dev_register(struct se_if_priv *priv, u16 soc_rev,
> if (!soc_rev || !soc_name || !uid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - attr = kzalloc_obj(*attr, GFP_KERNEL);
> + attr = kzalloc_obj(*attr);
> if (!attr)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> @@ -293,15 +302,325 @@ static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv, const u8 *se_img_file_to_load)
> +{
> + const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
> + dma_addr_t se_fw_dma_addr;
> + u32 se_fw_buf_len;
> + void *se_fw_buf;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!se_img_file_to_load) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "FW image is not provided.\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + ret = request_firmware(&fw, se_img_file_to_load, priv->dev);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (fw->size > U32_MAX) {
> + ret = -EFBIG;
> + release_firmware(fw);
> + return ret;
> + }
> + dev_info(priv->dev, "loading firmware %s.\n", se_img_file_to_load);
> +
> + /*
> + * Serialize access to priv_dev_ctx shared memory to prevent pos
> + * corruption if two driver-internal callers run concurrently (e.g.
> + * ele_get_info() racing with load_firmware()).
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + se_fw_buf_len = fw->size;
> + ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx,
> + &se_fw_buf_len, &se_fw_dma_addr,
> + &se_fw_buf);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate firmware shared buffer: %d\n",
> + ret);
> + release_firmware(fw);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(se_fw_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
> + ret = ele_fw_authenticate(priv, se_fw_dma_addr, se_fw_dma_addr);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev,
> + "Error %pe: Authenticate & load SE firmware %s.",
> + ERR_PTR(ret), se_img_file_to_load);
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + }
> + if (!se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx))
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
> + }
> +
> + release_firmware(fw);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int se_load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> +{
> + struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + guard(mutex)(&load_fw->load_fw_lock);
> + if (!load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (load_fw->imem.state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD) {
> + ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->prim_fw_nm_in_rfs);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load boot firmware.\n");
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->seco_fw_nm_in_rfs);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load runtime firmware.\n");
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> + load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = false;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int init_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
> +
> + if (priv->mem_pool)
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list);
> +
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr =
> + dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
> + &se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER;
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + bool free_dma_buf;
> +
> + /*
> + * mem_pool_buf_list is only initialised for interfaces that own a
> + * gen_pool (priv->mem_pool != NULL). On interfaces without a pool
> + * (e.g. imx93, which has no pool_name) the list head is left
> + * zero-filled, so se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf() must not walk it here or
> + * list_for_each_entry_safe() would dereference a NULL head and panic
> + * the kernel on close/teardown. Skip the pool cleanup entirely when
> + * there is no pool; there is nothing to reclaim in that case.
> + */
> + if (priv->mem_pool)
> + se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(dev_ctx, reclaim);
> +
> + /* Guard against being called before shared memory was ever allocated
> + * (e.g. probe failure before dma_alloc_coherent succeeded).
> + */
> + if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Decide whether the DMA buffer can be released before touching the
> + * pending lists. se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup() resets
> + * non_secure_mem.pos, so the "nothing staged" test must be sampled
> + * here first. When reclaim is false the buffer is released only if no
> + * data is still staged for the firmware; otherwise the enclave may
> + * still be DMA-ing into it and the buffer is deliberately leaked to
> + * avoid a DMA-after-free.
> + */
> + free_dma_buf = reclaim || !se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos;
> +
> + /*
> + * Free any se_buf_desc items that were never consumed (e.g. when the
> + * fd is closed while pending I/O buffers are still listed). This must
> + * happen before the DMA backing memory is released to avoid a leak.
> + */
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> +
> + if (free_dma_buf) {
> + dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr,
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Drop the host-side tracking unconditionally. On the reclaim path the
> + * buffer has been freed. On the deliberate-leak path the buffer is
> + * abandoned on purpose, so clearing the pointer here guarantees a later
> + * cleanup pass (e.g. se_if_priv_release()) cannot double-free it.
> + */
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = NULL;
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr = 0;
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = 0;
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
> + bool do_cpy = true;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out, link) {
> + if (b_desc->usr_buf_ptr && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr && do_cpy) {
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Copying output data to user.\n");
> + if (do_cpy && copy_to_user(b_desc->usr_buf_ptr,
> + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr,
> + b_desc->size)) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failure copying output data to user.\n");
> + do_cpy = false;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
> + memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
> +
> + list_del(&b_desc->link);
> + kfree(b_desc);
> + }
> +
> + return do_cpy ? 0 : -EFAULT;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Clean the used Shared Memory space,
> + * whether its Input Data copied from user buffers, or
> + * Data received from FW.
> + */
> +void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct list_head *pending_lists[] = {&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in,
> + &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out};
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
> + bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx;
> + int i;
> +
> + /*
> + * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared
> + * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware.
> + */
> + is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pending_lists); i++) {
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, pending_lists[i], link) {
> + if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
> + memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
> +
> + list_del(&b_desc->link);
> + kfree(b_desc);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Keep non_secure_mem.pos non-zero while this context still owns an
> + * outstanding firmware transaction. A non-zero pos is the marker that
> + * data is still staged for the enclave, which cleanup_se_shared_mem()
> + * uses to decide the buffer must be leaked rather than freed. Resetting
> + * it here would let a later teardown pass free a buffer the enclave may
> + * still be DMA-ing into.
> + */
> + if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx)
> + se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct se_buf_desc *add_b_desc_to_pending_list(void *shared_ptr_with_pos,
> + struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf *io,
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
> +
> + b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc);
> + if (!b_desc)
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = shared_ptr_with_pos;
> + b_desc->usr_buf_ptr = u64_to_user_ptr(io->user_buf);
> + b_desc->size = io->length;
> +
> + if (io->flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) {
> + /*
> + * buffer is input:
> + * add an entry in the "pending input buffers" list so
> + * that copied data can be cleaned from shared memory
> + * later.
> + */
> + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * buffer is output:
> + * add an entry in the "pending out buffers" list so data
> + * can be copied to user space when receiving Secure-Enclave
> + * response.
> + */
> + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
> + }
> +
> + return b_desc;
> +}
> +
> +static void se_if_open_gate_release(struct kref *kref)
> +{
> + struct se_if_open_gate *gate =
> + container_of(kref, struct se_if_open_gate, refcount);
> +
> + kfree(gate);
> +}
> +
> +static bool se_if_open_gate_get(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
> +{
> + if (!gate)
> + return false;
> +
> + return kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->refcount);
> +}
> +
> +static void se_if_open_gate_put(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
> +{
> + if (gate)
> + kref_put(&gate->refcount, se_if_open_gate_release);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Distinct lockdep class for the internal priv_dev_ctx fops_lock. Taking it
> + * while an open context's fops_lock is held (for example a firmware load
> + * triggered from an ioctl) is valid hierarchical locking, but shares the same
> + * class as the per-open fops_lock and would otherwise be misreported as
> + * recursive locking by lockdep.
> + */
> +static struct lock_class_key se_priv_ctx_fops_key;
> +
> static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
> - struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
> + struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx,
> + const struct file_operations *se_if_fops)
> {
> + struct se_if_open_gate *gate = NULL;
> struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
> + int ret = -ENOMEM;
>
> - dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
> + dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx);
> if (!dev_ctx)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> + dev_ctx->priv = priv;
> dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
> get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
> ch_id);
> @@ -310,10 +629,53 @@ static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> - dev_ctx->priv = priv;
> + mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> + lockdep_set_class(&dev_ctx->fops_lock, &se_priv_ctx_fops_key);
> +
> + kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount);
> + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
> *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
> + set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
> +
> + ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + gate = kzalloc_obj(*gate);
> + if (!gate) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto exit;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_init(&gate->lock);
> + kref_init(&gate->refcount); /* device-owned reference */
> + gate->priv = priv;
> + gate->dying = false;
> + priv->open_gate = gate;
> +
> + /*
> + * The miscdevice storage is now owned by the open gate object.
> + * priv->priv_dev_ctx still keeps a pointer to that miscdevice.
> + */
> + dev_ctx->miscdev = &gate->miscdev;
> +
> + dev_ctx->miscdev->name = dev_ctx->devname;
> + dev_ctx->miscdev->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
> + dev_ctx->miscdev->fops = se_if_fops;
> + dev_ctx->miscdev->parent = priv->dev;
>
> return 0;
> +exit:
> + *new_dev_ctx = NULL;
> +
> + if (gate) {
> + priv->open_gate = NULL;
> + se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
> + }
> + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
> + kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
> + kfree(dev_ctx);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan,
> @@ -331,9 +693,25 @@ static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Forward declarations. se_if_probe_cleanup() and se_if_probe() are kept
> + * together as the teardown/probe pair, but several helpers, the file
> + * operations table and the firmware-busy work handler they reference are
> + * defined further down in this file.
> + */
> +static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
> +static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose);
> +static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv);
> +static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref);
> +static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref);
> +static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv);
> +static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work);
> +static const struct file_operations se_if_fops;
> +
> static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
> {
> struct platform_device *pdev = plat_dev;
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
> struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
> struct se_if_priv *priv;
>
> @@ -341,31 +719,144 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
> if (!priv)
> return;
>
> - if (priv->rx_chan)
> - mbox_free_channel(priv->rx_chan);
> - if (priv->tx_chan)
> - mbox_free_channel(priv->tx_chan);
> -
> /*
> - * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated
> - * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM.
> + * Announce teardown, then wake any in-flight waiter. going_away makes
> + * ele_msg_send_rcv() bail out instead of arming a new transaction and
> + * lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a teardown-forced completion apart from a
> + * real response; it must be set before complete_all().
> + *
> + * Set it under clbk_rx_lock, not se_if_cmd_lock: se_if_cmd_lock is held
> + * across the whole blocking transaction, so taking it here would stall
> + * unbind for a full receive-timeout. clbk_rx_lock is the short spinlock
> + * ele_msg_send_rcv() holds while arming, so this closes the lost-wakeup
> + * window - the sender either sees going_away and bails before arming, or
> + * armed first and this store (and complete_all()) is ordered after its
> + * reinit_completion() - and supplies the ordering the relaxed atomics do
> + * not.
> */
> + scoped_guard(spinlock_irqsave, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock)
> + atomic_set(&priv->going_away, 1);
> + /*
> + * Wake the waiter before iterating the device-context list. It sleeps on
> + * this completion holding dev_ctx->fops_lock, which cleanup_dev_ctx()
> + * below also takes, so completing first avoids an unbind hang. Runs
> + * outside clbk_rx_lock; the going_away store above already orders it
> + * against the arming path.
> + */
> + complete_all(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
>
> /*
> - * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated
> - * before calling for its release. Or clearing the
> - * un-set bit.
> + * Mark the private device context as cleanup_done first.
> + * This prevents new device contexts from being created in open().
> */
> - of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev);
> + if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
> + /*
> + * Mark cleanup_done under fops_lock so that se_if_fops_open(),
> + * which checks cleanup_done while holding fops_lock, cannot
> + * race past this and add a new device context after teardown.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock)
> + priv->priv_dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
>
> - dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
> + if (priv->open_gate) {
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->open_gate->lock) {
> + priv->open_gate->dying = true;
> + priv->open_gate->priv = NULL;
> + }
> + }
>
> - if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
> - kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
> - kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
> + /*
> + * misc_register() is deferred to the end of probe, so the
> + * device may have a miscdev set up but never registered if
> + * probe failed before se_if_misc_register(). Only deregister
> + * when registration actually succeeded.
> + */
> + if (priv->open_gate && priv->open_gate->registered &&
> + priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev)
> + misc_deregister(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev);
> }
>
> - kfree(priv);
> + while (true) {
> + dev_ctx = NULL;
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
> + if (list_empty(&priv->dev_ctx_list))
> + goto out_done;
> +
> + dev_ctx = list_first_entry(&priv->dev_ctx_list,
> + struct se_if_device_ctx, link);
> +
> + /* pin this context so close() cannot free it under us */
> + kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount);
> + dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Local cleanup outside the global lock avoids ABBA deadlock
> + * with paths that already take dev_ctx->fops_lock first.
> + */
> + cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, false);
> + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
> + }
> +out_done:
> +
> + /*
> + * Cancel fw_busy_work before acquiring se_if_cmd_lock. The work
> + * handler, se_clear_fw_busy(), acquires dev_ctx->fops_lock. A
> + * concurrent close() may hold fops_lock and then attempt to acquire
> + * se_if_cmd_lock via se_close_storage(). Calling cancel_work_sync()
> + * while already holding se_if_cmd_lock would therefore deadlock all
> + * three threads. Canceling first, without any lock held, lets the
> + * work and the close() finish independently.
> + *
> + * going_away was set under clbk_rx_lock earlier in this function.
> + * Once set, se_if_rx_callback() will not call schedule_work() again,
> + * so the work cannot be re-queued after cancel_work_sync() returns.
> + */
> + cancel_work_sync(&priv->fw_busy_work);
> + /*
> + * Free the mailbox channels under se_if_cmd_lock. ele_msg_send_rcv()
> + * holds se_if_cmd_lock for the full duration of a synchronous
> + * transaction, including the mbox_send_message() call on priv->tx_chan.
> + * going_away was set above and complete_all() has already woken any
> + * in-flight waiter, so any transaction in progress will unwind to
> + * -ENODEV and release the lock quickly. Acquiring se_if_cmd_lock here
> + * guarantees no caller is still touching the channels when they are
> + * freed, and nulling the pointers under the lock prevents any sender
> + * that races past the going_away check from accessing a freed channel.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->se_if_cmd_lock) {
> + if (priv->rx_chan) {
> + mbox_free_channel(priv->rx_chan);
> + priv->rx_chan = NULL;
> + }
> + if (priv->tx_chan) {
> + mbox_free_channel(priv->tx_chan);
> + priv->tx_chan = NULL;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Release any dev_ctx retained by the firmware-busy circuit breaker.
> + * A synchronous command that timed out parks its dev_ctx in
> + * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx so that a late firmware response can still be
> + * routed back. If no such response arrived before teardown, that
> + * retained reference must be dropped here to avoid a leak.
> + * se_clear_fw_busy() is safe to call unconditionally: it checks
> + * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx under fw_busy_lock and is a no-op when
> + * nothing is parked.
> + */
> + se_clear_fw_busy(priv);
> +
> + /*
> + * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated
> + * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM.
> + */
> +
> + dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
> +
> + /* Drop the initial reference - priv will be freed when last fd closes */
> + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
> }
>
> static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> @@ -383,28 +874,59 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>
> se_info = if_node->se_info;
>
> - priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv, GFP_KERNEL);
> + priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv);
> if (!priv)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> priv->dev = dev;
> + /*
> + * Pin the parent device for the lifetime of priv. A file descriptor may
> + * stay open after the device is unbound; close() then still passes
> + * priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn(). Without this reference
> + * the struct device could be freed while priv->dev still points at it,
> + * so the reference is dropped in se_if_priv_release() via put_device().
> + */
> + get_device(priv->dev);
> + kref_init(&priv->refcount);
> priv->if_defs = &if_node->if_defs;
> dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
>
> spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
> spin_lock_init(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
> atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
> + spin_lock_init(&priv->fw_busy_lock);
> + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL;
> + INIT_WORK(&priv->fw_busy_work, se_fw_busy_work);
> +
> init_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
> init_completion(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.done);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->dev_ctx_list);
> +
> + mutex_init(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
> + mutex_init(&priv->modify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * Initialize load_fw_lock unconditionally before registering the misc
> + * device. se_load_firmware() acquires this mutex on every call path,
> + * including on SoCs that have no firmware image (is_fw_tobe_loaded is
> + * false, so it returns immediately after the lock, but it still takes
> + * it). A userspace process could open the device and trigger
> + * se_load_firmware() via ioctl immediately after misc_register(), so
> + * the mutex must be ready before the device becomes visible.
> + * Initializing unconditionally also ensures se_if_priv_release() can
> + * call mutex_destroy() unconditionally.
> + */
> + load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
> + mutex_init(&load_fw->load_fw_lock);
> + if (se_info->se_fw_img_nm.seco_fw_nm_in_rfs) {
> + load_fw->se_fw_img_nm = &se_info->se_fw_img_nm;
> + load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = true;
> + }
>
> ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, se_if_probe_cleanup, pdev);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - ret = devm_mutex_init(dev, &priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
> - if (ret)
> - return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
> - "Failed to init mutex: priv se_if_cmd_lock.\n");
> /* Mailbox client configuration */
> priv->se_mb_cl.dev = dev;
> priv->se_mb_cl.tx_block = false;
> @@ -436,26 +958,8 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>
> dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
>
> - /*
> - * Initialize load_fw_lock before registering the misc device.
> - * A userspace process could open the device and trigger se_load_firmware()
> - * via IOCTL immediately after misc_register(), so the mutex must be ready
> - * before the device becomes visible.
> - */
> - if (se_info->se_fw_img_nm.seco_fw_nm_in_rfs) {
> - load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
> - ret = devm_mutex_init(dev, &load_fw->load_fw_lock);
> - if (ret)
> - return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
> - "Failed to init mutex: load_fw_lock.\n");
> - load_fw->se_fw_img_nm = &se_info->se_fw_img_nm;
> - load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = true;
> - }
> -
> /* By default, there is no pending FW to be loaded.*/
> if (se_info->imem_state_mgmt) {
> - load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
> -
> /* allocate buffer where SE store encrypted IMEM */
> load_fw->imem.buf = dmam_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, ELE_IMEM_SIZE,
> &load_fw->imem.daddr,
> @@ -466,7 +970,7 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> load_fw->imem_mgmt = true;
> }
>
> - ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx);
> + ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx, &se_if_fops);
> if (ret)
> return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
> "Failed to create device contexts.\n");
> @@ -477,12 +981,1228 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Failed to fetch SoC Info.\n");
> }
>
> + /*
> + * All probe-time initialization is complete; expose the
> + * interface to userspace last so that an open()/ioctl cannot
> + * race against a not-yet-initialized device.
> + */
> + ret = se_if_misc_register(priv);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> dev_info(dev, "i.MX secure-enclave: %s0 interface to firmware, configured.\n",
> get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
>
> return ret;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Expose the interface to userspace. Deferred until the end of probe so
> + * the device node only becomes openable after SoC info has been fetched
> + * and, on SoCs with IMEM management, the encrypted-IMEM buffer has been
> + * allocated. This prevents userspace from opening the node and issuing
> + * commands against a partially initialized interface.
> + */
> +static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = misc_register(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev);
> + if (ret)
> + return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret,
> + "Failed to register misc device.");
> +
> + priv->open_gate->registered = true;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = container_of(kref, struct se_if_priv, refcount);
> +
> + /* Free priv_dev_ctx if it exists */
> + if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
> + /*
> + * miscdev storage belongs to open_gate, not directly to
> + * priv_dev_ctx. The gate should already have been detached
> + * from priv during teardown.
> + *
> + * Reclaim the internal context's shared memory directly here
> + * instead of through cleanup_dev_ctx(). Teardown already set
> + * cleanup_done on priv_dev_ctx, so cleanup_dev_ctx() would
> + * short-circuit and leak the host descriptors and the coherent
> + * buffer. By this point the device is fully unbound; if this
> + * context ever armed the firmware-busy breaker, se_clear_fw_busy()
> + * has already run with reclaim=false and freed the host
> + * descriptors, emptied the pool list and cleared
> + * non_secure_mem.ptr. A reclaim=true pass here is therefore both
> + * safe and idempotent: it releases the buffers for a normal
> + * context and is a no-op for the abandoned firmware-busy one.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock)
> + cleanup_se_shared_mem(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true);
> +
> + kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
> + kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
> + priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL;
> + }
> + /*
> + * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated
> + * before calling for its release. Or clearing the
> + * un-set bit.
> + */
> + of_reserved_mem_device_release(priv->dev);
> +
> + /*
> + * Be defensive: if teardown did not already drop the device-owned
> + * gate reference for some reason, release it here.
> + */
> + if (priv->open_gate) {
> + se_if_open_gate_put(priv->open_gate);
> + priv->open_gate = NULL;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Drop the reference on priv->dev taken in se_if_probe(). The device was
> + * pinned so that a file descriptor closed after device unbind can still
> + * safely pass priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn().
> + */
> + put_device(priv->dev);
> + mutex_destroy(&priv->load_fw.load_fw_lock);
> + mutex_destroy(&priv->modify_lock);
> + mutex_destroy(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
> +
> + /* Free any remaining resources that weren't devm-managed */
> + kfree(priv);
> +}
> +
> +static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx =
> + container_of(kref, struct se_if_device_ctx, refcount);
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + kfree(dev_ctx);
> +
> + /* drop the priv reference owned by this device context */
> + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
> +}
> +
> +static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = NULL;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> + dev_ctx = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx;
> + priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL;
> + atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * The circuit breaker is cleared from two places, which need opposite
> + * memory-reclaim policies:
> + *
> + * 1. se_fw_busy_work(): a late firmware response actually arrived.
> + * going_away is not set and the enclave has finished with the
> + * buffer, so a full reclaim (reclaim=true) is safe. This includes
> + * priv_dev_ctx, which has no close() path between a timeout and
> + * module unload: cleanup_done is only set at unbind, so the
> + * previous "else if (cleanup_done)" would permanently leak the
> + * 128 KB shared-memory slot for priv_dev_ctx after a late response.
> + * Reclaim unconditionally here instead; for userspace contexts
> + * se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup() is idempotent when pos is
> + * already reset by the normal close() path.
> + *
> + * 2. se_if_probe_cleanup(): teardown. going_away is set and no
> + * response has been confirmed, so the enclave may still be
> + * DMA-writing into the shared buffer. Freeing it here would be a
> + * DMA-after-free. Pass reclaim=false so cleanup_se_shared_mem()
> + * frees only the host-side descriptors and deliberately leaks the
> + * DMA buffer that the enclave might still touch.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away)) {
> + /*
> + * Fatal, but deliberately non-panic: the enclave is
> + * unresponsive at unbind with a transaction still in
> + * flight. Both the coherent staging buffer and any
> + * gen_pool buffers this context owns are abandoned
> + * (host descriptors freed, DMA-visible memory leaked)
> + * to avoid a DMA-after-free while the enclave may still
> + * be writing. Emit one headline error here rather than
> + * per-buffer so the count of faulted contexts is clear.
> + * Do not use WARN/BUG: this path is recoverable and
> + * panic_on_warn kernels must not be brought down by it.
> + */
> + dev_err(priv->dev,
> + "%s: FATAL: enclave stuck at unbind, DMA leaked.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, false);
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * Late response arrived after going_away is clear.
> + * fw_busy has already been cleared atomically above;
> + * reclaim the shared-memory slot now. For priv_dev_ctx
> + * this is the only reclaim site (no close() path). For
> + * userspace contexts cleanup_se_shared_mem() is a
> + * safe no-op if the close() path already reset pos.
> + */
> + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
> +}
> +
> +void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_api_msg *old_rx_msg = NULL;
> + struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&priv->modify_lock);
> +
> + se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
> +
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx) {
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + old_rx_msg = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg;
> + se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = NULL;
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = 0;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> +
> + kfree(old_rx_msg);
> + complete_all(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * check_cmd_rcvr_status() - check whether dev_ctx can become the command
> + * receiver or is already become the command receiver.
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 - dev_ctx is already the registered receiver
> + * -EBUSY - another context is already the receiver
> + * -EINVAL - dev_ctx has no storage handle
> + * -ENXIO - ready to proceed: no receiver set, strg_hdl present
> + *
> + * Caller must hold priv->modify_lock.
> + */
> +static int check_cmd_rcvr_status(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&priv->modify_lock);
> +
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx->strg_hdl)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Reaching here means, with a valid storage handle and command-receiver as NULL,
> + * either the registration process is to be done or failed.
> + */
> + return -ENXIO;
> +}
> +
> +int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
> + struct se_api_msg *new_rx_msg = NULL;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + int ret;
> +
> + guard(mutex)(&priv->modify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * All state checks happen inside modify_lock so the result cannot
> + * go stale between the check and the arming below.
> + */
> + ret = check_cmd_rcvr_status(dev_ctx);
> + if (ret != -ENXIO)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
> + new_rx_msg = kzalloc(MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_rx_msg)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + if (new_rx_msg)
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = new_rx_msg;
> + reinit_completion(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
> + se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN;
> + se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
> + dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
> +
> + if (!list_empty(&dev_ctx->link)) {
> + list_del_init(&dev_ctx->link);
> + priv->active_devctx_count--;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + bool match;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> + match = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx == dev_ctx;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
> +
> + return match;
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
> +{
> + bool already_done;
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + already_done = dev_ctx->cleanup_done;
> + if (!already_done) {
> + /*
> + * Ask FW to drop this context's session and storage so
> + * the kernel and FW stay in sync. Done here, under this
> + * context's fops_lock only (not the global modify_lock),
> + * because both close requests block on a firmware
> + * round-trip; issuing them while modify_lock was held
> + * would stall every other context for the FW timeout.
> + *
> + * Skip the round-trips once the FW path is marked busy.
> + * fw_busy is armed when a synchronous transaction times
> + * out; while it is set ele_msg_send_rcv() rejects further
> + * commands with -EBUSY without waiting. It is only cleared
> + * by se_clear_fw_busy(), which during unbind runs once
> + * after this loop (or earlier from fw_busy_work only if a
> + * genuine late FW response arrives). On a hung FW no late
> + * response comes, so the breaker stays set for the rest of
> + * the loop and the remaining closes would just return
> + * -EBUSY and log spurious "failed to close" errors. Skip
> + * them and emit a single warning instead.
> + */
> + if (atomic_read(&dev_ctx->priv->fw_busy)) {
> + if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl || dev_ctx->sess_hdl)
> + dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
> + "%s: skipping session/storage close, FW is busy\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * Pick the context that carries the close messages.
> + *
> + * fclose (is_fclose): a userspace close() may race
> + * driver unbind. Send on the caller's own dev_ctx so
> + * ele_msg_send_rcv()'s going_away check rejects the
> + * transmission with -ENODEV if unbind has begun (and
> + * may have freed priv->tx_chan), instead of touching a
> + * freed mailbox channel.
> + *
> + * Teardown (!is_fclose): going_away is already set, but
> + * priv->tx_chan is still live at this point in
> + * se_if_probe_cleanup(). Send on priv_dev_ctx, the only
> + * context ele_msg_send_rcv() lets through going_away for
> + * teardown-close messages, so the kernel can still
> + * resynchronise session/storage state with FW.
> + */
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *tx_ctx = is_fclose ? dev_ctx :
> + dev_ctx->priv->priv_dev_ctx;
> +
> + if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl && se_close_storage(tx_ctx,
> + dev_ctx->strg_hdl))
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close storage.\n");
> + if (dev_ctx->sess_hdl && se_close_session(tx_ctx,
> + dev_ctx->sess_hdl))
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close session.\n");
> + }
> + /*
> + * fw_busy is caused by one timed-out synchronous transaction.
> + * Only that transaction's dev_ctx may still have coherent
> + * memory referenced by FW. Do not skip cleanup for unrelated
> + * contexts while fw_busy is set.
> + */
> + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
> + dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
> + "%s: deferring shared memory cleanup while FW is busy\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + else
> + cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
> +
> + kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
> + dev_ctx->devname = NULL;
> + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (is_fclose)
> + kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
> +}
> +
> +static void dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + if (is_fclose) {
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
> + dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
> + }
> +
> + cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, is_fclose);
> +}
> +
> +static int init_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
> + struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx);
> +
> + if (!dev_ctx)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
> + get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
> + ch_id);
> + if (!dev_ctx->devname) {
> + kfree(dev_ctx);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> + kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount);
> + dev_ctx->priv = priv;
> + dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_ctx->link);
> + set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS);
> + *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
> +
> + ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
> + kfree(dev_ctx);
> + *new_dev_ctx = NULL;
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + /* Take a reference to priv for this device context */
> + kref_get(&priv->refcount);
> +
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
> + list_add_tail(&dev_ctx->link, &priv->dev_ctx_list);
> + priv->active_devctx_count++;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void __user *uarg,
> + struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info *cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
> +{
> + /* shared memory is allocated before this IOCTL */
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> +
> + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info->rx_buf_sz &&
> + copy_to_user(uarg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, sizeof(*cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info to user.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + void __user *uarg)
> +{
> + struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info = {0};
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + int rsp_status_err = 0;
> + int cleanup_err = 0;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, uarg,
> + sizeof(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev,
> + "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info from user.",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ||
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%d < %d)\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ :
> + MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ);
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -ENOSPC;
> + }
> +
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + memdup_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf),
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz);
> + if (IS_ERR(tx_msg)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + err = se_chk_tx_cmd_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header,
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz);
> + if (err) {
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ||
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ) {
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (tx_msg->header.tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) {
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver &&
> + get_load_fw_instance(priv)->is_fw_tobe_loaded) {
> + err = se_load_firmware(priv);
> + if (err) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Could not send msg as FW is not loaded.\n");
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg) {
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + err = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, tx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
> + rx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + /*
> + * -ERESTARTSYS here means the wait was interrupted by a signal
> + * after the command had already been handed to - and executed
> + * by - the firmware, with its response delivered into rx_msg
> + * (ele_msg_send_rcv() converts only a positive, i.e. successfully
> + * received, result to -ERESTARTSYS). If that response carried a
> + * freshly allocated session/storage handle, record it now via
> + * fw_api_specific_ops(): the handle is already live in firmware,
> + * so leaving it untracked would stop cleanup_dev_ctx() from ever
> + * closing it and leak the firmware resource. Validate the
> + * delivered response first, using its own declared length bounded
> + * by the caller's buffer, so a truncated or malformed reply is
> + * not acted upon.
> + */
> + if (err == -ERESTARTSYS) {
> + u32 rsp_sz = rx_msg->header.size << 2;
> +
> + if (rsp_sz && rsp_sz <= cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz &&
> + !se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg,
> + tx_msg->header.command, rsp_sz,
> + tx_msg->header.ver)) {
> + se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
> + fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg, true);
> + }
> + /*
> + * Returning -ERESTARTSYS would let the VFS transparently restart
> + * the ioctl, which would re-run the command with the just
> + * cleaned-up (zeroed) shared input buffers. Report -EINTR instead
> + * so the syscall is not auto-restarted; userspace enters its
> + * signal handler and can decide whether to reissue the command.
> + */
> + err = -EINTR;
> + }
> +
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> +
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * ele_msg_send_rcv() returns a positive received-message size on
> + * success. Returning that raw size as the ioctl result would make a
> + * successful transaction look like a positive (non-zero) return value
> + * to userspace. Record the actual received size in rx_buf_sz for the
> + * response copied back to userspace, then normalise err to 0 so the
> + * ioctl reports plain success; the firmware status is conveyed to
> + * userspace inside the response buffer itself.
> + */
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz = err;
> + err = 0;
> +
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: %s %s.\n", dev_ctx->devname, __func__,
> + "message received, start transmit to user");
> +
> + /*
> + * Validate using the size the firmware declared in the response header
> + * rather than cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz (the amount actually
> + * received, clamped to the caller's buffer). If the caller supplied a
> + * buffer smaller than the firmware's full response, rx_buf_sz reflects
> + * the truncated copy and se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status() would fail the size
> + * check, causing fw_api_specific_ops() to be skipped and any freshly
> + * allocated session/storage handle to go unrecorded. Using the
> + * firmware-declared size ensures a well-formed response is always
> + * recognised and its handle is tracked for cleanup.
> + *
> + * Any size discrepancy between the firmware response header and the
> + * userspace-supplied buffer is already logged by the mailbox receive
> + * callback before control returns here.
> + */
> + rsp_status_err =
> + se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, tx_msg->header.command,
> + rx_msg->header.size << 2, tx_msg->header.ver);
> +
> + if (!rsp_status_err) {
> + /*
> + * The response is well formed and fully fits the caller's
> + * buffer, so any FW-allocated session/storage handle it carries
> + * (data[1]) has been delivered. Record it now, before the
> + * copy-out steps below. The FW has already committed the handle;
> + * running fw_api_specific_ops() only after a successful
> + * se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data()/copy_to_user() would leave the
> + * handle untracked - and so never closed on teardown, leaking it
> + * in FW - whenever the caller supplied a bad output pointer.
> + */
> + fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg, false);
> +
> + err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> + return err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* Copy data from the buffer */
> + print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, rx_msg,
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, false);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf), rx_msg,
> + cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz)) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy to user.\n", dev_ctx->devname);
> + err = -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + cleanup_err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
> +
> + if (cleanup_err && !err)
> + err = cleanup_err;
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int se_ioctl_get_mu_info(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + void __user *uarg)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_ioctl_get_if_info if_info;
> + struct se_if_node *if_node;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if_node = container_of(priv->if_defs, typeof(*if_node), if_defs);
> +
> + if_info.se_if_id = 0;
> + if_info.interrupt_idx = 0;
> + if_info.tz = 0;
> + if_info.did = 0;
> + if_info.cmd_tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag;
> + if_info.rsp_tag = priv->if_defs->rsp_tag;
> + if_info.success_tag = priv->if_defs->success_tag;
> + if_info.base_api_ver = priv->if_defs->base_api_ver;
> + if_info.fw_api_ver = priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver;
> +
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: info [se_if_id: %d, irq_idx: %d, tz: 0x%x, did: 0x%x].\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, if_info.se_if_id, if_info.interrupt_idx, if_info.tz,
> + if_info.did);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(uarg, &if_info, sizeof(if_info))) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy mu info to user.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + err = -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static void rollback_shared_mem_pos(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 length)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL;
> +
> + shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(length > shared_mem->pos)) {
> + shared_mem->pos = 0;
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + shared_mem->pos -= length;
> +}
> +
> +int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL;
> + bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx;
> + size_t aligned_len = 0;
> + u32 pos;
> +
> + /*
> + * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared
> + * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware.
> + */
> + is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx);
> + if (is_fw_busy_dev_ctx)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + aligned_len = round_up((size_t)*length, 8);
> + if (aligned_len < *length) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Invalid buffer length.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* No specific requirement for this buffer. */
> + shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
> +
> + /* Check there is enough space in the shared memory. */
> + dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: req_size = %zd, max_size= %d, curr_pos = %d\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, aligned_len, shared_mem->size,
> + shared_mem->pos);
> +
> + if (shared_mem->size < shared_mem->pos ||
> + aligned_len > (shared_mem->size - shared_mem->pos)) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Not enough space in shared memory.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + /* Allocate space in shared memory. 8 bytes aligned. */
> + pos = shared_mem->pos;
> + shared_mem->pos += aligned_len;
> + *ele_dma_addr = (u64)shared_mem->dma_addr + pos;
> + *ptr = shared_mem->ptr + pos;
> + *length = aligned_len;
> +
> + memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, aligned_len);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Copy a buffer of data to/from the user and return the address to use in
> + * messages
> + */
> +static int se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + void __user *uarg)
> +{
> + struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf io = {0};
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
> + void *dma_buf_ptr = NULL;
> + dma_addr_t ele_dma_addr;
> + u32 aligned_len = 0;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&io, uarg, sizeof(io))) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed copy iobuf config from user.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: io [buf: %p(%d) flag: %x].\n", dev_ctx->devname,
> + u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf), io.length, io.flags);
> +
> + if (io.length == 0 || !io.user_buf) {
> + /*
> + * Accept NULL pointers since some buffers are optional
> + * in FW commands. In this case we should return 0 as
> + * pointer to be embedded into the message.
> + * Skip all data copy part of code below.
> + */
> + io.ele_addr = 0;
> + goto copy;
> + }
> +
> + aligned_len = io.length;
> + err = get_shared_mem_slot(dev_ctx, &aligned_len, &ele_dma_addr, &dma_buf_ptr);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + io.ele_addr = ele_dma_addr;
> + if ((io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) ||
> + (io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT)) {
> + /*
> + * buffer is input:
> + * copy data from user space to this allocated buffer.
> + */
> + if (copy_from_user(dma_buf_ptr, u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf),
> + io.length)) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
> + "%s: Failed copy data to shared memory.",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + err = -EFAULT;
> + goto rollback;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + b_desc = add_b_desc_to_pending_list(dma_buf_ptr, &io, dev_ctx);
> + if (IS_ERR(b_desc)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(b_desc);
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to allocate/link b_desc.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + goto rollback;
> + }
> +
> +copy:
> + /* Provide the EdgeLock Enclave address to user space only if success.*/
> + if (copy_to_user(uarg, &io, sizeof(io))) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy iobuff setup to user.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + err = -EFAULT;
> + goto rollback;
> + }
> + return err;
> +
> +rollback:
> + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(b_desc)) {
> + list_del(&b_desc->link);
> + kfree(b_desc);
> + }
> +
> + if (dma_buf_ptr && aligned_len) {
> + memset(dma_buf_ptr, 0, aligned_len);
> + rollback_shared_mem_pos(dev_ctx, aligned_len);
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* IOCTL to provide SoC information */
> +static int se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + void __user *uarg)
> +{
> + struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info soc_info;
> + int err = -EINVAL;
> +
> + soc_info.soc_id = get_se_soc_id(dev_ctx->priv);
> + soc_info.soc_rev = var_se_info.soc_rev;
> +
> + err = copy_to_user(uarg, (u8 *)(&soc_info), sizeof(soc_info));
> + if (err) {
> + dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy soc info to user.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname);
> + err = -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * File operations for user-space
> + */
> +
> +/* Write a message to the MU. */
> +static ssize_t se_if_fops_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *buf,
> + size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + int err;
> +
> + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: write from buf (%p)%zu, ppos=%lld.\n", dev_ctx->devname,
> + buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
> +
> + if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ || size > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%zu < %d)\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, size,
> + size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ :
> + MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ);
> + return -ENOSPC;
> + }
> +
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = memdup_user(buf, size);
> + if (IS_ERR(tx_msg))
> + return PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
> +
> + err = se_chk_tx_rsp_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header, size);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + print_hex_dump_debug("from user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
> + tx_msg, size, false);
> +
> + err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, size);
> +
> + return err;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Read a message from the MU.
> + * Blocking until a message is available.
> + */
> +static ssize_t se_if_fops_read(struct file *fp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
> + loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
> + u8 rx_msg_snap[MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN] = {};
> + char devname_snap[32] = {};
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + size_t copy_len;
> + int err;
> +
> + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + /*
> + * Snapshot devname once while fops_lock is held. After the
> + * scoped guard releases the lock, a concurrent cleanup_dev_ctx()
> + * could free dev_ctx->devname before the error path below runs.
> + */
> + strscpy(devname_snap, dev_ctx->devname, sizeof(devname_snap));
> +
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: read to buf %p(%zu), ppos=%lld.\n", devname_snap,
> + buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
> +
> + mutex_lock(&priv->modify_lock);
> + if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
> + mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock);
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock);
> + }
> +
> + err = ele_msg_rcv(dev_ctx, &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + if (err != -ERESTARTSYS)
> + dev_err(priv->dev,
> + "%s: Er[0x%x]: Signal Interrupted. Current act-dev-ctx count: %d.",
> + devname_snap, err, dev_ctx->priv->active_devctx_count);
> + return err;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Reacquire fops_lock before touching any dev_ctx state (pending lists,
> + * rx_msg) after the blocking wait. fops_lock was dropped before calling
> + * ele_msg_rcv(). If cleanup_dev_ctx() ran concurrently it could have
> + * freed the DMA buffers and the pending lists, leading to UAF and list
> + * corruption. Re-checking cleanup_done under fops_lock prevents that.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> +
> + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
> + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Snapshot the full rx_msg buffer under modify_lock + clbk_rx_lock.
> + * Always copy the full received message (not just copy_len bytes) so
> + * fw_api_specific_ops() reads complete data words. copy_len is the
> + * amount the caller asked for and is used only for copy_to_user().
> + * fw_api_specific_ops() must be called OUTSIDE modify_lock: for
> + * ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ it calls set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(),
> + * which takes modify_lock itself. Calling it while modify_lock is
> + * already held would deadlock.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx ||
> + !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg ||
> + !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz) {
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> + /*
> + * Snapshot the whole received message, not just copy_len bytes.
> + * fw_api_specific_ops() reads data words (e.g. strg_hdl at
> + * data[1]) that may lie beyond the userspace read() size.
> + * Truncating the copy here would zero-pad those words and cause
> + * fw_api_specific_ops() to record a zero handle, losing it.
> + */
> + copy_len = min(size, (size_t)priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz);
> + memcpy(rx_msg_snap, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg,
> + priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz);
> + priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = 0;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
> +
> + /* We may need to copy the output data to user before
> + * delivering the completion message.
> + */
> + err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> + return err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* fw_api_specific_ops() runs outside modify_lock; see comment above. */
> + print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
> + rx_msg_snap, copy_len, false);
> +
> + cmd_receiver_specific_ops(dev_ctx, (struct se_api_msg *)rx_msg_snap);
> + err = copy_len;
> + if (copy_to_user(buf, rx_msg_snap, copy_len))
> + err = -EFAULT;
> +
> + se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
> + mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* Open a character device. */
> +static int se_if_fops_open(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
> +{
> + struct miscdevice *miscdev = fp->private_data;
> + struct se_if_open_gate *gate;
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *misc_dev_ctx;
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + gate = container_of(miscdev, struct se_if_open_gate, miscdev);
> +
> + if (!se_if_open_gate_get(gate))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&gate->lock)) {
> + se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
> + return -ERESTARTSYS;
> + }
> +
> + if (gate->dying || !gate->priv ||
> + !kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->priv->refcount)) {
> + mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
> + se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +
> + priv = gate->priv;
> + mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
> +
> + misc_dev_ctx = priv->priv_dev_ctx;
> +
> + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock)) {
> + err = -ERESTARTSYS;
> + goto out_put_priv;
> + }
> +
> + if (misc_dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
> + err = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_unlock_misc;
> + }
> +
> + priv->dev_ctx_mono_count++;
> + err = init_device_context(priv, priv->dev_ctx_mono_count, &dev_ctx);
> + if (err) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to create dev-ctx.\n");
> + goto out_unlock_misc;
> + }
> +
> + fp->private_data = dev_ctx;
> +
> +out_unlock_misc:
> + mutex_unlock(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> +out_put_priv:
> + kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
> + se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* Close a character device. */
> +static int se_if_fops_close(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
> +
> + dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, true);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* IOCTL entry point of a character device */
> +static long se_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
> + long err;
> +
> + /* Prevent race during change of device context */
> + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
> + if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case SE_IOCTL_CHECK_CMD_RCV_REG_STATUS: {
> + guard(mutex)(&priv->modify_lock);
> + err = check_cmd_rcvr_status(dev_ctx);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO:
> + err = se_ioctl_get_mu_info(dev_ctx, uarg);
> + break;
> + case SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF:
> + err = se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
> + break;
> + case SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO:
> + err = se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
> + break;
> + case SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP:
> + err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
> + break;
> + default:
> + err = -ENOTTY;
> + dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: IOCTL %.8x not supported.\n",
> + dev_ctx->devname, cmd);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* Char driver setup */
> +static const struct file_operations se_if_fops = {
> + .open = se_if_fops_open,
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .release = se_if_fops_close,
> + .unlocked_ioctl = se_ioctl,
> + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
> + .read = se_if_fops_read,
> + .write = se_if_fops_write,
> +};
> +
> +int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
> + dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
> +
> + if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc);
> + if (!b_desc)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * gen_pool is internally thread-safe, so contexts may allocate
> + * concurrently. The buffer is tracked on this context's own
> + * mem_pool_buf_list and released on its cleanup path.
> + */
> + *buf = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool, len, daddr);
> + if (!*buf) {
> + dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to alloc from gen_pool.\n");
> + kfree(b_desc);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */
> + memset(*buf, 0, len);
> + b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = *buf;
> + b_desc->size = len;
> +
> + list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim)
> +{
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
> + struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
> +
> + /*
> + * Free only the buffers this context allocated. A context that never
> + * used the pool has an empty list, so this is a no-op for it.
> + *
> + * Unlike the coherent staging buffer, the pool path needs no
> + * "nothing staged" (pos) gate on the reclaim=false leg. Pool buffers
> + * are ephemeral, per-transaction allocations: se_get_mem_pool_buf()
> + * refuses to allocate once the context is fw_busy, ele_msg_send_rcv()
> + * refuses to start a new command while fw_busy, and the success path
> + * frees the whole list via se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(reclaim=true)
> + * before returning. se_if_cmd_lock serialises synchronous commands, so
> + * at most one transaction is outstanding. The only way to reach here
> + * with reclaim=false and a non-empty list is the single fw_busy
> + * context still owning the buffer(s) from the one timed-out
> + * transaction. Those buffers are exactly the in-flight ones the
> + * enclave may still be DMA-ing into, so leaving them on the list (no
> + * gen_pool_free) deliberately leaks them to avoid a DMA-after-free -
> + * there are no already-consumed pool buffers to reclaim on this leg.
> + */
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list, link) {
> + if (reclaim)
> + gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool,
> + (unsigned long)b_desc->shared_buf_ptr,
> + b_desc->size);
> + list_del(&b_desc->link);
> + kfree(b_desc);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv =
> + container_of(work, struct se_if_priv, fw_busy_work);
> +
> + se_clear_fw_busy(priv);
> +}
> +
> static int se_suspend(struct device *dev)
> {
> struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
> index dd4a1ea7e35a..2ea15bc2d855 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
> @@ -10,20 +10,40 @@
> #include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> #include <linux/mailbox_client.h>
> #include <linux/semaphore.h>
> +#include <linux/workqueue.h>
>
> #define MAX_FW_LOAD_RETRIES 50
> #define SE_MSG_WORD_SZ 0x4
>
> #define RES_STATUS(x) FIELD_GET(0x000000ff, x)
> +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER (128 * 1024)
> #define MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN (256)
> #define MESSAGING_VERSION_6 0x6
> #define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7
>
> +struct se_if_open_gate {
> + struct miscdevice miscdev;
> + struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + /* to lock to update the structure */
> + struct mutex lock;
> + struct kref refcount;
> + bool dying;
> + /* set once misc_register() has succeeded (deferred to probe end) */
> + bool registered;
> +};
> +
> struct se_clbk_handle {
> struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
> struct completion done;
> bool signal_rcvd;
> + /*
> + * Set under clbk_rx_lock once a real response is copied into rx_msg,
> + * cleared when a new transaction is armed. Lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a
> + * genuine response from a teardown-forced complete_all() with no data.
> + */
> + bool rx_delivered;
> u32 rx_msg_sz;
> +
> /*
> * Assignment of the rx_msg buffer to held till the
> * received content as part callback function, is copied.
> @@ -45,10 +65,46 @@ struct se_imem_buf {
> u32 state;
> };
>
> +struct se_buf_desc {
> + u8 *shared_buf_ptr;
> + void __user *usr_buf_ptr;
> + u32 size;
> + struct list_head link;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_shared_mem {
> + dma_addr_t dma_addr;
> + u32 size;
> + u32 pos;
> + u8 *ptr;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info {
> + struct list_head mem_pool_buf_list;
> + struct list_head pending_in;
> + struct list_head pending_out;
> +
> + struct se_shared_mem non_secure_mem;
> +};
> +
> /* Private struct for each char device instance. */
> struct se_if_device_ctx {
> struct se_if_priv *priv;
> + struct miscdevice *miscdev;
> const char *devname;
> + u32 sess_hdl;
> + u32 strg_hdl;
> + bool cleanup_done;
> + unsigned long rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies;
> +
> + /* process one file operation at a time. */
> + struct mutex fops_lock;
> +
> + struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info se_shared_mem_mgmt;
> + struct list_head link;
> +
> + /* Add reference counting */
> + struct kref refcount;
> };
>
> /* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */
> @@ -90,6 +146,29 @@ struct se_fw_load_info {
> struct mutex load_fw_lock;
> };
>
> +struct cmd_rcvr_data_info {
> + /*
> + * Tracks the last FW export command received by the command receiver
> + * (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ or ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ).
> + * Set by cmd_receiver_specific_ops() when the FW command arrives via
> + * read(), cleared at entry. se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp() checks it to
> + * ensure write() can only follow a matching read() for export responses.
> + * Stored per SE interface (not file-scope static) to prevent a race when
> + * multiple SE interfaces (e.g. ELE and V2X) run concurrent export flows.
> + */
> + u8 cmd_rcvr_last_rcvd_cmd_id;
> +
> + /*
> + * Export buffer size communicated by the FW in the preceding
> + * ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ or ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ
> + * command. cmd_receiver_specific_ops() stores it here; se_val_cmd_addrs()
> + * reads it when size_idx == SE_CMD_RCVR_ADDR_VAR_SIZE to range-check
> + * the response buffer. Stored per SE interface so concurrent ELE and V2X
> + * export flows cannot corrupt each other's size.
> + */
> + u32 cmd_rcvr_var_size;
> +};
> +
> struct se_if_priv {
> struct device *dev;
>
> @@ -113,9 +192,44 @@ struct se_if_priv {
> struct se_fw_load_info load_fw;
>
> atomic_t fw_busy;
> + /*
> + * Set once teardown begins. New synchronous transactions are rejected
> + * and a teardown-forced completion is not mistaken for a real firmware
> + * response.
> + */
> + atomic_t going_away;
> + /*
> + * Serialise the fw_busy_dev_ctx and fw_busy state updates between the
> + * timeout path, late-response callback/work, and teardown.
> + */
> + spinlock_t fw_busy_lock;
> + struct se_if_device_ctx *fw_busy_dev_ctx;
> + struct work_struct fw_busy_work;
>
> struct se_if_device_ctx *priv_dev_ctx;
> + struct list_head dev_ctx_list;
> +
> + /* prevent modifying priv member variable in parallel. */
> + struct mutex modify_lock;
> + u32 active_devctx_count;
> + u32 dev_ctx_mono_count;
> +
> + /* Add reference counting */
> + struct kref refcount;
> +
> + /* stable gate used by .open() */
> + struct se_if_open_gate *open_gate;
> + struct cmd_rcvr_data_info crcvr_info;
> };
>
> char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id);
> +void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
> +int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
> +bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
> +void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
> +int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
> + u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr);
> +int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
> + dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len);
> +void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim);
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c7ce736b5ea4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause*/
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2025 NXP
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef SE_IOCTL_H
> +#define SE_IOCTL_H
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
> +#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
> +#define SE_TYPE_ID_UNKWN 0x0
> +#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
> +#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
> +/* IOCTL definitions. */
> +
> +struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf {
> + __u64 user_buf;
> + __u32 length;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u64 ele_addr;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_ioctl_shared_mem_cfg {
> + __u32 base_offset;
> + __u32 size;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_ioctl_get_if_info {
> + __u8 se_if_id;
> + __u8 interrupt_idx;
> + __u8 tz;
> + __u8 did;
> + __u8 cmd_tag;
> + __u8 rsp_tag;
> + __u8 success_tag;
> + __u8 base_api_ver;
> + __u8 fw_api_ver;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info {
> + __u64 tx_buf;
> + __u64 rx_buf;
> + __u32 tx_buf_sz;
> + __u32 rx_buf_sz;
> +};
> +
> +struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info {
> + __u16 soc_id;
> + __u16 soc_rev;
> +};
> +
> +/* IO Buffer Flags */
> +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_OUTPUT (0x00u)
> +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT (0x01u)
> +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SEC_MEM (0x02u)
> +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SHORT_ADDR (0x04u)
> +#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT (0x10u)
> +
> +/* IOCTLS */
> +#define SE_IOCTL 0x0A /* like MISC_MAJOR. */
> +
> +/*
> + * ioctl to designated the current fd as logical-receiver.
> + * This ioctl is send when the nvm-daemon, a slave to the
> + * firmware is started by the user.
> + */
> +#define SE_IOCTL_CHECK_CMD_RCV_REG_STATUS _IO(SE_IOCTL, 0x01)
> +
> +/*
> + * ioctl to get the buffer allocated from the memory, which is shared
> + * between kernel and FW.
> + * Post allocation, the kernel tagged the allocated memory with:
> + * Output
> + * Input
> + * Input-Output
> + * Short address
> + * Secure-memory
> + */
> +#define SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x03, struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf)
> +
> +/*
> + * ioctl to get the mu information, that is used to exchange message
> + * with FW, from user-space.
> + */
> +#define SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x04, struct se_ioctl_get_if_info)
> +/*
> + * ioctl to get SoC Info from user-space.
> + */
> +#define SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x06, struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info)
> +
> +/*
> + * ioctl to send command and receive response from user-space.
> + */
> +#define SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x07, struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
> +#endif
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-03 19:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-02 21:46 [PATCH v46 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 16:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 16:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 21:05 ` Frank Li
2026-09-03 11:50 ` Pankaj Gupta (OSS)
2026-09-03 19:49 ` Frank Li [this message]
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node pankaj.gupta
2026-09-02 16:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 21:46 ` [PATCH v46 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add reserved memory for EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
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