From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C28EC35246 for ; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 06:13:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DEA942173E for ; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 06:13:17 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org DEA942173E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 850056EC9E; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 06:13:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mga07.intel.com (mga07.intel.com [134.134.136.100]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 391BA6EC9E for ; Tue, 28 Jan 2020 06:13:16 +0000 (UTC) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 27 Jan 2020 22:13:09 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,372,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="231802051" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by orsmga006.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 27 Jan 2020 22:13:09 -0800 Received: from [10.252.25.124] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.252.25.124]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C4312580277; Mon, 27 Jan 2020 22:13:01 -0800 (PST) From: Alexey Budankov To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , Will Deacon , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov References: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process X-BeenThere: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Intel graphics driver community testing & development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Song Liu , Andi Kleen , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , Alexander Shishkin , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Igor Lubashev , linux-kernel , Stephane Eranian , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Namhyung Kim , Jiri Olsa , linux-arm-kernel Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "Intel-gfx" Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, else return -EFAULT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; if (count != sizeof(uint32_t)) -- 2.20.1 _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx