From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jesse Barnes Subject: Re: [PATCH] drm/i915: Add OACONTROL to the command parser register whitelist. Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 12:53:30 -0700 Message-ID: <20140516125330.040ca508@jbarnes-desktop> References: <20140326163820.GV26878@phenom.ffwll.local> <53331068.7090007@whitecape.org> <20140326182605.GA28133@bdvolkin-ubuntu-desktop> <20140327075721.GA26878@phenom.ffwll.local> <20140327155708.GA4690@bdvolkin-ubuntu-desktop> <53349971.3000806@whitecape.org> <5334B2C4.5000702@whitecape.org> <20140516120545.23ddf6d7@jbarnes-desktop> <20140516192050.GA4495@nuc-i3427.alporthouse.com> <20140516123408.75e68aed@jbarnes-desktop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Received: from gproxy2-pub.mail.unifiedlayer.com (gproxy2-pub.mail.unifiedlayer.com [69.89.18.3]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 683E06E28A for ; Fri, 16 May 2014 12:53:33 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20140516123408.75e68aed@jbarnes-desktop> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "Intel-gfx" To: Jesse Barnes Cc: Daniel Vetter , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" List-Id: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org On Fri, 16 May 2014 12:34:08 -0700 Jesse Barnes wrote: > On Fri, 16 May 2014 20:20:50 +0100 > Chris Wilson wrote: > > Yes, X only sets the secure bit when it pokes the display registers, and > > those registers should be privileged even with a cmd parser in place > > (which they are). > > > > Daniel's argument presumes that we haven't been patching out the > > cmd parser all this time anyway. > > Yeah I know we have some perf issues as it is; it would be nice if the > overhead were so minimal that it didn't matter. But just on principle, > scanning secure buffers seems wrong, and I'm trying to understand why > Daniel would want it. Ok Daniel explained on IRC that we actually have a special whitelist for the secure batch case. The idea is to allow a DRM_MASTER to submit secure batches, but still prevent a local root exploit. I suppose that means preventing access to most commands and registers, but allowing a few extra things like wait events and display register updates. I suppose it's not entirely unreasonable, but it does add complexity to the scanner and overhead to all users; not sure it's worth it. -- Jesse Barnes, Intel Open Source Technology Center