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From: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
To: Intel Wired LAN <intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org>
Cc: Anthony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>,
	Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Subject: [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 06/14] ice: merge ice_mbx_report_malvf with ice_mbx_vf_state_handler
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2023 09:09:12 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230222170920.1629293-7-jacob.e.keller@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230222170920.1629293-1-jacob.e.keller@intel.com>

The ice_mbx_report_malvf function is used to update the
ice_mbx_vf_info.malicious member after we detect a malicious VF. This is
done by calling ice_mbx_report_malvf after ice_mbx_vf_state_handler sets
its "is_malvf" return parameter true.

Instead of requiring two steps, directly update the malicious bit in the
state handler, and remove the need for separately calling
ice_mbx_report_malvf.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c  | 34 +++++---------
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c | 51 ++++++---------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h |  5 +-
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
index b65025b51526..71ce3998dd75 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
 	s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
 	struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
 	struct ice_mbx_data mbxdata;
-	bool malvf = false;
+	bool report_malvf = false;
 	struct ice_vf *vf;
 	int status;
 
@@ -1811,33 +1811,23 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
 #define ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK 64
 	mbxdata.async_watermark_val = ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK;
 
-	/* check to see if we have a malicious VF */
-	status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, &mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info, &malvf);
+	/* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
+	status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, &mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
+					  &report_malvf);
 	if (status)
 		goto out_put_vf;
 
-	if (malvf) {
-		bool report_vf = false;
+	if (report_malvf) {
+		struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
 
-		/* if the VF is malicious and we haven't let the user
-		 * know about it, then let them know now
-		 */
-		status = ice_mbx_report_malvf(&pf->hw, &vf->mbx_info,
-					      &report_vf);
-		if (status)
-			dev_dbg(dev, "Error reporting malicious VF\n");
-
-		if (report_vf) {
-			struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
-
-			if (pf_vsi)
-				dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
-					 &vf->dev_lan_addr[0],
-					 pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr);
-		}
+		if (pf_vsi)
+			dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
+					&vf->dev_lan_addr[0],
+					pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr);
 	}
 
 out_put_vf:
 	ice_put_vf(vf);
-	return malvf;
+
+	return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c
index 1f332ab43b00..15667555589f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
  * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
  * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data
  * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for the VF in question
- * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
+ * @report_malvf: boolean output to indicate whether VF should be reported
  *
  * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF
  * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state
@@ -234,25 +234,24 @@ ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
  * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
  */
 int
-ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
-			 struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
-			 struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
-			 bool *is_malvf)
+ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
+			 struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, bool *report_malvf)
 {
 	struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
 	struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
 	struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq;
 	enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state;
 	int status = 0;
+	bool is_malvf = false;
 
-	if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data)
+	if (!report_malvf || !mbx_data || !vf_info)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	*report_malvf = false;
+
 	/* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF
 	 * is not malicious until detected.
 	 */
-	*is_malvf = false;
-
 	 /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current
 	  * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold.
 	  */
@@ -301,8 +300,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
 		if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >=
 		    mbx_data->async_watermark_val) {
 			new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
-			status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state,
-						      is_malvf);
+			status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf);
 		} else {
 			new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
 			ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
@@ -316,8 +314,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
 
 	case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT:
 		new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
-		status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state,
-					      is_malvf);
+		status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf);
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -327,33 +324,15 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
 
 	snap_buf->state = new_state;
 
+	/* Only report VFs as malicious the first time we detect it */
+	if (is_malvf && !vf_info->malicious) {
+		vf_info->malicious = 1;
+		*report_malvf = true;
+	}
+
 	return status;
 }
 
-/**
- * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF
- * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
- * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF
- * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported
- *
- * This function updates the malicious indicator bit in the VF mailbox
- * tracking structure. A malicious VF must be reported only once if discovered
- * between VF resets or loading so the function first checks if the VF has
- * already been detected in any previous mailbox iterations.
- */
-int
-ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
-		     bool *report_malvf)
-{
-	if (!report_malvf)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	*report_malvf = !vf_info->malicious;
-	vf_info->malicious = 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF mailbox info
  * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking structure for a VF
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h
index e4bdd93ccef1..41250519bc56 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h
@@ -21,13 +21,10 @@ ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
 u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed);
 int
 ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
-			 struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, bool *is_mal_vf);
+			 struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, bool *report_malvf);
 void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info);
 void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info);
 void ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw);
-int
-ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
-		     bool *report_malvf);
 #else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
 static inline int
 ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw __always_unused *hw,
-- 
2.39.1.405.gd4c25cc71f83

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-22 17:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-22 17:09 [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 00/14] ice: refactor mailbox overflow detection Jacob Keller
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 01/14] ice: re-order ice_mbx_reset_snapshot function Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:15   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 02/14] ice: convert ice_mbx_clear_malvf to void and use WARN Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:15   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 03/14] ice: track malicious VFs in new ice_mbx_vf_info structure Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:15   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 04/14] ice: move VF overflow message count into struct ice_mbx_vf_info Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:16   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 05/14] ice: remove ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:16   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` Jacob Keller [this message]
2023-03-10 13:17   ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 06/14] ice: merge ice_mbx_report_malvf with ice_mbx_vf_state_handler Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 07/14] ice: initialize mailbox snapshot earlier in PF init Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:17   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 08/14] ice: declare ice_vc_process_vf_msg in ice_virtchnl.h Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:17   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 09/14] ice: always report VF overflowing mailbox even without PF VSI Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:17   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 10/14] ice: remove unnecessary &array[0] and just use array Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:18   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 11/14] ice: pass mbxdata to ice_is_malicious_vf() Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:18   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 12/14] ice: print message if ice_mbx_vf_state_handler returns an error Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:18   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 13/14] ice: move ice_is_malicious_vf() to ice_virtchnl.c Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:19   ` Szlosek, Marek
2023-02-22 17:09 ` [Intel-wired-lan] [intel-next PATCH 14/14] ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg() Jacob Keller
2023-03-10 13:19   ` Szlosek, Marek

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