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From: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
To: Pawel Chmielewski <pawel.chmielewski@intel.com>,
	Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Cc: pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	lukasz.czapnik@intel.com, intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org,
	Liang-Min Wang <liang-min.wang@intel.com>,
	Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [Intel-wired-lan] [PATCH iwl-next v2] ice: Reset VF on Tx MDD event
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 15:06:37 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3ddf5201-5434-edc3-129d-113c1f6ee332@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZXsyfFHcFnaqeWe+@baltimore>



On 12/14/2023 8:51 AM, Pawel Chmielewski wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 09:37:32AM +0100, Michal Schmidt wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 2, 2023 at 4:56 PM Pawel Chmielewski
>> <pawel.chmielewski@intel.com> wrote:
>>> From: Liang-Min Wang <liang-min.wang@intel.com>

...

>>> When Malicious Driver Detection event occurs, perform graceful VF reset
>>> to quickly bring VF back to operational state. Add a log message to
>>> notify about the cause of the reset.
>>
>> Sorry for bringing this up so late, but I have just now realized this:
>> Wasn't freezing of the queue originally the intended behavior, as a
>> penalty for being malicious?
>> Shouldn't these resets at least be guarded by ICE_FLAG_MDD_AUTO_RESET_VF?
>>
>> Michal
> 
> In some cases, the MDD can be caused also by a regular software error
> (like the one mentioned in commit message), and not the actual malicious
> action. There was decision to change the default behavior to avoid denial
> of service.

Michal brings up some valid questions. I'd like to clarify the 
expectations between how the two should work together before moving 
forward with this.

Thanks,
Tony
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      reply	other threads:[~2023-12-18 23:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-02 15:51 [Intel-wired-lan] [PATCH iwl-next v2] ice: Reset VF on Tx MDD event Pawel Chmielewski
2023-11-04 15:33 ` Simon Horman
2023-12-14  8:37 ` Michal Schmidt
2023-12-14 16:51   ` Pawel Chmielewski
2023-12-18 23:06     ` Tony Nguyen [this message]

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