From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B9322606A32A for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=ZZMeeioP Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7338E10EA24; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from tor.source.kernel.org (tor.source.kernel.org [172.105.4.254]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B87410EA24 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) by tor.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39B9A609D0; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BB4781F000C9; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794843585; bh=aBVLaaMEbF9Ey2fsKvEuSNeb7xIt+ZUOwvu2ALe2SsU=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=ZZMeeioP4xyKcFQu3kqrOonrvZke6lxcgnMRqMFdt9TF85h5+uM8Vn+XpZ2lVWxZZ wYy7Cb0BWcFYAhQuGcir8sK59QiHCttJxveT0K8N6gMe4JFLKS30G5Wh82rakSOOWu nZQ9X6L5RQJpxY9Hb129I/RdYEXD38u09aZy+MMBKqegxrWEXJUXo50jJfTCzl9KE0 uD402FHsQceeywjUj4Hb4Cw2WLu2OoMw5eWntUg5T0kJ/TrCiNupCkQeTy0bD5govw IHT2GjIyQwaR2CtoNGj93FLG8DDhAv/7VQ+5iq5a9yAVLnvrHs/5rL7WH/0bIYXR6y bJedTatNHDkZw== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 13/17] drm/xe/vsec: Support late bind fw information To: "Michael J. Ruhl" , intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org In-Reply-To: <20261116150649.368686-32-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> References: <20261116150649.368686-19-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> <20261116150649.368686-32-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:39:44 +0000 X-BeenThere: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Intel Xe graphics driver List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Sender: "Intel-xe" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 X-Archived-By: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issues to consider: - [Medium] drm/xe/vsec: lock inversion holding pmt.lock in cri_late_bind_probe() - [Medium] drm/xe/vsec: missing pmt.lock during CRI discovery in xe_vsec_init() -- commit 32874c6df8ff2b93eb16e544520f64211460d328 Author: Michael J. Ruhl drm/xe/vsec: Support late bind fw information This commit adds delayed-work polling and synchronous readiness waits so Crescent Island PMT registration and telemetry or crashlog accesses wait for the OOBMSM firmware to finish initializing. > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vsec.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vsec.c > index 4ca41a5ef5027..fe3d8338cfc98 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vsec.c > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vsec.c [ ... ] > @@ -476,6 +549,28 @@ static enum xe_vsec get_platform_info(struct xe_devi= ce *xe) > return vsec_platforms[xe->info.platform]; > } > =20 > +static void cri_late_bind_probe(struct xe_device *xe) > +{ > + struct intel_vsec_platform_info *info; > + struct device *dev =3D xe->drm.dev; > + enum xe_vsec platform; > + > + platform =3D get_platform_info(xe); > + if (platform !=3D XE_VSEC_CRI) > + return; > + > + info =3D &xe_vsec_info[platform]; > + if (!info->headers) > + return; > + > + guard(mutex)(&xe->pmt.lock); > + > + info->priv_data =3D &xe_cri_pmt_cb; > + xe->soc_remapper.set_telem_region(xe, CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISCOVERY); > + > + intel_vsec_register(dev, info); > +} [Severity: Medium] Does holding xe->pmt.lock across intel_vsec_register() introduce a circular locking dependency and potential ABBA deadlock with PMT sysfs attributes? intel_vsec_register() adds the auxiliary device under device_lock(&auxdev->= dev) and synchronously runs pmt_telem_probe(), which acquires ep_lock and creates sysfs attributes for each discovery entry. Reading those attributes enters intel_pmt_read() -> xe_pmt_telem_read() under the kernfs active reference (kn->dep_map) and takes xe->pmt.lock, while unbinding or rolling back on a later entry's probe failure drains kn->dep_map under &auxdev->dev.mutex and ep_lock: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xe->pmt.lock) lock(&auxdev->dev.mutex) lock(&ep_lock) lock(kn->dep_map) lock(&xe->pmt.lock) lock(kn->dep_map) *** DEADLOCK *** CPU0: cri_late_bind_probe() -> intel_vsec_register() -> ... -> pmt_telem_probe() -> pmt_telem_remove() -> sysfs_remove_bin_file() CPU1: kernfs_fop_read_iter() -> intel_pmt_read() -> xe_pmt_telem_read() > =20 > /** > * xe_vsec_init - Initialize resources and add intel_vsec auxiliary > * interface > @@ -503,12 +598,24 @@ void xe_vsec_init(struct xe_device *xe) > =20 > case XE_VSEC_CRI: > xe->pmt.base_offset =3D CRI_PMT_OFFSET; > + > + xe->pmt.retry_count =3D 0; > + INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&xe->pmt.work, cri_late_bind_probe_work); > + > + xe_pm_runtime_get_noresume(xe); > + if (!xe_sysctrl_is_oobmsm_fw_ready(xe)) { > + queue_delayed_work(system_freezable_wq, &xe->pmt.work, > + msecs_to_jiffies(VSEC_LATE_BIND_DELAY_MSEC)); > + return; > + } > + > info->priv_data =3D &xe_cri_pmt_cb; > xe->soc_remapper.set_telem_region(xe, CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISCOVERY); > break; > =20 > default: > - break; > + drm_err(&xe->drm, "Unsupported platform: %u\n", platform); > + return; > } > =20 > /* > @@ -516,5 +623,22 @@ void xe_vsec_init(struct xe_device *xe) > * resources. > */ > intel_vsec_register(dev, info); [Severity: Medium] Can a concurrent telemetry read corrupt the SoC remapper index while intel_vsec_register() is still reading Crescent Island discovery headers? When OOBMSM firmware is already ready in xe_vsec_init(), CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISC= OVERY is programmed and intel_vsec_register() is called without serialization against xe_pmt_telem_read(). Because intel_vsec_register() registers three cri_telemetry entries followed by two cri_crashlog entries, a reader can open the first telemetry sysfs file as soon as entry 0 is created and switch the remapper index away from CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISCOVERY while the remaining headers are still being read from CRI_PMT_OFFSET: CPU0 CPU1 xe_vsec_init() set_telem_region(..., CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISCOVERY) intel_vsec_register() pmt_telem_probe() intel_pmt_dev_create(entry 0) xe_pmt_telem_read() lock(&xe->pmt.lock) set_telem_region(..., mem_region) intel_pmt_dev_create(entry 1) pmt_get_headers() readl(disc_vaddr) <-- reads wrong remapper region memcpy_fromio(...) set_telem_region(..., CRI_IDX_TELEM_DISCOVERY) unlock(&xe->pmt.lock) --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261116150649.3686= 86-19-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com?part=3D13